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SEA HARRIER FRS MK.1

Near dusk on 8 May 1980, two Argentine Air Force Mirage fighters were shot down by Royal Navy Sea Harriers. The Sea Harriers, one each from the Invincible and Hermes, scored their kills within 20 minutes of each other. It was the pilot from Invincible's 801 Squadron who claimed the first air victory of the Falklands War and had the honor of drawing first blood in the Harrier, "I saw my missile (AIM-9L Sidewinder) hit the back of the enemy aircraft and it exploded...just as advertised!" Later that same evening a third Argentine aircraft, this time a Camberra bomber, was shot down by another Harrier from 801 Squadron.

The American made AIM-9L Sidewinder, carried on the outboard pylons of the Sea Harrier proved their technological worth in these limited air engagements. During one of the most spectacular battles, four Mirage fighters were shot down with only three Sidewinders, fired from only two Sea Harriers. Sweeping in low over the islands to attack British ships during the Port Darwin and Goose Green actions, the four Argentine Mirages were met by the only two Harriers available to counter the attack. The lead Harrier fired his first Sidewinder and then his second; each missile found a Mirage. Simultaneously the second Sea Harrier fired his first Sidewinder, it also found a Mirage, but before the pilot could launch his second missile the fourth Mirage, trying to escape an almost certain fate, banked into the debris of the other Mirages and went down.

By Wars end in mid June, between 100 and 105 Argentine aircraft and helicopters had been destroyed. Of this number, according to a Ministry of Defense official, neary two-thirds are claimed and credited to Harriers. The final accounting of the Harrier's role in the Falklands fighting will no doubt be determined in detail by future historians, for the present suffice to say...The Harrier proved its worth!

Paul Jackson, in an excellent article on the Harrier, points out that "After its versatility, the most remarkable aspect of the Sea Harrier is the length of time taken to adapt the basic Harrier design for naval strike operations." Carrier trial after carrier trial has been conducted, no less that 24 separate tests, beginning with the P.1127 XP831 prototype landing on the HMS Ark Royal in February 1963. The results were always the same — outstanding! However, little official interest was forthcoming from the Royal Navy and



The new FRS MK.1 cockpit, raised 11 inches higher than the GR 3 and with a new bubbled canopy provides much improved all-around visibility for the pilot including much needed improvement in downward visibility. To reduce length for shipboard storage the pilot tube was moved from the tip of the nose to a position above the nose overlapping the nose cone. (British Aerospace)

The initial production Sea Harrier, XZ450, demonstrates VIFFing (thrust Vectoring in Forward Flight) over the English countryside. Note the downward position of the forward port exhaust nozzle. XZ438-440, the first three aircraft scheduled to be built were designated as prototypes, however, on 20 August 1978, XZ450, the first production machine was in fact the first Sea Harrier to take to the air, XZ438, designated the first prototype, did not fly until year's end. (British Aerospace)



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

The business end of the FRS MK.1 Sea Harrier provides an excellent view of the large air intakes needed for V/STOL. Except for the huge intakes the Harrier is an exceptionally sleek design. (British Aerospace)

(Below) The rugged landing gear of the Harrier required no modification for carrier use other than the addition of tie down lugs and an emergency brake system. The main and nose wheel doors remain closed except when the landing gear is lowering or retracting or being serviced. The nose cone and pitot tube will fold open to the port to provide easy servicing and a 5.3 ft. reduction in length during stowage aboard ship. (British Aerospace)





XZ450, with exhaust nozzles vectored downward, goes into a hover just before landing. The main gear doors are open and the main wheels are beginning to descend, as are the outrigger wheels. (British Aerospace)

other than the ill-fated 1154 project little effort was made toward taking the Harrier to sea. However, the Labour government's cancellation of the 50,000 ton CVA-01 fleet carrier, the 'unacceptable cost' of refitting HMS Eagle for Phantom II operations, and the widening role for shore based maritime aircraft, all created a need for a V/STOL aircraft to operate alongside the helicopter force. The decision was made to reduce the range and capability of the Royal Navy aircraft carrier forces and bring it more in line with Britain's role in NATO. The conventional carriers already in inventory were to be operated until the expiration of their hull life and then be replaced by the new Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Cruisers. These ASW Cruisers or 'through-deck' Cruisers were ideally suited for Harrier V/STOL operations and at a cost that can be more easily afforded by the British government. Considerable impetus to this program was added when the USMC put the Harrier into service. In May of 1975 an order was placed for 24 navalised versions of the Harrier under the designation Sea Harrier FRS MK.1s.

Designed for the Fighter, Reconnaissance and Strike (FRS) roles, the Sea Harrier's first flight was made on 20 August 1978 at Dunsfold and the first delivery was made when XZ451 was delivered to RNAS Yeovilton in 1 June 1979. The Sea Harrier, a derivative of the RAF's GR MK.3, is powered by a navalized version of the 21,500 lb. thrust Pegasus MK 103 under the designation MK 104, and while retaining a 90% commonality with the Gr 3, the cockpit and nose were completely redesigned.

Because of the limited space in the GR 3 cockpit (little has been changed since the P.1127), the additional equipment requirements of the multi-role weapons system brought about a complete revision of the cockpit in order to provide single crew the highest operational efficiency. By raising the pilot seat eleven inches, the cockpit, even with the addition of naval equipment became 'ordered and workable'. The windscreen was raised but unchanged and the GR 3 canopy frame was used with only minor modifications, however the transparency was made a more bubbled shape. Outside dimensions of the cockpit remained the same but the sidewalls were thinned internally to provide additional space. While the new raised seat position provided much improved visibility and somewhat more panel space, a great deal of unpressurized space was provided under the cabin behind the large new nose cone which houses the Blue Fox radar.

While the airframe, engine and mechanical systems of the Sea Harrier may offer a 90% commonality with the GR 3, the avionics package is 90% new. The Ferrnati Blue Fox Nav/Attack system is a heavily modified version of the Sea Spray system used in the Lynx helicopter with extensive up-grading of the air-to-air and air-to-surface modes to meet the Sea Harrier's fighter requirements. The latest Martin-Baker Mk 10 ejection seat with zero-zero capability is installed in the Sea Harrier as well as an automatic pilot. A larger Smith's Head-Up Display (HUD) driven by a 20,000 word digital computer not only generates the HUD symbols but also provides flight path and weapons aiming data. The PWR system mounted in the fin and tail cone is essentially the same as the GR 3. The five weapons pylons have been beefed up and can carry all RAF and USMC stores.

Exposure to the salt laden sea air caused further modification requirements.



XZ450, the first Sea Harrier to land on a carrier deck is seen just after recovery on board HMS Hermes. This machine carried out some of the last carrier trials before service introduction of the Sea Harrier. All went well as usual. (HMS Hermes)

Aluminium replaced corrosive prone magnesium parts in both the Pegasus MK 104 engine and in the airframe. A new coat of anti-corrosive extra Dark Sea Grey over White paint was applied. Tie down lugs were added to the undercarriage which was otherwise unchanged, except for the addition of an emergency brake system. The engine received an enhanced water injection system to aid in high weight approaches and recoveries, and improvements were made to the V/STOL handling system for extra stability during turbulence at sea landings.

Developed from an idea presented by Lt. Cmdr Douglas Taylor RN, the ski jump is having a tremendous effect on Sea Harrier operational performance. Land based Harriers had already proven the usefulness of short rolling take-offs which increases the range and payload by decreasing fuel consumption during take-off. By providing a 7 degree raised ramp from which the Harrier can be launched with its nozzles in a downward position; the aircraft gathers upward velocity without using the large quantities of fuel consumed during a normal vertical take-off. The ASW Cruisers Invincible and Illustrious carry ski ramps of 7 degrees, while the Ark Royal and re-built Hermes will have 12 degree ramps and experiments are being conducted on using a 20 degree ramp. To help train naval pilots a ski ramp was installed at Yeovilton, becoming operational in February 1981. RAF pilots, flying GR 3s, trained on the Yeovilton ski ramp prior to their departure for the Falklands.

On 26 May 1979 Fleet Air Arm formed an Intensive Flying Trials Unit (IFTU) to begin working the Sea Harrier into Fleet service. Based at Yeovilton which was designated the Harrier home base, the first aircraft was delivered on 18 June 1979 and was coded 100/VL. On 19 September the IFTU was redesignated No.700A Squadron, and after finishing work-up it was redesignated No.899 Squadron on 31 March 1980. Also on 31 March 1980 No. 800 Squadron was established with aircraft coded 250/N, and almost immediately did a tour of duty on the HMS Invincible. Returning to Yeovilton No. 800 Squadron was re-assigned to HMS Hermes and their aircraft were recoded 123/H. No.801 Squadron, commissioned on 26 February 1981, was also assigned to the Commando Carrier Hermes with its aircraft carrying the codes 001/N. No.802 Squadron was to be the third and last of the Royal Navy's Harrier Squadrons, however, war breaking out in the Falklands altered the squadron commissioning schedule and No.809 was unexpectedly commissioned during April 1982 at Yeovilton, leaving 802 still uncommissioned at this writing. No.809 with its aircraft painted in a new overall low visibility semi-matt medium Sea Grey with lower wing surfaces of Barley Grey (Mixed Grey), and new low visibility roundels was immediately sent to the Falklands.

An export order of six single seat Sea Harriers under the export designation FRS MK.51 and two T MK.60 trainers were ordered by India to replace the Hawker Sea Hawks aboard the aircraft carrier Vikerant. To be delivered in late 1982, they will serve with No.306 Squadron. Unlike the Royal Navy, who fly RAF T MK.4 trainers (even painted in the RAF paint scheme), the Indian two seaters have the Sea Harrier cockpit arrangement and nose, the T MK.60 carries most of the Nav/Attack system but not the radar.



No. 700A Squadron (formerly the IFTU) conducted sea trials aboard the Hermes. 101/VL, with its nozzles pointing to the rear prepares for a short rolling take-off. Note that the dive brake is in the open position. (HMS Hermes)

The addition of the tie down lugs allows the Sea Harrier to be lashed to the carrier deck. The glossy extra dark Sea Grey over glossy White is very reflective in the bright morning sunlight. (HMS Hermes)





When the IFTU became No.700A Squadron they adopted a Grey hovering hawk superimposed on a Red A outlined in White, as the squadron emblem. The landing machine in the background is carrying Sidewinder missiles on the outboard pylons. (HMS Hermes)

As one Sea Harrier comes in for a landing, others prepare to take off. The ability to operate in low visibility conditions, such as on this foggy day, was one of the Royal Navy's requirements of the Sea Harrier. (HMS Hermes)

Formed on 31 March 1980, 800 Squadron was the first operational Sea Harrier squadron. The squadron emblem on the tail is Red with White trim, the crossed swords and trident are in Gold. With their aircraft coded 250/N No. 800 did a tour of duty aboard the Invincible, upon the squadron's return to Yeovilton, the unit was reassigned to the Hermes and their aircraft were recoded 123/H. Unlike the other squadrons, which carry their aircraft codes on the nose, No. 800 Squadron carries the codes on the air intake. (Lindsay Peacock)

After finishing 'squadron workup' No.700A Squadron was redisignated No.899 Squadron, becoming the Sea Harrier land based headquarters and training squadron. Upon commissioning, on 22 May 1980, the squadron adopted a White winged fist heavily outlined in Black. (MOD)





100/VL of 899 Headquarters Squadron equipped with 30MM Aden gun pods and 100 gal drop tanks. 899 Squadron has undergone a further code change when the individual aircraft numbers were changed to the 700 block, the tail codes of VL were not altered. (Bruce H. Johnson)

Harrier GR Mk 3 early



Harrier GR Mk 3
late
with Laser nose



Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1







As a negotiated settlement was attempted by Great Britain, HMS Hermes, her deck laden with Sea Harriers and Sea Kings, steams out of Portsmouth in April 1982, heading for the Falklands. (Wide World Photos)



The journey to the South Atlantic Islands held by Argentine troops was spent in training and maintainence, bringing both men and machines to a fine edge, in case they were called upon to go into combat. (Wide World Photos)

(Below) With Sea Kings standing by, a Sea Harrier recovers aboard the Hermes after an attack mission against the airstrip at Port Stanley. Note the empty Sidewinder pylon. (Wide World Photos)

(Below) Black 25 (XZ2459) of 899 Squadron on the deck of the Hermes. All squadron markings have been removed to provide the Argentines with as little intelligence as possible. The usual glossy Dark Sea Grey has been extended to the lower fuselage surfaces and has become very dull with weathering. (Stephen Wolf-Flightlines International)





Black 77 (ZA177) is a Sea Harrier FRS Mk.1 of 809 Squadron, which was hastily formed and immediately added to the Falklands task force. 809 Squadron aircraft were painted in the new low visibility scheme of light Grey with low visibility markings. (Stephen Wolf-Flightlines International)

Painted in the low visibility scheme, Black 94 carries a single Mirage kill marking just above the Light Blue roundel. (HMS Heron via Jerry Scutts)



Returning to England after the surrender of the Argentine forces and the Island has been secured, 899 Squadron is neatly lined up on the deck of the Hermes on 21 July 1982. (Stephen Wolf-Flightlines International)

Black 14 (XZ2457) carries three kill markings, two Mirages and a Skyhawk. Note the addition of waterproof tape over the canopy seal.(Stephen Wolf-Flightlines International)



CSG 1/28

A Trainer with Bite

– Defence looks at the MB.339A

by Michael J. Gething

One of the side effects of the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands was the need to concentrate a large number of strike aircraft in the Falklands themselves, to compensate for the fact that the British fleet was at the edge of the main strike force's combat radius. The major type involved was the IA.58 Pucará, but alongside these, camouflaged for the occasion, were a number of Aermacchi MB.339A advanced jet trainers with an effective light strike payload. Many (perhaps all) of the ten aircraft delivered were deployed to Port Stanley, and at least one MB.339A achieved fame (or infamy, depending on your viewpoint) as being the aircraft whose rocket caused HMS *Ardent* to be lost in San Carlos Water on 21st May. When *Defence* visited Varese Aermacchi in mid-March, and flew the MB.339 from the company factory and airfield at Venegono, these events were only weeks away. Desk-bound pundits have been advancing the concept of a trainer/light strike concept for several years. The Aermacchi MB.339, flying against a sophisticated air defence, proved it could be done; albeit at a cost only the Argentine and British defence staffs know for sure.





BA/Dornier Alpha Jet, the MB.339 came out of the MB.326, using that type's wing and tail surfaces and an advanced version of its powerplant – the Rolls-Royce Viper. The process of evolution from the MB.326 to the MB.339 and the work behind it is well summarised by the designer, Dr Ing Ermanno Bazzochi, General Manager (Technical) of Aermacchi in his well-known paper 'Military Pilots' Training and its Equipment' presented to the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19th May 1978. It is not our purpose here to tread the same ground, but in one part of the paper, Dr Bazzochi places his design, the MB.339 (M for Macchi, B for Bazzochi) in context with its rivals. Having spoken of the Czech L-39 Albatros and Spanish CASA C-101 Aviojet as being at the lower end of the second-generation and the Franco-German Alpha Jet and British Hawk being at the higher end of the spectrum, he says 'The MB.339 is something in between, combining the low cost and simplicity of the L-39 and CASA C-101 with a performance level approaching the Hawk and Alpha Jet to cover the complete training spectrum at a moderate cost.' While not deriding his rivals in any way, he has put his finger very firmly on the formula which looks as if it is set to repeat the success of the MB.326 series around the world.



Aermacchi MB.339A (I-TOCA, MM54443) in which the author carried out his evaluation.
(Photo : Aermacchi)

Aermacchi first began work on looking for an MB.326 replacement in September 1972, when the Italian Air Force (**Aeronautica Militare Italiana** – AMI) awarded the company a study contract to define the basic principles for the design of a second-generation to replace existing trainers in service. On the basis of the studies presented, the AMI developed its own evaluation which ended in the selection of the Aermacchi MB.339. The first of two prototypes, the MB.339X (I-NOVE) took to the air on its maiden flight on 12th August 1976. The AMI requirement for 100 aircraft crystalised in FY 1978, with an order for 15 MB.339s, followed in FYs 1979 and 1980 with orders for 40 and 45 aircraft respectively. The first production aircraft flew on 20th July 1978, and the first MB.339As were handed over to the AMI for pre-service evaluation on 8th August 1979, and later that year it entered service with the **Scuola di Volo Basico-Iniziale Aviogetti** at Lecce-Galatina in Southern Italy.

The first export orders for the MB.339 came in 1980. In January the Argentine Navy ordered ten aircraft, delivery of which was completed in January 1981. In the middle of the year, Peru placed an order for 14 aircraft (with options on a further two) and the last batch were undergoing final assembly during our visit in March this year. It has since been announced that 66 MB.339s are to be built under licence in that country over the next six years. The most recent success has come in Malaysia, where 12 MB.339s are to be procured to replace the CL-41 Tebuan in service, with options on a further 14.

The author (left) with Aermacchi CTP Franco Bonazzi after the flight. *(Photo : Isa/Defence)*



The MB.339 Described

Although based on the earlier and most successful MB.326 series of trainers and light strike aircraft, the MB.339 is very much a 'new' aeroplane. The structural design criteria is based on MIL-A-8860A, with an 8g load factor limit in 'clean' configuration. It has a service life requirement of 10,000 flying hours and a landing requirement of 20,000 'touch-downs' in the training role. Of stressed-skin construction, the wing has a leading edge sweep of 11° 18' with a single main spar and auxiliary rear spar, and is fitted with wingtip fuel tanks (of 69½ Imp gallons, 316 litres, capacity).

The wholly-new fuselage is of all-metal semi-monocoque construction in two main parts : forward (nose to engine-mounting bulkhead) and aft (engine-mounting bulkhead to tailcone), with a four-bolt attachment point to facilitate access to the engine. There is an electrically-controlled, hydraulically-actuated airbrake under the centre-fuselage, just forward of the CG. The two-place tandem cockpit, which is fully pressurised, is equipped with two Martin-Baker IT10F zero-zero ejection seats, with

The tail unit consists of a slightly swept vertical fin and tailplanes, of stressed-skin construction, with the control surfaces each having a dual-purpose, electrically actuated balance and trim tab.

The hydraulically-actuated tricycle undercarriage is fitted with oleo-pneumatic shock-absorbers, suitable for operation from semi-prepared surfaces. The nosewheel is steerable, and hydraulic disc brakes with an anti-skid system are fitted.

The MB.339 is powered by a single Rolls-Royce Viper Mk.632-43 turbojet engine, rated at 4,000lb (1,814kg), built in Italy under licence by Piaggio. Export aircraft, however, are fitted with UK-built engines supplied to Aermacchi. Apart from the two wingtip fuel tanks, there are two fuselage tanks with a 172 Imp gallon (781 litre) capacity, giving the aircraft a total capacity of 311 Imp gallons (1,413 litres) internally. There is also provision for two external fuel tanks on the centre under-wing hardpoints, adding a further 143 Imp gallons (650 litres) of fuel.

For weapons training and the light strike role, up to 4,000lb (1,814kg) of external stores may be carried on the three hardpoints under each wing. The inner four are stressed for loads up to 1,000lb (454kg) each and the outer two for up to 750lb (340kg) each. The variety of stores able to be carried is wide and sample loads are discussed later in respect of the MB.339K Veltro 2 version of the aircraft. There is provision for the Aeritalia 8,105.924 fixed reflector sight,

A sample sortie

The highlight of the author's visit to Aermacchi was a demonstration flight in the MB.339, which on the morning scheduled looked most unlikely because of low cloud in the Venegono area. However, after viewing the production line and a modest lunch (at least by Italian standards), visibility had improved sufficiently for the author to don flying clothing and take a pre-flight brief from Aermacchi Chief Test Pilot, Franco Bonazzi. As Italian pilots appeared to be small of stature and the author larger of girth than the available anti-g suits, he ventured forth without this item of flying clothing and the flight was promised to be 'not too violent' in 'blood-chit' and ventured, like a latter-day Biggles, out to the tarmac to his mount, Aermacchi MB.339A I-TOCA–MM.54443, one of the two aircraft retained by the company for development and demonstration flying.

As CTP Bonazzi completed his external check of the aircraft, the author was strapped into the ejection seat in the rear cockpit and began familiarisation on the cockpit. It was clear and relatively uncluttered, with the blind-flying panel centrally-placed and each section easily identified by system. There is ample space for several customer-specified avionics fits, allowing the aircraft to fit in with equipment already in the user's service. CTP Bonazzi was now installing himself in the forward cockpit, and with bone-dome in place, the ejection seat safety pin removed, we were ready to start-up the Viper.



The first MB.339PAN for the Italian aerobatic team, **Il Frecce Tricolori**. *Note the absence of wingtip tanks (which although supplied, are removed after delivery) and the small underwing tank which contains the coloured oil used to provide display smoke.* *(Photo : Aermacchi)*



AMI maintenance personnel remove a Viper 632 turbojet from one of the MB.339As at Lecce for its routine 300 hour check. *(Photo : Rolls-Royce)*

Once the engine was running, we taxied out to the runway. The control tower gave clearance for take-off, the brakes were taken off and we began to roll. Half way down the runway we lifted off with an indicated air speed (IAS) of 100kt. Climbing away from Venegono we turned towards Lake Maggiore. Under radar control we climbed up to 30,000ft, heading for the work area, just north of Domodossola where CTP Bonazzi began the demonstration with some engine handling. To show there are no limitations, he demonstrated swift changes of throttle level, to which the aircraft responded well. We then dived towards the mountains, reaching M 0.82 at which speed some shaking and buffeting was experienced. Reaching 20,000ft, we attempted some stalls. Being in clean configuration, the stall was reached at 100kt IAS, all the more interesting as our tip tanks were still three-quarters full of fuel. We then repeated the manouevre wheels-down in landing configuration, and the stall occured at 90kt IAS. Each stall was completed with wings level.

Gaining height again we put the aircraft into a left-hand spin. We made three and a half turns before initiating the recovery procedure, which went smoothly. Bonazzi pointed out to the author that the MB.339



The prototype single-seat version of the MB.339, the MB.339K Veltro 2, seen with underwing stores. Note the under-fuselage bulges for the cannon armament, and the appropriate registration, I-BITE. *(Photo : Aermacchi)*

has no spin limitations as far as weight is concerned. It can be spun with underwing stores, or with full fuel in the tip tanks (by now we had two-thirds therein). There is no inherent tendency to spin in the MB.339, and spins have to be initiated. To prove his point, Bonazzi throttled back and we made several stall turns – all very straightforward. The natural tendency of the aircraft is to recover itself from most unusual positions. Again, to demonstrate, we made two aggravated stalls, holding the stick fully back for over ten seconds. The nose rocked and buffeted, but once the back pressure was released, it was enough to break the stall condition. The aircraft accelerated and we were flying once more.

We next headed towards Milan-Malpensa airport, under Milan radar control to join the circuit and make an ILS approach. The system worked perfectly and following a touch-and-go, we climbed out, heading back towards the mountains and our working area. At this stage, Bonazzi handed over control. The MB.339 was a delight to fly. Getting the feel on straight and level, heading (ominously, I thought) towards a mountain, I was instructed to push the throttle fully forward, to which the Viper responded magnificently and immediately. Again, I was instructed to pull right back on the stick, and in no time at all, we had accomplished a passable loop, much to Bonazzi's satisfaction (and my delight). This was followed by several rolls, both to port and starboard, slowly at first as I got the feel of the aircraft, but ending with full aileron deflection flick rolls that might have put me one thousandth in line for Il Frecce Tricolori (or so I kidded myself – even editors are allowed some flights of fancy).

By now we had been in the air just over an hour (it felt like ten minutes) and it was time to return to Venegono. We made our approach, and as we lost height, we gradually throttled back. We made close finals at 105kt IAS, and after one touch-and-go, went round for the last time, touching down at 95kt. for a full-stop landing. We had used just less than half the available runway, and Bonazzi told me a 500m landing run was quite normal. Our return to the hangar was almost an anti-climax. The MB.339 had made a lasting impression.

Looking back on the flight, I can see why the aircraft is proving popular, not only with students, but with the Italian aerobatic team, Il Frecce Tricolori, who had received their first aircraft shortly before my visit – the last MB.339s for the team were in final assembly. The aircraft is responsive, but forgiving; simple to assimilate, yet capable of a degree of sophistication. While perhaps not up to the performance of its British and Franco-German rivals, it is more than capable of performing its tasks well, preparing students for more advanced types in AMI operational service.

The Veltro 2

Sophistication was mentioned earlier, and one step beyond the trainer version of the aircraft, is the MB.339K single seat light strike aircraft. Derived in the same way the single seat MB.326K came out of that trainer series, the Veltro 2 (perpetuating the name of the MC.205V fighter of the Second World War) is a private venture project from Aermacchi.

Apart from a new forward fuselage with single cockpit and twin 30mm DEFA cannon internally mounted in the lower forward internal equipment and avionics changes, relevant to its new role, and should the customer so desire, further capabilities such as a HUD, cockpit TV displays and improved ECM fits can be installed.

The prototype Veltro 2 made its maiden flight on 30th May 1980, and was shown at that year's Farnborough show for the first time. Much interest has been shown in the type, but at the time of writing no firm orders have been announced. An initial production batch was begun in March 1981 against future orders, and we look to this month's Farnborough show for such an announcement.

As mentioned for the MB.339A, a wide range of underwing stores can be carried on the six pylons, and in addition, the Veltro 2 has the two 30mm cannon with 125 rounds per gun. Typical loads include two Matra 550 Magic or two AIM-9 Sidewinder AAMs on the outer two pylons plus four 1,000lb or six 750lb bombs; six Matra 155 rocket launchers, each with 18 x 68mm folding-fin rockets; six Aerea AL-12-80 rocket launchers, each with 12 x 81mm rockets; a photo-reconnaissance pod with four Vinten cameras; an Elettronica ECM pod; or two underwing fuel tanks. Both free-fall and retarded 500lb Mk.82 bombs have been tested, as have Thomson-Brandt 100m anti-runway bombs.

Apart from sales to countries as a pure light strike aircraft, Aermacchi are pushing the Veltro 2's suitability as a continuation weapons trainer to the AMI. The aircraft's designer, Ermanno Bazzochi, told Defence the comparatively low operating costs of the MB.339 mean that some aspects of operational continuation can be performed by the aircraft, with consequent savings. It would allow more hours to be flown by, say, Tornado pilots than would otherwise be possible. Signor Bazzochi also feels that the Veltro 2 could perform a similar role for the F-16. He accepts that it would not (and could not) be a total substitute for a front line aircraft, but feels that the savings made by its use in this role worthy of consideration, as well as offering a useful war role.

Conclusions

While perhaps being slower off the mark than the Hawk or Alpha Jet, the Aermacchi MB.399A is now beginning to carve out a niche for itself in the world market. As well as going to an MB.326 user, it has scored two 'new' customers for Aermacchi in Peru and Malaysia. As an aircraft it is more than capable of performing its tasks, and economically it is attractive. Aermacchi told Defence that, depending on the avionics fit, the flyaway cost of the MB.339A or Veltro 2 is in the region of $3.5 million. The product is good, the price appears to be right and the customers are starting to appear. We think that the MB.399 is set to emulate the success of its predecessor, the MB.326. ■

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Rivista Italiana Difesa
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

Alcune unità della Task Force inglese alla fonda nell'Isola di Ascensione. Si distinguono la nave d'assalto anfibio (LPD) FEARLESS (in primo piano), la nave da crociera CANBERRA della P&O e 5 navi da sbarco (LST) della classe SIR.

Ugo Mazza

Falkland / Malvinas

A cose finite e passata l'onda emotiva, il conflitto delle Falkland che ha opposto due paesi appartenenti allo stesso schieramento geo strategico, quello occidentale, appare sempre più un avvenimento anacronistico ed inutile.

Una guerra provocata da giochi di politica interna ed attizzata da pericolosi rigurgiti di orgoglio e nazionalismo che sembravano essersi ormai sopiti con lo sviluppo delle relazioni umane e, soprattutto, senza che in realtà siano stati in gioco interessi vitali di nessuno dei due Paesi.

Qualcuno ha scritto che si è trattato di una guerra «preterintenzionale» basata da entrambe le parti su erronee valutazioni delle reazioni avversarie, a cui sono da aggiungere i caratteri dei due governi interessati — entrambi conservatori, anche se fortemente diversi — che hanno fatto delle questioni di onore e di principio i cardini saldi della loro condotta.

Qualcun altro, altrettanto giustamente, si è trattato dell'ultima (speriamo) guerra dell'800, quando i conflitti avvenivano per la caparbietà di due regnanti e si inviavano al di là del mare flotte di cannoniere a salvare l'orgoglio nazionale.

La giunta militare argentina si è cacciata in un'impresa dissennata quale ultimo diversivo rispetto al clamoroso fallimento economico del paese ed alla crescente marea di proteste e insoddisfazioni, sperando di cogliere il consenso popolare con la facile occupazione militare di un arcipelago indifeso rivendicato da oltre un secolo, illudendosi che il fatto compiuto — prima o poi — sarebbe stato accettato dagli inglesi come d'altra parte da decenni gli occidentali accettavano atti del genere nelle liquidazioni dei loro imperi coloniali.

La Gran Bretagna — che peraltro aveva preso in giro gli argentini per anni facendo finta di condurre trattative circa le loro rivendicazioni sulle isole — di fronte ad un innegabile sopruso rispolverava un nazionalismo degno del miglior Churchill e un orgoglio vagamente imperiale, puntando sulla durezza della risposta per ridurre l'avversario a più miti consigli.

A quel punto nessuno dei due paesi credeva ancora allo scontro, ma una volta messa in moto, l'efficientissima macchina bellica inglese ha lasciato sempre meno margini all'azione politica, procedendo diritta verso il suo obiettivo: riprendere le Falkland.

Così, mentre le iniziative diplomatiche segnavano il passo, quelle militari avevano una veloce escalation, allontanando ogni possibile soluzione negoziabile.

La South Georgia veniva riconquistata mentre Haig stava ancora trattando con gli argentini, l'Incrociatore Belgrano veniva affondato, mentre il Presidente del Perù presentava un suo piano di pace e, i SEA HARRIER bombardavano Port Stanley mentre il Segretario Generale dell'ONU conduceva la sua opera di mediazione.

La diplomazia ed in particolare le grandi organizzazioni internazionali, l'ONU, l'OSA, hanno fatto una ben misera figura mostrandosi al massimo capaci di vuoti documenti o appelli alla pace.

Ma il relitto più illustre che oggi giace sul fondo del Sud Atlantico, è il prestigio degli Stati Uniti affondato da una politica estera contraddittoria e dilettantistica.

In primo luogo, Washington si è lasciata sorprendere dagli eventi nella regione dove la sua sfera di influenza è maggiore, secondo, non è stata in grado di utilizzare la sua autorità per dividere i contendenti o evitarne lo scontro, terzo, la scelta di campo tardiva ed intempestiva non è stata determinante per gli inglesi ma è suonata per gli argentini come un tradimento premeditato e soprattutto è stata sufficiente per alienare tutte le simpatie degli stati latino americani.

Gli Stati del continente afflitti da storiche rivalità hanno ritrovato solidarietà e concordia nella reazione alla decisione americana; uomini di destra e sinistra, di ogni tendenza si sono trovati affratellati nella crociata anti-yankee che ha fatto facile leva su sentimenti popolari molto diffusi in Sud America.

Non è stato l'invio della Task Force inglese, quanto il voltafaccia americano, alla dottrina di Monroe, al trattato di Rio, ai dettati dell'OSA che ha causato i guasti politici maggiori e che difficilmente il tempo potrà sanare.

Lo dimostra il fatto che ad un paio di mesi di distanza le sanzioni sono state levate, i paesi CEE e la stessa Gran Bretagna hanno ripreso i loro rapporti con i paesi latino americani, mentre sono ancora molto freddi quelli con gli Stati Uniti.

Il Presidente del Venezuela, Herrera Campin, ha dichiarato che l'America Latina non sarà più la stessa dopo tale evento ed il Presidente di Panama, Royo, ha scritto che il conflitto anglo-argentino, dopo la decisione americana, ha cessato di essere un problema bilaterale interessando tutti i paesi dell'area e mettendo a dura prova i principi e la prassi su cui si regge il sistema interamericano.

Reazioni e prese di posizione altrettanto dure sono venute da tutti i paesi della regione — con l'eccezione del Cile — creando intorno agli USA un isolamento senza precedenti.

In maniera del tutto imprevista il conflitto si è traformato in un pericoloso e falso confronto Nord-Sud, tra paesi capitalisti e sfruttatori da una parte e, dall'altra, paesi in via di sviluppo in lotta per la loro libertà e dignità nazionale contro un tentativo di restaurazione coloniale. Che poi la Gran Bretagna sia la più antica democrazia del mondo e che le Falkland siano abitate solo da cittadini britannici, che l'Argentina sia il paese dei 12.000 «deparecidos» e che generalmente libertà e democrazia non sono piante che allignino facilmente nel Centro e Sud America è tutta un'altra cosa.

Il risultato immediato è stato uno spostamento di quegli stati su posizioni di non allineamento, con adesioni di alcuni a tale movimento, con la partecipazione del Ministro degli Esteri argentino Costa Mendez alla conferenza di Cuba, il rifiuto di partecipare ad esercitazioni con gli USA e così via.

A più lungo termine, se tale atteggiamento verrà mantenuto potrebbero crearsi pericolose incognite sul piano strategico.

L'appartenenza all'area occidentale dei paesi sud americani è sempre stato uno dei presupposti della politica di sicurezza degli USA e della stessa NATO; ultimamente l'apparizione di unità sovietiche nell'Atlantico del Sud e la concessione ai russi di basi in Angola, aveva spinto Washington a riesumare l'idea di una alleanza militare sul tipo della NATO che riunisse oltre agli USA anche Brasile, Argentina e forse il Sud Africa.

Gli interessati accolsero tiepidamente l'idea, che peraltro rispecchiava una certa preoccupazione militare degli Stati Uniti verso l'area sud Atlantica e, soprattutto, l'esigenza di una maggiore integrazione e cooperazione.

Ora, a parte il problema militare, Washington dovrà recuperare anche sul piano politico prima che l'URSS ne approfitti per estendere la sua influenza con il rischio di una profonda destabilizzazione dell'intero continente e una crescente minaccia per la pace mondiale.

Anche se può sembrare assurdo, le maggiori opportunità politiche sembrano essere per quell'Europa schieratasi compatta e solidale con la Gran Bretagna in quanto ad essa i paesi del subcontinente guardano come ad un interlocutore alternativo e disponibile ad un dialogo paritetico.

Del resto la Gran Bretagna e per assimilazione l'Europa ha conquistato ai loro occhi — e nonostante la fortissima solidarietà con l'Argentina — un prestigio ed una credibilità che si ritenevano scomparsi: in primo luogo perchè gli inglesi hanno reagito e combattuto con determinazione, non accettando passivamente un sorpruso ed in secondo luogo perchè lo hanno fatto bene dimostrando un'efficienza ed una preparazione che ha lasciato stupiti tutti.

Chances speciali in questo quadro sta avendo l'Italia la cui decisione, in sede CEE, di astenersi dal rinnovare l'embargo totale nei confronti dell'Argentina è stato molto apprezzato nel subcontinente, rimanendo di conseguenza il prezioso punto di contatto per riprendere i rapporti tra Europa e Sud America.

È stato quindi quello del Ministero degli Esteri italiano, Colombo, il primo viaggio ufficiale di un uomo di stato europeo nell'America Latina del dopo Falkland per ricucire strappi e rotture da una parte e dall'altra.

Inoltre sarà determinante l'atteggiamento che terranno gli stati europei nei confronti della pesante crisi economica e finanziaria che ha colpito quegli stati — in particolare Messico, Argentina e Brasile, — le cui economie sono state travolte da un grave indebitamento estero soprattutto verso banche europee e USA.

Tuttavia oltre alla disponibilità e comprensione europea, l'emancipazione degli stati sud americani e la sicurezza dell'Atlantico meridionale potrà solo avvenire attraverso un reale ed armonioso sviluppo interno che faccia definitivamente scomparire avventurismi politici — come quello argentino nelle Falkland — per coprire malefatte di giunte militari o del dittatore di turno.

Se così sarà, tremila vite non saranno state spese invano.

CONSIDERAZIONI SULLE OPERAZIONI

Il 15 Giugno con la resa delle forze argentine si concludeva il conflitto delle Falkland ed iniziava la fase delle riflessioni e delle considerazioni su ciò che tali eventi hanno significato tecnicamente e su quali conseguenze potranno avere nel settore navale sia sul piano dei concetti operativi, sia su quello più strettamente tecnico-industriale.
Vi sono stati i maggiori scontri aeronavali dall'epoca della seconda guerra mondiale e dopo molti anni si è tentata un'operazione anfibia su larga scala in zone di prevedibile forte contrasto aeronavale avversario; ma soprattutto sono stati impiegati in situazioni reali i più avanzati sistemi d'arma ed elettronici ed i più moderni mezzi aerei, navali e terrestri.
Lo stato dell'arte della tecnologia militare occidentale si è trovato di fronte ad un'improvvisa e dura verifica e, come la guerra del Kippur nel 1973 modificò sostanzialmente i concetti di guerra terrestre ed aeroterrestre, così il conflitto della Falkland avrà notevole influenza sull'evoluzione dei mezzi navali e sui loro criteri d'impiego.
La geografia è stato il fattore strategico di questo conflitto determinandone il carattere navale, la composizione delle forze ed i criteri di impiego.
Per gli argentini, le Falkland sono minimo a 300 miglia, mentre per gli inglesi sono a 7.500 miglia da casa ed a 3.500 dall'isola di Ascensione mentre la prima base operativa ottenibile era l'isola di South Georgia, pur sempre a 800 miglia di distanza.
Al di là delle polemiche sulle perdite e sulla validità dello strumento navale, resta il fatto che soprattutto da parte inglese si è trattato di un'operazione di notevole impegno con l'impiego di circa 100 navi e 27.000 uomini in condizioni meteo e climatiche avverse.
Normalmente per il buon esito di un'operazione navale di questo genere si richiedono alcuni presupposti:
- la riservatezza sulla consistenza della Forza da Sbarco;
- la sorpresa circa il luogo e la data dello sbarco;
- l'assoluto predominio navale ed aereo nella zona di operazioni.

«Task Force» ha dovuto invece affrontare l'operazione in una situazione del tutto anomala, in quanto:
- la determinazione delle forze disponibili per lo sbarco era estremamente semplice;
- il luogo dello sbarco era facilmente ipotizzabile data la inclemenza della stagione e quindi l'estrema precarietà di scelte di zone di mare non protette naturalmente come il Flakland Sound;



Un mezzo da sbarco, impiegato nel trasporto di Royal Marines, si avvia verso la costa approfittando di un momento di pausa negli attacchi degli aerei argentini. Sullo sfondo una nave rifornimento della classe FORT GRANGE.

- la data dello sbarco, subordinata in un primo tempo alla durata del trasferimento di uomini e materiali e successivamente ai vari condizionamenti politici, era facilmente individuabile;
- alla indiscussa superiorità navale, amplificata anche nel corso dell'operazione «dall'abbandono» della flotta avversaria rimasta chiusa nei porti, si contrapponeva una situazione di contrasto aereo favorevole all'avversario a causa delle limitazioni in quantità e qualità degli aerei imbarcati disponibili.

Si è avuta dunque una netta differenziazione tra i concetti di «sea denial» e di «sea control» sino ad ora reputati strettamente correlati: gli inglesi hanno ottenuto il primo, come teorizzato da Mahan ad un costo relativamente basso, grazie al deterrente costituito dai smg. atomici, mentre per ottenere il secondo, il costo è stato molto più alto a causa di un predominio aereo ottenuto solo parzialmente.
Come gli argentini avevano sottovalutato la reazione britannica invadendo le isole, così gli inglesi avevano sottovalutato la capacità offensiva delle forze aeree argentine, per cui la Task Force si è trovata a fronteggiare una minaccia di notevoli dimensioni e pericolosità sia in rapporto alla componente imbarcata disponibile sia alla capacità di autodifesa delle unità i cui sistemi d'arma, come vedremo in seguito, non erano assolutamente adeguati.
Osservando nel dettaglio le operazioni navali si rileva che quelle della Marina Argentina sono state soprattutto limitate alla fase dell'occupazione delle isole (2 - 4 aprile) che ha impegnato buona parte della squadra.
I piloti argentini oltre a rivelare un addestramento di prim'ordine hanno mostrato una determinazione ed uno sprezzo del pericolo nel condurre i loro attacchi, spesso con scarsissime possibilità di ritorno, che ha stupito gli stessi avversari.
Dopo la dichiarazione di blocco e l'affondamento dell'incrociatore GENERAL BELGRANO ad opera del smg. nuclerare CONQUEROR (2 Maggio) le navi argentine sono rimaste nei loro porti venendo a mancare il previsto confronto tra le due marine; altre azioni sporadiche hanno riguardato tentativi di rifornimento delle truppe nelle isole, alcuni dei quali andati a buon fine ed altri intercettati da navi o aerei inglesi.
Per quanto riguarda però le operazioni svolte dai sommergibili, va messo in evidenza che, dopo la distruzione del SANTA FE nella Baia di Gritvyken da parte di 2 elicotteri nel corso della riconquista della South Georgia, gli argentini sfiorano il colpo grosso il 5 maggio. In quella data infatti il sottomarino d'attacco SAN LUIS (Tipo 209 di co-

Un elicottero Aérospatiale SA-330 PUMA impiegato dagli argentini. Subito dietro di scorge la coda di un aereo antiguerriglia / appoggio tattico PUCARA

Un elicottero Boeing CH-47 C CHINOOK appartenente alle Forze Armate argentine impegnato nelle operazioni di occupazione delle isole.



Attività operativa a bordo dell'HMS HERMES.

struzione tedesca; l'unità gemella SALTA si trova ai lavori e non potrà prendere il mare per tutta la durata del conflitto) che da diversi giorni seguiva in immersione la task force inglese, riesce a forzare lo sbarramento difensivo AS, si porta all'interno della formazione e attacca l'INVINCIBLE con quattro siluri. Due delle armi colpiscono il bersaglio, ma per ragioni non accertate non esplodono. Immediatamente si scatena la reazione inglese, condotta da unità di superficie e da elicotteri: ma dopo ben 72 ore (!) di caccia AS continua, il SAN LUIS riesce a rompere il contatto e a rientrare in porto indenne.

Rinunciando all'azione navale di superficie, i comandi argentini hanno puntato tutto nei settori ove potevano vantare un favorevole rapporto di forze: quello aereo e terrestre; inoltre presumevano l'impossibilità per gli inglesi di sostenere a lungo uno sforzo logistico così complesso e ad una così forte distanza dalle proprie basi.

Come si è visto molti calcoli e molte decisioni si sono dimostrati sbagliati: gli inglesi non solo sono riusciti a reggere lo sforzo logistico ma anche a sbarcare 9.000 uomini la cui esperienza e capacità hanno trovato l'unico vero ostacolo nella natura del terreno e non nelle truppe avversarie.

L'offensiva aerea, anche se condotta ai limiti dell'autonomia dei velivoli, ha provocato gravi danni alla Task Force ma a caro prezzo — circa 67 aerei abbattuti e non si sa quanti precipitati sulla via del ritorno e tuttavia ciò non ha influito sugli sbarchi: tra l'altro risulta singolare la decisione argentina di dare la priorità negli attacchi alle unità da guerra, piuttosto che alle navi trasporto truppe o a quelle da sbarco.

L'azione britannica si è basata invece soprattutto su operazioni navali ed in tale ottica il conflitto risulta ricco di aspetti ed elementi di valutazione.

Le operazioni, prima di ogni altra cosa, sono state condizionate sul piano strategico dalla mancanza di grandi portaerei convenzionali e di un efficace sistema di allarme lontano (A.E.W.).

Senza tali portaerei non è stato possibile creare sulla Task Force un efficace ombrello di intercettori in grado di ingaggiare a lunga distanza gli aerei attaccanti; la mancanza di un sistema A.E.W. ha costretto a distaccare in permanenza unità in funzioni di picchetto radar, rendendole — come è accaduto per i DDG SHEFFIELD e COVENTRY — particolarmente esposte alla minaccia avversaria.

In un ruolo non proprio adatto, le HARRIER Carrier hanno mostrato i loro limiti, tra l'altro gli aerei imbarcati — 42 — avevano grossi problemi di spazio sulle due portaerei, tanto che di notte parte andavano a stazionare sulla nave porta container ATLANTIC CONVEYOR prima di poter usufruire dell'aereoporto di Goose Green.

I SEA HARRIER della Royal Navy e gli HARRIER della RAF si sono comportati egregiamente con un indice di disponibilità dell'80% e con ottimi risultati in combattimento, accreditandosi 37 vittorie — oltre la metà degli abbattimenti di aerei argentini — grazie alle loro doti di manovrabilità derivantigli dal sistema di propulsione, contro solo 10 aerei perduti e nessuno dei quali in combattimento con altri aerei.

Tuttavia anche loro hanno messo in luce gravi limitazioni, come il carico bellico, la velocità e soprattutto l'autonomia che imponeva un continuo ritorno alle portaerei costringendo i piloti ad un ritmo massacrante di missioni; inoltre la disponibilità di aerei per le missioni di intercettazione e di pattugliamento è andata diminuendo con l'aumentare delle missioni di supporto tattico a favore delle truppe a terra.

Una corvetta argentina della classe DRUMMOND (tipo A-69 francese) all'ancora nelle Falkland orientali. Notare a poppa il complesso binato Breda da 40/70 mm e 4 missili mare/mare MM-38 EXOCET a centro nave.



LE NAVI:

Ad un giornalista che chiedeva un'opinione sull'esito del conflitto, l'Amm. Woodward rispose «dipende se finiscono prima le navi a noi o gli aerei agli argentini..»

Le navi dunque sono state il perno dell'azione della Task Force e sulle navi si sono rivolte critiche e considerazioni, a volte esatte, più spesso dettate dall'emotività.

Non riteniamo che le Falkland abbiano posto un punto interrogativo sul futuro delle navi da guerra di superficie — anzi, forse il contrario — tuttavia è altrettanto vero che le lezioni sono state molte, dimostrando l'inadeguatezza di alcuni concetti e la validità di altri, ma soprattutto come l'evoluzione tecnologica renda sempre più serrati i tempi ed i modi dell'eterna lotta tra la spada e lo scudo.

Una volta una nave nasceva e moriva con lo stesso armamento; oggi il sistema d'arma deve essere aggiornato ogni sei - otto anni pena l'obsolescenza. Ma, mentre è possibile aggiornare l'armamento di una nave nel corso della sua vita, appare pressochè impossibile apportare concrete modifiche agli scafi per adeguarli allo sviluppo delle offese, per cui le navi, a differenza degli aerei che vengono completamente sostituiti per il loro stesso criterio costruttivo, mal si sono adattate a questo continuo sviluppo; inoltre per la mancanza di verifiche «sul campo», da alcuni decenni, l'evoluzione della tecnologia navale si è basata soprattutto su teorie.

Attualmente, in qualsiasi Marina ben poche sono le navi realmente up to date, quelle in grado di affrontare qualsiasi minaccia; tutte le altre, calcolando che la vita di una nave da guerra è di circa 20-25 anni, sono parzialmente obsolete o comunque rischiano molto se buttate improvvisamente in un teatro di guerra moderna.

Se a questo si aggiungono i problemi economici del tempo di pace, i tagli di bilancio che precludono il ritmo normale di rinnovamento, o riducono la consistenza anche a di sotto del minimo di operatività, abbiamo il quadro della Royal Navy, prima del conflitto.

Il Governo Britannico che aveva puntato tutto sul deterrente nucleare subacqueo decidendo di smantellare la propria flotta convenzionale, si è trovato ad affrontare una guerra convenzionale e le perdite sono state soprattutto il frutto più di lontane scelte politiche che di immediati errori strategici o tattici.

Ma poteva andare peggio: se Buenos Aires avesse aspettato un solo anno, la Royal Navy sarebbe stata senza la INVINCIBLE, venduta alla Australia e senza un buon numero di DDG, fregate, navi da sbarco e logistiche, radiate o vendute, mentre l'Argentina avrebbe avuto in servizio tutti i SUPER ETENDARD, i missili AM.39 EXOCET e, forse, i nuovi smg. tedeschi Tyssen.

Considerata la mancanza di elementi sul comportamento delle navi argentine, l'affondamento al di fuori della zona di blocco del GENERAL BELGRANO, un incrociatore costruito nel 1939 relegato a compiti di nave scuola, è più da considerarsi una discutibile operazione punitiva che un'azione di guerra. Esaminiamo alla luce dei fatti il rendimento delle navi inglesi ed in particolare:

— la piattaforma
— il sistema d'arma.

Per quanto riguarda la piattaforma, le navi da guerra, soprattutto i DDG e le fregate,

hanno mostrato buone caratteristiche di tenuta al mare, abitabilità, autonomia, affidabilità dei sistemi di propulsione anche se sottoposti a sollecitazioni di operazioni così lunghe e complesse, hanno rivelato una certa fragilità delle strutture anche a fronte di danneggiamenti non gravi.
Per le portaerei non abbiamo elementi di giudizio in quanto essendo sempre tenute al di fuori dalle zone di rischio di attacco aereo non sono state mai impegnate direttamente o hanno riportato danni.
In un periodo di sistemi offensivi o difensivi «assoluti» la consistenza della piattaforma, la sua capacità di incassare e la sua possibilità di sopravvivere sono risultate pericolosamente sottodimensionate.
Una compartimentazione certo non memore delle esperienze della seconda guerra mondiale, l'abbandono di ogni forma di corazzatura e l'uso esteso di leghe leggere al posto dell'acciaio sono elementi che hanno contrassegnato le costruzioni navali militari degli ultimi vent'anni in tutto il mondo ma che ora con il senno di poi sembrano assurdi.
Quando a bordo scoppiava un incendio, quasi sempre si è rivelato indomabile: le stesse strutture in lega di alluminio alimentavano il fuoco e si squagliavano a 600 gradi rendendo impossibile ogni tentativo di iso-

COMPOSIZIONE DELLA TASK FORCE INGLESE

Portaerei (V/STOL)	HERMES*, INVINCIBLE*[1]
Caccia (DDG) Type 42 (classe SHEFFIELD)	SHEFFIELD*[2], GLASGOW*[3], COVENTRY*[4], EXETER, SOUTHAMPTON, LIVERPOOL
Caccia (DDG) Type 82 (classe BRISTOL)	BRISTOL
Caccia (DDG) classe COUNTY	ANTRIM*[5], GLAMORGAN*[6]
Fregate Type 22 (classe BROADSWORD)	BROADSWORD*[7], BRILLIANT*[8], BATTLEAXE
Fregate Type 21 (classe AMAZON)	ARDENT*, ARROW*[10], ALACRITY*[11], ANTELOPE*[12], AVENGER*, AMBUSCADE
Fregate classe LEANDER	AURORA, DIDO, EURYALUS, ANDROMEDA, PENELOPE, MINERVA, ARGONAUT
Fregate classe ROTHESAY	PLUMOUTH*[13], RHYL, YARMOUTH*
* Sottomarini nucleari (SSN) classe SWIFTSURE	SPLENDID*, SCEPTRE, SPARTAN*
Sottomarino nucleare (SSN) classe CHURCHILL	CONQUEROR*[14]
Navi d'assalto anfibio (LPD)	FEARLESS*, INTREPID
Navi da sbarco (LST) classe SIR	SIR GERAINT*, SIR GALAHAD*[15], SIR BEDIVERE*, SIR PERCIVAL*, SIR TRISTRAM*[16], SIR LANCELOT*
Petroliere di squadra	TIDESPRING*, BLUE ROVER, GREY ROVER, PEARLEAF*, PLUMLEAF, APPLELEAF*, OLMEDA*
Rifornitori di squadra	FORTH AUSTIN*, RESOURCE*, STROMNESS*
Navi ausiliarie	ENDURANCE, HYDRA, HECATE, HECLA

Inoltre circa 60 navi mercantili requisite o noleggiate
* pare che altri 2 SSN abbiamo raggiunto la zona delle operazioni
* **partite il 5 aprile**

Le unità in nero sono quelle affondate

1) INVINCIBLE:
il 5 maggio viene colpita da 2 siluri, che non esplodono, lanciati dal sottomarino argentino SAN LOUIS (tipo 209 tedesco)
2) SHEFFIELD:
il 4 maggio, mentre si trova in missione di picchetto radar circa 20-30 miglia più verso costa rispetto al grosso della Task Force, è scoperto da un Grumman TRACKER argentino. Tre SUPER ETENDARD della Marina argentina decollano da Rio Gallegos e, guidati dal ricognitore e riforniti in volo, si portano verso lo SHEFFIELD. Alle 12,30 due dei SUPER ETENDARD riescono a portarsi a distanza di lancio e da circa 20 miglia nautiche, lanciano 2 missili AM-39 EXOCET. Uno dei missili colpisce la nave circa 2 m sopra il galleggiamento, tra la COC e la sala macchine anteriore, senza esplodere ma provocando un violento incendio, interrompendo l'erogazione di energia e le comunicazioni interne. L'incendio si propaga a tutta la parte centrale della nave e alle 16 giunge a minacciare i depositi dei missili SEA DART. La nave viene abbandonata. Affonderà il 10 maggio dopo il fallimento dei tentativi di rimorchio.
3) GLASGOW:
attaccato il 12 maggio alle 13,30 circa da 3 A-4 SKYHAWK che volano a pelo d'acqua scortati da MIRAGE / DAGGER mentre era intento a bombardare Port Stanley sotto la protezione della fregata BROADSWORD. Due degli SKYHAWK vengono abbattuti dai missili SEAWOLF della BROADSWORD mentre il terzo precipita in mare per una errata manovra. Dopo pochi minuti l'attacco viene ripetuto da una seconda ondata di SKYHAWK: il GLASGOW viene colpito da una bomba da 500 kg che fa «piastrella» sull'acqua e attraversa lo scafo da parte a parte appena sopra il galleggiamento senza esplodere. L'impatto provoca un'interruzione di energia che paralizza la nave per alcuni minuti.
4) COVENTRY:
nelle prime ore del mattino del 25 maggio, mentre era in missione di picchetto radar all'imboccatura nord del Falkland Sound, abbatte con un missile SEA DART un ricognitore argentino che però ha fatto in tempo a trasmettere la posizione dell'unità. A metà giornata, 3-4 SKYHAWK, protetti dalla Falkland occidentale, attaccano il COVENTRY che però ne abbatte due con i missili SEA DART costringendo gli altri a ritirarsi. Una seconda ondata di A-4 SKYHAWK attacca alle 15,30 e il COVENTRY è colpito da 3 bombe sulla dritta che provocano 26 morti e un forte sbandamento; poco dopo la nave si capovolge e affonda.
5) ANTRIM:
il 22 maggio incassa una bomba a poppa che però non esplode
6) GLAMORGAN:
Il 13 giugno, mentre si trovava a circa 3.000 m dalla costa intento a bombardare le posizioni argentine attorno a Port Stanley, viene colpito da un missile MM. 38 EXOCET lanciato da terra. La nave si trovava già con la prua puntata verso costa e quando l'ufficiale di guardia ha visto l'ordigno, ha avuto il tempo di puntargli contro la prua. Il missile, ancora molto alto, ha colpito la nave con un angolo strettissimo, penetrando all'altezza dell'hangar e uscendo dall'altra parte. L'esplosione della testata bellica ha avuto luogo all'esterno. I danni sono stati quindi limitati ma si sono avuti 13 morti e 16 feriti.
7) BROADSWORD:
impiegata soprattutto nella protezione ravvicinata dell'HERMES e dell'INVINCIBLE. Ha abbattuto 3 aerei argentini (2 con il sistema missilistico SEAWOLF ed uno con la mitragliera da 40 mm). Una bomba d'aereo, rimbalzata sull'acqua, è passata sopra il ponte di volo senza esplodere scaraventando in mare l'elicottero LYNX.
8) BRILLIANT:
impiegata come la precedente. Ha abbattuto 4 aerei A-4 SKYHAWK con il sistema SEAWOLF. È stata sfiorata da 3 bombe senza essere colpita.
9) ARDENT:
il 22 maggio viene attaccata nel Falkland Sound da aerei Aermacchi MB-339 basati sulle isole. Uno di essi riesce a colpire la nave con una salva di 14 razzi da 5 pollici (127 mm) che provocano un violentissimo incendio; la nave deve essere abbandonata e affonda dopo alcune ore. 22 morti e 30 feriti.
10) ARROW:
danneggiata il 22 maggio durante un attacco di A-4 SKYHAWK e MIRAGE / DAGGER.
11) ALACRITY:
danneggiata nella stessa occasione della precedente. L'11 maggio nel Falkland Sound aveva affondato a colpi di cannone la nave cisterna ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS.
12) ANTELOPE:
il 23 maggio, durante violenti attacchi condotti da A-4 SKYHAWK e MIRAGE / DAGGER, mentre era di guardia all'entrata della baia di San Carlos, incassa una bomba da 250 kg che finisce in sala macchine senza esplodere. La nave viene evacuata; più tardi, mentre un esperto cercava di disinnescarla, la bomba esplode e la nave si incendia e affonda. 4 morti e 6 feriti.
13) PLYMOUTH:
ha abbattuto 5 aerei lanciando 9 missili SEACAT e sparando 900 colpi con i cannoni da 114 mm. Colpita da 4 bombe, nessuna delle quali esplosa, sganciate per la maggior parte da 5 MIRAGE / DAGGER nel corso di un attacco effettuato l'8 giugno.
14) CONQUEROR:
Il 2 maggio attacca il vecchio incrociatore argentino GENERAL BELGRANO (ex USS PHOENIX) appena al di fuori della zona delle 200 miglia e lo colpisce con 2 siluri. I due caccia (vecchie unità ex USA) che scortavano il BELGRANO, e che il CONQUEROR aveva risparmiato affinchè potessero raccogliere i superstiti, si allontanano immediatamente dalla zona. In un primo momento, viene comunicato che l'attacco è stato condotto con i moderni siluri filoguidati Mk-24 TIGERFISH; più tardi si saprà che invece il GENERAL BELGRANO è stato colpi da 2 «preistorici» siluri a corsa libera Mk-8, risalenti alla metà degli anni '30 (!) e che ufficialmente non erano più in servizio nella Royal Navy sin dal 1970. Il GENERAL BELGRANO affonda il 3 maggio con la perdita di 321 uomini.
15) SIR GALAHAD:
l'8 giugno, mentre si trovava nella Reasant Bay insieme alla SIR TRISTRAM, impegnata nello sbarco della 5ª Brigata, viene attaccata da 2 A-4 SKYHAWK e da 2 MIRAGE. L'attacco, condotto struttando con accuratezza la protezione offerta dalle colline, coglie le unità inglesi completamente di sorpresa. Una bomba prende in pieno la SIR GALAHAD ancora carica di Welsh Guards facendo esplodere carburante e munizioni. Devastata dall'incendio è portata ad arenarsi su un basso fondale e viene perduta.
16) SIR TRISTRAM:
danneggiata nella stessa occasione della precedente.

L'aviazione imbarcata comprendeva 28 SEA HARRIER della Royal Navy (solo tre SEA HARRIER erano rimasti in Gran Bretagna, ed erano utilizzati per l'addestramento «lampo» di nuovi piloti), 14 HARRIER GR-3 della RAF modificati per essere armati con missili aria-aria AIM-9L SIDEWINDER, 18 elicotteri SEA KING e COMMANDO, diversi elicotteri LYNX e WASP e alcuni GAZELLE.
Le forze di terra comprendevano circa 8.000 uomini così suddivisi: circa 100 appartenenti ai servizi speciali SBS, circa 200 appartenenti ai servizi speciali SAS, 2.000 Royal Marines suddivisi in 3 gruppi Commando, 2.000 paracadutisti appartenenti al 1°, 2° e 3° Btg., 3.000 appartenenti alla 5ª Brigata di Fanteria (1° Btg. Guardie Gallesi, 2° Btg. Guardie Scozzesi, 7° Btg. Fucilieri Gurka), uno squadrone carri leggeri CVR (T) SCORPION e SCHIMITAR, un gruppo di artiglieria da campagna dotato di obici / cannoni da 105 mm (Light) del 29° Rgt., un gruppo missili AA RAPIER della RAF e missili AA individuali BLOWPIPE.

Un elicottero Westland COMMANDO impegnato in operazioni di sbarco.

larlo; altre esche, le fiamme le trovavano nei cablaggi, in rivestimenti, nelle imbottiture ed in altri materiali presenti.
Nei casi più gravi le centrali di controllo danni sono rimaste subito tagliate fuori e nonostante il principio della ridondanza, sulle navi colpite mancava l'energia e si interrompevano le comunicazioni interne.
DDG type 42 da 4.100 T. entrati in servizio ella Royal Navy a partire dalla metà degli anni settanta, erano presentati come tra le più avanzate unità nel loro genere anche se per le solite ragioni economiche il loro dislocamento era stato limitato; la stessa Argentina ne aveva acquistati due! Lo SHEFFIELD è affondato ingloriosamente, divorato da un incendio appiccato da un missile EXOCET nè avvistato nè contrastato che l'aveva colpito nelle cucine, senza neanche scoppiare (4 Maggio), e causando 20 morti.
Il fuoco alimentato dal combustibile rimasto nel missile si è rapidamente esteso, mentre a bordo non vi era energia ed erano interrotte le comunicazioni interne, ed i fumi tossici rendevano difficile l'opera delle squadre anticendio. Nel giro di tre ore, per il rischio di esplosioni, la nave veniva abbandonata.
Le poche fotografie disponibili mostrano inequivocabilmente lo SHEFFIELD con un buco a mezza nave ma con le sovrastrutture intatte anche se annerite; affonderà il 10 Maggio mentre si tentava di rimorchiarlo.
Il gemello COVENTRY almeno si difenderà ma tre bombe lo colpiranno sulla dritta provocando 26 morti, incendi, estesi danni ed un forte sbandamento che in breve tempo lo farà affondare senza che fosse possibile un tentativo di salvataggio della nave (25 Maggio).
Al GLASGOW poteva andar peggio quando una bomba da 500 kg. ne passa lo scafo da parte a parte senza scoppiare finendo in acqua; per l'urto la nave rimane paralizzata senza energie e senza comunicazioni per qualche minuto (12 Maggio).
Le Fregate type 21 da 3.250 T. sono navi costruite all'inizio degli anni '70 quali unità polivalenti a costi contenuti; su progetto VOSPER di tali criteri di economicità hanno portato ad un abbassamento degli standard non più secondo le norme Royal Navy - Mil ma secondo quelle Lloyd Register valide per le navi mercantili! Il risultato è stato evidente: a parte l'inadeguatezza dell'armamento antiaereo di cui parleremo in seguito, queste unità si sono rivelate pessime incassatrici.
L'Ardent è colpita da una salva di 14 razzi da 5 polici, che causa 22 morti e 30 feriti ed un incendio praticamente «squaglia» la nave (21 Maggio).
Ancora più triste la fine dell'ANTILOPE (23 Maggio); una bomba da 250 kg. trafora il ponte e si ferma nella sala macchine, ma esplodeva alcune ore dopo, durante il tentativo di disinnesco; ne derivano esplosioni a catena ed incendi che fanno colare a picco la nave.
Danni gravi con 13 morti e 16 feriti riporta il DDG GLAMORGAN (classe COUNTY) colpito nelle sovrastrutture da un EXOCET MM38 lanciato da terra (21 Giugno) ed esploso fuori dalla nave.
Una bomba distrugge la nave da sbarco SIR GALAHAD ed un'altra danneggia gravemente la SIR TRISTRAM entrambe da 5.000 T. provocando 54 morti e 74 feriti (8 Giugno).
Danni di diversa entità vengono riportati da molte altre unità, Il DDG ANTRIM, le fregate ARROW, ALACRITY, BROADSWORD, ARGONAUT, PLYMOUTH.
Più duro a morire si è dimostrato il mercantile portacontainer ATLANTIC CONVEYOR: scambiato due volte per una portaerei e due volte colpito da EXOCET. La prima volta (15 Maggio) da un missile che forse non esplode ma che causa 12 morti, un vasto incendio e la distruzione del prezioso carico di 16 elicotteri, ma senza affondarlo, la seconda il missile esplode e cola a picco il povero relitto bruciacchiato (30 Maggio).
È lontano il ricordo delle navi della seconda guerra mondiale che incassavano bombe e siluri e riportavano l'equipaggio a casa!
Si dice che una moderna fregata ha una potenza di fuoco superiore a quella di una corazzata di quarant'anni fa ma nessuno dice che non ha neppure la centesima parte della sua protezione.
In epoca di armi «smart» con probabilità di colpire sempre maggiori, la sopravvivenza della nave non può essere affidata soltanto alle probabilità della difesa di distruggere o deviare il missile ma anche alla capacità della nave stessa di incassare e limitare i danni.
Le lezioni alla luce di informazioni più dettagliate saranno molte, con la necessità di rivedere materiali e sistemi di costruzione, impianti e sistemi di sicurezza.
Forse si rispolvererà la corazza, giustificando così la decisione russa di costruire il KIROV e quella americana di riarmare le corazzate IOWA; nel frattempo l'US Navy ha deciso di istallare 100 T. di corazza su DDG classe SPRUANCE già in servizio e di aumentare di circa 200 T. quella dei futuri DDG-51.
Soprattutto sotto questo aspetto le Falkland influiranno sul futuro delle navi da guerra.

I SISTEMI MISSILISTICI

Passando ad esaminare il rendimento dei sistemi d'arma delle unità della Task Force le esperienze delle Flakland hanno rivelato elementi di notevole interesse.
Il concetto inglese della nave da guerra, in particolare DDG e Fregate, molto vicino a quello americano ha mostrato lacune: una filosofia basata sui gruppi di battaglia con al centro le grandi portaerei classiche dove l'efficacia nasce dalla reciproca integrazione dei sistemi d'arma delle varie navi e degli aerei imbarcati.
Nelle Falkland ogni unità si è trovata a far tutto; non vi erano gruppi di battaglia ma più spesso le navi operavano isolate o in coppia, come nelle missioni di picchetto radar, interdizione del traffico, bombardamento a terra ed in tali situazioni le unità specializzate risultavano più vulnerabili delle polivalenti in quanto idonee a fronteggiare un solo tipo di minaccia.
Basti pensare che per missioni semplici, quali un supporto di fuoco alle truppe a terra, per non rischiare troppo, l'Amm. Woodward era costretto a distaccare un DDG type 42 ed una super Fregata type 22: il primo sparava a terra e nel contempo garantiva con il sistema SEA DART una difesa di zona a medio raggio, la seconda non sparava — perchè non ha cannoni — ma stava pronta con i SEA WOLF per una eventuale difesa ravvicinata e di punto.
Sempre le costosissime super fregate Type 22 da 4.000 T., a parte il sistema SEA WOLF hanno rivelato il limite della «nave elettronica» in quanto la mancanza di artiglieria le rendevano inutili per il sostegno di fuoco d operazioni anfibie o le mettevano a repenta glio quando sembrava possibile un attacc di naviglio sottile argentino.
Delle due concezioni attuali in tema di nav di superficie quella anglo-americana e quel la italiana, quest'ultima è sembrata alla luc delle esperienze delle Flakland più valida essendo basata sul principio della poliva lenza vale a dire che la nave deve essere i grado di compiere la più vasta gamma d missioni possibili e di fronteggiare il mag gior numero possibile di minacce.
Quindi molti i problemi emersi: nel bombardamento di istallazioni a terra e nella preparazione di fuoco agli sbarchi, il pezzo standard delle navi inglesi, il Vickers 4.5, pur d mostratosi affidabile come funzionamento si è dimostrato insufficiente come calibr soprattutto contro postazioni protette o in terrate; inoltre, spesso, i proiettili no esplodevano a causa del terreno torboso molle, tipico di quelle isole.
Nel settore antinave — essendo mancato l scontro diretto — non vi sono elementi d giudizio; l'azione si è limitata alla caccia mercantili che cercavano di forzare il blo co, anche se uno solo — l'ISLO DE LO ESTADOS di 9.000 tsl - risulta affondato da la Fregata ALACRITY.
Risultati più consistenti sono stati invec conseguiti dagli HARRIER con tre mercanti affondati ed uno danneggiato.
Sempre nel settore antinave, ricordiamo il «debutto» dei missili SEA SKUA che lanciati da due elicotteri LYNX hanno colpito due vecchie navi pattuglia da 800 T. scarsamente manovrabili e scarsamente armate, la COMMODORO SOMELLERA e la ALFEREZ SOBRAL, affondando la prima e danneggiando la seconda; ugualmente due LYNX ma sembra armati con razzi non guidati e mitragliatrici hanno colpito nella baia di

Truppe e materiali prendono terra da mezzi da sbarco (LCM) su una spiaggia della Baia di San Carlos.



Grtvyken nella South Georgia il smg. SANTA FE che in emersione andava a rifornire la guarnigione argentina, danneggiandolo e costringendolo ad arenarsi.
Gli elicotteri imbarcati dotati di idonei sistemi d'arma, si sono rivelati un importante «lungo braccio per la nave, soprattutto per la lotta a naviglio sottile in particolare Vedette l.m.
Infatti una Vedetta può sparare i suoi missili contro una nave da lunga distanza, approfittando della sua bassa risoluzione radar, della sua manegevolezza e velocità, inoltre le capacità di reazione della nave diminuiscono se l'attacco è condotto da più vedette. Ricordiamo che gli argentini non disponevano di Vedette l.m.
Nel settore della difesa area, la Royal Navy ancora chiaramente in fase di trapasso tra le capacità di protezione e allarme a lungo raggio offerte dalle portaerei convenzionali a quelle più limitate della HARRIER Carrier ha mostrato molte lacune; inoltre riallacciandosi alla concezione del «battle group» e delle navi specializzate, le unità disponevano o di un sistema a medio raggio o di uno ravvicinato ma mai di entrambi, — come nella concezione italiana delle Fregate LUPO e MAESTRALE — rendendo difficile un'efficace protezione in un teatro operativo che esigeva una frammentazione delle forze navali.
Tutto l'armamento della portaerei INVINCIBLE consiste in una semplice rampa binata di SEA DART ed ancor meno quello della HERMES con un superato sistema SEA CAT.
La difesa inglese è andata spesso in crisi di saturazione davanti a ondate di aerei attaccanti che, in genere, si sottraevano ai radar volando sul pelo del mare o nascondendosi tra i profili montuosi delle isole, piombando improvvisi sulle navi.
Ciò rendeva difficile sia l'intervento degli HARRIER in volo di pattuglia, sia l'ingaggio da parte dei sistemi d'arma delle navi in tempi e distanze utili; lo dimostra il fatto che, al contrario delle regole, secondo cui l'attaccante va fermato il più lontano possibile, buona parte degli aerei argentini abbattuti sono stati intercettati dagli HARRIER o agganciati dalla difesa c.a., solo dopo aver sganciato il proprio carico bellico.
Negli attacchi al nucleo della Task Force, gli aerei argentini superate le pattuglie di HARRIER, si trovavano di fronte allo schermo formato dalla difesa c.a. dei DDG e delle Fregate poste a cerchio intorno alle portaerei e alle navi trasporto truppe, composto da sistemi a medio raggio SEA DART, da sistemi a distanza ravvicinata e per la difesa di punto SEA CAT e SEA WOLF, integrabili con i cannoni da 4.5 (144 mm) e le mitragliere da 20 mm. e 40 mm. a puntamento a vista.
Se lo schermo si è mostrato efficace in questo caso, le cose sono andate diversamente per le navi isolate, dove superata la labile difesa dell'unico sistema difesa aerea disponibile, erano praticamente alla mercé degli attaccanti, con scarsissime possibilità di reazione in quanto nè il cannone da 4.5. nè le armi da 20 mm. o 40 mm. a puntamento ottico potevano qualcosa.
Si è visto con le due Fregate type 21 affondate nella Baia di San Carlos la cui difesa c.a., affidata agli obsoleti SEA CAT, ed a 2 mitragliere da 20 mm., era andata rapidamente in saturazione: la ARDENT colpita praticamente a bruciapelo da una salva di razzi e la ANTELOPE su a cui uno SKYHAWK sfiorando gli alberi vi lasciava cadere una bomba da 250 Kg. finita in sala macchine.
Lo stesso era accaduto con i DDG type 42 la cui difesa c.a. consisteva oltre che nelle solite due mitragliere da 20 mm., in una rampa binata di SEA DART, destinati alla difesa di zona validi sulle medie distanze e alle medie quote e non al di sotto: il COVENTRY, isolato in missione di picchetto radar, attaccato da più parti, dopo aver abbattuto due aerei, è stato colpito e affondato da altri che avevano superato la distanza minima di ingaggio e avevano potuto arrivarvi sopra senza ulteriore opposizione sganciando tre bombe.
Quasi lo stesso era accaduto al GLASGOW, solamente che la bomba da 500 kg. non era esplosa.
Sullo SHEFFIELD, pur essendo questo di picchetto radar, i sensori di bordo non hanno rilevato nè il missile nè gli aerei nonostante questi al momento del lancio fossero a 20 miglia nella distanza utile dei SEA DART, così nessuna azione di difesa era attivata quando l'EXOCET ha colpito.
Anche nel caso dell'attacco alle navi da sbarco SIR GALAHAD e SIR TRISTRAM a Fitzroy gli aerei superavano facilmente la labile difesa rappresentata dai SEACAT della Fregata PLYMOUTH e le colpivano ripetutamente affondando la prima, danneggiando la seconda e la stessa Fregata.
Le perdite sarebbero state ancora più gravi se gli argentini avessero avuto più fortuna e migliori spolette per le loro bombe: infatti essendo costretti a volare bassi le spolette a volte non avevano tempo d'innescarsi, oppure per difetto di vecchiaia (in genere bombe MK-82 e MK-84 dei surplus USA) pur colpendo non esplodevano, come nel caso già citato del GLASGOW o quello del DDG ANTRIM sulla cui poppa una bomba rimbalza e finisce in mare, o quello della super Fregata BROADSWORD, cui una bomba con un effetto «piastrella» è rimbalzata sulla superficie del mare, ha sfiorato il ponte di volo poppiero prendendo in pieno l'elicottero LYNX, parcheggiato e trascinandoselo in mare senza esplodere.
Esaminando più a fondo i sistemi missilistici c.a. della Task Force ed il loro rendimento:

— **Sea Dart:** sistema per la difesa di zona (medie quote e distanze di 20-30 miglia) a guida semiattiva, dimostratosi troppo lento quanto a tempi di reazione. Dopo aver lanciato i primi due missili e aver ricaricato la rampa, bisogna infatti aspettare **due minuti (!!!!!)** perchè i giroscopi dei missili si riscaldino. Gli Argentini avevano quindi tutto il tempo di arrivare. Questo problema avrebbe dovuto essere risolto con il SEA DART Mk-2, il cui sviluppo venne cancellato l'anno scorso per ragioni di costo. Imbarcato sui DDG type 42 e sulla NPA INVINCIBLE un totale di sei navi e di 6 lanciatori binati; avrebbe abbattuto 8 aerei argentini;
— **Sea Cat:** sistema per la difesa ravvicinata a guida radar con gittata fino a 3,5 km è risultato irrimediabilmente superato; imbarcato su un gran numero di unità tra cui le Fregate type 21, type LEANDER, ROTHESAY ecc., le navi d'assalto anfibio FEARLESS, la NPA HERMES ecc.; un totale di 15 navi e di 23 lanciatori quadrupli — avrebbe abbattuto 6 aerei.



I sopravvissuti della nave da sbarco (LST) SIR GALAHAD a bordo di scialuppe e gommoni della gemella SIR TRISTRAM nella baia di San Carlos.

Un mezzo da sbarco (LCM), carico di autovetture da collegamento Land Rover da 1 t., ripreso mentre fuoriesce dal bacino allagato della nave da assalto anfibio (LPD) HMS FEARLESS.



IL BOTTINO DI GUERRA INGLESE

Gli argentini hanno lasciato in mano agli inglesi un ingente bottino di guerra, comprendente tre obici da 155 mm e 18 da 105 mm (tutti di produzione francese), i due radar AN/TPS-43 e AN/TPS-44 almeno un sistema missilistico superficie-aria ROLAND (versione montata su autocarro), diverse batterie di missili superficie-aria TIGERCAT, molti missili AA spalleggiabili BLOWPIPE, alcuni affusti binati AA Rheinmetall Rh-202 da 20 mm e Oerlikon da 35 mm, circa un centinaio di veicoli (tra cui i nuovissimi carri TAM e i veicoli da combattimento per la fanteria VCPT, 12 autoblindo Panhard LYNX 90 appena consegnate e VTT cingolati M-113), e tutto l'armamento individuale e di squadra (fucili, mitragliatrici, mortai, cannoni s.r., alcuni missili c.c.). Gli Inglesi hanno anche recuperato tre dei missili MM.38 EXOCET che gli argentini avevano utilizzato per le loro batterie costiere.
Almeno una ventina tra aerei ed elicotteri sono stati abbandonati sulle piste di Port Stanley. Tra questi, gli inglesi hanno potuto rimettere in condizioni di volo due PUCARÀ, un elicottero CH-47 CHINOOK, due Bell UH-1 e un paio di Agusta A-109.
Le perdite argentine ascendono ad almeno 700 caduti.

LE FORZE ARGENTINE

Come già detto, dopo la perdita del GENERAL BELGRANO la Marina argentina — a parte l'episodio isolato del sottomarino SAN LUIS — non ha più avuto alcuna parte nelle ostilità. Tutto il peso del conflitto è stato quindi sopportato dall'aeronautica e dall'aviazione navale argentina; quest'ultima aveva distaccato a terra gli aerei della 25 DE MAYO. Almeno alcuni degli aerei argentini, che operavano al limite della loro autonomia, erano stati frettolosamente dotati di sonde per il rifornimento in volo. All'inizio delle ostilità, gli argentini potevano disporre di:
— 9 bombardieri CANBERRA;
— 10 aerei AS/ricognitori marittimi S-2 A ed E TRACKER
— 10 aerei AS/ricognitori marittimi P-2H NEPTUNE
— 45 aerei anti-guerriglia PUCARÀ;
— 10 aerei scuola / appoggio tattico MB-339
— 8 aerei scuola/appoggio tattico MB-326
— 68 aerei da attacco A-4 SKYHAWK;
— 5 o 6 aerei da attacco SUPER ETENDARD;
— 18 MIRAGE IIIA;
— 26 NESHER (DAGGER), cioè la copia israeliana del MIRAGE.
— 8 aerei da trasporto C-130 E ed H HERCULES
— 3 aerei da trasporto G-222

Nel corso del conflitto, l'Argentina ha ricevuto in «prestito» dal Perù 10 MIRAGE 5P, che però non sono stati usati nelle operazioni ma tenuti di riserva. In aggiunta, come si è visto, alcuni degli addestratori Aermacchi 339 erano stati convertiti per l'attacco. Sulle Falkland-Malvine gli argentini disponevano di circa 12.000 uomini. La forza aerea ivi dislocata comprendeva velivoli d'attacco PUCARÀ, aerei scuola T-34 TURBO MENTOR ed Aermacchi MB-339, armati di mitragliere e razzi, più un numero imprecisato di elicotteri.
La difesa contraerea, particolarmente attorno a Port Stanley, disponeva di missili ROLAND, TIGERCAT e BLOWPIPE (questi ultimi spalleggiabili), di complessi binati Oerlikon GDF-001 da 35/90 mm e Rheinmetall Rh-202 da 20/85 mm. La direzione del tiro era assicurata da una centrale radar Contraves SUPER FLEDERMAUS mentre la scoperta era affidata ad un radar Cardion AN/TPS-44 di sorveglianza tattica e ad un radar tridimensionale Westinghouse AN/TPS-43. Per la difesa costiera sono stati impiegati alcuni missili MM-38 EXOCET.

— **Sea Wolf:** sistema per la difesa ravvicinata e di punto con capacità antimissile a guida con fascio direttore e gittata fino a 6 miglia si è dimostrato il sistema più efficace contro aerei a bassa quota ed a distanze ravvicinate ma presente in un numero troppo limitato per essere determinante; imbarcato sulle super Fregate type 22 — un totale di tre navi e di 5 lanciatori sestupli — avrebbe abbattutto 6 aerei avversari.

Il paragone tra SEA CAT e SEA WOLF è talmente evidente da rendere superfluo ogni commento; globalmente il totale di venti aerei abbattuti dalle navi è da considerarsi piuttosto negativo in confronto sia al volume di fuoco disponibile sia all'entità e alla consistenza degli attacchi aerei.
Non è conosciuto quanti missili siano stati lanciati per giudicare la reale affidabilità dei vari sistemi; in ogni caso si tratta sicuramente di un numero elevato se si considera che uno dei problemi logistici maggiori era il rifornimento di queste armi.
È anche da dire che la difesa c.a. in alcune situazioni era particolarmente difficile; ad esempio nel corso dello sbarco iniziato il 21 Maggio nella Baia di San Carlos, un fiordo lungo circa 4 Km. e largo da un minimo di 300 mt. ad un massimo di 1 Km., le unità erano praticamente immobili, mentre gli aerei potevano sfuggire ai radar grazie alle montagne circostanti e piombare direttamente sulla baia.
Analogamente il Flakland Sound, il canale di divisione tra le isole, un lungo e stretto imbuto che poteva costituire una pericolosa trappola per le navi che sotto attacco aereo avevano scarse possibilità di manovra.
Anche se non strettamente navale, si è rivelato buono il rendimento dei sistemi c.a. RAPIER (13 aerei abbattuti) in dotazione alle forze da sbarco.
Al sistema missilistico spalleggiabile BLOWPIPE sono invece attribuiti 8 abbattimenti.
Un elemento di cui si conosce ben poco è l'attività di guerra elettronica svolta da entrambi i contendenti; sembra tuttavia che gli aerei argentini abbiano più volte ingannato i radar inglesi sfruttando tattiche ed apparecchiature di origine israeliana.
Da parte loro gli inglesi pare siano riusciti a rendere la centrale radar Contraves SUPER FLEDERMAUS, che dirigeva il tiro delle batterie AA poste a difesa di Port Stanley, incapace di condurre un fuoco efficace contro gli HARRIER e i SEA HARRIER. È stato detto inoltre che, durante uno degli attacchi alla Task Force effettuato con missili AM.39 EXOCET, un elicottero LYNX dello Squadron 815 sia riuscito a deviare, mediante mezzi ECM attivi e passivi, uno dei 2 missili lanciati dai SUPER ETENDARD contro la portaerei HERMES. L'ordigno ha cambiato direzione ma il radar del suo sistema di guida si è agganciato sull'unità di maggiori dimensioni più vicina alla HERMES che in quella occasione era rappresentata dalla portacontainer ATLANTIC CONVEYOR.
L'insieme delle deficenze nel settore della difesa contraerea, assume maggiore rilevanza se si esamina la difesa antimissile.
La Royal Navy, dopo anni di discussioni e di pressioni da parte dell'industria inglese, aveva optato per la difesa di punto antimissile basato sul sistema missilistico SEA WOLF, al contrario di molte altre Marine che hanno preferito sistemi convenzionali ad elevata cadenza di fuoco quali l'italiano DARDO da 40 mm, l'americano PHALANX da 20 mm., l'olandese GOAL KEEPER da 30 mm. mentre altri sono in via di sviluppo qua

Una squadriglia di FMA IA-58 PUCARA dell'Aeronautica Argentina. Circa 23 macchine di questo tipo sono andate perdute durante il conflitto.

li il SEAGUARD della Contraves ecc.
Ciò si era risolto in una serie di ritardi per cui solo le otto super fregate Type 22, di cui solo tre erano operative al momento del conflitto, avevano imbarcato questo sistema d'arma e non nella sua versione più avanzata.
Negli scontri avvenuti alle Falkland non si sa se il SEA WOLF abbia colpito qualcuno dei sei (o sette?) missili AM 39 EXOCET lanciati, forse uno ma è improbabile; sembra che invece abbiano avuto più fortuna sistemi ECM ed i lancia - chaff CORVUS.
Resta comunque il fatto che gli inglesi alla luce dei primi risultati, si siano affrettati ad acquistare in USA alcuni sistemi PHALANX.
Ma sono stati gli EXOCET, l'arma risolutiva delle Flakland, come spesso la stampa li ha presentati?
Nel primo attacco (4 Maggio) su due missili AM 39 lanciati da 20 miglia senza alcuna reazione uno fallisce, l'altro colpisce lo SHEFFIELD ma non esplode; l'incendio e la distruzione che seguono non sono tanto merito del missile quanto colpa della nave.
Nel secondo (26 Maggio) su due missili lanciati da circa 15 miglia contro la Portacontainer ATLANTIC CONVEYOR scambiata per una portaerei, uno viene accecato dai chaffs lanciati dalle navi scorta, il secondo colpisce — ma anche questa volta sembra che non sia esploso — e provoca un vasto incendio.
Nel terzo attacco (30 Maggio) due o tre missili vengono lanciati da circa 20 miglia contro il relitto galleggiante della ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, fatto ad arte credere dagli inglesi una portaerei, al centro di un dispositivo navale; un intensa attività ECM, lancio di chaff e missili SEA WOLF neutralizza il primo (o i primi due) mentre l'ultimo colpisce affondando il mercantile.
Un ultimo attacco anche se atipico avviene il 13 Giugno con il lancio di un MM.38 da una rampa montata artigianalmente su un camion, contro il DDG GLAMORGAN, mentre bombardava l'aereoporto di Port Stanley; a causa della distanza ravvicinata (3.000 m) il missile, che non si è ancora abbassanto sul mare, colpisce la nave all'altezza dell'hangar; data la leggerezza delle sovrastrutture in quel punto, la spoletta a ritardo si è attivata solo quando il missile era già uscito dalla nave dopo averla attraversata da parte a parte. La testata bellica è quindi esplosa fuori dalla nave.
In conclusione, se la difesa antimissile inglese, scarsamente dotata, ha funzionato poco, altrettanto si può dire dei missili AM 39 EXOCET; infatti nonostante le distanze ottimali di lancio, su sei o sette missili lanciati, due o tre sono stati agganciati dalle difese inglesi ed eliminati, uno si è perduto e tre hanno colpito ma di questi uno solo, forse due, sono esplosi.
Ciò vuol dire che con un'efficace difesa basata su sistemi antimissili, chaffs, ECM ecc., le probabilità per una nave di non essere colpita sarebbero più elevate rispetto al 50% dimostrato alle Falkland, raggiungendo margini del 70-75%.
Inoltre anche se colpita non è detto che la nave affondi e specialmente se verranno adottate adeguate misure di controllo danni, antincendio ecc. le probabilità di sopravvivenza di un'unità di medie dimensioni e di un missile della categoria dell'EXOCET potranno essere nell'ordine dell'85-90%.

OPERAZIONI ANFIBIE:

Nel corso del conflitto gli inglesi hanno attuato operazioni di sbarco a tutti i livelli: dalle azioni di piccoli gruppi di commandos a quelle complesse con lo sbarco di migliaia di uomini e mezzi.
È un settore in cui vantano da sempre capacità ed esperienza e sin dall'arrivo in zona della Task Force, uomini dei Royal Commandos e dello Special Boat Squadron si sono infiltrati nelle isole compiendo azioni di sabotaggio e di disturbo, dirigendo il tiro delle artiglierie navali o i bombardamenti aerei e preparando la strada ai grandi sbarchi.
Tra le azioni riuscite ricordiamo quella di Pebble Island (14 Maggio) ove 120 uomini distruggevano sul locale aereoporto 11 aerei ed una stazione radar particolarmente pericolosa per la Task Force; tra quelle non riuscite, la misteriosa missione del commando imbarcato sul SEA KING precipitato nella Terra del Fuoco al confine tra Argentina e Cile.
Ma l'impegno maggiore per l'Amm. Woodward rimaneva lo sbarco di migliaia di uomini equipaggiati, mezzi corazzati, artiglieria, rifornimenti ecc., in un'area di forte contrasto e che per la sua complessità presentava molti rischi.
Gli argentini si aspettavano uno sbarco frontale, alla maniera americana, proprio a Port Stanley e quindi avevano lì concentrato la maggior parte delle proprie forze.
Del resto una serie di ragioni alimentavano tale convinzione: la natura del terreno e la mancanza di strade nel resto delle isole, l'esistenza nella capitale dell'unico aereoporto attrezzato, gli stessi bombardamenti aereonavali che sembravano essere di preparazione.
Invece, la notte del 21 Maggio la nave passeggeri CANBERRA, il traghetto NORLAND e alcune unità da sbarco con a bordo materiale pesante con la scorta di cinque unità da guerra, entravano nel Faikland Sound quindi si infilavano nello stretto budello del fiordo di S. Carlos in una posizione ridossata rispetto al mare sempre agitato, ma pericolosissima per gli attacchi aerei.
Infatti per la mancanza di un numero sufficiente di grandi unità di assalto anfibio e di piccoli mezzi da sbarco era impossibile procedere allo sbarco contemporaneo di un gran numero di uomini e mezzi.
Con una serie di trasbordi e una spola continua tra le navi e la spiaggia nella prima giornata furono trasferiti a terra 2.500 uomini che raggiunsero al termine delle 48 ore il numero di 5.000 oltre grandi quantità di materiali e mezzi, consentendo quindi ai mercantili di ritirarsi in zone più sicure.
Tanto audace e organizzata l'azione inglese, tanto confusa fu l'azione argentina; convinti che quella fosse un'azione diversiva rispetto allo sbarco atteso a Port Stanley, gli attacchi aerei iniziarono oltre sei ore dopo l'inizio delle operazioni e si concentrarono sulle navi da guerra tralasciando i mercantili e la testa di sbarco.
Vennero affondate due fregate ed altre danneggiate, pagando tra l'altro con quasi il 50% di perdite degli aerei attaccanti, ma mai le operazioni di sbarco o le forze a terra ancora in fase di organizzazione entrarono in crisi o ebbero consistenti difficoltà.
Il giorno dopo non vi furono praticamente incursioni, le operazioni continuarono e la testa di ponte potè consolidarsi, apprestare un sistema di difesa aerea con missili RAPIER, mentre i paracadutisti si muovevano verso Goose Green e Port Darwin.
Meno fortunati furono 500 uomini del battaglione delle Welsh Guards che l'8 Giugno dovevano essere sbarcati a Fitzroy - un estuario a fiordo molto stretto in una zona ove già si trovavano le avanguardie inglesi.
Forse per un eccesso di fiducia le due navi da sbarco, la SIR GALAHAD e la SIR TRISTRAM furono mandate solo con la scorta della vecchia fregata PLYMOUTH; gli aerei argentini - imparata la lezione attaccarono le navi da sbarco e la testa di sbarco, affondandone una, danneggiando gravemente l'altra e causando numerose perdite senza che gli inglesi potessero organizzare una reazione efficente.
Questa della mancanza di unità idonee per operazioni anfibie si è dimostrato uno dei maggiori problemi alle Flakland; per evitare di esporre le navi passeggeri o i traghetti alle incursioni avversarie vi furono continui trasbordi sulle navi da sbarco allungando così i tempi delle operazioni ed il disagio per gli uomini.
LA QUEEN ELISABETH II con 3.000 uomini



Il vecchio incrociatore argentino GENERAL BELGRANO (ex USS PHOENIX) affondato dal sottomarino nucleare CONQUEROR. Sono ben visibili, ai lati del torrione, i due sistemi missilistici AA a breve raggio SEACAT.



Questa foto, scattata da un aereo argentino durante le operazioni nella Baia di San Carlos (21-25 maggio), mostra una fregata inglese della classe BROADSWORD (tipo 22) sotto attacco.



L'incrociatore argentino GENERAL BELGRANO in affondamento. Come si può notare, la prua è stata completamente asportata.



Il sottomarino nucleare britannico HMS CONQUEROR autore dell'affondamento del GENERAL BELGRANO.

della 5ª brigata di fanteria per tenerla al riparo da aerei e sommergibili venne inviata nella South Georgia, gli uomini man mano trasbordati sulle navi d'assalto anfibio INTREPID e FEARLESS ed inviati alle Falkland con viaggi di 800 miglia per venire sbarcati a S. Carlos oppure con un ulteriore trasbordo su navi da sbarco tipo SIR per sbarchi locali lungo le coste, come quello poco fortunato di Fitzroy.
È evidente come il dispositivo da sbarco inglese sia stato a lungo in una situazione estremamente precaria con il rischio continuo di compromettere l'intera operazione.
Al contrario di ogni buona regola in materia, si sono trovati a tenere concentrata l'intera forza di sbarco in poche grandi unità passeggeri requisite e quindi senza autodifesa, a volte portandole in prima linea, come nello sbarco del 21 Maggio, oppure tenendole decentrate e sottoponendosi, come abbiamo visto, all'handicap dei trasbordi.
In una guerra moderna l'efficenza delle forze anfibie ha assunto un'importanza determinante ma quasi ovunque a ciò non ha fatto riscontro qualitativamente e quantitativamente un pregresso delle unità navali destinate a tali operazioni, mentre oggi un battaglione ha una quantità di materiali al seguito tre volte superiore a quella della seconda guerra mondiale per non parlare delle necessità di rifornimenti quali munizioni, carburanti, ecc.

Per le esigenze di tempo di pace, sempre condizionate dall'economia, molte Marine riducono all'osso la componente anfibia, mantenendo in servizio solo poche unità spesso risalenti alla seconda guerra mondiale.

Per ironia della sorte proprio il Governo inglese ha dovuto valutare direttamente l'erroneità di tale politica avendo in questi ultimi anni radiato, per ragioni di economia, buona parte delle unità antifibie della Royal Navy, tra cui la nave porta-commandos BULWARK.

La nave d'assalto anfibio INTREPID che ha costituito uno del pilastri delle operazioni di sbarco alle Falkland era già destinata al disarmo mentre la gemella FEARLESS l'avrebbe seguita entro pochi anni.

Da parte argentina, un elemento che ha stupito gli osservatori è stata la mancanta posa di mine nei molti passaggi obbligati che le coste delle Falkland presentano mentre hanno proceduto ad estesi minamenti terrestri intorno a Port Stanley. Un minamento navale avrebbe creato grosse difficoltà nelle operazioni di sbarco, tanto è vero che gli inglesi aspettandoselo avevano attrezzato alcuni trawlers con sistemi antimine PAP con cui hanno svolto operazioni di controllo soprattutto prima dello sbarco di San Carlos.

LOGISTICA

È questo forse l'aspetto di maggiore interesse e anche quello che ha maggiormente differenziato i due contendenti.
Dal punto di vista argentino, la logistica è stata soprattutto legata alle unità terrestri; tuttavia sin dall'inizio delle operazioni, l'organizzazione dei rifornimenti per gli 12.000 uomini dislocati nelle isole aveva lasciato a desiderare e si era aggravata ancor di più con l'intervento del blocco inglese.
Alcuni tentativi di rifornimento effettuati con mercantili sono stati intercettati dalle navi inglesi, altri sono riusciti a passare, con il ponte aereo notturno sull'aereporto di Port Stanely ma senza reali modifiche sullo sviluppo delle operazioni in corso.
Gli argentini entro la prima metà di Aprile avevano sbarcato grandi quantità di materiali in maniera caotica e senza che ne fosse mai effettuata una razionale distribuzione sono stati ritrovati magazzini di viveri, munizioni, parti di ricambio, mentre i soldati pativano la fame, non avevano più munizioni ed i mezzi si fermavano.
La Marina inglese nel giro di tre giorni è stata in grado di far partire due portaerei, otto tra DDG e Fregate, due navi d'assalto anfibio, sei navi da sbarco e sette navi logistiche a cui erano da aggiungere quattro sm nucleari.
Al punto massimo delle operazioni il dispo

PERDITE INGLESI IN AEROMOBILI
(ammesse ufficiosamente)

6	aerei ADAC/V	SEA HARRIER	(4 per incidenti e 4 abbattuti dalle difese AA argentine) su un totale di 28 imbarcati sulla HERMES e sull'INVINCIBLE (Squadrons 800, 801 e 899)
2	aerei ADAC/V	HARRIER GR-3	
3	elicotteri	SEA KING Mk-5	
4	elicotteri	COMMANDO	
3	elicotteri	CHINOOK	(perduti con l'affondamento dell'ATLANTIC CONVEYOR)
10-12	elicotteri	WESSEX	(la maggior parte perduti con l'affondamento dell'ATLANTIC CONVEYOR)
8	elicotteri	SEA LYNX e GAZELLE	
1	elicotteri	SCOUT	(abbattuto da un PUCARÀ)

PERDITE ARGENTINE IN AEROMOBILI
(secondo stime britanniche)

26	aerei	MIRAGE/DAGGER	(di cui 19 distrutti da HARRIER)
31	aerei	SKYHAVK	(di cui 5 distrutti da HARRIER)
1	aereo	CAMBERRA	(abbattutto da un HARRIER)
1	aereo	C-130	(distrutto da un HARRIER)
23 (clr.)	aerei	PUCARÀ	(compresi quelli distrutti al suolo o catturati. Di essi, 2 sono stati distrutti da HARRIER)
18	(clr.)	elicotteri	(compresi quelli che sono stati distrutti al suolo o catturati)
5	aerei d'addestramento / attacco		
3	aerei leggeri		
1	aereo	SKIVAN	

sitivo navale ha raggiunto il tetto delle 100 navi di cui 60 mercantili requisiti, con 50/60 aerei, un centinaio di elicotteri e 27.000 uomini.
Un cordone ombelicale lungo 7.500 miglia, ha mantenuto in mare questo dispositivo per quasi due mesi e poi ha sostenuto lo sbarco e l'azione di 9.000 uomini trasferendo decine di migliaia di tonnellate di materiali.
Un meccanismo organizzativo di prim'ordine che aveva i suoi punti di coordinamento in Gran Bretagna e nell'isola di Ascensione, divenuto una grande base logistica, ha assicurato il flusso dei rifornimenti con decine di convogli e persino le riparazioni delle unità e degli aerei danneggiati in combattimento.
Sono stati operati centinaia di trasferimenti in mare di uomini, materiali ecc.

Altro aspetto importante, la velocità di requisizione dei mercantili ed il loro rapido adattamento ai compiti di guerra: la porta container ATLANTIC CONVEYOR (poi affondata), trasformata in nave trasporto aerei ad hangar mobile per HARRIER ed elicotteri transatlantici CANBERRA e QUEEN ELISABETH 2 trasformati in navi trasporto truppe con piattaforme per elicotteri mentre l'UGANDA veniva attrezzata a nave ospedale nel giro di tre giorni.
Su un'altra porta container, l'ATLANTIC CAUSEWAY, in 15 giorni sarebbe stato istallato uno ski-jump ed altre infrastrutture per aerei ed elicotteri; un prezioso apporto nella fasi di sbarco è stato dato dai traghetti dalle navi ro-ro che imbarcavano mezzi e materiali pesanti.
Gli arsenali della marina hanno lavorato giorno e notte modificando navi mercantili e da guerra: trawlers sono stati attrezzati a dragamine, la nave oceanografica HECATE è stata trasformata in nave picchetto radar, la nave rifornimento STROMNESS trasformata in nave trasporto truppe.
Le Fregate RHYL, TARTAR, ZULU, GURKHA; BERWICH e FALMOUTH poste in disarmo sono state riarmate per essere inviate nel Sud Atlantico.
Altra «chiave» determinante nel contesto della logistica inglese alle Falkland è stata costituita dagli elicotteri impiegati in maniera ampia per una vasta gamma di missio-

L'elevato numero delle perdite — maggiore del previsto, anche a causa di incidenti — è da porre in relazione ad un tasso di utilizzo che a volte superava le dieci ore giornaliere.
Oltre le missioni di supporto, trasporto ecc., gli aerei hanno svolto un efficientissimo ruolo di ricerca e soccorso, spesso in condizioni molto disagiate.
La mancanza di un adeguato sistema SAR ha invece accresciuto il numero delle perdite argentine soprattutto per il recupero dei piloti abbattuti o precipitati in mare per mancanza di carburante sulla vita del ritorno.

Negli ambienti dell'US NAVY si dice che mentre loro discutono da quasi un anno sulla Rapid Deployment Force, su cosa e chi dovrà comporla, equipaggiarla e comandarla, gli inglesi l'hanno realizzata e messa in mare in tre giorni utilizzando ciò che avevano, basandosi soprattutto sull'addestramento e la professionalità degli uomini.

Anche i russi si sono molto interessati a tale sforzo organizzativo, seguendo attentamente i movimenti delle navi inglesi nel sud attantico, sia per tastare il polso delle capacità della NATO e trarne utili insegnamenti, sia per fornire informazioni agli argentini.

Una lezione da trarre riguarda l'importanza crescente delle unità logistiche in una moderna forza navale e — anche senza prevedere azioni di vasto impegno come quelle delle Falkland — su come vada rivisto il loro numero e le loro caratteristiche in funzione delle navi combattenti.

La loro limitata disponibilità ha evidentemente costituito un grosso problema per la Royal Navy che, come si è visto, ha dovuto requisire decine di mercantili, i quali nonostante le modifiche apportate non offrivano quelle caratteristiche, prestazioni, affidabilità di unità costruite ad hoc con attrezzature specializzate ed equipaggi addestrati.

La nave logistica TIDEPOOL da 13.000 ton. che nel quadro delle citate economie era stata venduta al Cile, era in viaggio di trasferimento, quando la Marina inglese, in crisi per la mancanza di navi di questo tipo, ne ha chiesto gentilmente una temporanea restituzione, così in un porto sud americano l'equipaggio cileno è sbarcato lasciando il posto a quello inglese arrivato via area.
Infatti uno degli elementi rilevati è stato l'elevato livello di consumo di carburanti, munizioni, missili ecc. da parte di navi, aerei ed elicotteri, nonchè il ritmo di usura di apparati, sistemi d'arma con un assorbimento di parti di rispetto, interventi di riparazione e sostituzione maggiori di ogni previsione, ciò tra l'altro ha aumentato la dipendenza delle unità navali ed aeree combattenti del complesso logistico retrostante.
Gli argentini non hanno compreso che questo era il lato debole del dispositivo navale inglese: la perdita di una nave logistica o di un mercantile con un prezioso carico di materiali avrebbe potuto creare gravi conseguenze.

L'affondamento dell'ATLANTIC CONVEYOR — perchè gli argentini l'avevano scambiata per una portaerei — ha causato sul piano strategico agli inglesi un danno maggiore all'affondamento delle unità militari; la perdita di una ventina di elicotteri che costituivano buona parte della mobilità delle forze a terra ha sicuramente modificato il corso del conflitto allungandolo di diversi giorni.

CONCLUSIONI:

Molti ancora sarebbero gli aspetti da approfondire e solo fra qualche tempo si potrà avere un quadro completo degli avvenimenti confrontabile per entrambe le parti.
Nel frattempo, Stati Maggiori, tecnici, industrie ognuno per quanto di sua competenza, e prima di lasciare la materia agli storici, stanno valutando gli insegnamenti emersi in campo navale, terrestre, aereo.
Gli inglesi hanno dimostrato come ancora una volta di più la professionalità e l'elevato addestramento, nonostante il loro costo, siano paganti e come l'articolazione della loro macchina militare sia ancora perfettamente funzionante.
Un'operazione di questo genere con tutte le enormi difficoltà che presentava non poteva essere intrapresa senza la certezza che tutto avrebbe funzionato al meglio per l'insita e tradizionale capacità del personale a lavorare in organismi perfettamente affiatati ad agire, con serietà e grande autonomia, nell'ambito di direttive semplici ed essenziali, a rifuggire gli impacci burocratici e gli scarichi di responsabilità.
Inoltre una determinazione nel raggiungimento degli obiettivi prefissati che ci eravamo dimenticati nelle azioni militari occidentali, ma determinazione che non è mai venuta meno in qualsiasi momento del conflitto e che era ravvisabile in eguale misura nel governo e popolo inglese e negli uomini della Task Force in Sud Atlantico.
Gli argentini hanno mostrato invece come «non» si deve fare una guerra che oggi è più che mai un perfetto coordinamento di azioni complesse e dove il singolo ha un ruolo quando la sua preparazione e professionalità è inserita in un contesto armonico e funzionale.
La dimostrazione è venuta con il meraviglioso eroismo dei singoli piloti, rinnovando il romantico binomio di uomo e macchina contro il nemico tanto più forte, ma non appena l'azione da individuale diveniva collettiva come nei combattimenti terrestri, nel coordinamento tra i vari reparti, oppure nel supporto aereo tattico, per non parlare della logistica, delle comunicazioni ecc., allora gli argentini entravano in crisi.
Bisogna riconoscere comunque che essi sono stati perseguitati da un misto di malfunzionamenti tecnici e di sfortuna che ha quasi dell'incredibile. Basterà ricordare a questo proposito il non corretto funzionamento della testata bellica degli EXOCET che hanno raggiunto il bersaglio o le bombe a segno che non sono esplose.
Un punto chiave per tutto lo sviluppo della guerra è poi rappresentanto dai due siluri del SAN LUIS che hanno colpito l'INVINCIBLE. Se l'attacco argentino fosse stato coronato da una fortuna pari all'audacia e all'abilità con cui è stato condotto, le cose sarebbero forse andate in modo ben diverso. Evidentemente, gli dèi erano contrari.....

► *Un SEA HARRIER in volo sopra le portaerei V/STOL HMS INVINCIBILE. Notare i 2 missili aria/aria AIM-9L SIDEWINDER sotto le ali.*

▼ *Il trionfale ritorno in patria della QUEEN ELIZABETH II che era stata requisita il 2 maggio per trasportare truppe alle Falkland.*







La portaerei V/STOL HMS HERMES.



Un elicottero SEA KING fotografato durante le operazioni di soccorso alla nave da sbarco (LST) HMS SIR GALAHAD in fiamme nella Reasant Bay (8 giugno).

Prima di riassumere qui di seguito alcuni aspetti dal punto di vista tecnico, vogliamo ricordare come gli insegnamenti desunti dal conflitto delle Falkland riguardino soprattutto le minacce aeree e missilistiche, mentre non vi sono stati elementi di valutazione per quanto riguarda le minacce di superficie e subacquea.

1. In assenza di aerei AEW, disporre di un efficace sistema di allarme lontano che possa superare le limitazioni dei radar imbarcati; a tale scopo potrebbero essere realizzati degli elicotteri AEW, che consentirebbero una credibile protezione anche per navi di medie dimensioni.
(Questo provvedimento è stato in effetti immediatamente messo in pratica dagli inglesi equipaggiando alcuni elicotteri SEA KING Mk-2 di radar Thorn-EMI SEARCHWATER di sorveglianza marittima, modificato per la scoperta di bersagli volanti a bassa quota. Divenuti operativi dopo la fine del conflitto, due di questi elicotteri hanno raggiunto la portaerei V/STOL ILLUSTRIOUS il 2 agosto scorso).

La fregata inglese HMS BROADSWORD (tipo 22) era una delle poche unità equipaggiate di sistema antimissile SEAWOLF presenti alle Falkland.



2. rivedere i concetti di costruzione delle navi da guerra, mettendole in grado di meglio sopportare i danni; ciò sia a riguardo dei materiali di costruzione, sia dei sistemi di sicurezza e degli impianti di bordo.

3. Le navi — in particolare DDG e Fregate — devono essere in grado di reagire al maggior numero di minacce possibili, in quanto sia per le esigenze operative che per i costi esse dovranno essere in grado di affrontare differenti missioni in differenti situazioni.
A nostro avviso nel futuro le unità di medio dislocamento diverranno sempre più grandi, sofisticate e costose, mentre per le piccole potrebbe esservi una tendenza alla semplicità ed alla economicità: le unità destinate al pattugliamento e alla scorta costiera costruite in serie ed a basso costo potrebbero risolvere vantaggiosamente problemi sia in tempo di pace che di guerra.
Per le unità veloci d'attacco potrebbe esservi un ritorno al vecchio concetto italiano dei MAS o a quello più recente delle vedette l.m. tipo OSA o KOMAR: poco costose, costruibili in maggiore quantità spendibili in combattimento e dotate di un efficace sistema antinave e puntando sul numero per la riuscita dell'attacco.

4. Conseguentemente il sistema d'arma della nave dovrà essere in primo luogo polivalente ed in secondo facilmente aggiornabile, per controstare ogni evoluzione della minaccia con l'adorazione di sistemi modulari o di famiglie di sistemi.

5. Ciò comporterà per tutte le unità un'intensificazione dei cicli di refitting al fine di mantenere sempre aggiornati sistemi ed apparati; lo sviluppo di criteri di containerizzazione consentirà di rendere meno onerose e difficoltose le sostituzioni.
Da un punto di vista economico e delle validità operative sarà meglio avere un numero limitato di unità dotate di sistemi up to date che un numero maggiore di unità non più in grado di difendersi efficacemente.

6. La sempre maggiore diffusione di armi intelligenti con più elevati livelli di precisione, velocità, autonomia, imporrà l'introduzione nel settore della difesa antiaerea/antimissile, di sistemi automatici di cannoni e/o missili, chaffs, ECM, al fine di minimizzare i tempi di reazione che si sono dimostrati troppo lunghi.
Miglioramenti dovranno essere introdotti nella velocità di ricaricamento e nelle dotazioni di scorta.
I sistemi dovranno essere in grado di gestire un maggior numero di minacce contemporanee evitando quei fenomeni di saturazione ché alle Falkland hanno, a volte, annullato le capacità difensive delle navi.

7. Il conflitto ha dimostrato il peso determinante dei sistemi di comando, controllo e comunicazioni che hanno consentito il coordinamento in tempo reale di complesse azioni contemporanee in terra, mare e cielo, anche se in questo campo dovranno essere migliorati gli standard di capacità e affidabilità.

8. Migliori caratteristiche di protezione e di difesa dovranno essere introdotte per le unità logistiche e le unità da sbarco; analoghe misure dovranno essere previste per i mercantili con apparati e sistemi di difesa containerizzati di facile installazione in caso di necessità.
Gli attuali livelli di minaccia impongono di accoppiare ai criteri di difesa ravvicinata condotta da unità di scorta, più avanzati criteri di autodifesa dei mercantili.
L'affondamento dell'ATLANTIC CONVEYOR è stato il peggior danno subito dalla T.F. ed un secondo colpo del genere avrebbe potuto compromettere l'intera spedizione.

9. L'utilizzazione di navi mercantili non solo per compiti di trasporto ma anche come piattaforma di appoggio per aerei VSTOL, elicotteri, sistemi missilistici ecc. (evoluzione del progetto Arapaho) troverà sempre più larga applicazione.

10. La componente aerea, grazie agli sviluppi degli aerei VTOL, diverrà sempre più parte integrante dei dispositivi navali anche in assenza di navi portaerei, utilizzando navi ausiliarie o mercantili attrezzate.

11. Bisognerà ridiscutere dell'efficacia delle portaerei leggere o navi tuttoponte in grado di imbarcare al massimo sei o sette aerei e che quindi non solo non risolvono il problema della copertura area della formazione navale, ma che persino non riescono a difendersi.

12. Gli elicotteri dimostratisi insostituibili dovranno migliorare ulteriormente i livelli di affidabilità ogni tempo per soddisfare una sempre più ampia gamma di missioni.

13. Dovrà essere migliorato il supporto di fuoco nel corso delle operazioni anfibie.

Le Falkland comunque non hanno in alcun modo costituito il canto del cigno delle navi da guerra, anzi forse al contrario, hanno esaltato la loro indispensabilità per un effettivo controllo degli spazi oceanici e per l'attuazione di operazioni estese nello spazio e nel tempo.

Sea Services

CS9/21

Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr.

Falkland Fallacies—I

Literally millions of words have been written about the recently concluded war in the South Atlantic. Generally they fall into three categories: editorials, news reports, and editorials posing as news reports. There have been far too many of the last, and far too few well-thought-out versions of the first. The result has been a plethora of "learned statements" about naval warfare by individuals whose sole exposure to navies may have been watching "Victory at Sea," "The Silent Service," and even "McHale's Navy" on television.

Detailed operational and engagement analyses of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict are being performed by professionals all over the globe. It will take months simply to reconstruct all the actions that took place, and perhaps even years to thoroughly analyze those actions. No earth-shattering conclusions will be reached, however; the South Atlantic War held no surprises for any knowledgeable student of naval warfare. In fact, it confirmed many hypotheses of modern naval art held by most naval analysts.

The speed with which some columnists, newsmen and politicians seized upon the sinkings of the GENERAL BELGRANO and SHEFFIELD as being indicative of the demise or obsolescence of surface combatants was truly incredible. A tragic fact of life in warfare is that people are killed, ships are sunk, and aircraft are shot down. There were no similar editorials proclaiming the obsolescence of airpower despite the staggering losses sustained by the Argentine Air Force: Some 40 per cent of the Argentine fighter and attack aircraft force was destroyed in action. A number of fallacious conclusions have been drawn from the actions on and around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and it is the intent of this series of columns to set the record straight. It seems that most, if not all, of these conclusions center on the vulnerability of surface ships and their utility in modern naval combat. To address this subject, one must first understand where surface ships fit in the overall naval picture, and then address their vulnerabilities and strengths.

The Component Parts of a Navy

There are three combat elements to any modern navy: aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses. A truly balanced navy is made up of a mix of these elements in a proportion such that the strength of the whole navy is greater than the sum of its individual parts. The same applies to any subgroup of the navy assembled for the performance of a particular mission; each element protects the other and forms a synergistic whole.

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Because the strengths and weaknesses of each element differ, so do their functions. Aircraft are fast, maneuverable, and unrestricted by the medium (land or water) over which they are flying, but they have very limited endurance and must be based near their area of operation. Of the three naval components, they have the smallest payload. Surface ships are generally the slowest component and are easily detected, but they have relatively enormous endurance and huge payloads. Nuclear submarines are fast relative to surface ships and have indefinite endurance, they are the hardest of the three components to detect, but they have very limited payloads.

Because of these characteristics, aircraft and submarines are best suited to combatting surface ships; aircraft and surface ships are best equipped for projecting power ashore and for combatting aircraft; and all three have advantages over each other in combatting submarines. However, surface ships are necessary as the platforms from which the aircraft operate. There are, of course, differences within the generic categories of aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, but these differences also serve the synergism of interaction between different types that were designed to perform different missions.

The composition and functions of a typical U.S. Navy carrier battle group (CVBG) serve to illustrate the separate but interrelated functions described above. The carrier exists solely as a platform (or base) for its aircraft. The aircraft are tailored to particular missions: attack aircraft for striking land targets (power projection) or

surface ships (antisurface warfare—ASuW); fighter aircraft for protecting the attack aircraft from interceptors and the ships from air attack (antiair warfare—AAW); airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft for providing sufficient warning to the fighters for them to intercept attacking aircraft before they reach the launching point for their weapons; antisubmarine airplanes and helicopters for the protection of the carrier and its escorts from submarines (antisubmarine warfare—ASW); and a variety of other very specialized but numerically limited aircraft including electronics warfare (EW) and tanker aircraft. Escorting surface combatants serve not only as AAW and ASW weapon platforms, but also as bases for ASW helicopters. Escorting submarines are primarily ASW vehicles, but also, secondarily, ASuW weapons. This CVBG entity can simultaneously project power ashore (using its attack aircraft) and defend itself against air, surface, and subsurface attack. It can also protect other naval forces from attack, such as amphibious forces and convoys. It is a smoothly functioning whole, made up of disparate, but mutually supportive parts. It can control an area of ocean with its attendant air and underwater volume for a sufficient period to accomplish a specific mission or group of missions. This is called sea control.

The British Approach

In December 1978 the Royal Navy retired its last multi-purpose aircraft carrier, HMS ARK ROYAL, because the British government had decided, primarily for fiscal reasons, that never again would its ships have to operate in an area of the globe that would be outside the protective air umbrella of the Royal Air Force. In effect, the RAF was assumed into the synergistic whole that constituted the Royal Navy's capability to exercise sea control. The theory was persuasive: the British Empire had been dismantled and the primary naval threat to Great Britain was the Soviet submarine force, concentrated in the Northeast Atlantic, within range of RAF bases. If RN ships operated in wartime outside the range of those bases, they would likely be doing so as an element of a NATO task force, under the protection of an American carrier battle group. The entire Royal Navy was therefore redesigned to operate in a NATO v. Warsaw Pact context, either under RAF or USN air cover.

The Argentine takeover of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands was not so much a repudiation of this theory as a calculated risk taken by the British leadership. Unfortunately, that calculation backfired on the British. The Royal Navy was forced to employ forces designed for a very specific mission, that of ASW in the Northeast Atlantic, in a classic power projection role in the South Atlantic, thousands of miles from the nearest RAF base. The shortcomings of such a force performing that kind of mission could have proven to be disastrous; it is indeed fortunate for the Royal Navy that the Argentines were laboring under some rather severe shortcomings of their own.

Airborne Early Warning

The single, most crucial operational shortcoming of the British fleet in this conflict was its total lack of airborne early warning (AEW). The air defense of any naval force in an age of precision guided weapons such as anti-ship missiles is a matter of the echelonment of defenses and simple geometry. There are, or should be, three defensive echelons: the outer air defense, which extends outward from the launching point of the enemy's longest-ranged antiship missile, the inner air defense between that launch point and within a couple nautical miles of the ships, and the close-in air defense. The outer air defense is accomplished by fighters vectored to intercept approaching strike aircraft before the latter have time to launch their missiles. The inner air defense is mounted by medium to long range surface-to-air missile systems on the ships, and the close-in air defense is composed of the short range gun and missile systems, the electronic countermeasures (ECM), and chaff on the targeted ships themselves.

Simple geometry dominates the outer air battle. An aircraft attacking a force of surface ships is much easier to shoot down than the missiles it launches against that force. Therefore, a fighter must intercept and destroy that attacking aircraft *before* it comes within its missile range of any friendly surface ships. To accomplish this the enemy aircraft must be detected at a distance far enough from the friendly force to permit that interception. Throughout the conflict in the South Atlantic, the British had no means of detecting an enemy aircraft before it came within shipboard radar range (about 20 miles for a low-flying aircraft) of a potential target. The EXOCET missile that hit HMS SHEFFIELD had a range in excess of twenty miles.

The vulnerabilities of surface ships have long been understood and compensated for within the balanced force concept. The lack of a critical element of that balanced force, AEW, caused a known vulnerability to be uncompensated, and permitted EXOCET missiles to be launched against SHEFFIELD and later against other elements of the British fleet. Since the end of the Falklands War the British have partially rectified that deficiency by rushing the development of an AEW helicopter that can be deployed from the HARRIER and helicopter carriers of their fleet. The radar range of this AEW SEA KING is probably adequate to provide sufficient warning to the British fleet of small raids of bomb-carrying SKYHAWK's and EXOCET-carrying SUPER ENTENDARD's, but it is a stopgap measure at best.

(Contd. on p. 65)

Sea Services

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The April "Sea Services" discussed a potential long-term solution to the British AEW problem, the Grumman Model 698 that is now under development. This aircraft is a V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) design that would be equipped with conformal radar capable of providing AEW against bomber-sized targets at ranges in excess of 200 miles and against missile targets at approximately 90 miles. In addition, the design would provide surveillance and targeting of surface ships up to 500 miles from its base, and could function additionally as a missile platform for engaging both surface and air targets. The Model 698's primary advantage lies in its ability to operate from V/STOL-capable ships such as the British INVINCIBLE-class, the Italian GARIBALDI, and the Spanish Sea Control Ship, providing them with an AEW capability currently unavailable to them, a capability approaching that possessed only by big-deck U.S. aircraft carriers.

Unfortunately, hardware development of the Model 698 has fallen victim to the fiscal needs of the JVX tiltrotor development program discussed in the May/June "Sea Services." The $36.3M in Fiscal 1983 funding requested to produce a prototype was cut out by Congress to accelerate the development of the JVX. The Fiscal 1986 first flight of the Model 698 has therefore been pushed back to 1989 at the earliest (assuming a Fiscal 1986 prototype contract). Modest design and model testing efforts are being funded by NASA and the Navy to keep the Grumman design team together until a substantial prototype effort can be launched.

Next month's "Sea Services" will discuss additional aspects of the war in the South Atlantic including the damage control problems that led to SHEFFIELD's loss. ■



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Foreign Military Dev.

(Contd. from p. 51)

technology systems to defeat low-flying aircraft. Roland does allay the suspicion that the U.S. project was undertaken because of political considerations and pressures and that it is evidence of American willingness to import a European system within the concept of the "two-way street" framework.

Essentially, by far the most consistent complaint against U.S.-Roland has been its rapidly escalating cost. The original pro-Roland argument had been that the European technology and its development phase would cost about one-half that of an equivalent U.S. system. However, the result of totally Americanizing Roland (ostensibly so that the system could be produced independently of European suppliers) including changes in specifications and improvements to the system, plus inflation factors, has been to increase the original cost estimates of $835 million in 1975 to about $3.3 billion currently. So, not surprisingly, repeated attempts have been made to block the U.S.-Roland production program.

Cancellation of the program would be of great advantage to Pentagon planners and their associates on the Defense Resources Board. It would bring savings needed for Fiscal 1983 defense economies. In all, an estimated $2 billion of savings would accrue from cancelling the U.S.-Roland program entirely.

The remainder of the article discusses the tactical need for Roland on the Warsaw Pact Front in order to contain the Soviet air threat in terms of an all-weather system. When the German article was written, no final decision had been reached regarding U.S.-Roland production but hope was expressed that there would be room for compromise concerning the ultimate scale of production and that the entire program would not be cancelled. ■

C59/2E

THE FALKLANDS: AN ARGENTINE ASSESSMENT

The Argentines feel US aid and equipment gave Britain the edge. But problems ranging from faulty fuzes to a lack of aerial refueling were crucial.

Too Many Missing Pieces

BY GEN. T. R. MILTON, USAF (RET.)

As we have all learned at one time or another, there are two sides to any argument. Wars, to take a few liberties with Clausewitz, are simply extensions of arguments by other means, the right side depending on where you are. In the case of the recent Falklands/Malvinas scrape, the natural tendency is to blame the Argentines. The British were, after all, in clear possession of those bleak little islands, and if the title was clouded in the Argentine view, there was no doubt about who had been running things for some 150 years. The Argentine incursion, then, appeared to be a standard aggressive move, and the British response was thus both understandable and correct.

Looked at through Argentine eyes, the view is somewhat different. The Malvinas, so named by the Spanish in a corruption of the original French Malouines, are claimed by Argentina as an inheritance from Spain, which periodically contested its ownership with the British. The complex history of those tiny god-forsaken outcroppings, however, is not important. What is important is the war they caused.

An Unplanned War

It was a war, the Argentines say, that really was not planned. What they will not say in so many words, understandably enough, is that the Falkland invasion was badly planned and poorly timed. It now seems clear that there was little coordination among the various services prior to the occupation of Stanley. Had the British not sunk the *Belgrano* with its loss of 400 lives, perhaps the whole affair would have ended in negotiation. That, at least, is what the Argentines say.

Whatever the validity of that view—the Brits will dispute it—the war did start. And since only land-based air—air force and navy—distinguished itself against the British, we ought to hear that side. Maybe there is a lesson, or at least a reminder, here and there. This, then, is how some senior Argentine airmen look at the lost war for the Malvinas.

To begin with, they say the British could not have won that war without the considerable help of the United States, an ironic commentary on the American attempt to stay friends with both sides, since the general feeling in Britain is that we did not help enough. At any rate, in the Argentine view, American assistance at Ascension was vital to the British effort, and our satellite intelligence provided the British a great advantage.

If the Argentines had received similar intelligence, they feel certain they would have sunk the *Queen Elizabeth II*, a prize they badly wanted. As for Soviet satellite information, the Argentines deny receiving any, principally because they lacked the communication links. Evidently, the Soviets, always happy to take on a Latin American client, did offer their services.

Because the war was essentially an unexpected contingency brought on by the surprising British reaction to the invasion, or by the need to avenge the lives lost on the *Belgrano*, the Argentines had not done some of the things that would

Gen. T. R. Milton's pre-Falklands War analysis of the Argentine Air Force, "A Blessed and Troubled Land," appeared in this magazine last April. Regular readers look forward to his monthly columns on various aspects of airpower. General Milton commanded bomber units in Europe during World War II, and held a series of high-level command and staff positions after the war. Prior to his retirement from the Air Force in 1974, he was US Representative to the NATO Military Committee.

occur to a prudent planner. They had not, for instance, lengthened the runway at Stanley, nor had they even put pierced metal planks on the island. Then, when the British submarines cut off sealift, there was insufficient airlift for the job. Another deficiency was the lack of portable runway arresting gear. It was on order, but not yet in stock. Without it, Stanley airport was unusable by A-4s or Mirages, leaving only the counterinsurgency turboprop Pucarás for island basing.

Need for Reconnaissance

So there they were, faced with a modern British fleet operating at the outer limits of the Argentine Air Force's radius of action. A still further complication was the lack of any real reconnaissance capability in pinpointing their targets. The Argentines did set forth in a Boeing 707 at 18,000 feet one day in search of the *QE II*, and while they never found that great ship, they managed to dodge a barrage of British surface-to-air missiles without harm. Lack of reconnaissance, as well as the lack of any electronic warfare capability, was a continuing source of frustration to the Argentine air commanders.

Nonetheless, they began to score some successes. The *Sheffield*, of course, was sunk by an Exocet missile delivered by a navy Super Etendard flying at wavetop height. All the world has seen pictures of that ship's final moments, but another Exocet strike claimed by the Argentines has not had British confirmation. That one involved the carrier *Invincible*. My informants claim two A-4s flew formation with the Exocet as it homed in on and struck the *Invincible*. The Argentine belief is that the missile, along with a bomb from one of the A-4s, did considerable damage below deck, judging from the smoke and fire a returning pilot reported. The British have denied that *Invincible* was ever hit, so maybe it was another ship the Argentine pilots had in their sights. It is easy to make mistakes at 400 knots on the deck, especially if someone is trying to kill you.

The Harrier jump jet gained a considerable measure of respect from the Argentine Air Force, for it proved an elusive opponent at low altitudes. But it was the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile that caused the most envy. In the opinion of the Argentines, almost any airplane becomes something to be taken seriously if it has the AIM-9L aboard. Again, they say, it was US support that gave the British this edge.



The British frigate Antelope *sinks after an undetonated bomb exploded as the British were trying to disarm it. Exocet was the best antiship weapon, but Argentina had only five available. (Wide World photo)*

Iron bombs, however, are still formidable weapons against ships. If the fuzing had not betrayed them, the Argentines feel certain they could have sunk several more ships, perhaps even turned things their way. Unhappily, the bombs too often failed to explode after they had struck their targets. The tactics were sound, the pilots skilled and aggressive, but the fuzes let them down. As for the now famous Exocet, Argentina had only five on hand.

No Regrets

Looking back on this war, the two Argentine airmen profess no regrets. The Air Force, along with some land-based navy pilots, has reason to be proud. There were severe losses—they put the number at thirty-eight airplanes—but the Argentine Air Force, they say, came out of the war with high morale, and there will surely be a monument at the Air Force Academy in Córdoba to those who were lost in combat.

If the Argentines were to fight again, they would want all their fighters to be air refuelable. Neither the Mirages nor the Etendards had that capability, a severe limiting factor to Argentine tactics. Their two KC-130s were heavily used in refueling A-4s, but the Argentines could have made good use of more and better tankers. If they had had a few KC-135s, they could have attacked the British fleet from all points of the compass.

The lack of an electronic warfare capability was a distinct handicap, and so was the lack of reconnaissance. The Argentines feel these were important disadvantages, along with, of course, their conviction that without United States help to the British, it would have been an even game.

Dormant But Not Settled

For the time being, then, the Falklands/Malvinas matter is dormant, but not, in the Argentine view, settled. A visitor to an Argentine office will see posters proclaiming the Malvinas forever. Meanwhile, the British have moved a force of some 3,000 men into the Falklands, and the runway at Stanley has been lengthened and equipped with arresting gear to accommodate a squadron of Phantoms. All indications are for prolonged British military preparedness against another Argentine move. Mrs. Thatcher, in fact, has said the United Kingdom will never give up those islands.

Nevertheless, this is very expensive business, this providing defense and a logistic lifeline to islands so far from Britain. The Argentines appear to be counting on the fact that this burden may eventually become too heavy. Meanwhile, they are thinking about modernizing their depleted air force.

Despite the fact that relations between the United States and Argentina are distinctly cooler than they were a year ago, the Argentines would probably like American airplanes if the terms are within reason and the President clears the way by certifying Argentine respectability in the matter of human rights, something he has not yet indicated he will do. There are other sources of airplanes, the Argentines say, and they are going to get them somewhere. The French are standing by with Mirage 2000s, and the Soviets have made one of those offers you cannot refuse—unless, that is, you know the Soviets.

From all indications, the military junta is approaching the end of its regime. Elections may take place as early as next year, at least in the provinces. Once the elective process is in force, some sort of Peronist victory seems assured. Maybe it will be a moderate version of Peronism, one that would begin an Argentine recovery from the present economic morass. Then again, maybe not. But whatever happens, whether Peronism, further military coups, or even an improbable shift to conservative democracy, we have not heard the last of the Falklands or the Malvinas. ■

THE FALKLANDS: A BRITISH ASSESSMENT

Political will, professional forces, and good equipment—helped along by luck and improvisation.

Britain's Near-Thing Victory

BY CHARLES W. CORDDRY

London

"JUST," the taxi driver answered with an amused smile.

The question was whether he could maneuver his cab through a narrow entry into the tiny square off Fleet Street where the newspaper I work for has its London office. "Just" is a rather stronger term in English than "just barely" is in American, signifying that, indeed, the task can be done—not to worry too much.

This thought was percolating when the taxi whizzed past the Wellington Museum at Hyde Park Corner, and one reflected that the Duke had been just ready for Waterloo. The battle was, he said afterward, "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life."

Some moments later the sight of Admiralty Arch across Trafalgar Square recalled a visit many years ago to a naval officer who explained how Britain had been, in its usual mode, "just ready" when plunged into World War II. He was thinking of the Spitfires and Hurricanes. Today people think of the Harrier.

Great Britain in 1982 went to war with Argentina in the Falkland Islands, its first conflict in a quarter century during which there had been recurrent retrenchments in its military power; once again the old saw about readiness applied. From the moment that Argentine forces invaded the islands, it was clear to the British government that in retaking the Falklands, its Task Force would be heavily outnumbered in combat aircraft.

The fine calculation was made, however, that the Falklands' location 400 miles from the Argentine

mainland, at the extreme reach of most of Argentina's warplanes, should allow "a just tolerable air situation to be obtained," as one source put it.

The calculation was right, as it turned out. Harriers and antiaircraft missiles took a terrible toll of Argentine aircraft. But there were times when it seemed a question whether the Argentine Air Force would be defeated before the Royal Navy suffered unacceptable losses.

Five British ships were sunk—two to sea-skimming Exocet missiles—and others escaped only because perhaps a dozen iron bombs were duds. The Navy and the Royal Air Force together lost no more Harriers to enemy action than the fleet lost ships—just five, all to ground fire, in the course of 1,650 sorties flown in air defense, bombing, interdiction, close support, and reconnaissance roles, from two aircraft carriers and a 690-foot metal plank runway at the San Carlos beachhead.



The Royal Navy mounted 1,500 Harrier sorties in which the jump jet proved its versatility in war. Although Harrier has a vertical takeoff and landing capability, most launches were made with use of a ramp.

For the Royal Navy, which mounted 1,500 of the Harrier sorties, and for the government, the Falklands operation proved the validity of the V/STOL aircraft and small aircraft carrier concept, if *Nimitz*-type battle groups cannot be afforded. This is provided that the horrible absence of airborne early warning, which probably caused most of the grief in the Falklands, can be overcome. Rapid conversion of Sea King helicopters to carry Searchwater radar—the first one done in eleven weeks—goes part way to meeting this problem.

The Royal Air Force Harrier GR3s are configured for close support missions in Europe. But, given that the Navy could mobilize just twenty-eight Sea Harriers in the face of about 120 land-based Argentine jets, it was immediately decided to convert RAF aircraft for possible attrition replacements. In a week's time, nine GR3s had been fitted with US all-aspect AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles, as well as Royal Navy two-inch rocket pods. Eventually fourteen were deployed. But it turned out they were not needed in the air defense role and could be dedicated to the other airpower missions.

The RAF, which also had seven pilots serving with the Navy in Sea Harriers, similarly concludes that V/STOL aircraft proved their versatility in the war and, though not optimal air combat jets, did their air-to-air job superbly in an out-of-the-NATO-area conflict.



British antiaircraft missiles took a terrible toll of the Argentine Air Force. The Rapier air defense system, shown here, accounted for thirteen of the forty British SAM kills.

Unexpected Reaction

After a two-week period of tension over an incident in South Georgia Island, a Falklands dependency, the conflict had its beginning April 2 when Argentine forces invaded the Falklands, under the total misimpression apparently that they could get away with it.

"The English are peculiar, and they get annoyed when people trifle with them," an air marshal remarked to this reporter a score or so of years ago in urging that a peace

group's hooting of a defense speech by USAF Gen. Lauris Norstad was unrepresentative. On April 2, the British were annoyed. The next day John Nott, the Defense Minister, announced that the Navy would put to sea April 5 "in wartime order and with wartime stocks."

The speed was necessary to show Argentina—and the world—that Great Britain meant business. Mr. Nott had to be allowed, therefore, some poetic license about the wartime stocks.

The swift departure of ships from British ports was feasible, it is now authoritatively pointed out here, only if a supply chain could be established to provide the essential stores not initially on board. The fleet sailed, trailing RAF helicopters, which put some of the necessities aboard as the fleet made for Ascension Island, 4,100 miles to the south. C-130 Hercules and VC-10 transports rushed stores and personnel to Ascension to be in place when the ships got to the island. From then on, Ascension was the linchpin of an operation that provided continuous supply to the front line, 3,900 miles from the island and 8,000 miles from Britain.

Air transport ranked, as a pivotal asset, with the air refueling capability, much of it swiftly improvised, that enabled bombers, fighters, transports, and reconnaissance planes to project British power to that 8,000-mile distance.

By May 21, when diplomacy clearly had failed, the British forces were landed at San Carlos. On June 14, Argentina's numerically larger but isolated and entirely dispirited forces ran up the white flag.

Learning the Lessons

Britain won the war with a combination of political will, well-trained professional forces, good equipment (some of it rapidly turned out for the conflict), geographical luck regarding the air situation—and a great deal of improvisation.

When it was over, it was possible for some—maybe many—to render a Wellington-type judgment on the nearness of the thing. John Nott was not, of course, one of those. His ministry's "interim commentary" on British equipment was close to euphoric. This ran across the spectrum and, in regard to air operations, noted that 109 Argentine aircraft were destroyed from all causes, including thirty-one Skyhawks and twenty-six Mirages. Sea Harriers accounted for twenty-seven, thanks notably to Sidewinder missiles. The various British sea- and land-based air defense missiles were credited with forty kills. All claims were under continued study to be sure which weapon did what, to wring out duplications, to determine causes of failures, and to assess future implications. The lack of airborne early warning was unblushingly called a "disadvantage."

One who decidedly took the nearthing view, in contrast to Mr. Nott, was Capt. John E. Moore, the Editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*. In the 1982–83 edition, he wrote:

"The whole of the naval effort was fully extended by an encounter with a small South American state of dubious stability, and the support work was a triumph for the British ability to produce a 'lash-up'. Time was on Britain's side. It may not be next time."

Besides these lacerating judgments, reflecting the general naval annoyance at cuts projected by Mr. Nott last year in order to moderate the rise in defense spending, the air has been full of "What-If's?" What if Argentina had had nuclear-powered submarines roaming at will in the South Atlantic, as Britain did? What if the Falklands had been just a bit closer to Argentina's land-based air, or if Argentina had been better able to manage in-flight refueling and fighter direction? What if the Harriers had been engaged more in dogfights, instead of being generally able to wait for targets on bombing missions with little chance for maneuvers? (The Harriers probably would have done well.)

But all that is as relevant as asking what if the Luftwaffe had been smart enough to fly under British radar in 1940. The point is that those were not the circumstances that existed in the Falklands war of 1982.

The circumstances that did exist were challenging enough. And, as John Moore makes brutally plain, even if by indirection, the opposing forces were not those of a Napoleon or a Hitler but of a Galtieri.

In Whitehall and Parliament, the war is still being reconstructed and everything about it is being studied for future use, from the adequacy of soles on soldiers' footgear to the structure of Her Majesty's forces. A defense White Paper is due soon. Other reports will deal with the events leading up to the war and what might have been done to head it off.

In the upshot, though, it is difficult to envision major changes in policy or forces, given the financial and security imperatives as seen by the Thatcher government. The main arena is still to the east, not the far South Atlantic. Obviously, London will see to the defense of the Falklands and to that end is arranging for air defense with F-4 Phantoms operating on a much-improved airfield at Port Stanley.

There had been increasing talk, before the 1982 conflict, of the need for out-of-area operations, in view of world changes and the reach of Soviet military power. Mr. Nott's 1981 report on defense revisions spoke of such operations, using the new small carriers and Sea Harriers "in the South Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, or further east."

Nothing like the Falklands contingency was contemplated, however; when it came, it was an *ad hoc* war.

On very little notice, the fleet was dispatched, airlift was mobilized, aircraft were adapted for refueling and weapons carriage, and Ascension Island was turned into one of the busiest bases in the world. From forty aircraft movements a month, for example, Ascension's Wide-awake Airfield expanded to 400 *a day* as the Task Force moved south.

Correcting Deficiencies

The conflict exposed quite serious deficiencies, known ones as far as the British military leadership was concerned, the most serious of which was probably the one that has been most advertised—the lack of airborne early warning.

But many of these were fixed (not AEW, alas) in an astoundingly short time, once the government decreed that money was no object; and as a

result, there have been important enhancements in military capabilities, particularly in airpower:

• The RAF Harrier, which was not scheduled to be fitted with Sidewinders until next year, received them immediately. The first aircraft was modified in thirty-six hours. For carrier duty, the GR3 was given tie-down shackles, had holes closed to keep out sea water, and was provided with a modified oxygen resupply system to be compatible with the Navy's. In two weeks, Ferranti developed and delivered FINRAE (inertial navigation rapid alignment equipment) for shipboard use in aligning the GR3's navigation-attack system.

(Of the fourteen GR3s deployed to the Falklands, all made nine-hour flights to Ascension. Ten went the rest of the way on container ships while four flew the distance (another nine hours, with no alternate) and set down directly on the carrier *Hermes*.)

• In an operation strung over 8,000 miles, maritime surveillance was an urgent need. Victor tankers were quickly modified with radar, photo, and improved navigation equipment. Using a buddy system, Victor tankers and recce aircraft conducted surface shipping surveillance and both pre- and post-attack reconnaissance of South Georgia Island in fourteen hours, forty-minute missions from Ascension.

Nimrods, the RAF's maritime reconnaissance aircraft, meanwhile, were rapidly modified for in-flight refueling so they could perform the major surveillance mission over the full operating area. Nineteen-hour sorties, with an extra pilot and navigator, became routine just four weeks after the modification was ordered. Nimrods also were given Sidewinders for self-protection, and a capability for attack with bombs, Stingray torpedoes, and Harpoon antiship missiles.

• Air operations depended on in-flight refueling. At the start, only Harriers and F-4 Phantoms (used for air defense at Ascension) were equipped as receivers, and only the two squadrons (sixteen aircraft) of Victors were available as tankers. Moreover, some tankers had to be retained for normal operations with fighters in Britain. Besides the Nimrods, therefore, it was necessary to equip Vulcan bombers and C-130 Hercules transports as receivers, and six Vulcans and four Hercules were converted to tankers as well.

Modified in five weeks for air-to-air refueling, the C-130s ran a series of missions from Ascension to the Falklands, carrying airdropped spares, mail, and other necessities, in twenty-five-hour sorties. A world record Hercules flight of twenty-eight hours and three minutes is claimed for Flight Lt. Terry Locke and his crew on an airdrop to East Falkland on June 18, four days after the cease-fire.

Reams have been written on the "lessons," real or imagined, of the Falklands war, and repetition is not needed. But perhaps these few observations are in order:

• Political resolve was vital, and of this the Thatcher government had a full supply.

• The unforeseen happens. Wars break out in unexpected places. What works well in such cases should be exploited and deficiencies should be attended to. But there are not many Falklands to repossess, and major changes for that purpose are not likely in forces designed primarily for the NATO area.

• The scene of a war is, nevertheless, hard to leave. A garrison will be required in the Falklands for an indeterminate period, with some impact on readiness elsewhere.

• Limited resources (and whose aren't?) are likely to dictate increasing cooperation between air forces and navies, as the Falklands showed abundantly and as the US Navy and USAF are demonstrating in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region.

Questions remain as to what, precisely, the United Kingdom will do about defense in light of its reconstruction and analysis of the war in the South Atlantic. Nothing said officially so far suggests any alteration of long-stated security priorities or, therefore, any radical changes in force structure. This is not just because of politicians' need to say they were generally right in last year's defense review, in which cuts fell mainly on the surface Navy.

It has already been decided, in fact, that the Navy will operate three, instead of two, 20,000-ton *Invincible*-type carriers. And the Navy would like to stop the cut in its fleet of fifty-nine destroyers and frigates at nine instead of seventeen. Any such result would be viewed triumphantly. But, if one thinks about it, the victory could prove not to be long-lasting.

British priorities, at least as long as the Tories are in power, are maintenance of the nuclear deterrent through expensive modernization with US Trident-2 missiles and new submarines; home defense, involving large outlays for Tornado aircraft; maintenance of the British Army of the Rhine at 55,000 men, and modernization of the RAF in Germany with the US-UK Harrier AV-8B and the Tornado strike version; and enhanced maritime air and submarine efforts, while reducing the surface fleet.

These priorities, and particularly the emphasis on the Trident, greatly restrict the defense debate and point the way to more problems for the Royal Navy over the long term.

Britain has, however, moved away from the 1966 Defense Review's position that the nation "will not undertake major operations of war except in cooperation with allies." Mr. Nott's review was clear on that point last year, and Prime Minister Thatcher said on conclusion of the Falklands war: "We must have the capacity to act independently. We need both the power to act and the will to see it through."

With its out-of-area plans and its much vaster nuclear enterprise, as well as its alliance commitments, Britain retains earmarks of a world power—just. ■

Charles W. Corddry is the Defense correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, *and dean of the Pentagon press corps. His articles for* AIR FORCE *Magazine have included visits to Thule, Greenland, and to the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. His most recent article for this magazine, in September '82, examined the role of the nations on NATO's northern flank. Mr. Corddry has the longest tenure among Washington correspondents on the Public Broadcasting Service program "Washington Week in Review."*

DAILY TELEGRAPH

Eight Soviet satellites spy on isles

By IAN BALL in New York

EIGHT of the intelligence-gathering satellites which Russia has in orbit over the Falklands zone have been launched since March 31, two days before the Argentine invasion, American military analysts said yesterday.

The satellites are designed to snoop on movements of both the British and Argentine navies in three separate ways—by photography, by radar sensing and by communications interception.

Details of the Soviet satellite surveillance—including the most recent launching five days ago—were published yesterday in DEFENCE DAILY, a newsletter with sound sources and an influential readership within the Nato intelligence community.

These are the custom-orbit satellites feeding information back to the Soviet Union, which may or may not be relaying data to the Argentine Government.

Radar-sensing

Cosmos 1345, launched on March 31, a radar-sensing satellite which can eavesdrop on all types of radar transmissions, particularly from ships.

Cosmos 1346, launched on March 31, an electronic listening craft designed to monitor sea and air communications in a funnel-shaped area below its orbital track.

Cosmos 1347, launched on April 2, the day of the Argentine seizure of the Falklands, a photographic reconnaissance satellite of the type which ejects photographic capsules when it passes over the Soviet Union.

Cosmos 1350 and **Cosmos 1352**, launched on April 16 and April 23 respectively, believed to be additional high-resolution photographic satellites.

Tracking Fleet

Cosmos 1351, launched on April 21, another radar-sensing satellite whose mission presumably was to track the Royal Navy Task Force as it was entering the South Atlantic.

Cosmos 1352, also launched on April 21, apparently another photographic satellite.

Cosmos 1354, launched April 28, a second electronic listening satellite designed to intercept communications.

American ground stations around the Soviet Union and intelligence-gathering satellites orbiting overhead can monitor all launchings in the Soviet Cosmos programme.

By analysing the data being telemetred back to Soviet ground stations, the American monitors can quickly determine what type of satellite has been placed in orbit.

In the latest military space-activity by the Soviet Union, only two satellites—Cosmos 1348 and Cosmos 1349—have been sent aloft with missions apparently not connected with the Falklands crisis.

Since each satellite launching represents a considerable outlay of money and resources, the concentration on what is happening on the land and seas in an area as remote as one can possibly get from the Soviet heartland is a measure of the importance Moscow evidently places on having its own swift intelligence from the area.

American military analysts doubt whether the photographic satellites have returned much useful information. The weather generally has been foul and overcast and photographic satellites have only a limited useful life.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

Casualty making good recovery

By COLIN RANDALL

THE family of Able Seaman Ian Britnell, Britain's first casualty in action in the South Atlantic, were told yesterday that he is making a "good recovery" after an operation.

A.B. Britnell, 20, a gunner in the Amazon class frigate Arrow, 2,815 tons, received a splinter injury to the lower chest during an airborne counter-attack on his ship.

At the family's home in Teignmouth, Devon, yesterday, his mother Mrs Mavis Pownell, 42, said her son was reported to be "pottering around" a hospital ship after surgery to remove splinters.

She added: "Obviously we feel a lot happier now, knowing he is on the mend. We are hoping the Royal Navy will fly him home as soon as he is fit enough."

DAILY TELEGRAPH

BBC 'NEAR TO TREASON' SAYS MP

By KEITH NURSE

PRESENTATION of Falklands news on B.B.C-2's "Newsnight" on Sunday evening was "totally offensive and almost treasonable," Mr John Page, Conservative MP for Harrow West, said yesterday.

He added: "I was upset during Sunday because it seemed to me that the report from the Ministry of Defence and the Argentine Government were being presented with equal credibility.

"Then on 'Newsnight' Peter Snow used the expressions—'if we believe the British' and 'the only damage the British admitted. . .'"

Of his earlier reference to treason, Mr Page said: "My language was perhaps a little colourful. But it was really serious in the context of the fact that overseas correspondents in England might have been watching and have seen that the B.B.C were sceptical about the veracity of the British Government reports.

Totally offensive

"The use of the phrase 'if we believe the British' is totally unacceptable in a war situation. I don't think an experienced broadcaster should have allowed that to pass his lips. I find it totally offensive."

Mr Page, who has complained to the Corporation added: "With British troops in action they should have acted with a bit more responsibility, especially in view of the fact that there are B.B.C correspondents with the Task Force who have confirmed the accuracy of the M.O.D reports.

"The reports of the MOD and those of the reporters with the Task Force are amazingly factual and quick.

"I don't think anyone could complain that the public are being kept in the dark. If anything, there is an almost dangerous amount of information."

Responding to the criticism, the BBC said yesterday: "In times of hostility, as at all other times, the BBC has to guard its reputation for telling the truth.

"In its coverage of the situation in the South Atlantic, BBC Television and Radio has reported British, American and Argentine statements and reactions while stressing the unreliability of Argentine claims."

The B.B.C-2 "Newsnight" report by Peter Snow had been designed to illustrate "the extent of the falsity of Argentine propaganda and to emphasise that the official British version of events had been substantiated by the B.B.C correspondent with the Fleet."

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British ship hit in battle of South Atlantic

By GEORGE JONES and NORMAN KIRKHAM

BATTLE was joined in the South Atlantic last night between the British fleet and Argentine war planes after a day of rapidly escalating military conflict over the Falklands.

A month after the Argentines invaded the islands, the British naval task force moved on to the offensive in the struggle to regain them.

The action started when Port Stanley airfield — the Argentines' last remaining link with the mainland—was put out of action by daring bombing raids with a lone Vulcan bomber leading a wave of Harrier jump jets from the carrier Hermes. Later:

● Two Argentine Mirage fighters were shot down by a British Sea Harrier jet in aerial combat over the fleet and other enemy aircraft damaged.

● Six ships from t he Royal Navy task force began bombarding Argentine military positions on the Falklands.

The dramatic escalation of the crisis, with Britain launching the battle of the Falklands, brought a rash of counter claims from the Argentine military junta in Buenos Aires.

A military spokesman alleged that three frigates in the British task force had been damaged, but earlier claims that two Harriers had been shot down in the attack on Port Stanley airfield were denied emphatically in London.

The captain of Hermes, Lynn Middleton said none of the task force Harriers had been shot down and that there had been no British air casualties.

Task force helicopters were searching for the downed Argentine pilots.

It was understood a British ship took a hit during the battle but it was thought damage was not serious.

Argentina's military chiefs of staff said British helicopters had also attacked the settlement of Darwin on East Falkland—the same island as Port Stanley is on. They claimed a Pucara aircraft which was on the ground undergoing repairs had been damaged in the raid.

Earlier a lone Vulcan bomber and Sea Harriers had struck at the Port Stanley airstrip, leaving the runway wrecked by deep craters. Several Argentine military planes were destroyed on the ground.

The Vulcan, refuelled in the air during a 13-hour round trip from Ascension Island, had led the raid to cut the last supply link for the estimated 10,000

Vulcan bomber



Sea Harrier

Argentine troops occupying the islands.

The bombings—the start of the British campaign to recapture the Falklands—were carried through without loss of British aircraft or their pilots. One Harrier received a bullet hole in the tail, but this was soon repaired after it returned safely to the carrier Hermes.

After returning to the carrier the Harrier pilots said they had met heavy but ineffective anti-aircraft fire.

"It was like firework night. They were just hosing the anti-aircraft fire into the sky," said Senior Pilot Mike Blissett.

The raids prompted a series of confusing claims from Argentine military spokesmen in Buenos Aires. They said the attacks had been "repulsed by anti-aircraft fire" and that two Harriers had been shot down.

The Argentine spokesman admitted that six of their troops were "slightly wounded".

Argentina protested to the UN Security Council that the air strikes had been "in violation" of the Council's resolution 502 calling for cessation of hostilities.

A UN spokesman said last night that Senor Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General, was following up the Falklands crisis with the help of a special "task force" set up to monitor events and draw up contingency plans for possible UN intervention.

Sir Anthony Parsons, British Ambasador to the UN, pointed out in a letter to the Security Council that Briain had bombed the airstrips in exercise of her right of self defence under the UN charter. The UN Secretary General will have a working dinner in New York tonight with Mr Pym, the Foreign Secretary, and they will hold further talks tomorrow.

The raids were a forceful demonstration of British military capability and Mrs Thatcher's determination to liberate the islands from their month-long occupation by Argentina.

The first news of the raid came in a brief announcement from the Ministry of Defence yesterday morning.

A statement said the attack had been carried out to enforce the total exclusion zone around the Falklands which took effect at noon on Friday.

"The notice issued on April 28 made it clear that, after 48 hours warning, the airport would be closed and that any aircraft on the ground would be liable to attack.

"Early this morning, British aircraft took action to enforce the total exclusion and to deny

Other Falklands crisis news—
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the Argentines the use of the airstrip at Port Stanley."

Argentina claimed that the airfield remained "operable" and that the attack had not affected Argentina's ability to defend the islands.

News of the attack was flashed to Mrs Thatcher at 8.30am before she left for Chequers from Bedfordshire where she had stayed overnight after a Conservative party meeting. The order for the raid, the first British strike against the Argentine forces occupying the Falklands, came after two meetings of Mrs Thatcher's inner "war" Cabinet on Friday.

Government sources last night described the attack on the airstrip as a "deliberate further tightening of the screw" on the Argentine junta. It was being seen as a demonstration of Britain's capability and will to retake the Falklands by force, if necessary, although diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement have not been abandoned.

The raid came only hours before Mr Pym flew to Washington for talks today with Mr Haig, American Secretary of State.

Safe return for all our airmen

By R. H GREENFIELD, PETER DOBBIE and DEREK WOOD

THE first attack by Royal Air Force Vulcans on Port Stanley airfield took place during Friday night, the Ministry of Defence said yesterday.

Royal Navy Sea Harrier aircraft carried out a further attack at dawn.

A Ministry spokesman said both operations had been successful and all aircraft and personnel involved had returned safely. "There were no casualties," he said.

Goose Green airfield, to the south-west of Port Stanley on East Falkland, was also attacked.

The Defence Ministry spokesman said: "I can now confirm that runways and aircraft on the ground were hit, in particular the runway at Port Stanley was severely cratered. A full damage assessment is still awaited."

He said the targets were military targets on Port Stanley airfield and Goose Green airfield.

Referring to reports that British ships had been attacked by Argentine aircraft, he said: "We have no reports of any such attacks."

The Vulcan attack involved a round trip of some 13 hours with several air refuellings by Victor tanker aircraft on both outward and return journeys. The night raid was almost certainly carried out at medium altitudes using radar to pinpoint the target.

The Vulcan carries up to 21 one thousand pound bombs and is equipped designed to blot out enemy radars.

The Sea Harrier attack was to complete the wrecking of the airfield and its facilities. The Sea Harriers are equipped to carry bombs and rocket projectiles and carry 30mm cannons.

The British task force and the Argentine invaders of the Falklands are now confronting each other face to face, and the British have drawn first blood.

The destruction of Port Stanley airfield cuts off the Argentine garrison from its last source of re-supply, and the junta will be under extreme pressure to hit back at the earliest opportunity.

Predictions of open war between Britain and Argentina are now a reality. The double attack by the RAF and Royal Navy, coming on top of the imposition of American sanctions, is a severe blow to Argentina and the task force can now afford to await an Argentina response.

With its carrier borne Sea Harriers to serve as both eyes and arms the task force can take up stations to the east of the Falklands safely beyond the range of aircraft from the Argentine mainland, and enforce the blockade from there.

The only way the Argentine junta can hit back is to send out the Argentine Navy, now patrolling near the mainland coast, and in particular its elderly aircraft carrier the Veinticinco de Mayo — and they will be aware that four British submarine commanders are waiting for them to do precisely that.

In the longer term, Admiral Woodward must decide how to advise the Government in choosing between the task force's three clear options.

The force may rely on the effects of the blockade to wear the Argentine garrison down keeping its landing force as a threat in hand, and confining attacks to strikes on blockade runners or further hit-and-run raids.

It may keep up the momen-

Continued on Back Page, Col. 1

tum of its successful attacks on South Georgia and Port Stanley and land swiftly on the Falklands.

Or it may wait for its reinforcements to catch up and land in strength.

Unless plans are altered by an Argentine riposte, the indications are that the force will delay further major moves until it has been joined by all its reinforcements.

Canberra and other ships of the force in the South Atlantic are awaiting final positions.

This will give Admiral Woodward a landing force of two Royal Marine Commando units and two Parachute Regiment battalion groups, plus supporting troops and another 20 Harriers — approximately double the strength available to him on South Georgia.

To make a landing in the Falklands will mean bringing the task force within range of Argentine Mirage III and Dagger aircraft based on the mainland and facing an Argentine garrison estimated at 6,000—8,000. For that he will want all the strength he can muster.

Early or late, the task force commander must decide where to land. Here the broad choice lies between West Falkland or East Falkland.

West Falkland is sparsely inhabited and probably lightly garrisoned (there is understood to be one Argentine battalion at Fox Bay), have an excellent anchorage at Port Egmont and is separated from the force around Port Stanley by the tide that rips round the Falkland Sound.

There a British force could establish itself free of serious harassment except from the air and improve one of the many settlement air strips ready to take reinforcements flown in by the Hercules transports being converted to fly non-stop from Britain.

The alternative is to land on East Falkland itself, some distance from Port Stanley but near an airstrip, and rely on the appaling terrain of rock and bog to prevent the Argfientines mounting a full scale attack, before reinforcements can arrive. The task force has the advantage of a squadron of Scorpions and Scimitars, probably the only armoured vehicles capable of fighting across such ground without bogging down.

following correspondents a photostat of the five-line document, which the Royal Navy interpreter had prepared overnight for the garrison commander to sign, the captain said that in fact over his signature the young lieutenant commander inserted the words "I surrender to the superior forces of the invading British force."

"I said: 'No deal. Delete the word "invasion".' the captain said. "He said 'No' and I said 'All right, no surrender,' and then deleted it."

The captain said they took aboard the 37 scrap metal merchants and six of the garrison. "I think they were quite relieved to be in the warm and have some nice food."

The final task was the removal of more than 1,300lb of explosives that had been laid around the area, wired up to five separate detonators. The mines were planted in both bays.

"The Argentinians who laid them were the best people to make them safe so we employed them to clear the area," he said.

GUERRILLAS URGE END TO JUNTA

An outlawed Left-wing guerrilla group has called for replacement of the Argentine military government by a broad-based provisional government to rally the people in the fight against Britain over the Falklands.

A statement in Havana issued by the "montonero movement," denounced Argentina's ruling military junta as "an oligarchic tyranny" and called for Latin-American volunteers to be sent to the Falklands to bolster their defence against Britain. — Reuter.

INVINCIBLE DECISION 'SCANDALOUS'

By Our Melbourne Correspondent

Political fighting about the future of the carrier Invincible continues to rage in Australia. It follows a Government announcement that it was introducing defence cuts after deciding to buy the 16,000-ton ship.

Mr Hayden, Opposition leader, last night repeated his statement that Labour would seek a buyer for the Invincible if it were returned to office. He said the chaos inflicted on defence by the purchase was scandalous and dangerous.

The Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, in his weekly radio talk to his electorate, defended the purchase. He said the Government was fulfilling its fundamental responsibility to keep the nation secure.

Statements issued by both sides

THE following is the Defence Ministry statement issued at 12.30 p.m. yesterday:

As you know yesterday before dawn Vulcan aircraft attacked Port Stanley airfield. Subsequently there was a follow-up attack by a substantial number of Sea Harriers.

The result was a severely damaged runway at Port Stanley Airfield and considerable damage to surrounding military installations and stores.

Goose Green was also attacked by a number of Sea Harriers. This local airstrip was damaged together with a number of Argentine military aircraft parked in its vicinity.

All our aircraft and crews returned safely. There was only minor damage to one aircraft which did not affect its capability and which has now in any case been repaired. There were no Task Force casualties.

Aircraft attack

In the late afternoon of the same day elements of the Task Force situated within the Total Exclusion Zone bombarded Port Stanley Airfield to reinforce the effects of the bombing and to deter repair work.

While this bombardment was taking place Argentine fighter and bomber aircraft attacked the ships. They were engaged by Sea Harriers which shot down one Mirage aircraft. Another of the Argentine Mirage aircraft is believed to have been shot down by Argentine gunfire from around the airport.

During the evening the Argentines mounted a bombing raid on our Task Force. One of their Canberras was shot down by a Sea Harrier. Another was severely damaged. The raid was ineffective.

Only one ship was damaged and that was only superficial splinter damage. The frigate is continuing to perform its operational task. The only casualty was Able Seaman Ian Brinnell from Teignmouth, Devon, who sustained a splinter wound. He is only slightly wounded and able to walk.

We have no reports of further engagements to date. In the last 24 hours we have lost one aircraft, fixed wing or helicopters.



Harriers downed says Argentina

ARGENTINA's official communique on Saturday's fighting said:

1—At around 4.40 a.m. local time (07.30 G M T) the first English air attack starts against Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), that left nothing more than a small fire on the airport runway.

2—At 8.15 (11.15 G M T), English planes again, flying low, try to destroy the runway but no not achieve their objective in the face of stiff resistance from defensive fire.

3—At 9.38 (12.38 G M T), there is an attempt at a helicopter troop landing at Puerto Darwin (West of Port Stanley), and a Pucara (counter insurgency) plane that was being repaired in the area is damaged. Harrier planes attack the airport. Two of them are shot down, and it is believed that two more did not make it back to the aircraft carrier.

Navy spotted

4—At 12.25 p.m. (15.25 G MT), 11 English ships are spotted 20 miles from Puerto Argentino.

5—At 2.50 (17.50 GMT) there is another air raid on the runway at Puerto Argentino but it does not cause any damage.

6—At 3.30 p.m. 18.30 GMT) the enemy tries a helicopter troop-landing on the north part of Isla Soledad (East Falkland Island), covered by Sea Harriers It is broken up by the action of Pucaras. The number of ships near Puerto Argentino increases, and the presence of two aircraft carriers is confirmed.

7—At 5 p.m. (20.00 GMT), planes from the (Argentine) air force attack (British) naval units in a first wave that causes serious damage to a frigate and lesser damage to three other (frigates) which leave the operations zone.

Second attack

8—At 5.15 (20.15 G M T) there is a second air attack on the enemy fleet, inflicting an as-yet unconfirmed amount of damage to an aircraft carrier. Two (Argentine) Dagger planes are lost in the action.

During these actions the enemy lost, for sure, three Sea Harriers and two combat helicopters. There is evidence as well that four more (British) planes fell into the sea.

9—At 9 p.m. (00.00 G M T) there is an attack and an attempt to land with helicopters in the area of the airport in Puerto Argentino. There is naval fire from frigate-type ships.

10—The attack was repulsed with artillery fire. The attack ended, and the English ships started sailing away.

11—(Argentina's) personal and equipment losses are not significant as of this moment. —A P.

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Airfield 'inoperable'

By Maj. Gen. EDWARD FURSDON
Defence Correspondent

THE airfield runway at Port Stanley was so severely damaged by Saturday's V-bomber and Harrier attacks that the Ministry of Defence said last night it would be "difficult to believe it was now operable."

The first strike was made by R A F Vulcans in the dark at about 4.30 a.m. local time It must have taken the Argentines completely by surprise, with the dark rendering ineffective their optically-sighted Tigercat anti-aircraft missiles.

How many Vulcans made the final bombing run is not yet public, but for obvious reasons more than one aircraft would have flown the mission.

As well as cratering the airfield's runway considerable damage was also done to the surrounding Argentine military installations, radar equipment and stores.

The loss of vital fuel, ammunition and ration stocks, and gistic stores, will be a severe ow for the defending Argentine garrison.

Aircraft hit

Aircraft on the ground would also have been damaged. If these were the helicopters upon which the Argentine garrison depends for the movement of men and supplies between islands then their ability to support and maintain any isolated troop positions—in view of the appalling normal difficulties of getting around the 200-odd islands — will have been hit very hard

Royal Navy Sea Harriers from the task force aircraft carrier Hermes made a follow-up strike at dawn, with 1,000lb bombs and other armament.

The Harriers also attacked the short grass airstrip at Goose Green.

This is near Port Darwin, on East Falkland, some 70 miles west of Port Stanley.

Argentine military aircraft were parked around the airstrip.

All the British aircraft and their crews returned safely from their missions. One aircraft suffered minor damage—believed to have been a bullet hole—but this did not affect its capability, and repair has already been completed.

Reports indicate that the Argentine anti-aircraft fire against the Harriers was heavy, but ineffective—much of it "just hosepiping around the sky."

Late on Saturday afternoon, frigates of the task force bombarded Port Stanley airfield and its installations, principally with their 4·5 inch guns. This was to reinforce the effects of the earlier bombing and to act as a deterrent to repair work.

While this was going on, Argentine fighter and bomber aircraft, which had earlier been probing the outer area of the task force, attacked these ships.

Sea Harriers immediately engaged them, and one Argentine Mirage fighter was shot down. A second Mirage is believed to have been shot down by Argentine gunfire from the region of the airport.

During the evening, Argentine bombers mounted an ineffective bombing attack on the task force. One Argentine, ex-R.A.F. Canbera bomber was shot down by a Sea Harrier and another was severely damaged.

On the British side, one frigate suffered superficial splinter damage.

The only casualty was Able Seaman Ian Britnell, from Teignmouth, South Devon. He was, however, only slightly wounded, and is able to walk around.

Throughout all the actions it has been the British intention not to cause any civilian casualties. The Defence Ministry stated yesterday that Britain was "still not at war" and the action being taken was that of "self defence under the terms of the United Nations Charter."

Despite reports coming from the Argentine, the Ministry was able to confirm at noon yesterday that no British aircraft, fixed wing or helicopter, had been lost in the preceding 24 hours; and that the slightly wounded able seaman was the only British casualty.

The Falklands task force was launched with tremendous speed and efficiency.

Its subsequent military highlights, however, have followed a very successful but strangely predictable self-fulfilling pattern.

Its outside outward dimension has been one of sequential public steps—almost in slow-motion—which have come as no surprise to anyone.

Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward, having established the sea and air blockade, now faces the choice of whether or not to invade the islands.

On the one hand, there would be advantages in an early invasion.

It would exploit the confusion and disruption caused by his recent attacks, before the Argentine garrison commander has had time to re-organise his resources and re-plan his defence.

The plight of the Falkland Islanders, too, is relevant, and an early end to their ordeal in a situation of increasing isolation must be another strong factor for going in quickly.

Merit of blockade

On the other hand, the admiral could argue that there was much merit in letting the Argentine garrison enjoy a prolonged experience of the discomfort of an air and sea blockade.

A wait, punctuated by periodic bombardments and air strikes, would add to the physical fatigue which constant exposure to bombardments and alertness against surprise from an unknown quarter induces.

The situation of progressive strangulation of the garrison's life-maintaining supplies of food, water and medical items would be bound to be worrying.

Delay in invasion would also give time for more political pressure to be applied, thus possibly reducing the risk of casualties to both sides of further armed conflict.

It would also enable Admiral Woodward's additional Harriers and helicopters, now fast sailing towards the South Atlantic, to catch up with him.



FALKLAND ISLANDS - 2ND MOD STATEMENT 1200 HRS 2 MAY 1982

As you know yesterday before dawn VULCAN aircraft attacked Port Stanley airfield. Subsequently there was a follow up attack by a substantial number of Sea Harriers. The result was a severely damaged runway at Port Stanley airfield and considerable damage to surrounding military installations and stores. Goose Green was also attacked by a number of Sea Harriers. This local air strip was damaged together with a number of Argentinian military aircraft parked in its vicinity. All our aircraft and crews returned safely. There was only minor damage to one aircraft which did not affect its capability and which has now in any case been repaired. There were no Task Force casualities.

In the late afternoon of the same day elements of the Task Force situated within the Total Exclusion Zone bombarded Port Stanley airfield to reinforce the effects of the bombing and to deter repair work. While this bombardment was taking place Argentinian fighter and bomber aircraft attacked the ships. They were engaged by Sea Harriers which shot down one Mirage aircraft. Another of the Argentinian Mirage aircraft is believed to have been shot down by Argentinian gun fire from around the airport. During the evening the Argentinians mounted a bombing raid on our Task Force. One of their Canberras was shot down by a Sea Harrier. Another was severely damaged. The raid was ineffective. Only one ship was damaged and that was only superficial splinter damage. The frigate is continuing to perform its operational task.

The only casualty was Able Seaman Ian Britnell from Teignmouth, Devon, who sustained a splinter wound. He is only slightly wounded and able to walk

We have no reports of further engagements to date. In the past 24 hours we have lost no fixed wing aircraft or helicopters.

C59/26

The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation

Following are a statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, submitted to the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 5, 1982, and an annex on the legal aspects of the crisis negotiations submitted to that committee;[1] U.S. proposals for an agreement made to Argentina and the United Kingdom of April 27; an Argentine note of May 28 transmitting a letter from the Argentine Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State of April 29; the Peru-U.S. proposal of May 5; a British Government document of May 21, with annex; and an Argentine diplomatic note to the Department of State of May 26.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS' PREPARED STATEMENT, AUG. 5, 1982[1]

I was delighted to receive your invitation to review with this committee the impact of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands conflict on the inter-American system and specifically on U.S. relations with Latin America.

The clash between Argentina and the United Kingdom erupted suddenly, then as quickly disappeared from the headlines. It left in its wake some haunting questions—about how to prevent war in the hemisphere, about the future of inter-American cooperation, even about regional stability and progress.

This is not the first time that these islands have vividly illustrated the risk of massive repercussions from modest origins. These "few spots of earth which, in the desert of the ocean, had almost escaped notice" once brought "the whole system of European empire" to the point of convulsion. The remark is from *Thoughts on the Late Transactions Respecting Falkland's Islands,* written by Samuel Johnson in 1771.

This prepared statement addresses the disturbing consequences of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas crisis and records something of the origins and course of the conflict itself.

Origins of the Conflict

The territory immediately at issue consists of two main islands and some 200 smaller ones located in the South Atlantic 480 miles northeast of Cape Horn. The islands cover a total area of 4,700 square miles. Their terrain is alternately boggy and hilly, the environment wind-swept and virtually treeless. Samuel Johnson described it as "a bleak and barren spot in the Magellanick Ocean of which no use could be made." But Johnson never went there to see for himself. A U.S. Foreign Service officer who did so more than two centuries later in the course of her consular duties reported that "work is hard but life is simple and not uncomfortable." According to the 1980 census, the population was 1,813—down from the 1931 peak of 2,392. The predominant economic activity is the production of fine wool.

It is their relationship to the outside world rather than their marginal profitability that has made these islands a source of seemingly endless contention. Even their name reflects disagreement—though in English they are known as the Falklands, in the Spanish-speaking world they are invariably known as the Malvinas. There is even controversy over which European first sighted the islands in the 16th century.

But the central dispute has always been over sovereignty. In 1770 England, France, and Spain almost went to war over small outposts embodying competing claims to exclusive dominion on the islands. That crisis was resolved pragmatically when Spain restored to England the settlement of Port Egmont on Saunders Island off West Falkland, founded originally by English settlers in 1766, then seized by Spain. In turn, Spain kept Port Louis, which had originally been founded by France in 1764 on East Falkland. Both Spain and England maintained their broader sovereignty claims.

In 1774, apparently for reasons of economy, England withdrew from Port Egmont, leaving behind a leaden plaque declaring that "Falkland's Island" was the "sole right and property" of King George III. From 1774 to 1811, the islands were administered without challenge by a succession of Spanish governors under the authority of the Vice Royalty of La Plata in Buenos Aires.

In 1820 Argentina formally claimed sovereignty over the then-uninhabited islands as the successor to Spain. In one of the many ironies of this history, the Frigate *Heroina,* sent to enforce Argentina's control, was commanded by David Jewett, one of the many British subjects who fought in the Wars of Liberation in the service of the Argentine Republic. In 1826 Argentina established a new capital at the protected harbor of Stanley on East Falkland. In 1833, after a series of incidents over fishing rights, one of which had led to action by the U.S.S. *Lexington* against Argentine authorities, the corvette H.M.S. *Clio* reasserted Britain's claim.

For nearly a century and a half—until an Argentine naval force invaded Port Stanley last April 2—Britain administered the islands, first as a Crown Colony, then as a self-governing dependency. The royally chartered Falklands Islands Company undertook the first large-scale settlement of the islands and provided ships that made four or five round trips a year to Britain exchanging the islands' wool and hides for everything from chocolates to building materials.

Argentina's Claims

Argentina's commitment to recover territories Argentines believe were illegally wrested from them by force is documented in countless pamphlets, articles, and books, some of them distributed widely in Latin America. For the past 40 years or so, the claim to the "Malvinas" has been an important component of Argentine nationalism, endorsed by prominent civilian and military leaders across the political spectrum.

Immediately after World War II, Argentina moved its claims beyond the bilateral exchanges that had marked its efforts to recover the islands in the 19th and early 20th centuries. At inter-American conferences in Rio in 1947, Bogota in 1948, Washington in 1953, and Caracas in 1954, Argentine delegations introduced resolutions pressing Argentina's claims within a general framework of decolonization. In the arctic summer of 1947–48, an Argentine task force of two cruisers and six destroyers conducted maneuvers off the islands but left when Britain dispatched warships in response.

Department of State Bulletin

Argentine diplomacy registered a significant gain in 1964. Since 1946 the United Nations had treated the United Kingdom as the administering authority under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2065(XX) called upon Argentina and the United Kingdom to initiate talks with a view to resolving their conflicting sovereignty claims peacefully. Confidential bilateral talks began in 1966. With numerous ups and downs and occasional interruptions, Argentine-U.K. negotiations continued for 16 years. Agreements were reached providing for Argentine facilitation of air travel and communications, postal and medical services, education, and oil supply. The two sides remained far apart, however, on the basic issue of sovereignty and such related issues as land ownership and residence by Argentines. The last precrisis round of talks took place in New York in February 1982, ending barely 6 weeks before Argentina attempted to settle the matter by force.

It has been said that Britain's approach reflected a stubborn colonialist reflex. The fact that over the last generation, no fewer than nine members of the Organization of American States have received their independence in peace and good will from the United Kingdom suggests that the situation was rather more complex. The resident islanders—hardy individuals predominantly of Scottish and Welsh extraction—proved to be satisfied with British rule and adamantly united in opposing Argentine claims. Throughout the negotiations, Britain stood by the proposition that the rights and views of the inhabitants must be respected in any future disposition of the islands.

The standoff became rooted in principle as well as nationality—Britain arguing for self-determination, Argentina for territorial integrity.

U.S. Position

The United States has at no time taken a legal position on the merits of the competing sovereignty claims. In the 19th century, U.S. officials made clear that—because the British claims antedated 1823—the United States did not consider the reassertion of British control a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States, however, refused to become embroiled in the sovereignty issue and took no position on Argentine and British sovereignty claims.

Thirty-five years ago, at the signing of the final act of the 1947 Rio conference which created the Rio treaty, the U.S. delegation, headed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, made clear our view that the Rio treaty is without effect upon outstanding territorial disputes between American and European states—and explicitly refused to endorse Argentina's claims.

U.S. neutrality on the question of sovereignty has been confirmed repeatedly since then—at the Organization of American States and the United Nations, as well as during the recent fighting. I reassert it again today, before this body: The United States takes no position on the merits of the competing claims to sovereignty, nor on the legal theories on which the parties rely.

For the record, I would like to add that although we, of course, have an interest in peace there as elsewhere, the United States has no direct interest in the islands. Because some comments abroad have suggested otherwise, I state explicitly that the United States has never had, and does not now have, any interest in establishing a military base of any kind on these islands. The only occasion on which any U.S. military presence has ever been contemplated was in April-May 1982 as a contribution to a peaceful resolution had one been agreed to between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

The Occupation and Response

Argentina's surprise military occupation of the islands beginning April 2 provoked dismay and apprehension throughout the international community. The next day, April 3, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 502, demanding immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine troops and calling on Argentina and the United Kingdom to resolve their differences diplomatically. Invoking the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the United Kingdom dispatched a war fleet toward the islands.

The looming military confrontation put the inter-American system under great stress. Some said that because war would pit an American republic against an outside power, the Rio treaty required that all its members come to the assistance of the American republic.

Others said that the inter-American system—which protects regional order based on law and the peaceful settlement of disputes—could in no way be interpreted to support the resort to force to settle a dispute.

The U.S. position was that because the unlawful resort to force did not come from outside the hemisphere, this was not a case of extracontinental aggression against which we were—and are—all committed to rally.

These different responses to a conflict for which the inter-American system was not designed led to heated exchanges among foreign ministers at the meeting of the Rio treaty Organ of Consultation that began April 26. Two days later, the organ adopted, by a vote of 17–0–4 (the United States abstaining), a resolution that urged an immediate truce, recognition of the "rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the islanders," and called for "negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict."

Negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the conflict had, in fact, been the central objective of the U.S. response to the crisis.

U.S. efforts to encourage a negotiated settlement began even before the initial use of force. In late March, we offered to the two sides our good offices to help find a peaceful solution to an incident on South Georgia Island on March 19 when an Argentine salvage team was threatened with expulsion for operating without British permission. On April 1, learning that Argentine military action appeared imminent, President Reagan called President Galtieri to urge that Argentina desist from the use of force.

After Argentina forcibly occupied the islands, both President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher encouraged the United States to see whether it could be of assistance in finding a solution. At President Reagan's direction, Secretary Haig undertook two rounds of intense discussions in each capital.

On April 27, as prospects for more intense hostilities increased, the United States put forward a proposal of its own. It represented our best estimate of what the two parties could reasonably be expected to accept. It was founded squarely on U.N. Security Council Resolution 502, which both sides asserted they accepted.

The U.S. proposal called for negotiations to remove the islands from the list of non-self-governing territories under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. It specified that the definitive status of the islands must be mutually agreed, with due regard for the rights of the in-

habitants and for the principle of territorial integrity. And it referred both to the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and to the relevant resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly.

Those negotiations were to be completed by the end of the year. Pending their conclusion, an interim authority composed of Argentina, Britain, and the United States was to oversee the traditional local administration to be sure that no decision was taken contrary to the agreement. Argentine residents of the islands were to participate in local councils for this purpose. During the interim period travel, transportation, and movement of persons between the islands and the mainland were to be promoted and facilitated without prejudice to the rights and guarantees of the inhabitants.

The proposed interim authority of the three countries was to make proposals to facilitate the negotiations, including recommendations on how to take into account the wishes and interests of the inhabitants and on what the role of the Falkland Islands Company should be. Should the negotiations not have been completed by year's end, the United States was to be asked to engage in a formal mediation/conciliation effort in order to resolve the dispute within 6 months.

The British Government indicated that our proposal presented certain real difficulties but that it would seriously consider it. However, the proposal was not acceptable to the Argentine Government, which continued to insist that any solution must have a predetermined outcome.

On April 30, in light of Argentina's continued unwillingness to compromise, we took concrete measures to underscore that the United States could not and would not condone the unlawful use of force to resolve disputes. The President ordered limited economic and military measures affecting Argentina and directed that we would respond positively to requests for materiel support for British forces but without any direct U.S. military involvement. Secretary Haig's statement announcing these measures emphasized our belief that no strictly military outcome could endure, that a negotiated settlement would be necessary in the end, and that the United States remained ready to assist the parties in finding that settlement.

On May 5 President Belaunde of Peru took the initiative to put forward a new peace plan, drawing also on the fundamental elements of Resolution 502. We worked closely with him. The simplified text forwarded by Peru to Buenos Aires and London called for an immediate cease-fire, concurrent withdrawal and nonreintroduction of forces, administration of the islands by a contact group pending definitive settlement in consultation with the elected representatives of the islanders, acknowledgement of conflicting claims, acknowledgement in the final settlement of the aspirations and interests of the islanders, and an undertaking by the contact group to insure that the two parties reached a definitive agreement by April 30, 1983.

Britain made clear that it could seriously consider the proposal. Argentina asked instead for the U.N. Secretary General to use his good offices as, of course, it was its full privilege to do.

By this time, however, the military tempo was rapidly overtaking the negotiators. On May 2 two torpedoes from a British submarine sank the *General Belgrano*, Argentina's only cruiser. On May 4 a sea-skimming missile from an Argentine jet devastated the H.M.S. *Sheffield*, a modern British destroyer. Despite intense new efforts by the U.N. Secretary General, the war we had worked so hard to avoid had come in earnest.

By June 14, when the Union Jack was again raised over Port Stanley, what Horace Walpole had in 1770 called "a morsel of rock that lies somewhere at the very bottom of America" had become the improbable scenario of bitter fighting. More than 1,000 men and women were dead. Billions of dollars had been expended. Emotions had surfaced in both countries that promise to make this issue and others even harder to resolve in the future.

The Future

I said at the onset that the South Atlantic war faces us with several haunting questions.

Perhaps the most fundamental is how better to prevent war in the future in this hemisphere.

Many of us feared as soon as Argentina acted April 2 that the fighting would escalate. Argentina, it is true, did not cause casualties in its takeover. But that did little to diminish the shock. Any use of force invites further use of force. The shock in this case was increased because the two countries were both linked in friendship to us and to each other. It grew when brave men on both sides began to risk and lose their lives. But perhaps the deepest shock came because war between states had been virtually unknown in the Americas in our time.

In the world as a whole, some 4 million persons have lost their lives in armed action between states since the Second World War. Including the toll in the South Atlantic, fewer than 4,000 of them have died in the Western Hemisphere. The countries of Latin America spend less of their national resources for arms than any other area in the world. Their military expenditures come to only 1.4% of GNP—a quarter of the average in the Third World as a whole.

The South Atlantic war—the fact of major fighting and the clear advantages demonstrated by modern weapons—means that military institutions, throughout the hemisphere but especially in South America, have powerful new claims to resources. Because Latin America's military institutions and arsenals are relatively modest in size, demands for advanced weapons systems and for the expertise to maintain and employ them are likely to increase. Governments will also look for self-sufficiency in defense industries, for bigger stocks of weapons.

Budgetary limitations will, of course, constrain purchases, but we would be mistaken to expect arms modernization to be deferred as a result of the South Atlantic conflict. On the contrary. The duration and intensity of the fighting called into question the assumption that the inter-American system guarantees that interstate conflicts in this hemisphere would be limited to a few days of actual fighting.

A new emphasis on military preparedness in a region long plagued by territorial disputes and military involvement in politics would undeniably challenge every member of the inter-American system.

The hemisphere is laced with territorial questionmarks. The prevalence of territorial tensions (e.g., among Argentina-Chile-Peru-Bolivia-Ecuador, Colombia-Venezuela-Guyana, Nicaragua-Colombia, Guatemala-Belize) puts a premium on the peaceful settlement of disputes. To take just one example, tensions between Guatemala and Belize—the only place in the hemisphere other than the Falklands where the United Kingdom stations combat troops—will continue to fester if unresolved.

The challenge to regional peacekeeping is far from hopeless, however. The U.S. response to the crisis may serve to deter others from resorting to force. Moreover, the inter-American system equips the New World with the means to prevent or control the conflicts that have kept other continents from realizing their potential.

Machinery exists to anticipate disputes and permit their peaceful and definitive settlement—various inter-American arbitration and conciliation agreements, OAS peacekeeping mechanisms, the International Court of Justice, even the treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the world's first nuclear-free zone in a populated area. What appears lacking is the will to use this machinery to prevent and resolve contentious problems. The United States and other countries of the area have at one time or another been involved in calming or negotiating most of them. But this is a branch of hemispheric diplomacy that deserves fresh attention.

The interest of American states is clearly to avoid arms races. Even where competitive procurement cannot be avoided altogether, they will want to see that existing disputes are not needlessly exacerbated. U.S. arms sales as a proportion of South American purchases fell from 75% in 1960 to 25% in 1970 and 7% percent in 1980. The reduction in training and in-depth contacts between the United States and most South American militaries has been equally precipitous.

These patterns raise a question we are pondering in the wake of the Falklands/Malvinas episode. Can the United States maintain a degree of military access and communication with the states of South America so as to help maintain the regional balance of power with such limited personnel, doctrinal, and materiel relationships?

A related challenge is to prevent regional conflicts from having strategic consequences, changing the East-West balance. This is a real problem, for history shows the Soviet Union and its proxies are ready and eager to take advantage of instability. Should Moscow be willing to provide arms at bargain prices as it did to Peru in the 1970s, economic constraints on Latin American purchases of military equipment from traditional Western sources could give the Soviets a unique opportunity to forge closer links with established governments in South America. Cuba—and Nicaragua—rushed forward to exploit the Falklands crisis. In Argentina some talked of playing the Cuban card. We do not believe Argentina will turn to the country that harbors in its capital the extremely violent Argentine terrorist organization—the Montoneros. But Cuba will be working hard to use the crisis to lessen its current isolation within the hemisphere.

Overcoming Resentments

A second legacy of the conflict is the need to overcome resentments of the United States that were triggered by the crisis.

Although the immediate emotional strains of the crisis are already receding, the perception of the United States as a reliable ally to Latin American nations in times of crisis will take time to restore.

The commitment of the United States to the hemisphere and its institutions has been called into question. I have already noted the importance we attach to the OAS, that we have taken no position on the question of sovereignty, and that in our view no Rio treaty action could apply to this particular contingency. Nonetheless, U.S. support for what on May 29 the second meeting of the Rio treaty Organ of Consulation condemned as an "unjustified and disproportionate" U.K. military response was taken by some to mean that the U.S. commitment to the inter-American system was superficial at best.

The fact that the conflict remained localized and ended relatively rapidly helped mitigate damage to U.S. interests. Nonetheless, our bilateral relationships with certain countries have unquestionably been affected adversely. The most severe impact is obviously on relations with Argentina. But Venezuela, Panama, and Peru were also highly critical of our support for the United Kingdom's military response and will be watching closely the future evolution of the sovereignty issue. In contrast, U.S. relations with most other South American countries, Mexico, and the Caribbean Basin appear less affected.

The lasting effects of this mood, which varies from country to country, will depend on how the postcrisis situation evolves and what posture we adopt. Reactions may change as the position taken by the United States is better understood. But the widespread view that the United States does not take Latin America seriously could increase North-South and nonaligned rhetoric and inhibit cooperation in support of U.S. interests. The argument that the United States and United Kingdom acted as industrialized powers cooperating to keep a developing country "in its place" makes us once again a target for anticolonialist and anti-imperialist emotions that will make it harder for us to accomplish our objectives.

It would be wrong to conclude from such reactions that the United States should not have acted as it did.There can be no position for the United States other than to oppose the unlawful use of force to settle disputes.

The first lesson for U.S. policy is that this is a time for steadiness of purpose rather than for grandiose gestures, statements, or proposals. During the coming months, it will be especially important that we meet our commitments, protect our interests, and respond to those of our neighbors in a meaningful and resourceful manner.

The Caribbean Basin initiative is vitally important in this regard. Many basin countries now wonder whether our contribution to the initiative will ever materialize. If Congress were not to act, the concerns these countries now express about their future and our commitment to them would deepen, widening opportunities for Soviet and Cuban adventurism. It is now up to the United States to deliver.

We must maintain our commitment in Central America, where democratic processes are vulnerable and where fragile government institutions face a major challenge from Cuban-supported guerrilla movements. Our political, economic, and security assistance are essential to help them meet this challenge and make progress toward democracy, economic development, and the effective protection of human rights.

While we must continue to seek innovative solutions to the problems of our immediate neighborhood, we must understand what is happening in South America is also important to us. This was evident in the midst of the Falklands conflict—for example, in the visit of President Figueiredo to Washington. The conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom was a major topic of discussion. The exchange made clear that the positions of the United States and Brazil differed but that our basic interests and objectives were similar. For several years now, we have simply not given South America the attention its place in the world and our interests warrant.

U.S.-Argentine Relations

This brings me to a third challenge—the conundrum of our relations with Argen-

tina. Despite our many similarities, U.S.-Argentine relations have seldom been close.

The President's vision of region-wide cooperation had led us to make efforts to improve ties to South America, including Argentina. In the case of Argentina, however, those efforts had not yet borne fruit by the time of the crisis. We must continue to seek a dialogue that can develop the bilateral and multilateral framework for more fully cooperative relations.

During the South Atlantic crisis, our ties with Argentina proved too weak to promote effective cooperation in support of common interests. Repeated efforts were made by us and by others—before the Argentine landing on the islands, again when the British fleet was approaching, and again when the U.S. and Peruvian and U.N. peace plans were advanced in turn—to explain to Argentine leaders what would happen if they did what they proposed to do. Although our predictions consistently proved accurate, they were not believed. Communication failed utterly.

Our objectives with Argentina today include encouraging economic recovery, peaceful resolution of the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina, and, of course, political comity. Yet our ties to the government in Buenos Aires are now more limited than previously. How long this will last depends on several factors. But the fundamental point is that we all share a compelling interest in an Argentina that is true to hemispheric traditions and free of foreign Communist influence. We do not want the Soviets to be their only alternative. Neither do they. We all should be prepared to help Argentina maintain conditions in which its people can realize their free world vocation.

So we must begin, in orderly fashion, to build the solid, realistic relationship so evidently lacking until now.

Hemispheric Relationships

Finally, the South Atlantic crisis has highlighted economic problems in South America and throughout the hemisphere.

Even before the crisis, many of the region's countries were feeling the effects of the world recession on their development. The problems vary. Virtually all depend heavily on international trade and on access to international financial markets. Some have contracted substantial debt. The South Atlantic crisis could crystallize doubts about stability and creditworthiness on a region-wide level, particularly if arms procurement were to divert resources from development priorities.

The major lesson here is the need for cooperation in economic management—not merely with Argentina but with Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico.

Many of the problems now associated with the South Atlantic crisis have been developing for some time. The growing assertiveness and needs of major developing countries are not new. Let us hope that the crisis will strengthen our ability to work more realistically together.

Before the crisis erupted in the South Atlantic, we had already begun to develop more sustained hemispheric relationships.

- We had started to achieve with Mexico a relationship that reflects its exceptional importance to the United States and its role in world affairs. Now comes the harshest test of that new relationship, as the economic slowdown in both countries threatens to aggravate all our joint accounts—trade, finance, immigration. We must be steadfast.
- We had committed ourselves to help countries of the Caribbean Basin protect themselves against outside intervention, strengthen or develop democratic institutions, and overcome economic disasters. Now we must deliver.
- We were beginning to respond to new realities in South America, rebuilding close bilateral relations with each country after a decade of drift, when the shadow of the South Atlantic crisis fell across our efforts. Now we must relaunch those efforts, joining others to maintain the network of constructive relationships that is essential to peace.

What this crisis may ultimately mean for the United States is not that our recent decisions were wrong—they were right—but that the accumulation from our past decisions reveals a flaw in our outlook. We have pursued an *a la carte* approach, ignoring our friends when it suited us, yet demanding their help or agreement when it served our interest. We took too much for granted and invested too little. When we needed close and effective dialogue on April 2, we didn't have it.

When a fight in distant islands reverberates around the world, the fundamental lesson is not how little we need each other but how closely connected we are. Our task is to make interdependence work, not against us but for us. This requires long-term commitments that will enhance our ability to influence events and protect our interests.

ANNEX—LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

This paper addresses three aspects of the negotiations which occurred during April and May of 1982 to avert the war in the South Atlantic—the U.S. posture on the underlying dispute over sovereignty of the islands; the content of the three most intensive settlement efforts, focusing on the two in which the United States was most closely involved; and the consideration given to use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

U.S. Position on Claims to the Islands

Throughout the more than 200-year history of this dispute, the United States has maintained a legal neutrality on the competing U.K. and Argentine claims to the Falklands/Malvinas, urging that their dispute be resolved through peaceful means in accordance with international law. In the post-World War II era, the United States has abstained on U.N. or Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions that implied a position on the merits.

U.S. neutrality is also reflected in the U.S. position on the nonapplicability of the Monroe Doctrine. Because the dispute over the islands predated the Monroe Doctrine, and because the United States took no position on the dispute over sovereignty, the Department of State long ago expressed the view that the reinsertion of a British presence on the islands in 1833 was not a new attempt at colonization and that the doctrine is, thus, inapplicable.

In addition to declining to take a position on the merits, the United States has not taken a position on the underlying legal theories on which the parties rely. Specifically, the United States has taken no view on the relative weight to be given to Britain's position on self-determination for the islanders and Argentina's emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity with the mainland. The application of the principle of self-determination to the Falklands has raised a number of legal questions in view of the size and origin of the population, the existence of other legal principles which may be applicable given the

history and nature of the dispute, and, in particular, the interpretation placed by Argentina on the principle of territorial integrity contained in U.N. General Assembly decolonization resolutions, such as Resolution 1514 (XV).

This U.S. position of neutrality was maintained throughout and facilitated our attempts to mediate the crisis.

While remaining neutral on the merits of the dispute, the United States has acknowledged the fact of longstanding U.K. administration of the islands. The United States has, accordingly, dealt with the United Kingdom on matters related to the islands and has, on occasion, acquiesced in U.K. accession to bilateral agreements and international conventions on behalf of them. The U.S. position in such instances has been consistent with acknowledgment of the United Kingdom's *de facto* responsibility for the islands' foreign relations as the administering authority in peaceful possession. This pragmatic policy of dealing with the administrator in *de facto* control is also that of the United Nations, which has accepted from the United Kingdom, as the administering authority, annual reports under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter regarding nonself-governing territories.

April-May 1982 Negotiations

There were three intensive efforts after the Argentine occupation of the islands to avert the coming military confrontation; each resulted in textual elaborations of the positions of both sides on acceptable outcomes on the range of issues involved in a package to promote a peaceful settlement. All of these efforts addressed four common elements:

- A cease-fire, linked to a mutual withdrawal of forces within a short period, and a commitment on nonreintroduction of forces, subject to third-party verification (this element was consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 502, operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands);
- Interim administrative arrangements for the islands, based on some form of third-party supervision of local government, including provision for Argentine access to the islands during this period;
- The composition and definition of the functions of the third-party mechanism to assist the parties in implementation of an agreement; and
- A framework for negotiations to reach a definitive settlement, including a deadline or target date, and the role in such negotiations for third-party assistance.

Each side, of course, approached these common elements from a different perspective, which in some cases shifted as the diplomatic and military situation changed over time. The United Kingdom was willing to consider variations on the form of administration of the islands, subject to certain basic guarantees in respect of local rights and institutions. It was prepared to accept third-party assistance in implementation of an agreement, subject to inclusion of some role for the United States. U.K. insistence on a cease-fire coupled with immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands remained firm, consistent with its legal position based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter relating to self-defense and U.N. Security Council Resolution 502. The United Kingdom also insisted that nothing in an agreement prejudice the final outcome of the negotiations. This insistence focused in particular on the drafting of a formula on future negotiations that was neutral on the issue of sovereignty and on provisions to control Argentine intercourse with the islands at prewar levels, consistent with a 1971 agreement between the two countries.

Argentina, in turn, sought either effective interim control of the islands' administration, including freedom of access to the islands, or assurance that the formula on a definitive settlement would automatically result in confirmation of Argentine sovereignty over the islands at some fixed future time. While accepting the concept of a cease-fire linked to mutual withdrawal of forces, Argentina sought an immediate U.K. withdrawal of its units to home bases; the United Kingdom viewed such a formula for the withdrawal period as imbalanced (since Argentine forces would remain within close range of the islands) and as removing a necessary deterrent to Argentine violation of the terms of an agreement. Argentina sought drafting of the negotiation mandate to emphasize decolonization and the principle of territorial integrity with the mainland and resisted references to a right of self-determination on the part of the islanders which were desired by the United Kingdom. Argentina, in light of the long history of prior talks with the United Kingdom, took the position that the mandate had to be placed under a firm and short deadline date.

Both sides shared an evaluation that provisions on interim arrangements and the framework for reaching a definitive settlement were interlinked elements of the negotiation, each prepared to be flexible in one area for gains in the other.

The three principle initiatives are discussed below, and the resulting texts follow.

U.S. Proposal of April 27. The first effort, that of Secretary Haig, culminated in a fairly detailed set of proposals to the two parties on April 27. It was based on the 3 strenuous weeks of consultations he had held in London, Buenos Aires, and Washington and our best perception of what might ultimately prove acceptable to each side. Its approach, and many of its elements, reappeared in subsequent proposals to and by the two parties.

The U.S. draft memorandum of agreement provided for an integral cease-fire and withdrawal linkage. The formula for providing for balanced withdrawals proved troublesome in each of the three negotiations, given the vastly different geographic perspectives of each side. The U.S. proposal resolved the problem by a formula based on parity in reinsertion time, rather than on conventional but more difficult geographic withdrawal distances. These commitments, and that of nonreintroduction of forces into the islands and defined surrounding areas, were to be verified by the United States.

The proposal called for immediate steps to terminate simultaneously the various economic and financial measures each party had adopted and for the United Kingdom to request termination of similar measures taken by its allies.

Local self-government on the islands was to be restored. The office of governor was to remain vacant, and its powers exercised by the next-ranking official, appointed by the United Kingdom. The local Executive and Legislative Councils were to be retained but augmented by representation of the small local Argentine resident population by means of at least one representative in each council and by inclusion of two Argentine Government representatives in the upper, Executive Council. A Special Interim Authority was to be created, composed of a representative of each side and of the United States. The flags of each constituent country were to be flown at its headquarters. The authority was to have supervision over island administration, exercised by means of a veto power in the event the

authority, by majority vote, deemed an act of the local government to be inconsistent with the agreement. In all other cases, the authority was called upon to ratify expeditiously all local decisions, laws, and regulations.

The proposal called for decolonization of the islands as the negotiation objective. This was framed in terms of removing the islands from the list of non-self-governing territories under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. The potential means were not limited, but the conditions for their definitive status had to be mutually agreed. The negotiation mandate maintained neutrality on the competing legal positions of the two sides, noting that of each by short-hand references to due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and the principle of territorial integrity. Reference was made to relevant U.N. General Assembly resolutions (which would include general decolonization resolutions and specific resolutions on the subject of the Falklands/Malvinas).

Foreshadowing the contact group concept utilized in later proposals, the U.S. formulation provided a role for the Special Interim Authority to catalyze the negotiations with recommendations to the two sides, in particular on the sensitive issues of how to take into account the wishes of the islanders and the role of the Falkland Islands Company. If the negotiations did not prosper by the deadline date (December 31, 1982), a second phase of negotiations, under a new 6-month target date, was to occur in which the United States would act as a mediator/conciliator to press for an agreement.

With respect to contacts with the mainland, the draft agreement stated a principle of promotion and facilitation of nondiscriminatory travel, commercial, communications, and other links. The proposal provided for recommendation by the authority to the two governments of specific measures on such matters and for securing the views of the local councils on the recommendations. These provisions were balanced by an obligation to respect the traditional rights and guarantees of the islanders.

The United Kingdom, which had not yet landed on the Falklands/Malvinas or suffered any serious combat losses, found the proposal difficult but was willing to give it "serious consideration." This was the only time the United Kingdom considered a proposal to cover the South Georgia and South Sandwich dependencies, as well as the Falklands/Malvinas (sensitivity to the implications of use of the English and Spanish names for the islands resulted in the U.S. proposal defining the island groups by coordinates).

Despite many attractive features for the Argentines, the Argentine Foreign Minister replied on April 29 that the Government of Argentina could not accept the formulation since it gave them neither effective interim control nor assurances of obtaining sovereignty as a result of the negotiation process.

Peru-U.S. Proposal. At the initiative of the President of Peru, and with our cooperation, another effort was launched, culminating on May 5 with a more skeletal proposal, limited in geographic scope to the Falklands/Malvinas. A cease-fire and withdrawal of forces were inseparably linked, but all implementing detail was to be deferred for decision by a contact group composed of representatives of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States.

The contact group was to verify the military provisions of an agreement. It would assume administration of the government of the islands in consultation with the elected representatives of the islanders and insure that no actions were taken inconsistent with the agreement. All details on implementation of administration—financial questions, applicable law, administrative, legal and appointive links to Britain, the role of the councils, the exercise of powers of the office of governor—were to be deferred for later decision by the contact group. The result conceivably might have paralleled the U.S. proposal once elaborated, but the door was open to other variations of third-party administration and the role to be played thereunder by the existing local institutions.

The existence of the parties' differing legal positions was noted; the proposal also included an acknowledgment that the "aspirations and interests" of the islanders were to be "included" in a definitive settlement.

Finally, the contact group assumed a responsibility to attempt to insure that the two governments reached a negotiated agreement on the future of the islands by April 30, 1983. Again, the detail of modalities for the negotiation, and the role and procedures of the contact group in facilitating a result, were deferred for later decision. The negotiation formula was neutral but included a deadline date as Argentina desired.

The United Kingdom indicated that it was willing to give this proposal serious consideration; Argentina, after the initiation of talks under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General, preferred to shift the focus of negotiations to New York.

U.N. Negotiations. With continued change in the military situation and, from the United Kingdom's perspective, in the wake of failure to secure agreement on the basis of substantial concessions reflected in the U.S. and Peruvian proposals, the positions of both sides hardened in a number of respects as evidenced by the texts each side publicly released at the breakdown of these talks in late May.

Both sides accepted the concept of a U.N. administration with generally defined authority. This formulation reflected a substantial concession by the United Kingdom on maintenance of administrative links to Britain in favor of local self-rule under U.N. supervision. Again, critical details would have had to be defined in implementing agreements or by U.N. Security Council resolution. U.N. verification of military disengagement provisions was also accepted by both sides in principle, as well as the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General to conduct the negotiations.

The publicly released positions permitted identification of very limited other common ground. The United Kingdom sought to subject a U.N. administration to local law and practices "in consultation with" the islands' representative institutions, which Argentina resisted. Argentina sought immediate, expanded access to the islands, which the United Kingdom would not accept for fear that the population and character of the islands might be unilaterally altered during the interim period. Argentina desired a firm deadline for negotiation to be followed, if necessary, by reference of the dispute to the U.N. General Assembly for decision; the United Kingdom rejected recourse to the General Assembly and continued to consider a rigid timetable unrealistic. On these and other points (e.g., extent of geographical coverage, military withdrawal details, self-determination references), the two sides ended far apart.

The Secretary General made last-minute proposals to the two sides before the talks unraveled. Prime Minister Thatcher, as events overtook these suggestions, simply noted that Argentina could not possibly have accepted them. We are unaware of any formal Argentine response. To our knowledge, the content of these suggestions was not publicly released.

Subsequent Developments. The United Kingdom and Argentine texts tabled at the conclusion of the Secretary General's first round of negotiations remain the final textual elaboration of their views on settlement issues. There followed efforts in the Security Council to negotiate a resolution that would substitute for an agreement, notably involving a useful Brazilian draft text. None was the subject of intensive substantive negotiation. These efforts culminated in the Security Council's adoption on May 26 of Resolution 505, which asked the Secretary General to renew his good offices to secure a cease-fire; and in the U.K.-U.S. veto on June 4 of a Spanish/Panamanian draft resolution that sought a cease-fire and implementation of the previous Security Council resolutions, under verification of the Secretary General but with inadequate detail on withdrawal procedures and other elements to serve as a mutually agreeable vehicle for settlement of the conflict.

Possible Role for the International Court of Justice

The focus of U.N. General Assembly resolutions on the subject, the efforts of both countries over 16 years, and of the peacemaking efforts in the spring was on a negotiated settlement of the dispute.

The U.S. Government is committed to the use of the International Court of Justice to resolve legal disputes, consistent with Article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter. The submission to a Chamber of the Court of our differences with Canada over delimitation of a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine is a concrete example. The dispute on sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas is an issue which the Court could appropriately decide. U.S. negotiators this spring raised this matter with both sides. Neither has ever indicated a willingness to have recourse to the Court over the Falklands/Malvinas. The case does not fall within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and the agreement of both parties is thus necessary to submit the case for binding decision.

The United Kingdom on two occasions since World War II sought to submit to the Court the related dispute on sovereignty over the South Georgia and South Sandwich Island dependencies, but Argentina did not agree to do so.

The United States continues to believe that a peaceful solution to this longstanding controversy is required, consistent with the U.N. Charter obligations of both parties, and it may be that possible use of the Court will be reconsidered among the other possible settlement options, including renewed negotiations, that would be consistent with Article 33 of the Charter.

U.S. PROPOSALS, APRIL 27, 1982

His Excellency
Estanislao Valdes Otero
President of the Twentieth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Excellency:

In light of interest expressed by proposals made to the Government of Argentina and Great Britain on April 27, 1982, by the United States Government, I would like to ask that you circulate the enclosed document containing those proposals among the delegations accredited to the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Both English and Spanish texts are included.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

J. William Middendorf
Ambassador
Special Delegate

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Preamble:

On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, and the will of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom to resolve the controversy which has arisen between them, renouncing the use of force, both Governments agree on the following steps, which form an integrated whole:

PARAGRAPH 1

1. Effective on the signature of this Agreement by both Governments, there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

PARAGRAPH 2

2. Beginning at 0000 hours local time of the day after the day on which this Agreement is signed, and pending a definitive settlement, the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom shall not introduce or deploy forces into the zones (hereinafter, "zones"), defined by circles of 150 nautical miles' radius from the following coordinate points (hereinafter, "coordinate points"):

A) LAT. 51°40′ S
LONG. 59°30′ W

B) LAT. 54°20′ S
LONG. 36°40′ W

C) LAT. 57°40′ S
LONG. 26°30′ W

2.1. Within 24 hours of the date of this Agreement, the United Kingdom will suspend enforcement of its "zone of exclusion" and Argentina will suspend operations in the same area.

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this Agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom will commence the withdrawal of their forces in accordance with the following details:

2.2.1. Within seven days from the date of this Agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom shall each have withdrawn one-half of their military and security forces present in the zones on the date of this Agreement, including related equipment and armaments. Within the same time period, the United Kingdom naval task force will stand off at a distance equivalent to seven days' sailing time (at 12 knots) from any of the coordinate points, and Argentine forces that have been withdrawn shall be placed in a condition such that they could not be reinserted with their equipment and armament in less than seven days.

2.2.2. Within fifteen days from the date of this Agreement, Argentina shall remove all of its remaining forces from the zones and redeploy them to their usual operating areas or normal duties. Within the same period, the United Kingdom shall likewise remove all of its remaining forces from the zones and shall redeploy such forces and the naval task force and submarines to their usual operating areas or normal duties.

2.3. In accordance with its letter of acceptance of even date, the United States shall verify compliance with the provisions of this paragraph, and the two Governments agree to cooperate fully with the United States in facilitating this verification.

PARAGRAPH 3

3. From the date of this Agreement, the two Governments will initiate the necessary procedures to terminate simultaneously, and without delay, the economic and financial measures adopted in connection with the current controversy, including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. The United Kingdom at the same time shall request the European Community and third countries that have adopted similar measures to terminate them.

PARAGRAPH 4

4. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint and the United States has indicated its agreement to appoint, a representative to constitute a Special Interim Authority (hereinafter "the Authority") which shall verify compliance with the obligations in this Agreement (with the exception of paragraph 2), and undertake such other responsibilities as are assigned to it under this Agreement or the separate Protocol regarding the Authority signed this date. Each representative may be supported by a staff of not more than ten persons on the islands.

PARAGRAPH 5

5.1. Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the Authority, except in the event that the Authority deems such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue, except that the Executive and Legislative Councils shall be enlarged to include:

(A) two representatives appointed by the Argentine Government to serve in the Executive Council; and

(B) representatives in each Council of the Argentine population whose period of residence on the islands is equal to that required of others entitled to representation, in proportion to their population, subject to there being at least one such representative in each Council. Such representatives of the resident Argentine population shall be nominated by the Authority.

The flags of each of the constituent members of the Authority shall be flown at its headquarters.

5.2. Pending a definitive settlement, neither Government shall take any action that would be inconsistent with the purpose and provisions of this Agreement or its implementation.

PARAGRAPH 6

6.1. Pending a definitive settlement, travel, transportation, movement of persons and, as may be related thereto, residence and ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce between the mainland and the islands shall, on a nondiscriminatory basis, be promoted and facilitated. The Authority shall propose to the two Governments for adoption appropriate measures on such matters. Such proposals shall simultaneously be transmitted to the Executive and Legislative Councils for their views. The two Governments undertake to respond promptly to such proposals. The Authority shall monitor the implementation of all such proposals adopted.

6.2. The provisions of paragraph 6.1 shall in no way prejudice the rights and guarantees which have heretofore been enjoyed by the inhabitants on the islands, in particular rights relating to freedom of opinion, religion, expression, teaching, movement, property, employment, family, customs, and cultural ties with countries of origin.

PARAGRAPH 7

7. December 31, 1982 will conclude the interim period during which the two Governments shall complete negotiations on removal of the islands from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and in light of the relevant Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. The negotiations hereabove referred to shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of the present Agreement.

PARAGRAPH 8

8. In order to assist them in bringing their negotiations to a mutually satisfactory settlement by the date stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the Authority shall, after consultation with the Executive Council, make specific proposals and recommendations as early as practicable to the two Governments, including proposals and recommendations on:

8.1. The manner of taking into account the wishes and interests of the islanders, insofar as islands with a settled population are concerned, based on the results of a sounding of the opinion of the inhabitants, with respect to such issues relating to the negotiations, and conducted in such manner, as the Authority may determine;

8.2. Issues relating to the development of the resources of the islands, including opportunities for joint cooperation and the role of the Falkland Islands Company; and

8.3. Such other matters as the two Governments may request, including possible arrangements for compensation of islanders, or matters on which the Authority may wish to comment in light of its experience in discharging its responsibilities under this Agreement.

8.4. The Governments have agreed on the procedure in sub-paragraph 8.1 without prejudice to their respective positions on the legal weight to be accorded such opinion in reaching a definitive settlement.

PARAGRAPH 9

9. Should the Governments nonetheless be unable to conclude the negotiations by December 31, 1982, the United States has indicated that, on the request of both Governments, it would be prepared at such time to seek to resolve the dispute within six months of the date of the request by making specific proposals for a settlement and by directly conducting negotiations between the Governments on the basis of procedures that it shall formulate. The two Governments agree to respond within one month to any formal proposals or recommendations submitted to them by the United States.

PARAGRAPH 10

10. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

ARGENTINE NOTE OF MAY 28, 1982, AND LETTER OF APRIL 29, 1982

May 28, 1982

Mr. President of the
Twentieth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
D. ESTANISLAO VALDES OTERO

Mr. President:

I have the honor to address Your Excellency with respect to the document of this Meeting of Consultation bearing the title "Texts of the Proposals for Agreement Made by the Government of the United States to the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" (doc. 74/82), to present a copy of the letter that, in my capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, I sent on April 29, 1982, to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., informing him of the Argentine Government's views on the proposals for agreement made by the Government of the United States.

In making known this reply, the Argentine Government wishes to state, as the attached letter shows, that at no time did it term unacceptable the proposals of the United States Secretary of State. Instead its objection was directed primarily at certain specific points, including some changes that had been made in the document compared to previous drafts, and it suggested that other formulas be sought. It added that if "Argentina's position were encompassed, agreement would be facilitated enormously and the final text of the document would not pose any insurmountable problems."

The Argentine Government wishes this important point to be made clear, in view of the statements that have been made in the sessions of the General Committee of this Meeting of Consultation, which were ratified by circulation of the document cited.

I request that this note with its attachment be distributed immediately as an official document of the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
of the Argentine Republic

Attached: copy of the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez

April 29, 1982

Dear Mr. Secretary of State:

We have carefully reviewed the document you sent us and have compared it with our previous proposals and with the viewpoints we have maintained in our various meetings. From that review, significant differences have emerged, some of which give rise to difficulties that it is essential to overcome.

As my Government has already stated to you, the objective the Argentine Government

has set is recognition of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. This central element of our discussions is the ultimate justification of the actions taken by my country, and as I have had occasion to tell you many times, constitutes for us an unrenounceable goal.

Along with the question of sovereignty, the current crisis gives rise immediately to the need to establish a provisional regime for administration of the islands, as an essential step in the process of separating the two military forces and as a reasonable pause in the face of the logical impossibility of formalizing their final fate at this time.

The conversations we have held have been based primarily on these two questions—recognition of sovereignty and a provisional administrative regime. Solution of the remaining problems will be simpler if there is agreement on the two points that I have just mentioned.

One certain thing is that the two are intimately connected to each other. To the extent that the provisions relating to the recognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, for us it is necessary—if we do not want to return to the frustrating situation that prevailed before April 2—to establish mechanisms that give us broader powers in administration of the islands.

On the other side of the coin, if it were clear that Argentina's sovereignty would be recognized in the end, then we could be more flexible regarding the matter of temporary administration.

The document sent by the Secretary of State falls short of Argentine demands and does not satisfy its minimal aspirations for either of the two points. To the contrary, unfavorable changes have been made to both. The number of Argentine representatives involved in administration of the islands has been decreased, and the opportunity of expanding my country's control in the event that negotiations on the basic issue go on endlessly without a solution has been barred. Thus we are faced with the real possibility of establishing a predominantly British administration with no fixed expiration date.

As concerns the matter of sovereignty, the concept of territorial integrity has been stripped of all meaning. Further, the new element of a virtual referendum to determine the "wishes" of the inhabitants has been introduced in open opposition to United Nations Resolution 2065 and the unwavering position sustained by Argentina.

The Secretary knows that we cannot accept these changes. In my opinion, other formulas must be found. For this effort, we will always be at the disposal of the Secretary. These formulas should provide for the balance that I referred to above in order to weigh properly the data relating to the matter of sovereignty against the provisions regulating temporary administration of the islands. These provisions should have a fixed term and include gradually larger Argentine participation or, in lieu of this, the provisions should be made precise enough to offer security for recognition of Argentina's rights within a specific period.

If Argentina's position were encompassed, agreement would be facilitated enormously and the final text of the document would not pose any insurmountable problems.

Thank you once again for your arduous and difficult negotiations.

Accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ

His Excellency
Alexander Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

PERU-U.S. PROPOSAL, MAY 5, 1982

Draft Interim Agreement on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:

2. Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces, according to a schedule to be established by the Contact Group.

3. The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands, on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement. The Contact Group will assume responsibility for:

(A) Verification of the withdrawal;
(B) Ensuring that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the local administration, which would contravene this interim agreement; and
(C) Ensuring that all other provisions of the agreement are respected.

4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.

5. The two Governments acknowledge that the aspirations and interests of the Islanders will be included in the definitive settlement of the status of the Islands.

6. The Contact Group will have responsibility for ensuring that the two Governments reach a definitive agreement prior to April 30, 1983.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT, MAY 21, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Argentine Aggression

1. It is now almost seven weeks since Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. This unlawful use of force in unprovoked aggression threatened not only to destroy the democratic way of life freely chosen by the Falkland Islanders but also the basis on which international order rests. The invasion was also a singular act of bad faith: it took place when Britain and Argentina were engaged in negotiations in accordance with requests from the United Nations.

2. On 1 April the President of the United Nations Security Council had formally appealed to Argentina not to invade the Falkland Islands. Yet on 2 April Argentina invaded. On 3 April the United Nations Security Council passed its mandatory Resolution 502, demanding a cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands. The same day, Argentina took South Georgia. In the ensuing weeks she has shown no sign of complying with the Security Council Resolution: on the contrary, she has continued a massive build up of the occupying forces on the Falkland Islands. There could hardly be a clearer demonstration of disregard for international law and for the United Nations itself.

The British Response

3. Britain need have done nothing more than rest on the mandatory Resolution of the Security Council. Indeed, Britain's inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter would have justified the Government in adopting a purely military policy for ending the crisis. But, in pursuit of a peaceful settlement, Britain adopted a policy, frequently explained by the Government in Parliament, of building up pressure on Argentina.

Military pressure was exerted by the rapid assembly and despatch of the British Naval Task Force. Diplomatic pressure, first expressed in Security Council Resolution 502, was built up by the clear statements of condemnation of Argentine aggression which were made by many countries across the world. It was widely recognised that aggression could not be allowed to stand, since otherwise international peace and order would be dangerously prejudiced in many regions. The members of the European Community, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway joined Britain in rapidly imposing economic measures against Argentina.

Efforts for a Negotiated Settlement

4. Britain dedicated her maximum diplomatic efforts to the search for a negotiated solution, and the Government kept Parliament as fully informed as the confidentiality of difficult negotiations would allow. Efforts for an interim agreement to end the crisis were first undertaken by the United States Secretary of State, Mr Alexander Haig. His ideas for an interim agreement were discussed repeatedly with Argentina and Britain. The Government expressed their willingness to consider Mr Haig's final proposals, although they presented certain real difficulties. Argentina rejected them. The next stage of negotiations was based on proposals originally advanced by President Belaunde of Peru and modified in consultations between him and the United States Secretary of State. As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary informed

Parliament on 7 May, Britain was willing to accept the final version of these proposals for an interim agreement. But Argentina rejected it.

5. Since then, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar, has been conducting negotiations with Britain, represented by our Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, and Argentina, represented by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Senor Ros. In these negotiations, as in earlier ones, Britain made repeated efforts to establish whether Argentina was willing to be sufficiently flexible to make a reasonable interim agreement possible. But it became increasingly clear that Argentina was not seeking an agreement but was playing for time in the negotiation in the hope of holding on to the fruits of aggression, with all that this would imply for the international rule of law. There was an important meeting of British Ministers, attended by Sir Anthony Parsons and the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson on Sunday 16 May. On the following day, Sir Anthony Parsons returned to New York and handed to the United Nations Secretary-General two documents:

- A draft interim agreement between Britain and Argentina which set out the British position in full,
- A letter to the Secretary-General making clear the British position that the Falkland Islands dependencies were not covered by the draft interim agreement.

6. Sir Anthony Parsons made clear to the Secretary-General that the draft agreement represented the furthest that Britain could go in the negotiations. He requested that the Secretary-General should give the draft to the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister. The Secretary-General did this, and asked for a response within two days. Argentina's first response to the Secretary-General, late on 18 May, was equivocal and contained points known to be unacceptable to the United Kingdom. Early on 19 May, Sir Anthony Parsons pointed this out to the Secretary-General and requested that Argentina's final position should be conveyed within the two day period originally set for a reply to the British draft agreement.

7. Argentina's response, which HMG received late on 19 May, represented a hardening of the Argentine position and amounted to a rejection of the British proposals.

Britain's Fundamental Principles in Negotiations

8. The Government's approach in all the negotiations has been based on important principles, which ministers have set out repeatedly in Parliament:

A. International Law: Argentina's unlawful aggression must end and Security Council Resolution 502 must be implemented. Aggression must not be rewarded, or small countries across the world would feel threatened by neighbours with territorial ambitions.

B. Freedom: The Falkland Islanders are used to enjoying free institutions. The executive and legislative councils were established with their agreement and functioned with their participation. Britain insisted that any interim administration in the Falkland Islands must involve democratically elected representatives of the Islanders, so as to enable the latter to continue to participate in the administration of their affairs and to ensure that they could express freely their wishes about the future of the Islands, in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

C. Sovereignty: Britain has no doubt of her sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, having administered them peacefully since 1833. Nevertheless, successive British Governments have been willing, without prejudice, to include the question of sovereignty in negotiations with Argentina about the future of the Falkland Islands. In the recent negotiations, the Government have been willing that an interim agreement should provide for new negotiations about the future of the Islands, which likewise could discuss sovereignty in good faith, so long as there was no prejudgement as to the outcome of negotiations. Although Argentina seemed, at one point in the United Nations Secretary-General's negotiations, to be accepting a formula about not pre-judging the outcome of future negotiations, she continued to insist on other provisions running counter to this, thus casting grave doubt on the seriousness of this acceptance. This doubt was reinforced by repeated public statements by Argentine leaders.

9. Britain upheld these principles in the draft agreement which we presented on 17 May to the United Nations Secretary-General:

- The agreement provided for complete Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands within 14 days, thus terminating the aggression and upholding international law.
- It provided that the legislative and executive councils representing the Falkland Islanders would continue in existence and be consulted by the UN interim administrator, thus maintaining the democratic structure of the administration.
- It provided explicitly that the outcome of negotiations about the future of the Islands was not prejudged, thus safeguarding the British position on sovereignty. Britain, in participating in those negotiations, would have been guided by the wishes of the Islanders.

10. In the Secretary-General's negotiations, Britain has insisted that the Falkland Islands dependencies should not be covered by an interim agreement to end the crisis. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are geographically distant from the Falkland Islands themselves. They have no settled population. The British title to them, of which the Government have no doubt, does not derive from the Falkland Islands, and these territories have been treated as dependencies of the Falkland Islands only for reasons of administrative convenience.

11. Throughout the negotiations, Britain has been firm on the essential principles but willing to negotiate on matters where these principles were not breached. In particular:

A. In return for Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands, Britain was willing (Article 2(3)) [see following annex] to withdraw her task force to a distance of 150 nautical miles. She was also willing to have international verification (Article 6(4)) of the mutual withdrawal, in which the United Nations might have made use of surveillance aircraft from third countries.

B. Britain was willing that the exclusion zones (Article 3) declared by herself and Argentina, and the economic measures (Article 5) introduced during the present crisis, should be lifted from the moment of ceasefire, although these actions would give more comfort to Argentina than to Britain.

C. Britain was prepared to accept the appointment of a UN Administrator (Article 6(3)) to administer the government of the Falkland Islands. Britain wanted him to discharge his functions in consultation with the representative institutions in the islands—the legislative and executive councils—which have been developed in accordance with the terms of Article 73 of the UN Charter. (This makes clear that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories are paramount and refers to the need to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples.) It is inconceivable that Britain, or any other democratic country, could accept that her people should be deprived of their democratic rights. Britain was nevertheless willing to accept that one representative from the Argentine population of the Islands (some 30 people out of 1800) should be added to each of the councils.

Additionally, Britain was willing to accept the presence of up to 3 Argentine observers on the Islands in the interim period.

D. Britain was willing (Article 7) to agree to re-establishment of communications, travel, transport, postage, etc, between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainland, on the basis existing before the invasion.

E. Britain was willing to enter into negotiations (Article 8) under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General for a peaceful settlement of the dispute with Argentina about the Falkland Islands and to seek the completion of these negotiations by the target date of 31 December 1982. Our position was that no outcome to the negotiations should be either excluded or predetermined.

12. Argentina's final position in the negotiations speaks for itself. In particular:

A. Argentina insisted that South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands be covered by the interim agreement. One effect of this would be that British forces would have to withdraw from the British territory of South Georgia.

B. Argentina wanted thirty days for the completion of the withdrawal of forces. She wanted all forces to return to their normal bases and areas of operation, thus requiring British forces to be enormously further away than Argentine ones.

C. Argentina wanted the administration of the Islands to be exclusively the responsibility of the United Nations. There would have been Argentine and British observers. The administration would have been free to appoint advisers from the population of the Islands, in equal numbers from the Argentine population and from the population of British origin. The flags of Britain and Argentina would have flown together with that of the United Nations.

D. Argentina wanted free access for her nationals to the Islands, with respect inter alia to residence, work and property. Argentina also opposed a provision in the British draft agreement (end of Article 6(3)) but the UN Administrator exercising his powers in conformity with the laws and practices traditionally observed in the Islands. It was evident that Argentina hoped to change the nature of Falklands society and its demographic make-up in the interim period, and to prejudge the future.

E. Argentina proposed a formula about negotiations on the future of the Islands which stated that they should be 'initiated' without prejudice to the rights and claims and positions of the two parties. Argentina would not accept an additional phrase stating also that the outcome would not be prejudged. Argentine leaders continued in public to say that Argentina insisted on having sovereignty. In the negotiations Argentina also resisted a provision in the British draft (beginning of Article 9) which would have ensured that the interim arrangements should stay in place until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands could be implemented. Argentina's evident aim in resisting this was that, if no definitive agreement had been reached by the target date of 31 December 1982, the interim administration would cease to exist and a vacuum be created which Argentina could hope to fill.

13. The present crisis was brought about by Argentina's unlawful act of aggression. In the subsequent attitude the Argentine Government showed that they had no respect either for democratic principles or for the rule of law. Britain stands firmly for both.

ANNEX—FALKLAND ISLANDS: DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT

The Government of the Republic of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, responding to Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) adopted on 3 April 1982 under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Having entered into negotiations through the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an interim agreement concerning the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), hereinafter referred to as 'The Islands',

Having in mind the obligations with regard to non-self governing territories set out in Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the text of which is annexed hereto.

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

1. No provision of this Interim Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute over the Islands.

2. No acts or activities taking place whilst this Interim Agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty over the Islands or create any rights of sovereignty over them.

Article 2

1. With effect from a specified time, 24 hours after signature of this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as Time 'T'), each party undertakes to cease and thereafter to refrain from all firing and other hostile actions.

2. Argentina undertakes:

(A) To commence withdrawal of its armed forces from the Islands with effect from Time 'T';

(B) To withdraw half of its armed forces to at least 150 nautical miles away from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus seven days; and

(C) To complete its withdrawal to at least 150 nautical miles away by Time 'T' plus fourteen days.

3. The United Kingdom undertakes:

(A) To commence withdrawal of its armed forces from the Islands with effect from Time 'T';

(B) To withdraw half of its armed forces to at least 150 nautical miles away from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus seven days; and

(C) To complete its withdrawal to at least 150 nautical miles away by Time 'T' plus fourteen days.

Article 3

With effect from Time 'T', each party undertakes to lift the exclusion zones, warnings and similar measures which have been imposed.

Article 4

On the completion of the steps for withdrawal specified in Article 2, each party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces into the Islands or within 150 nautical miles thereof.

Article 5

Each party undertakes to lift with effect from Time 'T' the economic measures it has taken against the other and to seek the lifting of similar measures taken by third parties.

Article 6

1. Immediately after the signature of the present Agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom shall jointly sponsor a draft resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the Security Council would take note of the present Agreement, acknowledge the role conferred upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations therein, and authorise him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

2. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, a United Nations administrator, being a person acceptable to Argentina and the United Kingdom, shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and will be the officer administering the government of the Islands.

3. The United Nations administrator shall have the authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to ensure the continuing administration of the government of the Islands. He shall discharge his functions in consultation with the representative institutions in the Islands which have been developed in accordance with the terms of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, with the exception that one representative from the Argentina population normally resident on the Islands shall be appointed by the administrator to each of the two institutions. The administrator shall exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and in conformity with the laws and practices traditionally obtaining in the Islands.

4. The United Nations administrator shall verify the withdrawal of all armed forces from the Islands, and shall devise an effective method of ensuring their non-reintroduction.

5. The United Nations administrator shall have such staff as may be agreed by Argentina and the United Kingdom to be necessary for the performance of his functions under this Agreement.

6. Each party may have no more than three observers in the Islands.

Article 7

Except as may be otherwise agreed between them, the parties shall, during the currency of this Agreement, reactivate the Exchange of Notes of 5 August 1971, together with the Joint Statement on Communications between the Islands and the Argentine mainland referred to therein. The parties shall accordingly take appropriate steps to establish a special consultative committee to carry out the functions entrusted to the Special Consultative Committee referred to in the Joint Statement.

Article 8

The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgement of the outcome.

Article 9

This Interim Agreement shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands has been reached and implemented by the parties. The Secretary-General will immediately communicate its text to the Securi-

ty Council and register it in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARGENTINE DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 26, 1982

The Embassy of the Argentine Republic presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to inform, with regard to the proposal of the United Nations Secretary General referred to the conflict over the Islas Malvinas and its dependencies, the position of the Government of the Argentine Republic was clearly stated in the Proposed Agreement submitted in the course of the negotiations held at the United Nations, which text reads as follows:

"The Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties",

In response to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) of April 3, 1982, and taking into account the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 1514 (XV) 2065 and other Resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, have accepted, in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, the assistance of the Secretary General of the United Nations and have engaged in negotiations and arrived at the following provisional agreement relating to the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, hereinafter referred to as "The Islands" for the purposes of this agreement.

I. 1. The geographical scope of the area within which the withdrawal of troops is to be carried out shall comprise the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

2. The withdrawal of the forces of both parties shall be gradual and simultaneous. Within a maximum period of thirty days, all armed forces shall be in their normal bases and areas of operation.

II. With effect from the signature of this agreement, each party shall cease to apply the economic measures which it has adopted against the other and the United Kingdom shall call for the same action by those countries or groups of countries which, at its request, adopted similar measures.

III. 1. Supervision of the withdrawal of the forces of both countries shall be carried out by specialized personnel of the United Nations, whose composition shall be agreed with the parties.

2. The interim Administration of the Islands while the negotiations for final settlement of the dispute are in progress shall conform to the following provisions:

A) The Administration shall be exclusively the responsibility of the United Nations with an appropriate presence of observers of the parties.

B) The said Administration shall perform all functions (executive, legislative, judicial and security) through officials of different nationality from that of the parties.

C) Notwithstanding the provisions of 2(A) and (B), and in order not to cause unnecessary changes in the way of life of the population during the period of the interim Administration by the United Nations, local judicial functions may be exercised in accordance with the legislation in force on April 1, 1982 to the full extent compatible with this agreement. Similarly, the United Nations interim Administration may appoint as advisers persons who are members of the population of British origin and Argentines resident in the Islands, in equal numbers.

D) The flag of the parties shall fly together with that of the United Nations.

E) During the period of interim Administration, communications shall be kept open, without discriminatory restrictions of any kind for the parties, including freedom of movement and equality of access with respect to residence, work and property.

F) Freedom of communication shall also include the maintenance of freedom of transit for the state airline (Lade) and for merchant ships and scientific vessels, in addition, telephone, telegraph and telex communications, Argentine television transmissions and the state petroleum (YPF) and gas services shall continue to operate freely.

IV. The customs, traditions and way of life of the inhabitants of the Islands, and their social and cultural links with their countries of origin, shall be respected and safeguarded.

V. 1. The parties undertake to enter immediately into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the peaceful and final settlement of the dispute and, with a sense of urgency, to complete these negotiations by December 31, 1982, with a single option to extend until June 30, 1983, in order to comply with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of the Malvinas Islands. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights and claims or positions of the two parties and in recognition of the fact that they have divergent positions on the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

2. The negotiations shall be held in New York.

3. The Secretary General of the United Nations may be assisted in the negotiations by a contract group composed of representatives of four States members of the United Nations. To that end, each party shall nominate two States and shall have the right to a single veto of one of the States nominated by the other.

4. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall keep the Security Council assiduously informed of the progress of the negotiations.

VI. If the period specified in point V(1) above expires with out the attainement of a final agreement, the Secretary General shall draw up a report addressed to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in order that the latter may determine, as appropriate and with greater urgency, the lines to which the said final agreement should conform in order to achieve a speedy settlement of the question."

The Argentine Government, in the light of the position stated in the aforementioned proposed agreement, which reflects the reasonableness which has continuously inspired its negotiating behaviour, deeply regrets that the peace efforts carried out the U.N. Secretary General, in which pursuance and final success the Argentine Republic trusted, have been frustrated as a result of the unilateral decision of the British Government announced on May 20th.

The real possibilities of reaching a peaceful settlement to the conflict and of avoiding, with the responsibility that the situation demanded, further bloodshed and an imminent breaking of peace and security in the hemisphere, finally proved to be disregarded by the intransigence and stubbornness with which the Government of the United Kingdom has tried to make the use of force prevail over reason and peace.

The Government of the Argentine Republic, therefore, formally holds the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland responsible for the serious consequences which in the future may stem from its denial to exhaust the available means towards a peaceful settlement, and expressly reserves its rights to a legitimate defense recognized by the United Nations Charter.

The Embassy of the Argentine Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

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[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol on the authenic quadrilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.[1]
Signature: Australia,[2] Aug. 4, 1982.

Memorandum of understanding concerning transatlantic scheduled service air fares, with annexes. Done at Washington May 2, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1982, for Belgium, the F.R.G., France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, U.K., U.S., and Yugoslavia.

C59/2H

THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN: A WAR OF YESTERDAY?

AIR VICE-MARSHAL STEWART W. B. MENAUL, RAF (Ret.)

THE AUTHOR: Air Marshal Menaul covered the Falklands War for British Independent Television. He is Vice President of the Military Commentators Circle and a member of the Council of the Foreign Affairs Research Institute in London, having served as Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies from 1968 to 1976. During his career in the Royal Air Force, he was Director of Bomber Operations and Nuclear Affairs in the Air Ministry, Commander of the British atomic task forces in Australia and Senior Staff Officer at Headquarters Bomber Command. He is the author of *Countdown: Britain's Strategic Nuclear Forces* (1980).

IN BRIEF

In the analysis of an expert and close observer, the British flotilla that took the war to the Falklands was the model of effective, if hasty, improvisation. The British Marines fought well, albeit against a demoralized opponent on the ground, as did the Harriers in their sorties. Yet, the campaign bared not only outdated tactics, but also large gaps in British defenses against even the modest sophistication of the Argentine air arsenal. Indeed, British tactics and assets pale in comparison to those wielded by the Israelis in Lebanon during the same timeframe. It is up to NATO as a whole to ponder the lessons, so that the Alliance will not find itself, for its part, fighting yesterday's war on the ever more sophisticated battlefields of tomorrow.

A full account of the operations in the Falklands and South Georgia is being prepared by an investigating team of the British Ministry of Defense. In the meantime, enough information has become available from the Ministry and from first-hand accounts to support an assessment of the overall conduct of the operations and the results.

The Improvised British Task Force

It is by now incontrovertible that the invasion of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia by Argentine forces on April 2, 1982, took the British Government completely by surprise, notwithstanding indications from various sources that such action was contemplated by the ruling junta in Buenos Aires. When confirmation was received that Argentine land, sea and air forces had begun an invasion, the reaction of the British Government was swift and decisive. The first ships of a Task Force led by the aircraft carrier *Hermes* were hastily assembled and set sail for the South Atlantic on April 5, to be joined in succeeding weeks by an armada of upwards of 100 ships and involving some 30,000 men.

In a press interview, the Chief of Britain's Defense Staff admitted that "there were no contingency plans for the operation; they had to be hurriedly improvised." In the weeks that followed, necessity proved to be the mother of

improvisation. Britain's Armed Forces were geared for a totally different type of conflict against a more sophisticated enemy in a totally different environment: Europe and the North Atlantic. As events unfolded, Whitehall discovered that it did not have accurate intelligence of the strength of the Argentine Armed Forces and only superficial knowledge of their weapons systems and the ability of their personnel to use them. Much of the equipment for the British forces had to be augmented and modified and crews retrained for the type of combat envisaged. There were no strategic plans or tactical doctrine for such operations; they, too, had to be devised while the Task Force was enroute to the scene of combat, some 8,000 miles from home bases and with only a small volcanic island as an intermediate base between Britain and the Falklands.

Inflight refueling equipment had to be fitted to most British aircraft to enable them to reach Ascension Island and thence the Task Force or targets on the Falklands, particularly the airfield at Port Stanley. Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft had to be equipped with inflight refueling in order to operate from Ascension over a wide area of ocean centered on the Falklands. Harriers, Vulcans and C-130 transports underwent similar modifications.

The Task Force consisted of more than twenty warships, including the aircraft carriers *Hermes* and *Invincible*. The former acted as the command and control ship throughout the operations, with support from destroyers, frigates, nuclear-powered attack submarines, Royal Fleet auxiliaries, landing ships and a variety of commercial vessels requisitioned at short notice and modified for the special tasks they had to perform.

The two carriers held 28 out of a maximum of 32 Sea Harriers available. They were later to be reinforced by 20 Sea Harriers and GR-3 Harriers transported by sea or flown down to the carriers off the Falklands. The Task Force also had at its disposal a large complement of helicopters, which were to prove invaluable for intership communications and for ship-to-shore resupply and communications missions once the troops had landed on the Falklands. The troops were transported mainly by sea in passenger ships, which included the *Canberra* and the *Queen Elizabeth II*, both of which were adapted to carry helicopters. Heavy equipment was transported in merchant vessels, including container ships.

First Encounters

The first sighting of an Argentine aircraft by units of the Task Force occurred on April 21 in the South Atlantic, when a Boeing 707 with Argentine markings was picked up on radar and intercepted by a Sea Harrier. No hostile act took place, and the Boeing 707, obviously on a reconnaissance mission, veered off and was not seen again.

On April 8, Britain declared an exclusion zone extending to 200 miles around the Falklands, to be effective on April 12. Any ships found in the area were liable to attack, and it had been made known that British nuclear-powered attack submarines were deployed in the South Atlantic. On April 25, an exclusion air zone was declared around the islands, thus completing a sea and air security zone within which enemy ships and aircraft were subject to attack. This zone was extended on May 7 to 12 miles off the Argentine mainland.

South Georgia was recaptured on April 25 over little resistance from the occupying forces. In the skirmishes that did take place the Argentine submarine *Santa Fe* was attacked by navy helicopters and put out of action. By now the Task Force was approaching the Falklands, and on May 1 a bombing raid was made on the airfield at Port Stanley by a Vulcan bomber operating with inflight refueling from Ascension Island. Similar raids were repeated on subsequent occasions with varying degrees of success. Sea Harriers also attacked the Port Stanley airfield on May 1, using iron bombs and cluster bombs. The airfield at Goose Green was raided by Harriers as well, while British ships came under attack from Argentine Skyhawks, Mirages (Neshers) and Canberra bombers. A number were shot down, but the frigate *Arrow* suffered damage.

The Sinking of the General Belgrano

On May 3, the 13,000-ton Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* was sunk by the nuclear-powered attack submarine *Conqueror* with the loss of 368 men. The ship was hit by two Mark 8 unguided torpedoes which holed her below the water-line, and she sank soon afterwards.

The *Belgrano*, although outside the exclusion zone, was sailing in the direction of the Task Force, escorted by destroyers which were armed with Exocet missiles. The AM-38 Exocet missiles have a range of some 30 miles, and the *Belgrano's* 6-inch guns could fire over a range of 13 miles. The sinking of the *Belgrano* clearly gave pause to the Argentine Navy, which did not again venture out of port. As a result, there were no naval battles between the two fleets, and the Royal Navy had no opportunity to use its AM-38 Exocet missiles in a genuine engagement.

From the time the Task Force arrived off the Falklands, the commander decided to keep the two carriers well outside the range of Argentine shore-based aircraft and to be prepared for any attacks that might be mounted from the Argentine carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo*. As it turned out, the latter never appeared outside Argentine territorial waters. Thus, the main action from May 1 until the troops landed at San Carlos on East Falklands was a sea-air battle in which British ships were subjected to air attack by Argentine aircraft operating from bases 400 miles away on the Argentine mainland and therefore at the limit of their effective radius of action. The activity of the British Task Force concentrated on the defense of the fleet and on attacks on the airfield at Port Stanley with Sea Harriers and later GR-3s.

Sustained Enemy Air Attack on British Ships

Operating at the end of 8,000-mile lines of communications and with strictly limited numbers of Harrier interceptors, ground-attack aircraft and helicopters, the Task Force's most serious deficiency proved to be the lack of airborne early warning, which should be an integral part of any carrier task force operating outside the range of shore-based air cover. Unfortunately, the British carriers could not accommodate any of the seaborne early-warning aircraft available from either British or U.S. inventories. Even the American E-3A early-warning aircraft, if it had been offered, could not have provided constant cover operating from Ascension Island with inflight refueling. The Task Force had to be content with its ship-borne radars, which could not give early warning of Argentine aircraft attacking at low altitudes with iron bombs and modern missiles.

The most serious attack on British ships took place on May 4, when two Argentine naval Super Etendard aircraft, armed with AM-39 air-launched Exocet missiles and operating from bases on the mainland, attacked the destroyer *Sheffield*, which was on "radar-picket" duty some distance from the main Task Force. One missile missed, but the other penetrated the *Sheffield's* hull and exploded, causing damage, casualties and extensive fires which could not be controlled. The ship sank a week later while under tow. On the same day, a Sea Harrier was shot down while attacking Port Stanley airfield. The next week witnessed intermittent air attacks on the Task Force, during which a number of aircraft were shot down, including 2 Skyhawks intercepted by Seawolf missiles.

By May 21, landings at San Carlos had established a bridgehead of 10 square miles against little or no Argentine opposition. The absence of Argentine air attacks on the bridgehead could be accounted for in part by the destruction of 11 Pucará aircraft by British commandos in a daring raid on the Pebble Island airstrip on May 14. But the frigate *Ardent* was hit and destroyed by rocket fire from an Aermacchi MB 339 aircraft, the only recorded occasion when this model aircraft was seen in action. On May 23, in a strong attack on ships of the Task Force, five Argentine aircraft were destroyed, and three more were probably downed. Two helicopters and possibly a third were shot down by Sea Harriers, but the British frigate *Antelope* sank after an unexploded bomb that had penetrated her engine room blew up during attempts to defuse it.

On May 25, the destroyer *Coventry* was attacked by Skyhawks and received direct hits with bombs; she caught fire and sank. In the Falkland Sound the merchant ship *Atlantic Conveyor*, carrying important stores including Chinook helicopters, was attacked by Super Etendard aircraft armed with AM-39 Exocet missiles, one of which struck and sank her. There is some controversy over whether the *Atlantic Conveyor* was mistaken by the Argentine pilot for a warship also in the area, or whether chaff fired from the warship deflected the missile onto the merchant ship. The former explanation is the more plausible. During these actions three Skyhawks were claimed to have been shot down.

The most bizarre incident of the whole cam-

paign came on May 29, when the tanker *British Wye* was attacked north of South Georgia by an Argentine C-130 transport, the crew of which rolled bombs from the rear of the aircraft. One of them hit the tanker, but did not explode. The tanker was laden with fuel at the time.

On June 8 the frigate *Plymouth* was attacked in Falkland Sound and suffered bomb damage and casualties. Yet, the worst disaster for the British occurred at Fitzroy, near Bluff Cove, while the two landing ships, *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Tristram*, were disembarking men and equipment at a new landing site. Skyhawks and Mirages attacked with bombs and rockets, sinking the *Sir Galahad* with the loss of many lives, and inflicting damage and casualties on the *Sir Tristram* and a number of landing craft. The ships were unaccompanied by destroyers or frigates, and the landing was observed by Argentinians on high ground to the north and by the long-range AN/TPS-43 radar which called in the strike aircraft. At least five Argentine aircraft were destroyed.

By June 11, British forces were within 10 miles of Port Stanley, virtually surrounding it. The air attacks ceased, mainly because of the high loss rate that the Argentine Air Force had sustained, but probably also because the Argentinians knew that defeat was now inevitable.

British Ship Defenses

The surface-to-air missile and gun defenses available to ships of the Task Force were Sea Dart, Seawolf, Seacat and Seaslug missiles, and 4.5-inch and Bofors guns. The original concept of missile defenses for Type-42 destroyers such as the *Sheffield*, which was sunk by an Exocet missile, was formulated under a combined weapons system concept that became known as GWS-25. This envisaged the deployment of both Sea Dart and Seawolf missiles with appropriate radar and electronics. The Sea Dart was designed for long-range application against air attack from medium and high altitudes. The Seawolf was to provide close-in defense against low-flying aircraft and sea-skimming missiles; this missile had demonstrated in tests its ability not only to carry out these tasks, but even to intercept shells at close range. Yet, for reasons of economics, unidentified Government "experts" decided that Type-42 destroyers should be provided with Sea Dart missiles only and 4.5-inch guns. This combination clearly did not make for an adequate defense against sea-skimming missiles or even very low-flying aircraft.

Type-22 frigates such as *Broadsword* and *Brilliant* were armed with Seawolf but not Sea Dart missiles. The *Glamorgan*, which was hit by a shore-based Exocet, was armed with Seaslugs and Seacats to provide long- and short-range air defense. The frigates *Alacrity, Antelope, Ardent* and *Arrow* carried Seaslugs only; the *Antelope* and the *Ardent* were sunk by bombs dropped from very low-flying aircraft. Claims for enemy aircraft shot down by some of these SAM systems have yet to be verified; what is obvious is that the overall SAM defenses did not prevent six ships from being sunk and others damaged. There is no evidence that the Argentine Air Force used any sophisticated missiles other than the AM-38 and AM-39 Exocet; they relied mainly on 1,000-pound iron bombs and rockets launched from very low altitudes. Many of the bombs did not explode on impact with the target; others were literally thrown at the target and more often than not fell harmlessly into the sea. The Argentine aircraft did not have modern target-acquisition and attack systems and depended solely on visual aiming. They did not undertake night missions or fly in bad weather. They had to operate from land bases 400 miles distant from the area of operations.

Strategy for Repossession of the Islands

There were no contingency plans in London for operations to defend the Falkland Islands, much less recapture them following an invasion. Some senior British officers have asserted that if the airfield runway at Port Stanley had been enlarged to take modern aircraft, as had been recommended by Lord Shackleton in a report submitted to the Government in 1976, reinforcements could have been deployed quickly to the islands and the invasion prevented. This is unlikely. No British government since World War II has even considered deploying more than token forces to the Falklands, and air defenses were nonexistent on the islands. If the runway at Port Stanley airfield had been extended, British aircraft could not have gotten there without the inflight refueling that was

not available until it was hurriedly improvised for both operational aircraft and transports after the invasion in April.

The Argentine invasion would still have taken place and caught Britain by surprise. The invading forces would have captured an airfield capable of operating their Mirage, Skyhawk, Canberra, Super Etendard, C-130 and maritime aircraft. What this would have meant to a task force approaching the Falklands can readily be imagined: at three to four hundred miles away the vessels would have come under air- and possibly sea-attack with Exocet missiles, bombs and torpedoes. Judging by the success of attacks by aircraft operating at extreme range from bases on the Argentine mainland, it is safe to assume that most British ships, including the carriers, would have suffered damage or destruction.

Following the unopposed invasion by Argentine land, sea and air forces, the bulk of their ground forces were deployed on East Falkland Island, with detachments on West Falkland on the other side of the Falkland Sound. Intelligence of the total strength of the occupying forces and their deployment was sketchy, and tactical reconnaissance was lacking. A strategy had to be worked out while the Task Force was on its way south. On arrival in the Falklands area, the carriers were deployed out of range of Argentine aircraft, while other warships enforced the conditions of the exclusion zone. When the ground forces arrived in merchant ships and all preliminary arrangements had been completed for a landing, the plan was to land at Port San Carlos on the East Falkland Island and establish a bridgehead.

With a bridgehead firmly established, the next stage was to advance inland on two approaches, the first southward to Goose Green and Darwin, and the second eastward to Douglas and Teal. Before the landings at San Carlos were attempted, however, it was necessary to eliminate the threat of air attack by Argentine Pucará counter-insurgency aircraft based at Pebble Island and other grass airstrips on the islands, as well as at Port Stanley. Bombing raids were carried out by Harriers from the carriers and by Vulcan bombers operating with inflight refueling from Ascension Island against the airfield at Port Stanley and by Harriers against Goose Green, with limited success. Pucará aircraft based on Pebble Island were destroyed on the ground in a daring raid by special forces including SAS, SBS and Marine commandos. Ammunition dumps and radar installations also were destroyed in the raid.

Darwin and Goose Green were duly captured after a sharp engagement in which 2 Parachute Battalion defeated a force of 1,500 Argentine troops, killing 250 and forcing the surrender of the rest. To the north, Teal Inlet and Douglas were captured against little resistance.

At this stage, the decision was made to undertake a new landing farther to the east along the south coast at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. This was an entirely logical decision and had precedents in the Korean War and Vietnam, as well as on a number of occasions during World War II. A landing force just 25 miles from Port Stanley could join with the force advancing from Goose Green and execute a pincer movement with the forces to the north on Port Stanley. But, as has already been noted, while the landing ships at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove were unloading stores and equipment and disembarking troops, they came under intense attack from Argentine aircraft, during which 5 Infantry Brigade lost 50 men, the landing ship *Sir Galahad* was sunk, and the *Sir Tristram* was damaged.

The operation was nevertheless successful, and between June 9 and 12 the high ground at Mount Tumbledown, Mount William, Mount Harriet and Two Sisters was captured from a thoroughly demoralized enemy. The final assault on Port Stanley began on June 13, and the Argentine garrison surrendered on the following day.

The land battle had lasted just three weeks. As has been mentioned, the battle at sea never materialized once the *General Belgrano* had been sunk by a British submarine. There were no prolonged ASW operations such as must be expected in the North Atlantic in any possible conflict with the Soviet Union.

Argentine Weapons Systems

Before attempting to assess the effectiveness of British weapons systems in the battle for control of the airspace over and around the Falklands, it is necessary to look briefly at the attack capability the Argentinians were able to mount against the Task Force. Since no Argentine naval forces were involved, the burden of

responsibility fell on the Argentine Air Force, with some assistance from the naval air arm operating from shore bases and not from the carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo*. The total air strike capability available to the Argentinians has been variously estimated at between 145 and 150 aircraft, including 9 Canberra bombers, 68 Skyhawk A-4P/Qs, 20 Mirage IIIE/IAI Neshers, 45 Pucarás, and 6 Super Etendards, supported by maritime and transport aircraft and helicopters. Their armament consisted mainly of 500- and 1,000-pound iron bombs, 30mm cannons and rockets. The Super Etendards carried 6 or 7 AM-39 Exocet missiles. The Mirages, with supersonic capability, were designed primarily for the interceptor role and on some occasions were employed as escorts to the Skyhawks, although they were also capable of undertaking an attack role.

Many of the aircraft in the Argentine Air Force inventory were 20 years old, did not operate at night and appeared to have a very limited bad-weather capability. They carried no electronic countermeasures equipment, and their tactics were confined to low-level, free-fall bomb and cannon attacks reminiscent of World War II. The Mirages were equipped with air-to-air missiles, but they rarely engaged the Harriers in air-to-air combat. The sheer courage of the aircrews rather than the effectiveness of their equipment accounted in large measure for the successes achieved by the Argentine Air Force and naval air arm. With more reliable bombs, modern stand-off guided missiles and electronic countermeasures they would have dealt out a great deal more damage to British ships and could have mounted more destructive attacks on the British ground forces, especially during the initial landing and buildup of the bridgehead.

The Argentine Navy had the Sea Dart missile and was well acquainted with its capabilities. They therefore chose low-level tactics in preference to medium- or high-altitude attacks—which in any case, lacking effective blind-bombing equipment, they would not have been able to undertake in the weather conditions prevalent in the Falklands area. They also knew that only two British frigates were equipped with Seawolf missiles for defense against low-level attack. In the absence of airborne early warning, and given the limited number of Sea Harriers available to the British Task Force, low-level attack was the obvious choice for the Argentine Air Force. Rapier SAMs were not available to the Task Force until the troops were ashore, and then only for a limited time.

For the defense of the Port Stanley enclave, the Argentine forces had vast quantities of machine guns, cannon, SAM-7s, Roland, Blowpipe and Tigercat missiles and modern mobile radars. It would appear that the most notable deficiency in the Argentine ground forces was their inability to use the equipment available to them. The troops were poorly trained, badly led and low in morale. They appeared to have no recognizable strategy for the defense of the Falklands, probably because they expected no such contingency. The speed of advance of the numerically inferior British troops over very difficult terrain is ample testimony to the confusion and disarray on the Argentine side. They did manage to account for five Harriers with ground fire, but no Harriers were lost in air combat.

The Exocet Attacks

At the start of the war, it was estimated that the Argentinians had probably six Super Etendards and six or seven AM-39 Exocet missiles. They also had a supply of AM-38 ship-launched missiles, but did not use them. Two Exocets were fired at the *Sheffield*, one of which struck her. The destroyer *Glamorgan* was hit by an Exocet fired from a coastal defense site near Port Stanley and was fortunate to survive. The container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* was struck by an Exocet launched from a Super Etendard and sank. At least two other Exocets were fired but did not hit their targets, either because they were diverted by chaff or they suffered malfunction of the guidance system. This represents a high attrition rate in British ships as against an economical expenditure of relatively low-cost missiles, especially as none of the launching aircraft was shot down.

Argentine Bomb Failures

A feature of the air attacks by Argentine aircraft was the number of bombs which failed to explode despite hitting their targets. Others which did explode did so at harmless distances, mainly because of the poor aim of the aircrews

who often were more concerned with evading the defenses than with accurate targeting. The bombs were 500- and 1,000-pound iron types of U.S. origin, some of them more than 13 years old. Such bombs may be fused in the nose or tail or both. They can be fitted with instantaneous or time-delay fuses, to explode on impact or after penetrating the target. Normally the fusing system is so designed that the bomb is not live until after it leaves the aircraft, whereupon the arming vane rotates as the bomb falls toward its target and activates the fusing mechanism. If the bomb is released from too low an altitude too close to the target, the arming vanes will not have time to activate the fusing system, and the bomb will not explode upon impact.

There were many occasions when such "duds" hit, but spared British ships. The *Plymouth*, for example, was struck by four bombs, none of which exploded. Other ships had bombs pass right through their hulls without detonating. Less fortunate was the *Antelope*, which was hit by a bomb that penetrated the hull and lodged in the engine room. It blew up and destroyed the ship when bomb disposal experts attempted to defuse it. There is no doubt that if all the bombs that hit British ships or came close to their targets had exploded, the casualty rate in vessels and personnel would have been substantially greater.

Ship Defenses of the British Task Force

The primary defenses of the Task Force were the carrier-based Sea Harrier FRS-1 aircraft. They were modified to undertake a strike role, along with their interceptor and reconnaissance missions for which the Blue Fox radar installed in the nose equips them. Only 28 Sea Harriers were available initially on the carriers *Invincible* and *Hermes*. This force was later augmented by 10 Sea Harriers and 10 Harrier GR-3 ground-attack aircraft. The most outstanding deficiency was the lack of airborne early-warning equipment, which made the task of winning the battle for control of the air space that much more difficult. The Task Force had to rely almost totally on the ships' radars to give warning of approaching enemy aircraft—and inasmuch as they usually approached at very low level, the warning time was reduced to a minimum.

For the air defense role, the Sea Harriers were equipped with AIM-9L Sidewinder heat-seeking air-to-air missiles and 30mm cannon, as well as chaff dispensers, tail warning radar and flare dispensers against infrared missiles. For the ground-attack role, the Sea Harriers carried iron free-fall bombs, cluster bombs and 30mm cannon. A number of attacks were carried out against the airfields at Goose Green and Port Stanley, with varying degrees of success. Five Harriers were lost to ground fire—an attrition rate that could not have been sustained for very long with the limited number of aircraft available. Since such attacks involved overflying the target on each occasion, there can be no doubt that the Argentine ground forces would have become more proficient in the use of the defense systems available to them, and Harrier losses would have escalated.

British Ship Missiles

Ships of the Task Force were armed with a variety of surface-to-air missiles and guns. Destroyers like the Type-42 *Sheffield* had Sea Darts and 4.5-inch guns, frigates like the Type-22 *Broadsword* held Seawolf missiles. The *Glamorgan* had Seaslugs and Seacats, and other frigates carried Seacats as well. This means that only two frigates had defenses against Exocet missiles or very low-flying aircraft, since the Sea Dart is primarily designed for use against medium-level attack, albeit with some capability against low-flying aircraft. Lack of airborne early warning compelled the commander of the Task Force to deploy destroyers on radar-picket duty some miles away from the other ships in the Task Force. The *Sheffield* was on such duty when she was hit by an Exocet AM-39 air-launched missile. She did not know what hit her and had no warning of the attack. No electronic countermeasures were used against the missile's radar guidance system, nor was chaff dispensed, although it was used on other occasions with varying degrees of success.

But it was iron bombs dropped from very low-flying aircraft that did most of the damage to many ships of the Task Force. Most of the surface-to-air missile defenses claimed successes, and had all the ships been given effective protection against high- and low-flying aircraft and sea-skimming missiles, the casualties in ships and men in the Task Force would have

been much lower. Surface ships are as vulnerable as the defenses with which they are equipped.

Interdiction of Enemy Airfields

An important aspect of the battle for control of the air is interdiction of enemy airfields to destroy his aircraft on the ground and deny him the use of the airfields. Early in the war the Secretary of State for Defense announced that Britain would not bomb targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was undoubtedly welcomed by the junta because it permitted the limited number of Roland SAMs deployed around airfields on the mainland to be redeployed to the Falklands. They were positioned around the airfield at Port Stanley.

The first attack on the Port Stanley airfield was carried out by a Vulcan medium bomber of the RAF operating from Ascension Island with inflight refueling. The attack was staged from medium altitude, delivering a stick of 21 1,000-pound bombs that bracketed the airfield but achieved only one hit on the runway. In all, five attacks by Vulcan bombers were made on the airfield at Port Stanley, usually followed by strikes by Harriers, but the runway remained in use throughout the period of the conflict. The Vulcans carried active ECM, which may have blacked out the Fledermaus radar directing the Roland SAMs; they also wielded chaff dispensers, and it is significant that no Vulcan was lost on these missions. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the results achieved justified the enormous effort in inflight refueling which was necessary to get the Vulcans to the target and back to Ascension Island.

The combination of Sea Harrier interceptors, ship's missiles and guns, and attacks on enemy airfields succeeded in winning the battle for control of the air well before the culmination of the land battle and the surrender of the Argentine forces, but it was a close affair: a better-equipped, better-trained and better-led opponent could have seriously complicated the outcome.

Israeli Operations in Lebanon

Before examining the lessons from the Falklands operation, especially as they reflect upon needed improvements in British weapons systems, it is instructive to look at the Israeli operations in Lebanon, which took place in roughly the same timeframe, and to do so with particular emphasis on the air battle.

Prior to launching their main attack into Lebanon, the Israelis decided to neutralize the Syrian Air Force, which posed a real threat to their advancing forces. This involved the destruction of Syrian SAM-6 missiles deployed in the Bekaa Valley, the command and control centers, and as much as possible of the Syrian Air Force and its ground control interception centers. The plan was relatively simple, but brilliantly executed. The Israelis first flew remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) over the valley, tempting the Syrians to use their acquisition radars to track the RPVs before launching the SAM-6s to shoot them down. In doing so, the RPVs monitored the frequencies being used by the SAM sites and transmitted them back to the Israeli air bases, where attack aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles, Shrike and Wolf, were waiting to take off and attack the sites. A Grumman E-2C surveillance-and-control aircraft operating off the Lebanese coast was able to observe Syrian aircraft lifting off from their bases and to alert Israeli F-15s flying top cover for the attacking F-4 Phantoms and F-16s. The attacks on the SAM sites were highly successful, and in the air battles that followed, the Israeli Air Force claimed the destruction of 49 MiG-21 and MiG-23 Syrian fighters, without a single Israeli aircraft lost. In the week that followed, the Syrian losses mounted to 86, as contrasted with one Israeli Skyhawk shot down by a SAM-7 missile, plus the loss of two Israeli helicopters. ECM played a vital role in these operations.

The Israelis were equipped with the most modern weapons, including Maverick stand-off air-to-ground missiles, GBU-15 glide bombs, cluster bombs, AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles and infrared decoy-dispensers. They fielded the most modern aircraft in the F-15s and F-16s and demonstrated impressively that defense suppression is a primary requirement before launching an attack on heavily defended targets. Iron bombs are still useful once the defenses have been neutralized, but overflying heavily defended targets at low level in order to drop free-fall bombs will invite a high attrition rate. Electronic countermeasures, used so effectively to jam Syrian GCI communications,

and defense-suppression weapons must be included in the inventory of all modern air forces.

Modernization of British Ship and Air Defenses

All the ships and aircraft lost by Great Britain in the Falklands campaign are to be replaced. But it is not just a question of replacing destroyers, frigates and Harriers: they must in the future carry the kinds of modern, effective defenses against modern attack systems which the Task Force lacked. The Sea Harriers acquitted themselves exceptionally well, accounting for 27 aircraft shot down with no losses to themselves in air-to-air combat. Each of the ships' SAM missile types also performed admirably within the limitations imposed on them: Sea Dart claimed 8 enemy aircraft destroyed, Seawolf 5, and Seacat 6. An unknown number of enemy aircraft may well have been hit and damaged. Ground-based Rapiers claimed 13 and Blowpipes 8 enemy aircraft. Machinegun and small-arms fire may also have accounted for damage to aircraft sufficient to prevent them from reaching their home bases.

The most serious deficiency—lack of airborne early warning—has already been redressed with the installation of a Searchwater surveillance radar in a Sea King helicopter and deployed on board the *Illustrious*, the new carrier now on its way south to replace the *Invincible*. Ships engaged in operations anywhere in the world must in the future have airborne early warning of aircraft or missile attack, especially of such missiles as Exocet. Had British ships of the Task Force been equipped with both Sea Dart and Seawolf and more effective passive and active electronic countermeasures, the casualties would have been lighter.

A further improvement in ship defenses has been made in the *Illustrious* by fitting the American Vulcan/Phalanx multi-barrelled gun system capable of firing 3,000 to 4,000 rounds of 20mm cannon per minute. The rounds are made of depleted uranium, which is very dense and therefore more efficient in penetrating the skins of aircraft or missiles than lead rounds. More effective countermeasures are needed, involving an integrated ECM system to provide protection against radar-guided missiles. Essentially such a system must have greater range for passive measures, including chaff, and for active jammers. A system known as Shield currently under development by the Plessey Company will help fill the gap in electronic countermeasures.

The Sea Harriers, which did so well in the interceptor role, should have longer-range radar and short-range AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles, supplemented with longer-range missiles such as Skyflash. If the United States Navy were operating in conditions similar to those in the Falklands campaign, it would have E-2C aircraft on continuous patrol and F-14 interceptors equipped with Phoenix long-range missiles capable of engaging six enemy targets at ranges of 100 miles, and with a look-down, shoot-down capability. The F-4 Phantoms soon to be deployed to the Falklands will boost the interceptor force. Moreover, Buccaneers deployed in the strike role will eventually be equipped with the new British anti-ship missile, Sea Eagle, which will boast a stand-off range greater than that of Exocet, greater reliability and a capacity for evading or defeating countermeasures. The Sea Eagle will also be fitted to Nimrod maritime aircraft.

Ground-attack aircraft must in the future be armed with stand-off missiles and rely less on overflying defended targets to deliver free-fall bombs or unguided missiles. The Harrier GR-3 and its successor, the GR-5, employed in the closer-support role will risk a high attrition rate if they are not equipped with weapons such as Maverick. The BL-755 cluster bomb for use against tanks will be highly vulnerable to Soviet organic air defenses, including SAM-4s, SAM-6s, SAM-8s, SAM-9s and SAM-10s, as well as ZSU-23-4 AA guns which accompany Soviet armored divisions. There must be some doubt, too, about the efficacy of the JP-233 anti-airfield weapons, which require the delivering aircraft to overfly the target. Fitting them to expensive aircraft such as the Tornado may prove to be costly by comparison with stand-off weapons. Cluster bombs and 1,000-pound iron bombs were not effective against the airfield at Port Stanley and served to emphasize that last-war weapons and last-war tactics will not prevail in a potential war in Europe against the world's most heavily armed nation.

The land battle in the Falklands was primarily an infantry battle with artillery and mortar support, but the helicopter once more proved its worth as a versatile vehicle in many

roles, not least the evacuation of the wounded. The cross-country mobility of British troops was outstanding. The men were fit, disciplined, determined and well led. Their vehicles—Scorpion light tanks with 76mm guns, Scimitars with 33mm cannon, Samson recovery vehicles and 105mm light guns—performed well in very difficult terrain. The land battle did not last long enough to provide sufficient opportunity for ground forces to test their NATO role of initial delaying, defensive tactics, but years of training and NATO exercises enabled a force outnumbered nearly two-to-one and with inadequate air cover to carry out an amphibious landing at the end of 8,000 miles of ocean and defeat an occupying force with minimum losses. The total British casualties in dead numbered some 250, less than half the losses suffered by RAF Bomber Command in a single night raid on a German city in 1944.

Lessons for NATO

Britain has demonstrated her ability to gather a rapid deployment joint task force (RDJTF) more quickly and more efficiently than was thought possible. It was used well beyond the NATO area of responsibility and without help from any other power in the mobilization of the force or the conduct of operations. At the height of the campaign, just before the surrender of the Argentine forces, the British Task Force comprised at sea 26 warships, 15 fleet auxiliaries, 42 merchant ships, 52 fixed-wing aircraft and 136 helicopters. There were more at Ascension Island. The strategic importance of Ascension Island, the Falklands and South Georgia in the South Atlantic is on a par with that of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Other NATO countries surely should be able to muster a similar contribution, if perhaps smaller, for use in assisting the United States in keeping open the oceans of the world, particularly the oil routes from the Persian Gulf.

In a European land battle, NATO land and air forces will have to make wider use of electronic countermeasures. Defense-suppression systems such as the U.S. Wild Weasel in F-4 Phantoms and F-111 aircraft must be increased in number, and the need for precision, stand-off weapons in the ground attack role must now be recognized. New anti-tank weapons, with semi-automatic seekers such as Wasp and Skeet, are needed to replace wire-guided missiles that have given excellent service in many countries for more than a decade and will still be effective for some years to come. Yet, a new generation of anti-tank missiles is available and should be introduced into the NATO inventories as soon as possible.

The Falklands campaign was well planned and brilliantly executed when the odds seemed to be against a successful operation to repossess the islands. Firm decisions and determination at Britain's leadership level set the pattern for the successes that were to come. It was a battle as much against time and the elements as against the Argentine forces—a battle in which sheer professional skill overcame the disadvantages under which the Task Force had to operate. Nevertheless, a comparison with the weapons systems and tactics used by the Israelis in Lebanon suggests that in the Falklands Britain was fighting yesterday's war, while in Lebanon Israel was fighting tomorrow's. It will behoove the Western Alliance as a whole to study the lessons and draw the necessary consequences so that it will not risk the penalty of waging yesterday's war on the ever more sophisticated battlefields of tomorrow.

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

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Editorial Director

MILITARY AXIOMS AND OPERATION FALKLANDS

As the toll of sunken and damaged British warships off the Falkland Islands increased a British naval observer was heard to remark "The outcome now depends on whether we run out of frigates before they run out of aircraft." As we now know, the attrition rate of Argentine aircraft was so high, in making their daring and skilful attacks, that the British fleet prevailed. The amphibious operation which it was supporting succeeded and, once ashore, the troops were able to reoccupy the Islands at a remarkably low cost in human lives. What lesssons, everyone is asking, may be learned from the first sustained, high intensity, sea-air fighting in which the Royal Navy, at any rate, has been engaged since 1945? It is tempting to pronounce already on both failures and successes, particularly in regard to certain weapon systems and equipment used in action for the first time. But a mass of data has to be collected, analysed and interpreted before any valid conclusions may be reached. It is proposed now, therefore, to look briefly at the principles involved in the military action, and see how they worked out in practice.

Given a robust, unambiguous and single political aim — in this instance "to free the Falklands from alien occupation" — the planning and execution of the military operation calls for the application of certain principles. These are the well-tried, well-known, but sometimes neglected "principles of war". No two authorities agree as to exactly what they are, and in any case they may more properly be termed axioms, rather than principles, being self-evident propositions rather than fundamental truths. The first of them without doubt, is *maintenance of the aim.* In the present instance the military aim, in line with the strictly limited political aim, was (if one may conjecture) "to reoccupy the Falkland Islands in sufficient force to ensure the reestablishment of British administration". The remaining military axioms need not be placed in any particular order of priority. But in this case the *cooperation* of all arms must have been particularly important. The Royal Navy had to organise and conduct the safe and timely transportation of the Royal Marines and the Army and support their landing against a numerically superior and well armed garrison. The Royal Navy, in conjunction with the R.A.F. also had to protect the transports and supply ships from air, submarine and surface ship attack. Some fifty merchant ships cooperated closely with the armed forces, as did the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and the many civilian support functions such as dockyards, aircraft repair yards, and the supply depots for food, fuel, munitions and spare parts.

Next, let us take *mobility*. This was manifested in many ways. Strategic mobility was inherent in the operation as a whole, involving the movement of about 7,500 well armed and equipped troops some 8000 miles in eight weeks; in the deployment of nuclear-powered submarines into the theatre of operations within a week, in order to establish a blockade, followed by shore-based aircraft — Nimrods and Vulcans — and eventually reinforcements and replacements for the ship-borne Harriers. Tactical mobility was demonstrated by the ability of the naval battle-group to move in and out of range of the shore-based air threat, and to adopt varying dispositions in order to achieve maximum anti-air, anti-submarine, or gunfire support effectiveness as and when required. Such measures contributed also to *security*, together with reconnaissance, intelligence missions, and control of information release. By contrast, lack of airborne early warning much diminished the security of the British fleet against low-level bomb and missile attack.

The primary purpose of armed forces must be to destroy or neutralise the opposing armed forces, hence *offensive action* must be taken. To be successful such action must achieve a *concentration of force* against an important part of the enemy forces. As a rule this can only be made possible by *economy of force* elsewhere. The surest way to bring about this battle winning combination of economy and concentration of force is by *surprise* — strategic, tactical or technical, and preferably all three. Although Britain's reaction to the Argentine's seizure of the Falklands could not be concealed, its speed and power may have come as a surprise, in strategic terms; likewise the early imposition of a 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone, later extended to exclude aircraft, thus establishing an almost 100% effective blockade. Tactical surprise was achieved by the British with the landing of a complete Commando Brigade, and supporting arms, at San Carlos Bay in a single night. But the Argentine Air Force seems to have gained both tactical and technical surprise with the striking power of its shore-based, Exocet and bomb armed aircraft. Even more of a surprise, it seems — and one with major implications for coastal defence — was the Argentine Army's use of Exocet missile on mobile mountings. One of these struck H.M.S. *Glamorgan,* although it did not sink her.

All in all, the military axioms have stood the test of war, once again. How to assess the balance of advantage beteween shore-based air and naval (indluding seaborne air) power remains to be determined. The Falklands experience should help greatly to do this. NAFO

THE RIO-TREATY OF 1947

Except for the Wars of Independence in the first quarter of the 19th century, until World War II Latin American countries had no reason to form a hemispheric military alliance. Then, because of a certain concern that WW II could spread to the Western Hemisphere, an Inter-American Defence Board (Junta Interamericana de Defensa, JID) was formed to direct joint military action should it become necessary to defend the Americans and became the basis for the 1947 Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty (Rio Treaty). Since during the South Atlantic conflict discussions arose as to whether this defence organization should come to the assistance of Argentina, a study on the background and contents of the "Rio Treaty" is of actual interest.

Though there had been indications during the early months of 1982 that Argentina's Junta was hard pressed by rather severe internal problems, no one was prepared for the 2 April news that Argentine troops had landed on the Malvinas/Falklands islands which have been claimed by both Argentina and Britain since 1833. The immediate result of this landing was the distracting of both Argentine and British populations from serious internal problems. It also served the rekindle Latin Americas' sense of unity (all Spanish-speaking countries and Brazil agree that "Las Malvinas" belong to Argentina, though a few countries disagreed with the Argentine military action) and gave rein to a good deal of "jingoism" in both Argentina and Britain. And it brought to the attention of the general reading public an Inter-American defence Treaty which is little known outside the Americas: the "Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty" (TIAR, Tratato Inter-Americano de Asistencia Reciproca).

Going back in history a bit, the oft-referred to Monroe Doctrine, which for so long influenced the Americas, could possibly be considered as the starting point for the numerous Inter-American agreements, pacts, treaties, etc. which assumed such importance in Latin American affairs from 1915 on. This Doctrine was enunciated by President Monroe on 2 December 1823 in his annual message to the United States Congress. The President considered the doctrine necessary, as he believed there was a definite threat of intervention by the "Holy Alliance" to restore Spain's revolting colonies, and because of an aggressive Russian attitude on the North American west coast, where outposts of this country were to be found as far south as the San Francisco Bay area. It was also a time during which national sentiment within the United States regarding Great Britain was one of distrust.

President Monroe's message stated in part that *the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers,* and that European intervention in the (American) Hemisphere could not be viewed *in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.* This same doctrine also disclaimed any intention on the part of the United States to take part *in the wars of the European powers,* or, still referring to Europe, *in matters relating to themselves.*

Though the effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine today is at most historical, it was applied often enough in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Two situations for which the Monroe. Doctrine was used with less than desirable results, and, incidentally, which still haunt the Americans today, are:

in Latin American affairs.

In 1895 Britain refused to submit to arbitration the disputed boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. On 20 Juli 1895, U.S. Secretary of State Olney sent a note to Britain in which was stated that a British rectification of the boundary by force would violate the Monroe Doctrine, and that one way to settle the dispute was by arbitration. The Secretary of State then continued, *today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.* The 26 November reply of Britain's Lord Salisbury was as could be expected: arbitration was rejected and the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the dispute in question was denied.

Though Britain and Venezuela did agree to submit their dispute to arbitration on 2 February 1897, after the United States Congress had authorized a commission to ascertain the facts of the dispute as well as support for the findings, the fact that the awards made in 1899 largely supported the British position over that of the young and relatively impotent Venezuela has been the main cause for continued disagreement over the same territory ever since.

The second current Latin American problem which has its roots in the 19th century and which involves the Monroe Doctrine deals with Cuba. The Cuban insurrection against Spain which started in 1895 caught United States public attention because of alleged increasingly inhuman treatment of the rebels by Spanish colonial authorities. This allegation was picked up by the then new "yellow press" in the United States, which strongly influenced American sentiment against Spain. Then, on 15 February 1898, the USS *Maine* was mysteriously blown up in Havana harbour. This event could only agitate the anti-Spanish feelings in the United States and, with the press and various national groups pressuring for action, President McKinley finally sent a war message to Congress on 11 April — despite the fact that Spain had agreed to every condition laid down in the President's ultimatum with respect



Former Secretary of State for the United States, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., as he addresses the delegates to the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace which was held in Mexico City in 1945.

to Cuba. Congress for its part adopted a resolution authorizing intervention (but not annexation) in Cuba on 20 April, and war was declared on Spain on 24/25 April 1898. This war consisted of the 1 May defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila by Admiral George Dewey; a blockade of Cuba; the search for the main Spanish fleet; the land battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill and the naval battle of Santiago; and the invasion of Puerto Rico. On 12 August 1898 a peace protocol was signed and on 10 December of the same year the Peace Treaty. As a result of this war, Spain withdrew from Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines to the United States. (For the loss of the latter, Spain was paid $ 20,000,000.—.)

Though Cuba now had her independence, it was not total. On 12 June 1901 the Cuban constitutional convention incorporated the socalled Platt Amendment (which added to the U.S. Army appropriations for 1901—02) in the Cuban constitution as a condition of U.S. withdrawal from the island. With this, Cuba agreed not to impair her independence by treaty with foreign powers; not to assume public debt beyond the ability of her ordinary revenues to liquidate; to permit American intervention for the protection of Cuban independence; and to sell or lease to the United States land necessary for naval or coaling stations. In addition to the Platt Amendment, the Insular Cases were brought before the U.S. Supreme Court during the same period. On these cases the Court handed down a decision which held that territory might be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States without being incorporated into the country, and that the constitution was not applicable, in every particular, to all lands over which the United States exercised sovereignty. This cedicion made it possible for the United States to develop a distinct colonial policy and to enact legislation for the governing of less-developed peoples where a degree of paternalism was considered necessary.

During the independence movement in Spain's American colonies, Latin Americans enjoyed a degree of cooperation and a sense of unity which was not to be experienced again until the Argentine attempt to retake by force what she considered national territory. Though it was undoubtedly an emotional outbreak of brotherly solidarity which called this sense of Latin American unity back into existence rather than the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, it was the Treaty more than anything else which offered the framework for cooperative action. It is a tribute to the degree of maturity and self- control achieved by the countries of this young continent that the conflict in the South Atlantic did not cause them to rush headlong into a new "colonial" war and thereby endanger the world's very fragile stability.

The Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty was not, however, the first attempt at Inter-American cooperation. As early as 24 May 1915 there was a Pan-American conference which dealt with financial matters and concluded an arbitration treaty between Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the A.B.C. Powers of Latin America. Then, on 3 April 1916 a Pan-American high commission met at Buenos Aires to work out a plan for improving telegraph and railway communicationas and to create a permanent high commission to elaborate uniform commercial laws. A fourth Pan-American conference in Santiago lasting from March to May of 1923 resulted in a number of important agreements which provided for fact-finding commissions for cases of disputes, trademark regulations, publication of documents and so forth, in addition to many other resolutions touching on

such social areas as health and education. On 3 May, still in Santiago, the Pan-American treaty for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the first of its kind in Latin America, was signed. The next Pan-American conference was held at Havana in January/February 1938. At this meeting the Pan-American Union was placed on a treaty status. Other matters were also dealt with, one of which was a resolution directed against intervention in the internal affairs of other States, which the United States opposed. During the period December 1929 to January 1930 the Pan-American conference on conciliation and arbitration met in Washington D.C. to revise the treaty of 3 May 1924, declare for conciliation and arbitration of all disputes, and set up commissions to deal with actual cases as they arose. On September 30 of the same year the first Pan-American conference on Agriculture was held, and in 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared publicly against a policy of intervention in Latin America and made consistent efforts to demonstrate his "good neighbour" policy. This more or less paved the way for efforts at the seventh Pan-American conference, held in Montevideo the same year, during which Secretary of State Hull did his utmost to combat Latin American distrust of the United States and to impress upon the American States the need for confidence and collaboration. During the Pan-American conference for the maintenance of peace, which was held in Buenos Aires from 1 to 23 December 1936, the American Governments for the first time accepted the principle of consultation in the event that the peace of the continent should be threatened. During this same conference a convention was drawn up to provide for a common policy of neutrality should there occur a conflict between American States. The Pan-American conference held in Lima on 24 December 1938 adopted the "Declaration of Lima", which reaffirmed the absolute sovereignty of the individual American States and expressed the determination of the 21 States represented to defend themselves against *all foreign intervention or activities that may threaten them*. It also provided for consultation in the event that the *peace, security or territorial integrity* of any member State should be menaced. This declaration, though not as strong as the United States would have liked, was a reflection of the United States' growing uneasiness over possible designs European fascist powers might have upon Latin American territory. The Pan-American conference of 2 October 1939 proclaimed a safety zone around the Western (American) Hemisphere, while a 27



Juli 1940 conference meeting at Havana adopted plans for a joint trusteeship of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The 15 January 1942 conference at Rio de Janeiro discussed possible joint action in the event of foreign aggression, and the 21 February 1945 Inter-American conference in Mexico City agreed to strengthen the Inter-American system and to work out a general defence treaty. This was the last meeting of importance before the 2 September 1947 Inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro (often referred to as the 1947 Rio Treaty) during which the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty was concluded.

The 1947 Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty was the result of recommendations made in Resolution VIII of the Conference on Problems of War and Peace held in Mexico on 21 February 1945. The purpose of this in-force Treaty is to prevent and contain threats and acts of agression against any American State. The 26 Articles of the Treaty are preceeded by a listing of seven considerations, in which national representatives of member countries reiterate

- ☐ their will to form a union within the Inter-American system which would be compatible with the purposes and intentions of the United Nations;
- ☐ the existence of an accord on matters relative to the maintenance of peace and international security which would be susceptible to regional action;
- ☐ their adherence to the principles of Inter-American solidarity and cooperation, and in particular to those declared in the considerations and declarations of Chapultepec, all of which were accepted as norms for their mutual relations and as the juridical base for the Inter-American system.

Other considerations fealing with the perfecting of procedures for the peaceful solution of their problems, the obligation to mutual assistance and common defence of the American Republics, and agreement that peace is rooted in justice and moral order, etc., were also included in the opening considerations. But what was acutally said, all things considered, was that the Treaty was drawn up for the purpose of assuring peace by all possible means, for providing an effective mutual assistance front for the protection of any American State or States threatened against all foreign armed attacks, and to avert the dangers of aggression against any one of the American States.





Article 4 delineates the geographical boundaries covered by the treaty as follows: from the North Pole due south to 47N 010W, along a loxodromic line to 47.30N 050W, to 35N 060W, due south to 20N, along a loxodromic line to 05N 025W, due south to the South pole, From there due north to 30N 090W, along a loxodromic line to 097W, to 15N 120W, to 50N 170W, due north to 54N, along a loxodromic line to 65 30N 168.58W, due north to the North Pole.

The main Articles of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty cover the following points:

Article 1. The Representatives formally condemn war and obligate their individual countries not to take recourse to threats or to the use of force in any form which would be incompatible with the United Nations Charter or with the present Treaty in international relations.

Article 2. As a consequence of the principle formulated in the preceeding Article, the Representatives obligate their individual countries to subject all controversies which arise between them to methods of peaceful solution and to confer to resolve such controversies among themselves, making use of the procedures contained within the Inter-American system, before referring the matter to the United Nations General Assembly or Security Council.

Article 3 covers four important points.

- ☐ The Representatives agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State will be sonsidered as an attack against all American States, and as a consequence each country represented pledges to join forces to form a common front against attack, in the exercise of their inherent right to legitimate individual or collective defence as acknowledged in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
- ☐ At the request of the State or States directly attacked, and in accordance with the decision of the Consulting Body of the Inter-American system, each of the Representatives determines the immediate means his country can adopt in order to comply with the obligation covered in the above paragraph, and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Consulting Body is to meet without delay for the purpose of examining these means and to resolve by common consent the type of conditions on which they can collectively agree to adopt.
- ☐ That everything is stipulated in this Article applies in all cases of armed attack effected within the geographical limits described in *Article 4* or within the territory of an American State. Should the attack be effected outside of the said areas, the stipulations of *Article 6* would apply.
- ☐ The represented States can apply the means of legitimate defence covered by this Article for that time during which the United Nations Security Council has not taken the necessary steps to maintain peace and international security.

Article 5. The Representatives agree to send the United Nations Security Council complete information on developing and projected activities being pursued by right of legitimate defence or proposed for the maintenance of peace and Inter-American security.

Article 6. The Consulting Body is called on to meet immediately to reach agreement on the means to be taken to help state under attack, or, in any case, on steps to be taken for communal defence and the maintenance of continental peace and security should the inviolability of a territory or the sovereignty or the political independence of any American State be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack, or by any extra- or inter-continental conflict, or by any other action or situation which could endanger the peace in America.

Article 7. In the event of a conflict between two or more American States, without prejudicing the right of legitimate defence, and in conformance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Representatives are to meet to urge the disputing States to suspend hostilities and to reestablish a *status quo ante bellum*. They are also to take other necessary measures to reestablish or to maintain peace and Inter-American security and to settle the conflict by peaceful means. The refusal to cease hostilities by one of the belligerents will be considered for the determining of the methods agreed upon during the consultation.

Article 8. The means advised by the Consulting Body for the operation of this Treaty will include one or more of the following: recalling of Heads of Missions; severing of diplomatic relations; severing of consular relations; partial or total severance of economic or communications relations; and the use of armed force.

Article 9. Other acts which could be characterized as aggressive and which are to be considered in consultive reunion are such as

- ☐ unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, population, or ground, sea, air forces of another State;
- ☐ invasion of the territory of an American State by the armed force of a State by crossing borders set by treaty, legal decree, or arbitration, or, lacking borders so determined, an invasion which affects a region under the effective control of another State.

Most of the remaining seventeen Articles of this Treaty deal with procedure, so that of special interest there remains only to mention that the Consulting Body referred to in the above Articles is made up of the Foreign Ministers of those American Republics which ratified this Treaty; that the Directory Council of the Pan-American Union can provisionally take the place of the Cunsulting Body should the latter not be in session; that any bonefide member State can call for a meeting of the Counsulting Body; that only bonefide member states have voting rights; that the Consulting Body will adopt its decisions by a two-thirds vote of the ratifying States; that when there is a situation or dispute between American States, those parties having a direct interest in the situation or dispute will be excluded from the voting; that no State will be obligated to employ armed force without its consent to meet the obligation of any decision (as covered in Article 8); and that any member State may renounce the Treaty.

There is also an annex to this Treaty, which names Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States as garantors of the peace. This means, basically, that these four countries are responsible for furnishing advisors for the settlement of Inter-American disputes. This mini Peace-keeping force last saw action in 1981, when a group of four colonels, one from each of the Garantor States, mediated a cease-fire in the armed dispute between Ecuador and Peru.

There has been much talk in certain Latin American circles since the sudden and unexpected surrender of the Argentine force on the Malvinas/Falklands of a realignment of the Organization of American States (OAS) and other Inter-American acitvities and organizations for the purpose of excluding the United States, just as there has been talk in the same circles of moving the OAS Headquarters and other Inter-American Organization headquarters from locations in the United States. Such talk may seem incomprehensible to Europeans unfamiliar with both the American mentality and Inter-American history, but for a number of Latin Americans, even though Britain was the actual partner to the conflict in the South Atlantic, the United States is considered to be a traitor to her Hemisphere, and for many, at least at present, there is no greater sin.

Latin American relations with Britain and Europe undoubtedly will return to a more or less normal state of affairs within a reasonable length of time. After all, a good portion of the needed financing comes from Europe, a large percentage of investing industries are European, and the largest market place for weapons also happens to be Europe. But there just possibly will be a difference: for example, it is quite probable that the pride with which Argentines once spoke when bragging that they were the most European of the Latin Americans, will disappear, just as it is also quite possible that Latin American countries in general will seek to diversify more in their trade relations, so as not to be overly dependent on the United States and Europe. It is expected however, that the events in the South Atlantic will leave the deepest scar on Inter-American relations, though these relations will, eventually, return to a form of normalcy because of Latin American development needs. NAFO

Ratification of TIAR

Signatory Country	Date of Ratification	Deposition of Ratified Document
Argentina	19 July 1950	21 August 1950
Bolivia	18 September 1950	26 September 1950
Brazil	05 March 1948	25 March 1948
Colombia	10 January 1948	03 February 1948
Costa Rica	20 November 1948	03 December 1948
Cuba	04 December 1948	09 December 1948
Chile	28 January 1949	09 February 1949
Ecuador	30 October 1950	07 November 1950
El Salvador	19 February 1948	15 March 1948
USA	12 December 1947	30 December 1947
Guatemala	18 March 1955 *)	06 April 1955 *)
Haiti	30 October 1947	25 March 1948
Honduras	15 January 1948 *)	05 February 1948 *)
Mexico	23 November 1948	23 November 1948
Nicaragua	01 November 1948 *)	12 November 1948 *)
Panama	31 December 1947	12 January 1948
Paraguay	07 July 1948	28 July 1948
Peru	09 October 1950	25 October 1950
Dominican Republic	07 November 1947	21 November 1947
Uruguay	07 September 1948	28 September 1948
Venezuela	09 September 1948	04 October 1948

*) with reservations

DIARY OF THE FALKLAND CONFLICT



The following is a brief narrative of the events developing to the Falkland crisis and actions of naval forces. The chronology will be followed by initial conclusions and lessons learned. The period covered is that from 18 March to 14 June 1982.

March 1982

Friday, 19

- The *Bahia Buen Suceso,* a 3,000 t Argentine Navy transport ship enters Leith Harbour on South Georgia to disembark a group of 42 Argentine workers, which started to remove scrap from the whaling station there abandoned in 1964. This was in compliance with a commercial contract between the British owners and an Argentine business man, the workers however, did not have a diplomatic permission to stay on the Islands.

Monday, 22

- The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires complained to the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

Tuesday, 23

- HMS *Endurance,* the Royal Navy's antarctic patrol ship carrying a complement of 22 marines, two Wasp helicopters and two 20 mm guns, sailed from Port Stanley to South Georgia to back-up the local authorities there.

Thursday, 25

- The Argentine polar transport ship *Bahia Paraiso,* also carrying marines and two helicopters and armed with a light cannon, enters South Georgian waters. In Buenos Aires the British Ambassador was told that the Argentine party on South Georgia would be given "all protection necessary".

Friday, 26

- Intense activity at Argentine naval bases was noted by British Embassy representatives and reported to London.

Saturday, 27

- *Drummond* and *Granville,* two Argentine A-69 type corvettes sailed to South Georgia to join the *Bahia Paraiso.* Also the carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo* and two destroyer escorts put out to sea.

Sunday, 28

- *John Biscoe,* another RN antarctic survey ship sailed from Montevideo to the Falklands carrying 41 Royal Marines which were flown into the Uruguayan Capital.

April 1982

Thursday, 1

- The British Government requests US President Reagan to intervene in the Argentine courses of actions which were now clearly indicating invasion.
- Britain alerts three destroyers and a frigate to deploy from Gibraltar to the Falklands.
- Britain calls for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council.

Friday, 2

- Argentine Forces invade the Falkland Islands. The British Governor and the garrison of approximately 80 Royal Marines captured.

Saturday, 3

- Argentine Forces cease South Georgia
- British Royal Marines reportedly shot down an Argentine Puma helicopter and damaged an Argentine frigate lying offshore.
- Britain announces to send a Task Force to the Falklands and imposes sanctions against Argentina.

Monday, 5

- British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, resigns
- Argentina declines to comply with the United Nations Resolution No. 502 for complete withdrawal from the Falkland Islands.
- About half the British Task Force sails from Portsmouth, U.K.
- One British nuclear powered attack submarine is reported to be in the Falkland area (wrongly named at the *Superb*)
- Argentina has established a military air-lift shuttle to move troops and military equipment including anti-aircraft guns and armoured vehicles into the Falkland Islands.



HMS Antelope explodes in San Carlos Bay off East Falklands on 23 May when a bomb disposal man of the ships crew tried to defuse an unexploded bomb which had struck the frigate during heavy Argentine air attacks.

- The Argentine Government calls up first reservists.
- European Community Members decide on suspension of all arms deliveries to Argentina and carry-out a total embargo of exports to the country.

Tuesday, 6
- British Government starts chartering and requisitioning merchant ships, including the P&O liner *Canberra.*
- HMS *Fearless,* a landing assault ship, sails from the U.K. with a battalion of Royal Marines onboard

- Mr. Francis Pym appointed Foreign Secretary to replace Lord Carrington.
- Argentina decides on repatriation of the Royal Marines of the British Falkland garrison.

Wednesday, 7
- Britain declares a 200 mile "war zone" around the Falkland Islands

Thursday, 8
- Mr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO, backs Great Britain.
- US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, starts his shuffle peace mission, travelling between Britain, Argentina and the United States.

Friday, 9
- The liner *Canberra,* with 2,000 troops onboard sails from the U.K. for the Falklands.

Monday, 12
- Four British nuclear-powered submarines are reported to be in the Falkland area to enforce the 200 nautical mile exclusion zone declared on April 7.

Tuesday, 13
- The British Government charters five fishing trawlers to be converted into minesweepers for use in the Falklands.

Thursday, 15
- The US Government confirmed that the United States would provide systems to the British fleet sailing to the South Atlantic.
- First reports that the Soviet Union is supplying intelligence information on the movements of the British Task Force to Argentina. Two Soviet submarines are reported to be on patrol in the South-West Atlantic.

Friday, 16ff
- British Task Force is for re-grouping at Ascension Island and exercises amphibious landings on a hostile shore.

Tuesday, 20
- So far 28 merchant ships have been requisitioned or chartered by the British Government to sail to the South Atlantic in support of the Task Force, including a battalion of the 2nd parachute regiment.

Sunday, 25
- British Forces re-occupy South Georgia. The seizure was supported by a group of marines from Special Boat Squadron, one type 42 destroyer and 2 frigates.
- During the assault on South Georgia Royal Navy helicopters attacked and seriously damaged the Argentine submarine *Santa Fe* which was then beached.
- Up to 200 Argentine troops are said to have been captured, including the *Santa Fe's* 90 men crew.

Friday, 30
- Britain re-designs the total exclusion zone around the Falklands to apply not only to Argentine Naval Forces but also to any other ship or aircraft in support of the Argentine Falkland garrison.



- A. Haig's peace mission finally ends unsuccessful. US states that it will support Britain but will not deploy any troops, aircraft or ships.
- British attack Port Stanley and Goose Green airfields with one Vulcan bomber from Ascension Island and Sea Harriers from the carriers *Hermes* and *Invincible*.
- British ships bombard the Port Stanley airfield.

May 1982

Sunday, 2

- British nuclear attack submarine HMS *Conqueror* attacks the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* just outside the 200 nautical mile war zone with two Tigerfish torpedoes.



The type 22 frigate HMS Broadsworth was attacked twice and damaged in the South Atlantic. These ships were the only ones to be fitted with Sea Wolf anti-missile missiles.



Argentinas second largest ship, the aging cruiser General Belgrano was torpedoed by the British nuclear powered submarine Conqueror and sank on 3 May. Clearly visible are the ships Seacat missile launchers just aft of the bridge.

- The British Government requisitions the liner *Queen Elizabeth II* to take troops to the Falklands.

Monday, 3

- The Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* sinks with the loss of 300 lives.
- A Royal Navy helicopter sinks an 800 ton armed patrol boat and damages another.

Tuesday, 4

- HMS *Sheffield*, a British type 42 destroyer, sunk by an Exocet missile launched by an Argentine Super Etendard aircraft with the loss of 20 lives.

  Royal Navy Sea Harrier was shot down during a British bomraid on the airfield in the Falklands.

Friday, 7

- The Royal Navy looses two Sea Harriers which apparently crashed into the sea without enemy interference after take-off from their carrier.
- British Government announces another total exclusion zone extending 12 miles from the Argentine coast, in which any Argentine ship or aircraft would be attacked.

Saturday, 8

- Further 20 Harrier and Sea Harrier aircraft were transferred with air refuelling to Ascension Island in a record 9 hour flight.
- A number of Nimrod MR-2 maritime patrol aircraft, fitted with in-flight refuelling probes, deployed to Ascension Island.
- Royal Navy destroyers and frigates carried out bombardement of Port Stanley airport. During the attack an Argentine Puma helicopter was shot down.

Tuesday, 11

- A British frigate sinks an Argentine tanker in the Falkland channel.
- British warships carry out extensive bombardements on military installations and the airfield of Port Stanley.

Wednesday, 12

- The liner *Queen Elizabeth II* with 3,000 troops embarked, sails for Falkland Islands.
- British Task Force looses one Sea King helicopter ditching into the sea with no casualties.
- British frigates of the Broadsword class shoot down two Argentine A-4 Skyhawk fighter bombers with new Sea Wolf missiles and claim the ditching of another Skyhawk aircraf.

Friday, 14

- Royal Marines carry out a commando raid on Pebble Island, off the north coast of the Falkland Islands. They landed by helicopters and destroyed six Argentine Pucara aircraft on the ground and blew up an ammunition dump and a radar station.

Monday, 16

- British Sea Harriers attack two Argentine ships, the *Rio Carcarana* was reportedly abandoned by her crew. One Sea Harrier aircraft damaged.

Wednesday, 19

- 20 Harrier aircraft reinforcements arrive in the Falklands area onboard the converted transport ship *Atlantic Conveyor.*

Thursday, 20

- After the failure of all diplomatic efforts to resolve the Falkland crisis, the British Task Force Commander are given orders to re-take the Falklands.
- *Queen Elizabeth II* is believed to be in the Falkland area.
- A Royal Navy Sea King helicopter landed on Chilean territory on Terra del Fuego, near the Argentine border. Crew blew it up and disappeared.

Friday, 21

- British Forces established a bridge head with more than 1,000 troops at San Carlos Bay, 50 miles west from Port Stanley and carried out a number of diversionary raids on other parts of the coast. During the invasion, the British ships supporting the landing encountered heavy Argentine air attacks.
- Five British ships damaged, two seriously. Two British Gazelle helicopters shot down by Blowpipe missiles.
- A Sea King helicopter crashed on take-off from an unnamed British ship with the loss of 19 lives, all from the crack Special Air Squadron.
- One Harrier aircraft reported missing.
- 17 Argentine aircraft were shot down and two helicopters destroyed on the ground during the landing operation.



The British Task Force assembles at Ascension Island. In the foreground is HMS Fearless, an amphibious assault ship; behind is the requisitioned P&O liner Canberra; others are 5 logistic landing ships of the Sir Galahad class.

Saturday, 22

- The British type 21 frigate *Ardent* sinks as a result of Argentine air attack with the loss of 20 lives.

Sunday, 23

- The British bridgehead at San Carlos consolidated with about 5,000 men reported ashore. Three other bridgeheads or strong points reported to have been established on both the two main Falkland Islands.
- The British type 22 frigate HMS *Antelope* damaged during heavy Argentine air attacks off San Carlos she was abandoned and exploded during an attempt to disarm an unexploded bomb in the ships engine room. Several other ships of the Task Force reported to be damaged.
- Six Argentine Mirage and a Skyhawk jet aircraft shot down during the day's combat action. British Harriers attacked the Argentine helicopters in the Falkland Sound and destroyed two of them.

Monday, 24

- Another day of heavy Argentine air attacks on ships in the landing area. Apparently no British ships seriously damaged.
- Eight Argentine Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft shot down.

Tuesday, 25

- National Day in Argentina. Heaviest air attacks of the Argentine Air Force on British ships in the landing area. The Type 42 destroyer HMS *Coventry* heavily bombed and capsized with the loss of 20 men. The Type 22 frigate HMS *Broadsword* slightly damaged. The container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* hit by Exocet missile from a Super etendard aircraft with 11 killed. The ship had to be abandoned.
- Four Argentine jet aircraft destroyed.

Thursday, 27

- Second Battalion of British Parachute Regiment with 650 men captured Goose Green and Port Darwin with 1,400 Argentine soldiers. British troops continue to advance towards Port Stanley. British casualties reported 17 men including the Commanding Officer of the battalion, 31 wounded. Argentine casualties not known.

Sunday, 30

- Argentine positions at Port Stanley heavily shelled from the sea by British destroyers and frigates.
- Argentine air attacks on the Task Force north east of Falklands with Skyhawk and Super Etendard aircraft. Argentina reports HMS *Invincible,* one of the Royal Navy's two carriers, out of action. British claim no damage to own ships but report two Argentine aircraft destroyed.

  1,200 Argentine prisoners of war embarked in a British landing craft and a merchant ship and sent to sea out of the war zone.

Monday, 31

- Further Argentine air attacks on the Task Force. Two British frigates reported that they had shot down two Exocet missiles, but this was not confirmed, however two Super Etendard aircraft had been sighted and launched Exocet's but no British ships hit.



A British anti-submarine frigate of the modified type 42 under attack from an Argentine Mirage fighter bomber during air attacks on the British bridgehead at San Carlos.

A British type 21 frigate closes in on HMS Sheffield to give fire fighting support to the destroyer hit by the first AM 39 Exocet missile fired in the conflict. Pennant numbers of British ships were painted over in order to conceal the own order of battle.

June 1982

Tuesday, 1

- British troops gain control of Mount Kent overlooking Port Stanley. Stocks of Napalm bombs were found at Goose Green.

Wednesday, 2

- Two British Harrier Aircraft shot down by shore based anti-aircraft fire, pilots saved.

Thursday, 3

- British aircraft drop leaflets on Port Stanley asking Argentine troops to surrender.
- A British Vulkan bomber with fuel problems entered Brazilian airspace and was forced to land by Brazilian Air Force jet aircraft.

Friday, 4

- Britain vetoes UN resolution for a cease fire.

Sunday, 6

- British troops on the Falklands have been reinforced by 3,000 men of the 5th Infantry Brigade, raising the British strength on the islands to about 8,000.

Monday, 7

- *Queen Elizabeth II* reported to be on her way back to U.K.



Tuesday, 8

- Three British ships, the modified Type 42 frigate HMS *Plymouth*, and the two 3,270 t landing ships *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Tristam* were heavily damaged by Argentine air attacks whilst landing troops and supplies of the 5th Brigade at Fitzroy settlement and Bluff Cove south west of Stanley.
- Eleven Argentine aircraft reported destroyed.
- Argentine C-130 transport aircraft apparently bombed the Liberian Tanker *Hercules* outside the exclusion zone after the ship had failed to comply with the radio warning to steer due west for the Argentine coast. The ship was not employed by the British.

Friday, 11

- British troops advance to within 10 miles of Port Stanley. It was reported that the landing ship *Sir Galahad* was a total wreck and must be considered lost.

Saturday, 12

- British troops launched a surprise attack on Argentine positions outside Port Stanley. Over 400 Argentine prisoners taken.

Sunday, 13

- The British County class destroyer HMS *Glamorgan* hit by an Exocet MM-38 missile fired from the shore with 11 killed.

Monday, 14

- All Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands surrendered.

In an attempt to summarize the facts and to draw initial conclusions, it is at first worthwile to note, that the Royal Navy, at all, was able to put out to sea a considerable Task Force, projecting sea power over a distance of 8,000 miles to the Falkland Islands. It must also be noted that the naval war in the South Atlantic, that commenced with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* was the first operation in naval warfare including combat action of this scale for more than 37 years after the end of World War II.

It is much too early to come up with any overall assessments and conclusions. Too little information of too much incertainty are available on the forces and tactics employed by both sides, and of the courses of the various operations. Some considerations, however, can already be made.

The Royal Navy. An exact Order of Battle of the British naval forces in the South Atlantic is difficult to set up. The expeditious build up of the Task Force and the subsequent generation of combat ready units, of support and auxiliary ships which then sailed to the South Atlantic and the requirement to conceal the actual strength of British sea power at the Falklands has led to some confusion of the forces involved. With some certainty the original Task Force, however, can be assumed as follows:

2 aircraft carriers (*Hermes* and *Invincible*)
4 destroyers Type 42 *(Sheffield, Exeter, Coventry, Glasgow)*
2 destroyers County class *(Glamorgan, Antrim)*
3 frigates Type 22 *(Broadsword, Brilliant, Battleaxe)*
4 frigates Type 21 *(Antelope, Ardent, Atlacrity, Arrow)*
2 frigates Type 42 modified *(Plymouth, Yarmouth)*
2 assault ships *(Intrepid, Fearless)*
3 nuclear powered submarines *(Splendid, Spartan, Sceptre)*

Reinforcements included an unidentified number of Leander class frigates and nuclear submarines. Royal fleet auxiliary included initially at least four tankers, two fleet replenishment ships, two small support ships and five landing and logistic ships. In addition to that a large number of civil ships of various size including liners, ferries, Ro/Ro-ships, tankers, trawlers and tugs were chartered and/or requisitioned.

Aviation forces included up to 32 Royal Navy Sea Harriers, some 20 to 30 Royal Air Force Harriers, 18 Sea King helicopters, a number of ship-borne Lynx and Wasp helicopters, and a number of Nimrod early warning and maritime patrol aircraft based at Ascension Island. Also a number of Gazelle helicopters were available on the carriers.

The Argentine Navy. Apart from the ill fated sortie out to sea of the cruiser *General Belgrano*, the Argentine warships played no part in the battles at all. The submarine *Santa Fe* was beached and captured when the British invaded South Georgia, and one patrol craft was sunk by British helicopters.

While the British nuclear powered submarines kept the Argentine fleet in their home waters or ports, the remaining Argentine submarines worried the British Task Force. The *Santiago del Estera*, sister ship of the *Santa Fe*, was believed to be non-operational throughout as she was refitting. The German built *Salta* and *San Louis*, however, were believed to be at sea. They posed a real threat to the British Task Force. One can understand the Argentines not wishing to risk their surface ships in the known presence of nuclear-powered attack submarines and superior surface force, but it is not known why the submarines did not make any effort to attack.

Argentine aviation force included both aircraft from the Navy and the Air Force. All of them were operating at the edge of their range. It is not known exactly how many aircraft the Argentines had fitted with air refuelling probes and to what extent the aircraft could have been employed from the Falkland Islands itself. The Argentine Air Order of Battle was believed to include.

9 Canberra long range bombers
45 Pucara counter insurgency aircraft
68 A-4 Skyhawk maritime attack aircraft
5—10 Super Etendard carrier based attack aircraft.

It is unknown how many of their armed helicopters the Argentines had transfered to the Falklands.

Combat actions and losses. Undoubtedly the greatest danger to the British ships were the Argentine air attacks in which both, Exocet missiles and bombs, were employed.

There were three attacks made by Super Etendard aircraft using the Aérospatiale AM-39 Exocet missile (range 50 to 70 km).



Royal Marines head for the shore in a landing craft during a lull in the air attacks on the troop transport Canberra off the Falkland Islands.



A Royal Navy Sea King helicopter during rescue mission to pick up survivors from the blazing amphibious landing ship Sir Galahad.

The first was on HMS *Sheffield*. Two missiles were launched, one missed and the other hit right in the center of the ship about 2 m above the water line. Apparently the ship had no warning, either of the approach of the aircraft which flew very low, or of the approach of the missile until it was sighted about 4 seconds before it hit. There are some reports that the warhead did not explode, others say that it had a delay fuze and exploded well inside the ship knocking out the operations room and the damage control headquarters. A major fire, caused obviously by the residual fuel of the missile, rapidly spread by the very inflammable insulation of the electric cables. The fire took hold of practically the entire ship and eventually she had to abandoned. She was later taken in tow, finally sank in rough weather. 20 lives were lost.

The next attack was on the *Atlantic Conveyor*, a container ship. She was screened by a number of frigates who apparently detected the approaching missile, but it still managed to hit its target. Again a Super Etendard had launched two missiles of which only one hit. 11 men, including the ship's master, were killed.

The third attack was on Sunday May 23 and was on a carrier battle group who were some 150 nautical miles north east of the Falklands and believed they were outside range of the Super Etendards. It is now thought that the aircraft must have been fitted for air refuelling and refuelled on the way home. Three Exocet missiles were launched and two were diverted by two frigates on the screen, presumably by ECM. It is not known what happened to the third missile.

Finally, one Exocet missile was launched from a shore battery and hit HMS *Glamorgan* whilst she was bombarding the Port Stanley airfield on the night of 12/13 June. Obviously the battery had only just been installed as ships had been bombarding Port Stanley night after night for several days and had not been hit. The missile hit about 2 m above the water line and passed through the ship without exploding. The damage was not great but 11 men were killed.

The bombing attacks at San Carlos and in the Falkland Sound were carried out at a very low level and at maximum speed. The aircraft took full advantage of the cover afforded by the Falkland hills and approached from below them, skimming over the crests and diving down at high speed onto the ships. It was not possible for them to use air-to-ship missiles, such as the Argentine built Martin Pescador (range 2.5 to 8 km) or French AS 30s (range 10 to 12 km), because of the narrow waters. Similarly the surrounding hills prevented the British ships from detecting the aircraft by radar and from

using their long range SAMs, such as Sea Dart and Sea Slug. The radar pickets were very exposed being outside the Sound, but in all cases (except for the *Sheffield*) the aircraft still attacked by approaching from the West Falkland direction below the hills.

The attacks were very gallantly carried out and well pressed home. The aircraft were Mirage IIIs and Skyhawks. In all, three ships were sunk and one completely wrecked, three more were badly damaged. The ships sunk were the Type 42 destroyer *Coventry* and the Type 21 frigates *Ardent* and *Antelope*. Ships damaged were the type 42 class destroyer *Glasgow*, the 22 Type frigate *Broadsword* and the frigate *Plymouth*, the landing ships *Sir Tristram* and *Sir Galahad* the latter of which was so badly damaged that she had subsequently to be scuttled.

The initial landing at San Carlos achieved complete surprise and met with only slight resistance. Surprise was probably helped by the fact that for days previously commando type raids had been made on various parts of the coast and the Argentines found it difficult to determine which was a major landing and which just a raid. Further, to move troops rapidly across the island to meet a threat was almost impossible due to the soft biggy ground. The British took enormous risks, anchoring their troop carrying ships in San Carlos Bay, including the very large curise liner *Canberra*. The ships were not attacked during the initial landing, but it was during the landing of the stores and equipment, which took some days, that the attacks matured.

Some 250 British men were killed on sea, land and in the air. The cost of the whole operation is reckoned to have cost Britain £ 500 million.

Argentine casualties are not known, but are thought to be in excess of 700 men, plus, of course, the wounded and nearly 12,000 prisoners. The financial cost to Argentina must be enormous. All the Argentine weapons on the Falklands were handed over to the British and included a number of vehicles of various types, four Roland anti-aircraft missile systems, a number of anti-aircraft guns and 105 mm howitzers, a tremendous amount ot ammunition, including a stock of dum-dum small arms bullets and some napalm bombs.

British aircraft losses are believed to be 9 Harriers and 11 helicopters, some of these were due to accidents and not to enemy action. Argentine aircraft losses amounted to 29 Skyhawks, 23 Mirage, 9 Pucaras, 9 helicopters, 5 attack trainers, 3 light aircraft, 2 Canberra bombers, 1 C-130 transport aircraft.

Lessons learnt. It is too early yet to be able to assess the lessons learnt, but on what information is available at the time of writing (18 June) a few major points have emerged.

The lack of AEW aircraft (or indeed of any long range maritime patrol aircraft) was sorely felt by the British ships. The Argentine aircraft came in very low and the older ship's air warning radars were quite unable to detect them, which is the reason why *Sheffield* was not even at action stations when she was hit. It now also appears that at least one large merchant ship broke the sea blockade and managed to reach Port Stanley. Given adequate air patrols over the sea this would not have occurred.

Air launched anti-ship missiles pose an enormous threat and ships at sea will never apparently be safe in the future without adequate air cover. It also seems probable that whilst one ship may be able to divert a missile by ECM from striking her, it does not necessarily follow that the missile may not be able to continue and use its radar to find another nearby ship. Thus ships without their own ECM and/or anti-missile guns or missiles (such as merchant ships in convoy) may still be very vulnerable, however well they are screened.

British ships suffered severly from fire, largely due to the insulation on electric cables being highly inflammable, but also due to the presence of other inflammable materials onboard, such as foam rubber mattresses and wooden furniture.

Sea Cat as a close range weapon against aircraft or missiles did not appear very effective. Sea Wolf, on the other hand certainly proved its worth, but it is not known how many Exocets (if any) were shot down by it.

Long range anti-aircraft missiles, such as Sea Dart and Sea Slug apparently only shot down a few aircraft, but this was probably due to the Argentinians' low flying tactics and the use of land cover.

The Sea Harriers were resoundlingly successful. Not one Harrier or Sea Harrier was shot down in air-to-air combat, but the bombing of the Port Stanley runway by Harriers and the occasional Vulcan cannot have proved very effective as it is now reported that the Argentines continued to receive supplies by air, including landing C-130s on at least two occasions. One Harrier pilot on television told of how, when bombing the runway, he saw on his radar warning receiver that a Roland radar had locked onto him but he was able to avoid the missile by violent monoeuvres at which the Harrier is excellent.

J.M.



Survivors from the heavily crippled Sir Galahad were rescued with lifeboats and rafts from sister ship Sir Tristram in San Carlos Bay.

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THE FALKLANDS...

Air Claims and Losses Analysed

BY JOHN FRICKER



AFTER THE battle comes the reckoning: but while the cost of victory in human and material terms is easily determined in our democratic society, an accurate assessment of Argentine losses presents a more difficult challenge. In defeat, a totalitarian régime is reluctant to admit the full extent of its humiliation, and the loss admissions revealed to date by official spokesmen of a junta which disclaims any knowledge of the disappearance of more than 7,000 of its own citizens cannot expect the credibility accorded to more liberal administrations.

As will be demonstrated later, the Argentine admissions made mainly at a press conference shortly before the enforced retirement of Brig Gen Basilio Lami Dozo, *Fuerza Aérea Argentina* C-in-C at the time of the Falklands operations, and presented in greater detail in the national aviation magazine *"Aerospacio"*, may well have been true, so far as they went, but certainly did not tell the whole truth, or present the complete picture. Curiously, these claims were also presented in the French aviation press by France's leading fighter ace of World War II, Pierre Clostermann, who despite his earlier RAF service, appears to have embraced the junta's cause to the point of sending a laudatory message to "his comrades in arms", the Argentine "air heroes". This message he ended, somewhat melodramatically, with the words *"La Verdad vale únicamente por la sangre derramada y el mundo cree solamente en las causas cuyos testigos se hacen matar por ellas."* (Literally: "The only real measure of truth is the blood spilt in its defence, the world believing only in the things that people are willing to die for.").

Argentina's AOB*

As an illustration of the *FAA*'s selective statistics, Brig Gen Dozo claimed at his post-Falklands press conference that he started the campaign with only 82 combat aircraft, comprising A-4B/C Skyhawks, Mirage IIIEAs and Israeli-built M-5 Daggers, Canberra Mk 62s and IA-58 Pucará turboprop twins in service "at continental bases". This apparently refers only to combat aircraft in actual squadron service on the mainland, and excludes types on overhaul and maintenance, and in reserve, as well as the Pucarás of *IV Escuadrón de Exploración y Ataque* of the *IX Brigada* based on the Falklands.

This is confirmed by M Clostermann's indication that six more Mirages joined the 28 IIIEAs and Daggers reportedly in squadron service on 2 April last year after completion of their overhauls in early June. There is now positive evidence that the widely-rumoured follow-up batch of 10 of the latter type had arrived from Israel in 1981, increasing the *FAA*'s total Dagger receipts at that time from 26 to 36 aircraft (of which one had been lost prior to the Falklands conflict).

Having originally received 50 Douglas A-4B Skyhawks between 1966-70, plus a further 25 A-4Cs in 1976, all ex-US Navy and nominally all modified to A-4P standard, including the installation of Ferranti ISIS D126R lead-computing weapons sights — to prove of considerable significance for future operations — the *FAA* is believed to have had at least 46 of these (still apparently referred to by their original designations) in active service last April in the *IV* and *V Brigadas Aérea*.

With the 30 or more Daggers of the *VI Brigada Aérea*, the *FAA* Skyhawks filled most of Argentina's anti-ship strike rôles, leaving the 17 AIM-9B Sidewinder-armed Mirage IIIEAs of the *VIII Brigada* for air defence and occasional escort duties. M Clostermann said that only two Mirage IIIEAs in the north of Argentina and two in the south were retained on alert, in case of RAF Vulcan attacks on mainland bases.

The *FAA* was also estimated to be able to call on up to nine Canberra B Mk 62s of the *II Brigada Aérea* at the beginning of April last year, and these were the only aircraft with adequate range to cover both the 380 naut mls (704 km) or so between the nearest Argentine bases in Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz provinces at Rio Grande and Rio Gallegos, and the 518 naut mls (959 km) between Comodoro Rivadavia, from which the campaign was controlled, and the Falklands with an adequate fuel reserve and some all-weather and night capability.

Gen Dozo's 82 combat aircraft apparently excluded the Pucarás operating from the Falklands from two *FAA* Military Air Bases, comprising the so-called Malvinas MAB, using the facilities and 4,200-ft (1 280-m) runway of Port Stanley, or Puerto Argentino as it temporarily became, and Condor MAB at Goose Green, with its grass-surfaced strip.

The official *FAA* account of the operations talks of 12 Pucarás originally deployed in the Falklands squadron, but then admits to the "not considerable" loss of five in air combat, plus nine destroyed on the ground, mostly at the Pebble Island strip (not designated as an MAB), "as a result of naval artillery, air raids and commando groups". When the Falklands were recaptured, however, at least 14 Pucarás were identifiable on the ground, as listed later, in addition to the five destroyed in the air.

**Air Order of Battle.*

At least 56 Pucarás had been delivered to the *FAA* by early April last year, so its operational inventory was nearer 170 first-line aircraft (some 50 Skyhawks, 32 Daggers, 17 Mirage IIIEAs, nine Canberras and 56 Pucarás) than the 82 claimed. To these had to be added the aircraft of the *Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina* in the Falklands campaign, quoted by M Clostermann as 29 and presumed to include a squadron of a dozen A-4Q Skyhawks from 16 supplied in 1971 for the carrier *25 de Mayo* — remarkably quiescent last Spring — plus the five AMD-Breguet Super Etendards delivered by then from 14 on order for *CANA*, together with seven highly-lethal AM 39 Exocet air-launched anti-ship missiles.

CANA could also call on 10 Aermacchi MB.339A armed jet trainers, equipped with 30-mm cannon, rockets and Saab weapon sights, capable of using Stanley's short runway, from which they were operated, together with a few Beech T-34C Turbo Mentors for forward air control rôles, increasing the overall Argentine combat commitment to nearly 200 aircraft. In his report on the South Atlantic campaign*, the Task Force Commander, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, GCB, GBE, assessed the Argentine air threat last April as 64 A-4 variants, 39 Mirage III/5/Daggers, 60 Pucarás (including about 20 island-based), five Canberras, five Super Etendards and some 20 helicopters, or just under 200 aircraft in all.

Support and air defence elements

His report also mentioned "a small but significant air transport force" including two Lockheed KC-130 tankers, but many of the aircraft in this force were given first-line rôles, including the adaptation of some of the seven Lockheed C-130 E/H Hercules of *I Escuadrilla de Transporte* as medium-range bombers, carrying up to 20,000 lb (9072 kg) of HE stores, mainly on anti-shipping strikes.

Transport support to the Falklands was also provided by Fokker F.28s and Lockheed L.188 Electras of *CANA*, which flew more than 500 tons (508 *tonnes*) into the islands, including 56 tons (57 *tonnes*) during the blockade in the course of 50 hours of flying. About 50 missions to shadow units of the British Task Force and reconnoitre their locations for attack were also flown by four venerable Lockheed SP-2H Neptunes of *CANA*, later supplemented by two EMBRAER EMB-111 maritime patrol aircraft on loan from the Brazilian Navy.

In addition to the mainland combat element, the *FAA* requisitioned a number of civil jet aircraft, including HS.125s and Learjet 24s, 25s, 35As and 36s, to equip a special *Fénix* squadron for operational support rôles, including navigational assistance, communications relay and decoy flights, in 159 sorties.

Main responsibility for tracking Task Force movements was undertaken by the *Grupo Aérea de Exploración y Reconocimiento I*, operating from Comodoro Rivadavia MAB within *IX Brigada Aérea* with a makeshift collection of patrol and recce aircraft, including Boeing 707s (of which the *FAA* then had three in its inventory); Lockheed C-130s; Fokker F.27s (13 on strength); and four Learjet 35As. SAR centres were set up at all the main southern air bases and the Falklands with an even more varied collection of aircraft, including one F.27, a DHC-6 Twin Otter, six Bell 212s, two Hughes 369Ms, two Sikorsky S-58s and two S-61s, two CH-47 Chinooks and three Mitsubishi MU-2/60s of the *FAA*.

Finally, the Argentine air inventory in the Falklands was completed by more than 20 army helicopters, including armed Agusta A 109s; two Boeing-Vertol CH-47Cs; up to 16 or more Bell UH-1Hs (known locally as *Aguirras*); three or more Bell 212s and several SA 330J Pumas.

The Argentine air component in the Falklands operated in direct support of army units through a *Sección Operativa de Apoyo Aéreo (SOAAD)*, or in defensive rôles through a *Sección Operativa de Defensa Aérea (SODA)*, with appropriate liaison links and a *Centro de Información y Control (CIC)* near Port Stanley. This processed information from two recently-delivered Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F 3-D long-range surveillance radars airlifted by C-130 into the Port Stanley area, which were to become priority targets for Vulcan and Harrier attacks. These were also linked with other Argentine defence elements, including Skyguard and *Super Fledermaus* fire-control systems controlling twin Oerlikon 35-mm GDF-002 AA guns, Rheinmetall Rh 202 20-mm cannon



This camera gun photograph shows an attack on an RN frigate by an FAA Dagger operated by the VI Brigada's II Escuadrón de Caza-Bombardeo. *Note the splashes thrown up by cannon fire.*

**Published as a supplement to* The London Gazette *of 13 December 1982 and obtainable from HMSO, price £2·90.*

Among the losses suffered by the FAA, the Pucará figured prominently — partly because of the substantial number destroyed on the ground or eventually abandoned in the Falklands. The heading photo, opposite, shows damaged Pucarás at Port Stanley; shown below are two of the Pucarás, A-533 and A-549, that have been returned to the UK.





and Tigercat and ROLAND surface-to-air missile units. Argentine forces in the field were also armed with Short Blowpipe infantry SAMs, later supplemented by about 100 SA-7 *Grail* weapons of a similar type. Most of the latter were captured after the end of hostilities, and were believed to have been part of the five Boeing 707-loads of military equipment said by Gen Galtieri to have been supplied by Libya during the campaign.

The ROLAND battery at Port Stanley was one of two delivered to Argentina prior to April 1982, when one was airlifted to the Falklands by C-130, together with its 10 missiles; the second remained at Mar del Plata. There have been strong differences of opinion between Britain and France over the effectiveness of ROLAND, as well as of other French weapons used in the Falklands, and Aérospatiale appear to have accepted without reservation Argentine claims for the performance of their missile systems. According to Aérospatiale, the single ROLAND battery at Port Stanley made it possible for the Argentines to continue operating from the "Malvinas MAB" up to the very last day of the war by restricting Harrier and Vulcan attacks to between 10,000 ft and 18,000 ft (3 048 m-5 486 m) against the single vulnerable runway.

Although the battery had been set up with no technical assistance by inexperienced personnel, it was claimed to have resulted in the shooting-down of four Harriers, plus severe damage to a fifth, for the launching of only eight missiles. Only one of the three unsuccessful missiles was admitted by Aérospatiale to have malfunctioned. The second reportedly homed in on and struck a 1,000 lb (454 kg) bomb released from its target Harrier, while the third had its target masked by intervening terrain. Unfortunately for the Argentinian and French claims, however, Britain's Defence Ministry attributes only one loss to a ROLAND SAM (of Sea Harrier XZ456 at 30,000 ft/9 145 m on 2 June; its pilot ejected safely).

British air losses detailed

Of the six Sea Harrier losses now confirmed in the Falklands, from a total of 28 aircraft operationally deployed for 2,376 sorties and 2,675:25 flying hours, two (ZA192 on 24 May and ZA174 on 29 May) resulted from take-off and deck accidents, and two more (XZ452 and XZ453) from an unexplained accident in cloud on 6 May. The first Sea Harrier loss (XZ450) on 4 May resulted from ground fire during an attack on Goose Green airfield, far removed from the usual 5 000-m (16,404-ft) interception range of the ROLANDs at Port Stanley.

(Below) Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 XZ457 in extra dark sea grey overall, as operated by No 899 Squadron aboard HMS *Hermes*.



(Below) Harrier GR Mk 3 XW767 of No 1(F) Squadron as deployed to the South Atlantic, with Sidewinders.

(Below) Sea Harrier XZ499 in the medium sea grey/barley grey finish in which the aircraft of No 809 Squadron were operated. A single Mirage "kill" marking was later applied.

(Below) Westland Wessex HU Mk 5 XS518 operated by No 847 Squadron, one of the two new squadrons formed on this type for Operation "Corporate", and retained on the Falklands for garrison duties.





(Above) A Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2 in the original blue finish, but with white markings ("ROYAL NAVY" and roundel) overpainted in black.



(Left) Westland Sea King HAR Mk 3 XZ597, deployed south with a detachment of No 202 Squadron for search and rescue duties, acquired a dark grey finish in place of the normal SAR yellow.





(Above) Westland Sea King HC Mk 4 ZA310 was one of the helicopters of this type deployed by No 846 Squadron. As on other types, white lettering was overpainted black to reduce visibility; the standard olive drab finish overall was retained.



(Above) Westland Sea King HAS Mk 5 XZ578 of No 826 Squadron operating from HMS *Hermes*. (Left) The Boeing Vertol Chinook HC Mk 1 ZA718 "Bravo November", sole survivor of the four No 18 Squadron Chinooks on the *Atlantic Conveyor*.

In addition to these Sea Harriers, the RAF lost four of the 10 GR Mk 3s deployed in the Falklands campaign in the course of 126 sorties (see *"Strike Force South"* (April 1983), but the first, on 21 May, was shot down over Goose Green by a Blowpipe SAM, according to Argentine claims. Another was damaged by AAA at Goose Green on 26 May — its pilot also ejecting safely — while a similar occurrence on 30 May was attributed to conventional ground fire. The last GR Mk 3 loss (XZ989) resulted from damage at the forward strip at San Carlos on 8 June, when a section of aluminium planking struck the aircraft as it landed.

It is perhaps significant that the detailed French accounts presented to support the Argentine ROLAND claims do not give dates for any of the eight missile launches, which had an alleged success rate of 62·5 per cent. There is certainly no evidence that the ROLAND threat imposed more than minimum tactical limitations on British air operations, the Vulcan attacks being made from around 8,000, 12,000 and 16,000 ft (2438, 3657 and 4876 m), and an RN report mentions the deliberate "baiting" of the Port Stanley system by Sea Harriers, one of which succeeded in drawing two missiles unavailingly expended in a single run.

In addition to refuting French claims, these loss details also



Pucarás were observed in several different camouflage schemes during the conflict. This photograph, from Argentinian sources, shows one of the aircraft at Port Stanley, carrying rocket pods and bombs. One of the several aircraft of this type returned to the United Kingdom is the subject of a short handling assessment at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Boscombe Down.

(Below) The Vulcan B Mk 2 XM607 was one of five modified at RAF Waddington for active service in Operation "Corporate", and was used for the first, second and fifth bombing missions.



(Right) Hercules C Mk 1 XV179, one of the 16 modified by Marshall of Cambridge to have AAR probes, and operated between Ascension and the Falklands by the Lyneham Transport Wing. (Below) VC10 C Mk 1 XR107 of No 10 Squadron with air ambulance markings for casualty evacuation flights from Ascension to the UK.





(Below) Victor K Mk 2 air refuelling tanker of No 57 Squadron — heavily engaged, together with No 55 Squadron, to support RAF operations south of Ascension Island.

(Below) Nimrod MR Mk 2(P) XV239 was one of the aircraft modified during Operation "Corporate" to have AAR capability and to carry Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles.



NOT TO SCALE



Two Agusta A 109 helicopters captured at Goose Green were used by British forces in the closing days of the campaign before being returned to the UK aboard HMS Fearless, *whence they flew to Yeovilton on 13 July 1982.*

effectively counter Argentina's contention to have shot down 14 Harriers during hostilities, plus seven probables and, even more remarkably, to have captured seven of their pilots. In fact, only one British pilot — Flt Lt Jeffrey Glover, the Blowpipe victim of 21 May — achieved that dubious distinction, others being rescued before falling into Argentine hands.

Argentine claims for the destruction of 12 helicopters plus nine probables were nearer the mark, although not on the basis presented as mostly resulting from direct combat. The White Paper "The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons" lists the loss of 23 British helicopters, of which only four were shot down in action. Ten of these losses resulted from the AM 39 strike on *Atlantic Conveyor* on 25 May and included six Wessex HU Mk 5s (XS480, 495, 499, 512, XT476 and 483) of No 848 Sqdn, and three Chinook HC Mk 1s of No 18 Sqdn (ZA706, 716, 719), plus a Lynx HAS Mk 2 (XZ700). Two more Wessex HU Mk 5s (XT464, 473) were lost in the South Georgia white-out on 22 April, and the ninth — an HAS Mk 3 (XM837) — on 12 June on board HMS *Glamorgan* when it was struck by a shore-launched MM 38 Exocet.

Three Gazelles were shot down by ground or missile fire, comprising XX402 and XX411 of the Royal Marines on 21 May, and another of No 650 Sqdn, Army Air Corps on 6 June; two more received combat damage. Two Lynx HAS Mk 2s destroyed on ships sunk in action comprised XZ251 on HMS *Ardent* on 21 May and XZ242 on *Coventry*, 25 May. Sea King losses — none to enemy fire — included HC Mk 4s ZA311 on 23 April; ZA290 in Chile on 19 May and ZA294 after a bird-strike on 20 May, plus two HAS Mk 5s, ZA132 on 18 May and ZA128, ditched on 12 May, although later recovered. A Royal Marines Scout AH Mk 1, XT629, was also shot down by a Pucará at Goose Green on 28 May.

Air operations analysed

Between 2 April and the Argentine surrender on 14 June, the *FAA* planned a total of 505 Falkland missions, including tanker, recce and SAR sorties, of which 445 or 88·11 per cent were actually flown, for a total of 12,454 hours. Combat aircraft flew 2,782 hours on these missions, of which 302, or 67·86 per cent, were considered to have reached their targets, the remainder being aborted because of mechanical failures, weather or enemy action.

The required radius of action of some 400 naut mls (741 km) or so also restricted both weapon load and tactical flexibility to achieve the desired HI-LO-HI mission profiles. Although most *FAA* Skyhawks have fixed flight-refuelling probes, with only two KC-130 tankers available, few operations could be planned with their aid except to assist retrieval on return over the sea. In particular, the Mirages could use afterburning power in the combat area only at the risk of running out of fuel before regaining their bases, which reportedly happened on several occasions.

Discussing individual *FAA* operations, Gen Dozo said before his retirement that on the day of the initial British attack on the Falklands, 1 May, 56 sorties were flown by 12 A-4Bs, 16 A-4Cs, 12 Daggers, 10 Mirage IIIEAs and six Canberras, of which 35 reached their targets. British claims for that day comprised one Mirage and one Canberra shot down by Sea Harrier AIM-9L Advanced Sidewinder AAMs, plus a second Mirage by Argentine AAA fire from Port Stanley, as well as another Canberra and a Mirage/Dagger credited as probables. In its official report, however, the *FAA* admits losing a Canberra, a Dagger and two Mirage IIIEAs on 1 May — all, it claims, to AAA — and further acknowledges that several of its aircraft were shot down by "friendly" ground defences during the South Atlantic campaign.

Ten Argentine aircraft were also claimed destroyed on the ground at Port Stanley and Goose Green airstrips by single Vulcan and multiple Harrier attacks with BL755 cluster weapons, 1,000-lb (454-kg) bombs and rockets.

Air activity between 1-20 May was restricted by poor weather, and of 85 sorties planned by the *FAA*, only 16 were said to have reached their targets, the remainder being cancelled. On 3 May, however — the day on which the cruiser *General Belgrano*, presumably with the two Alouette III helicopters it normally carried, was sunk by two World War II Mk 8 torpedoes from HMS *Conqueror* — an Argentine patrol tug was damaged by two Sea Skua anti-ship missiles making their operational début from an RN Lynx, its master claiming to be *en route* to rescue a Pucará pilot who had ejected. Eight Sea Skuas were launched in all in the Falklands, scoring eight direct hits.

Enter the Super Etendard

Although some 20 *CANA* personnel had completed about six months' training in France on the Super Etendard, the five aircraft of 2ª *Escuadrilla* were not thought to be fully operational with their AM 39s from their base at Comandante Espora. It was claimed in Paris that the Argentines had not been instructed in the precise techniques required to match the computer and radar links after loading the weapons on the underwing pylons.

This was nevertheless achieved, and the first Super Etendard strike was launched on 4 May by three aircraft four hours after the location of HMS *Sheffield*, serving as a forward radar picket, had been reported west of the Falklands by a patrolling *CANA* Neptune. According to unofficial reports, the three Super Etendards took-off from Rio Gallegos, each carrying one AM 39 under the starboard wing and a 242 Imp gal (1 100l) drop tank beneath the port. They were accompanied by the remaining two Super Etendards with under-fuselage "buddy" flight-refuelling packs which transferred about 1 000 kg (2,200 lb) of fuel to each of the strike formation at a fairly early stage of the mission, and met them on return for the same purpose.

From press reports, it appears that only two AM 39s were launched during the attack, for which the third aircraft may have acted as back-up and target locator. Final approach and release was made at very low level to avoid radar detection and interception, and missile launch was achieved at a range of some 16-20 naut mls (30-37 km) from the target. One AM 39 was apparently deflected by chaff or radar counter-measures, but the second entered the side of *Sheffield* at a shallow angle, penetrating the operations centre and fuel tanks where continued combustion of its rocket propellant caused uncontrollable fires.

Considerable indignation has been caused in French industry circles concerning British reports that the missile's 360-lb (163-kg) warhead did not explode, but the Ministry of Defence is adamant that this was the case. Former Defence Secretary John Nott also flatly rejected Aérospatiale's claims that Exocet was immune to interference after launching. Some of these missiles, he said, were "definitely decoyed" during the Falklands operations. "Exocet is now dated," he concluded, "and we have far better weapons on offer." Nevertheless, it

remained a formidable factor for the RN to take into consideration in shaping its Falkland tactics.

On 9 May, an Argentine Puma was claimed shot down over Port Stanley airstrip by a Sea Dart from HMS *Coventry*, while one of two Sea Harriers on patrol attacked and helped capture the trawler *Narwhal*, which was attempting to shadow the Task Force.

Limited *FAA* operations on 12 May resulted in the destruction of two Skyhawks from three waves of four by Sea Wolf ShAMs from Type 22 destroyers in their operational début, while a third A-4 crashed into the sea taking evasive action and a fourth succumbed to Argentine AAA. Only two aircraft were admitted lost by Argentina, but the UK revealed that HMS *Glasgow* had been hit by a 1,000-lb (454-kg) bomb that went straight in one side and out the other without exploding.

Following continued air and naval strikes against Port Stanley and other airstrips, British helicopter-borne Commandos and Task Force gunfire together destroyed 11 aircraft on Pebble Island strip in the West Falklands on 14 May, including six Pucarás, one *Prefectura Naval* Skyvan and four light aircraft. Others were thought to have been damaged in subsequent loft-bombing Harrier attacks on Stanley airfield over four successive days with airburst VT bombs.

Operations intensify

Brig Gen Dozo's 18 May threats of "massive air attacks on the Task Force when within range" were amply fulfilled during the San Carlos landings three days later. Led by island-based Pucarás and MB.339s which verified Task Force assault intentions at 10.00 hrs, the *FAA* flew 72 sorties with three A-4 squadrons and one of Israeli-supplied Daggers. Losses were admitted of seven of these aircraft, although Task Force claims at the time comprised nine Mirage/Daggers, five Skyhawks, four helicopters and three Pucarás shot down, plus one Mirage damaged. This claim was subsequently reduced to 15 aircraft destroyed in the Falklands White Paper. Sea Harriers were credited with eight air victories, since processed as five A-4s and two Mirage/Daggers shot down by AIM-9L AAMs, plus one Pucará by ADEN cannon fire. Another Mirage was listed as a probable from a Sidewinder interception, and two A-4s as possibles from gun action. A Chinook and a Puma were further claimed destroyed on the ground by Harrier GR Mk 3s.

The Argentines claimed that the frigate HMS *Ardent* was sunk by 14 indigenous 2·75-in (70-mm) or 5-in (140-mm) Zuni rockets launched from *CANA* MB.339s, but RN survivors talked of "waves of Mirages". HMS *Antrim* took a 500-lb (226-kg) bomb in the engine room, but it failed to explode and was subsequently defused.

After 36 hours of inexplicable *FAA* inactivity through "lack of worthwhile targets", during which the British beach-head was allowed to become firmly established, resumed air attacks on 23 May resulted in British claims for five Mirage/Daggers shot down and one damaged; one Skyhawk destroyed by newly-installed Rapiers and two damaged; a Pucará shot down by ground fire and others destroyed on the ground at Goose Green. Sea Harrier engagements on 23 May have since been credited with confirmation of a single Mirage destroyed by AIM-9L action, plus two Pumas and an Agusta A 109 of the *CAE* shot down by ADEN cannon, although the White Paper claims that 10 enemy aircraft were destroyed on that day.

Despite indisputably heavy losses, and without sophisticated nav/attack systems or ECM, *FAA* pilots pressed home their attacks with skill and daring, achieving remarkable accuracy from visual bombing at the minimum altitudes to which they were forced by the missile engagement zone (MEZ). Among many ships hit, HMS *Antelope* was destroyed on the following day when a bomb which had penetrated the engine room exploded while being defused, providing the most unforgettable photograph of the war. The *FAA* used mainly 13-year-old 500-lb (226-kg) Mk 82 and 1,000-lb (454-kg) Mk 83 GP bombs of US origin, but fewer than half of those which hit at least 11 Task Force ships actually exploded, thus preventing a possible British withdrawal through unacceptable losses.

Some of these bombs may have been dropped from too low an altitude to allow sufficient time for fuse-arming, but it has also been suggested that these failures resulted from the use of bombs intended mainly for land targets. They were, therefore, fitted with high-impact fuses incorporating short delays to allow maximum penetration and sufficient aircraft clearance, for which the thin plating of RN ships offered insufficient resistance to ensure actuation.

Attacks against ships in Falklands Sound on 24 May resulted in eight *FAA* aircraft originally being claimed shot down, (increased to a highly optimistic 18 in the later White Paper), with three Mirage/Daggers confirmed as falling to Sea Harrier AAMs, including two claimed by one pilot in a single engagement. Two other Mirage/Daggers and three A-4s were claimed by ground and ship defence systems.

Argentine Independence Day on 25 May resulted in intensified *FAA* attacks, which brought total enemy sorties launched over the five-day period to 167, of which 106 were considered to have reached their targets. The latter included the DDG HMS *Coventry*, sunk by Skyhawks, and the supply vessel *Atlantic Conveyor*, victim of a second *CANA* AM 39 attack. At least two Super Etendards are believed to have taken part in the latter attack, since two AM 39s struck *Conveyor*, although there is speculation that these may have been decoyed by chaff away from the Task Force carriers. Curiously, no Sea Harrier interceptions were reported on that day, although five A-4s were claimed by defensive missiles. One pilot (Lt R Lucero) ejected and became the sole *FAA* PoW until the surrender. The *FAA* admitted losing 16 aircraft from 21-25 May, against revised British claims totalling 48.

The beach-head break-out on 27 May saw the first night attacks by *FAA* Canberras against San Carlos, supplementing the first sorties against shore-based UK forces by A-4s, which caused some casualties before two were shot down by ground

continued on page 258



The still-burning hulk of the Atlantic Conveyor, *which was struck by two AM 39 Exocets launched from Super Etendards of the 2º* Escuadrilla *of the 3ª* Escuadra *of CANA on 25 May. This may have been the single most effective strike by Argentine aircraft, as the loss of supplies on* Atlantic Conveyor *imperilled the success of Operation "Corporate" to a greater degree than the loss of any other ship. It is in the nature of warfare that this success was largely accidental, the supply vessel not having been identified as a target by the Super Etendard pilots.*

FALKLAND LOSSES ——— *from page 249*

fire. Falkland reinforcements provided on that day by the US included 110 more AIM-9L Sidewinders together with some ammunition.

Low cloud prevented most air operations on 28 May, but four out of six island-based Pucarás attempting ground attack missions were claimed shot down by Blowpipe infantry SAMs and ground fire. Only one A-4 was claimed by ground fire on 29 May, but the following day saw the launching of the third and final AM 39 strike in the Falklands campaign.

According to Brig Ernesto Horacio Cresto, commanding the *IV Brigada Aérea* at El Plumerillo, this was a co-ordinated attack by two Super Etendards accompanied by four bomb-carrying *FAA* Skyhawks, with the carrier HMS *Invincible* as their prime target. To achieve tactical surprise against the carrier, which had been pinpointed some 200 naut mls (370 km) east of the Falklands, the Argentine formation flight-refuelled from the two KC-130 tankers and flew a circuitous route to approach from the east. One Exocet was released at extreme range against a large radar blip believed to be a carrier, the Super Etendards then breaking off while the A-4s continued with their planned bomb attack.

The Skyhawks of Lt José Daniel Vasquez and Lt Jesus Omar Castillo disintegrated after missile hits, but one of the two remaining A-4s was said to have dropped three bombs on a smoke-enshrouded ship identified as *Invincible* before turning for home. Base was regained after two more refuelling contacts and a total sortie time of 3 hr 47 min covering 1,500 naut mls (2 780 km).

This account agreed with previous reports by the UK Defence Ministry for 30 May, when only one A-4, however, had been claimed shot down, but two AM 39s were thought to have been launched. The frigate HMS *Avenger* sighted a formation of six Argentine aircraft, including two Super Etendards, and an AM 39 detected after launch was hit almost immediately by the ship's 4·5-in (114-mm) gun at a range of about eight miles (13 km), causing it to explode. HMS *Invincible*, of course, was not hit in this or any other attack, despite repeated Argentine claims to the contrary.

Air activity over the next few days involved only sporadic and random Argentine sorties, although Sea Harriers intercepted an *FAA* C-130 in daylight on 1 June and shot it down into the sea. It was first hit by an AIM-9L which started a fire in the wing tanks, and was then finished off with 30-mm cannon. Between 26 May and 7 June, the *FAA* — now suffering from heavy losses in aircraft and experienced pilots — planned 110 sorties, but only 57 were considered to have reached their objectives, for the admitted loss of four fighters.

On 8 June, when the *FAA* made its last major effort with the successful attacks on the Fleet Auxiliary landing ships at Bluff Cove, it was reported to have received 10 replacement Mirage 5Ps from Peru and additional reinforcements from Israel and Venezuela. The Peruvian Mirages helped make up the attrition suffered by the Dagger units but the nature of any reinforcements from Israel or Venezuela in this period has not become known. Of 37 sorties launched on 8 June, 31 Mirage/Daggers and A-4s reached their targets, although Sea Harriers shot down three of the former type with AIM-9Ls. These were all in the same engagement, one pilot being credited with two Mirage/Daggers confirmed, plus a possible from a cannon attack.

One of two Aérospatiale Pumas that were among the spoils of war on the Falklands — found damaged and abandoned at the road-side in the centre of Port Stanley.



Bad weather and the deteriorating military situation restricted further attacks between 9-14 June, in which only 27 of 65 sorties planned were executed. *FAA* operations continued until the end, however, a Canberra being admitted lost to ground fire in a night attack on troops on 13 June, only a few hours before the cease-fire.

Argentine losses summarised

FAA sorties planned during the Falklands campaign included 149 by A-4Bs, 106 by A-4Cs, 145 by Mirage 5/Daggers, 45 by Mirage IIIEAs, 54 by Canberras and six by mainland-based Pucarás in 44 days of combat. From the 445 sorties which were completed, losses were admitted of 34 aircraft, or no less than 41·5 per cent of the quoted starting total, together with 36 commissioned aircrew. These 34 combat aircraft, said Gen Dozo, were worth around $160 million, or almost as much as the *FAA* annual budget of about $130 million per year between 1976-1982.

It will be noted that the loss totals do not appear to include island-based Pucarás, which on Argentine admissions would add five IA-58s shot down in combat (in which one pilot was killed), plus another blown up on the ground on 1 May when his aircraft taxied over a British CBU store which exploded. In addition to the Pucará shot down by a Sea Harrier on 21 May, another fell to an SAS-operated GD Stinger SAM on the same day, followed by three more on 28 May. The *FAA* also admits losing nine more Pucarás destroyed on the ground by British action, but these totals conveniently overlook those examples captured in various states of disrepair after the surrender. The "light" casualties admitted for *Grupo III* in fact amount to its entire inventory, and while the *FAA* gives the impression that this totalled only 14 aircraft, this many have already been identified from captured Pucarás in the Falklands, including A-506, 509, 513, 514, 515, 520, 522, 528, 529, 532, 533, 536, 549 and 556, apart from those shot down; at least six Pucarás have already been shipped back to the UK.

French industry sources are reluctant to concede that the Harrier was able to shoot down the higher-performance Mirage without loss in air combat, and refuse to admit more than one such loss to the British fighters. M Clostermann maintained that of 19 Argentine Mirage/Daggers (apparently eight and 11, respectively) that he reported were lost from the 34 jet aircraft casualties, 11 fell to British SAMs or AAA, just one to a Sea Harrier and seven were abandoned by their pilots after running out of fuel on their return flights. Eight other Mirages, said M Clostermann, regained their bases despite damage from proximity-fused SAMs, thus demonstrating "the incredible strength of this aircraft". A similar number of Skyhawks also returned to base with severe damage.

Later, although unofficial, Argentine estimates tend to reduce the Mirage III loss total, which would make sense in view of its limited utilisation (only 45 sorties planned, as against 145 for the Dagger). These same sources, however, admit that 10 of the 11 Daggers lost were shot down by Sea Harriers, which ties up exactly with current Fleet Air Arm confirmations for "Mirage-type" kills. Five Dagger pilots were said to have died in the Falklands operations, and six ejected.

Since the *FAA* admits losing one Canberra each on the first and last days of the air operations, as well as two Mirage IIIEAs on 1 May, and the recent Argentine estimates quote the loss of about 10 each A-4Bs and A-4Cs, the destruction of 34 jet aircraft admitted by Gen Dozo does not include additional scope for further Mirage casualties. This would appear to





Known as Aguirras to the Argentines, Bell UH-1H helicopters were used in some numbers in the Falklands, at least 10 being captured by the time the fighting ended. AE-413 (left) and AE-422 were returned to the UK, both apparently still airworthy.

indicate that either the 34 aircraft loss total is too small, or the Mirage casualties quoted to M Clostermann are excessive, although remarkably detailed.

Apart from excluding Pucarás, the *FAA* admissions also list separately the combat losses among second-line aircraft, quoted as a C-130 and a Learjet 35A of *Gpo Ae Expl/Rec I*, and of helicopters. The fixed-wing aircraft were notable for including in their crews the two highest-ranking *FAA* officers killed in the Falklands — *Vicecomodoros* Rodolfo de la Colina and Hugo C Meisner. The Hercules was shot down by a Sea Harrier on 1 June, as already described, and the Learjet (Co No 35-319) by a Sea Dart missile from HMS *Exeter* on 7 June at 12.00 hrs.

The *FAA* published the names and photographs of the 36 commissioned personnel reported killed in the Falklands, ranging in rank from vice-commodore (two), through major (one), captain (seven), 1st Lt (10), and Lt (14) to cadet (two), together with 14 NCOs and five conscripts, the last-mentioned presumably ground casualties. In addition, SAR statistics for the period indicate that 14 flight personnel were saved from 18 ejections, so that it appears that 50 or more *FAA* personnel were involved in aircraft losses of one kind or another.

Other than the Learjet, which had two pilots, a navigator and an engineer on board, crew or passenger composition of the multi-seat C-130 and the Canberras present unknown factors in the aircraft/crew loss equation, although the Pucarás appear to have been operated by single pilots. Even on its own admissions, however, the *FAA* lost at least 41 aircraft and an unspecified number of helicopters in action, while *CANA* added a further four A-4P Skyhawks from the 12 with which it started, plus two MB.339s, making a minimum of 47 Argentine combat losses in all.

This compares with a final total of 72 Argentine aircraft and helicopters claimed destroyed in action, plus 14 probables, as listed in the White Paper of December 1982. This document downgraded earlier Sea Harrier claims for the destruction of 27 enemy aircraft to a total of 20 confirmed kills, of which 16 were attributed to AIM-9L Sidewinders and four to 30-mm ADEN cannon. Previous claims had been for the destruction of 24 aircraft from 27 AIM-9Ls launched, so that the 33 per cent reduction represents a rather different success ratio. Although a final slight upward adjustment in favour of the Sea Harriers is still possible, their currently confirmed victories are confined to 10 Mirage/Daggers, five A-4s and a Canberra shot down by AIM-9Ls, plus a Pucará, two Pumas and an A 109 with cannon, and a C-130 with both armament. Previous MoD claims had also tended to exclude Argentine losses attributed to AAA, "own goals" and other ground fire, now credited with the destruction of seven enemy aircraft.

Some of the earlier Sea Harrier claims have since been edited to the Task Force missile systems, now quoted by the hite Paper to have achieved 45 kills, plus 10 probables, ead of 41. The revised figure now totals 14 by the 12 Rapier launch units — employed only in the optical mode — plus nine by Blowpipe, eight each by Sea Dart and Sea Cat, five by Sea Wolf and one by Stinger. This represents an increase of two kills for Sea Cat and one each for Rapier and Blowpipe over earlier claims, but unfortunately, no break-down of claims by aircraft type has been made available for the missiles. The Sea Dart apparently demonstrated its versatility by achieving kills between its maximum effective range of some 22 naut mls (40 km) and less than 100 ft (30,4 m).

Excluding probables, the MoD now claims a total of 103 Argentine aircraft destroyed in the air and on the ground in the Falklands, but does not appear to include those captured after the surrender. Deducting combat claims for 72 aircraft destroyed in the air from 103 would indicate a total of 31 found on the islands by British forces, but at least 40 have been identified by serial number to date, including several in airworthy condition.

In addition to the 14 Pucarás already mentioned from total UK claims of 21, including air victories and probables, captured Argentine aircraft, with corresponding Despatch claims in parentheses, include 10 UH-1H *Aguirras* (AE-406, 409, 410, 412, 413, 417, 418, 422, 424, 426) (two); two Bell 212s (H-83, H-85) (nil); two Agusta A 109s (AE-331, 334) (nil); one CH-47C (AE-520) (two); two Skyvans (PA-50, PA-54) (two); two SA 330J Pumas (PA-12, AE—) (six); three Aermacchi MB.339s (4-A-110, 4-A-112, 4-A-116) (three) and two Beech T-34C Turbo Mentors (1-A-408, 1-A-412) (four). The loss of 22 Argentine army helicopters was also confirmed by the C-in-C, Gen Cristino Nicolaides.

The December White Paper claim totals also include aircraft shot down in combat and probables, but clearly underestimates by a substantial amount Argentine material losses captured in the Falklands. These, plus the 47 aircraft admitted lost in combat by Argentina, bring total enemy aircraft and helicopter losses in the campaign to at least 117 which, incredibly enough, is precisely the total number, including probables and those destroyed on the ground, claimed in the British statement.

Final UK claims for 45 A-4s and 27 Mirage/Daggers shot down or probably destroyed cannot easily be analysed since the "probable" content is unknown. Even before the end of May last year, however, Defence Secretary John Nott was claiming that Argentina had lost 65 of its best pilots, and his "absolute assurance" of the accuracy of British claims was backed by a cryptic reference to his department "having means of checking how many Argentine aircraft went out and how many came back". This is presumably a reference to the widely-rumoured radar surveillance of the *FAA*'s southern bases from Chilean territory in Tierra del Fuego. What is indisputable, however, is the magnitude of the feat of arms represented by the overwhelming victory of the British Task Force, in a campaign operated at distances from its bases unparalleled in military history. □

C59/2K

SOUTH ATLANTIC AIR WAR...

...the other side of the coin

IN THE wake of the short and bitter Malvinas (Falklands) conflict — the first war for many years in which western weaponry has been pitted against western weaponry — have come many claims and counter-claims as to the efficacy of the respective forces and weapons involved. Much of the background of this conflict is arguable. What *is* certain is that an apparently legitimate territorial claim of the Argentine people was used to further dubious political purposes by Argentina's ruling Junta; an adventure that went sadly awry and ended in a humiliating defeat for the Argentine Army on 14 June 1982.

Occupation of the Malvinas was planned in strictest secrecy some three months prior to implementation; a plan of which even the Argentine secret service was apparently unaware and only the Junta and a small number of high-ranking officers of the armed forces cognisant. Perhaps ill-conceived, certainly ill-fated, this plan resulted directly in the South Atlantic conflict, many aspects of which remain obscure to this day, a year after its conclusion, and will for long be contentious. But one aspect unlikely to be disputed by either participant in the war is the courage and dedicated professionalism of the highest calibre displayed by the *Fuerza Aérea Argentina* and the *Comando de Aviación Naval*.

This feature is dedicated to that valorous effort; it attempts to be objective and its content has been drawn from both official and unofficial sources. If not dispassionate, it does endeavour to place the facts — the triumphs and the failures — of the Argentine air effort in perspective; it is for the reader to draw his own conclusions.

The principal losses sustained by both sides — with the exception of the sinking of the cruiser *General Belgrano* — were inflicted by air power, and the *Fuerza Aérea Argentina* was to be allotted the main share of the burden of carrying the fighting to the British Task Force. During the 44 days of the conflict, from 1 May to 14 June, Argentina's air force and naval air component were to be tested in earnest for the first time in their histories and they were not found wanting. If lacking any background of operational experience, they were well trained, and so long as the demands imposed on them came within their organic and operational capabilities, they rose to them with verve and spirit that aroused world-wide admiration. — SMH.

In recent months, this journal has devoted considerable space to various facets of the air operations that accompanied last year's conflict in the South Atlantic which terminated in repossession of the Falkland Islands by British Forces. AIR INTERNATIONAL is a British-based publication and this coverage has admittedly — and unashamedly — presented the British viewpoint of events. But it is appreciated that there are two sides to every coin, and the editors have therefore invited Salvador Mafé Huertas to present the view of the aerial conflict from the "other side". In publishing this account, however, the editors do not necessarily endorse the statements made, nor are they able to confirm all of the information gathered by the author from Argentine sources.

WHEN, on 2 April 1982, the River Plate Republic was startled out of its accustomed contemplation of soaring inflation and mounting unemployment by the stirring news that, after 150 years, Argentine forces had repossessed the Malvinas, the *Fuerza Aérea Argentina* (FAA) was faced with the possibility — albeit a seemingly *remote* possibility — of involvement in modern aerial warfare; conflict that would demand use of untried technology and tactics that were purely theoretical.

As the drama evolved throughout April, both Argentina and Britain believed the other to be employing brinkmanship, each underestimating the will of the other to fight. The result was to be what history now refers to as the South Atlantic War. It was to be a conflict from which lessons were to be absorbed that far transcended the narrow geographical frame within which they were taught; a struggle that, despite its comparative brevity, was to dictate changes in operational doctrines and hardware of both adversaries. Moreover, the experience that it was to provide was to be rich in novelties, both as a result of the



(Above) IAI Daggers of the II Escuadrón de Caza (VI Brigada Aérea) with, in the foreground serialled C-426, one of the three two-seat Daggers supplied to the FAA. These two-seaters have seven external stores stations. (Below) A II EdC Dagger (C-414) being bombed up in a hardened shelter at Rio Gallegos air base. A "ship kill" marking can just be seen on the nose of the aircraft.



weaponry employed and the comparative remoteness of the operational venue. Small wonder that the South Atlantic War was to generate intense technical interest as well as strong partisan feelings throughout the world. It was not a "David and Goliath" battle, as some were to proclaim. Neither was it a struggle in which one of the participants alone had to contend with daunting disadvantages.

When the FAA was ordered to prepare for the operation that was intended to restore Argentine sovereignty to the Malvinas, San Pedro (South Georgia) and the Sandwich Islands, the Service was all too well aware that what was possibly to be demanded of it could stretch its resources, both human and material, to the limit. There was admittedly some concern at the possibility of having to pit its strength against one of the more substantial of the world's military powers. It was by no means unaware of the many feats of arms punctuating the annals of the Royal Navy, nor of the proud traditions of the RAF which so many Argentine pilots admired. Furthermore, such a conflict would be somewhat remote from that for which the FAA had been geared — a possible war with neighbouring Chile blossoming from the ever-effervescent dispute concerning sovereignty in the Beagle Channel — and was likely to involve facing some of the most modern, accurate and lethal weapons extant.

Nevertheless, if the British were to attempt repossession of the Malvinas, the FAA, arguably the most professional of the Argentine armed services, was ready to resist, although the Junta was apparently convinced that British jingoism as represented by the British Task Force was no more than a gesture. Argentine possession of the islands, and the immense distance between the Malvinas and the nearest base from which the British could operate, seemed, by consensus, to render any serious attempt to retake the islands foolhardy in the extreme.

The nearest base that could be utilised by British forces was Ascension Island, 3,930 miles (6 325 km) from Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley) on Soledad Island (East Falkland) and 3,646 miles (5 867 km) from Grytviken on San Pedro Island (South Georgia) — distances which, it was believed, would present insurmountable difficulties in effectively supplying the British Task Force. On the other hand, the distance from the FAA's Rio Gallegos Air Base to Puerto Argentino was 483 miles (778 km), although from the same base to San Pedro Island it was 1,266 miles (2 037 km) and to the South Sandwich Group 1,796 miles (2 890 km). Thus, it was practicable for the FAA to provide air support from its continental bases only for the Malvinas, and even this was fraught with problems.

Planning problems

It was obvious that the distances from continental bases capable of handling the FAA's high-performance combat aircraft would complicate the mounting of strike sorties against the British Task Force in the vicinity of the Malvinas. The nearest continental base, Rio Grande, was 437 miles (704 km) from Puerto Argentino, and the Comodoro Rivadavia base was 596 miles (959 km) distant. External fuel was thus mandatory for such FAA equipment as the Mirage IIIEA and the Dagger, both of which lacked air-to-air refuelling capability, and external ordnance was therefore restricted. Not that the FAA possessed an impressive tanker fleet in any case, this being restricted to a pair of KC-130H Hercules. Even with external fuel and with due allowance for the use of military or afterburner power for combat or escape, these aircraft would be at the limit of their tactical radius by the time they reached the Malvinas. In the event, had the British Task Force possessed an effective AEW platform, the range problem would have been exacerbated by the need to adopt a LO-LO-LO flight profile within at least a 220-mile (350-km) distance of the islands.

Aviation support facilities in the Malvinas themselves were scarcely commodious, being largely restricted to the 4,100 ft (1 250 m) asphalt runway at Puerto Argentino which could accommodate the C-130H Hercules and such transports as the F27, but was of insufficient length for use by fully-loaded high-performance combat aircraft. There were some small airstrips at scattered farmsteads and hamlets, suitable for use — when not turned into quagmires by the rain — by light aircraft but these could be utilised only by the IA 58 Pucará close support aircraft, on which great store was placed in initial FAA planning. Generally speaking, the terrain of the major islands — Gran Malvina and Soledad — was unsuited for the rapid construction of permanent runways or for the laying of PSP runways.

The FAA *did* have a PSP runway which could perhaps have been used to lengthen the existing runway at Puerto Argentino and thus enable a detachment of *VIII Brigada Aérea* Mirage IIIEAs to be deployed there. A PSP runway could only be transported by sea, however, and there were higher priority calls on available shipping. In retrospect, it was to be seen that *had* Malvinas-based Mirages been available to maintain a degree of air superiority over the battle area, the outcome of the conflict might have been dramatically different. The air defence of the Malvinas was based on SAMs (eg, Roland, Tigercat, Blowpipe, etc) and radar-directed 35-mm and smaller-calibre guns, one essential ingredient of a fully efficacious air defence system — manned interceptor fighters — being missing.

The Argentine forces in the Malvinas had other problems to contend with, apart from the lack of adequate air support facilities. Communication routes, which were euphemistically designated as roads, were no more than rough tracks which were of little use in establishing a quick and efficient transportation system, and available telephone facilities were barely less rudimentary and totally inadequate as a basis for a permanent military network. Thus, transportation had to be

based on helicopters, and a radio network had to be established. Another significant problem was created by the establishment by the British of the Total Exclusion Zone with a radius of 200 naut mls (370 km), which inhibited the resupply of the Malvinas by sea.

The introduction of the Zone had little or no effect on the so-called air bridge to Puerto Argentino from continental bases, and the extension of the "aerial blockade" to within 12 naut mls (22 km) of the entire Argentine maritime coast scarcely affected normal air movements during April and was essentially ignored. However, it did mean that all indispensable items had to be carried by air to the Malvinas, imposing substantial logistics problems on the FAA and, to a lesser extent, on Aerolineas Argentinas whose services were enlisted.

The terrain of the Malvinas, too, imposed its share of problems. With rather sparse mountainous features, the topography nevertheless did not lend itself to ease of radar surveillance, which also had to cover the surrounding ocean, and the almost total absence of significant vegetation rendered effective concealment of defensive installations virtually impossible, greatly increasing their vulnerability. Aircraft were, of course, enshrouded by camouflage netting, but so few were their possible locations that this did little to protect them, and lacking any form of natural cover they presented ready targets. The subsequent loss by the FAA of a substantial number of Pucarás on the ground was to illustrate this point.

One other aspect of the theatre of operations that must not be forgotten was its meteorological character, which was often to determine the success or failure of a carefully planned operation. The Malvinas and the surrounding South Atlantic are notorious for their inclement weather and from the outset it was obvious that there would be many days on which flying would be impossible and others on which conditions would be marginal. Fully aware of the vital importance of a comprehensive knowledge of meteorological conditions *en route* to and over the Malvinas in any air operations, the *Comando de la Fuerza Aérea Sur* (CdoFAS), or Southern Air Force Command, established a main weather information centre at the Comodoro Rivadavia base and weather forecast stations at Trelew, Santa Cruz, Rio Gallegos, S Julian and Godor Gregores airfields. Information provided by these stations was supplemented by that of meteorological stations established at Puerto Argentino and Darwin — the former having to be relocated during the conflict after suffering damage in a naval bombardment — and meteorological satellites.

The forecasts provided by this organisation were to prove very accurate if rarely encouraging — during the critical period of 1 May to 14 June there was to be no *ideal* day for flying. Low cloud covered at least part of the Malvinas every day, adding to navigational problems and rendering target location and identification difficult. Weather conditions were to worsen as May gave way to June, at times seriously inhibiting the mounting of strike missions. During the 44 days of the South Atlantic War, there were to be 17 days of very bad weather, either in the Malvinas or on the continent, and a further six in which conditions were only marginally better. Unsuitable flying weather in the Malvinas did not, of course, necessarily coincide with similar conditions on the continent. Further limitations were imposed by the fact that daylight at that latitude and time of the year was of only some nine hours duration, and the FAA's nocturnal operating capability was strictly limited.

It may thus be seen that the defence of the Malvinas did not present so facile a situation for the Argentine armed forces as was to be postulated by many during the conflict that ensued. Indeed, evaluation of all these factors suggests that the disadvantages suffered by the Argentine forces in defending the Malvinas largely cancelled out the more widely publicised disadvantages imposed on the British forces by the immense distances over which they had to operate. It should not be forgotten that the United Kingdom, with the full support of the USA, succeeded in organising an almost faultless logistic pipeline to its forces in the South Atlantic; that the Harriers and Sea Harriers deployed aboard *Hermes* and *Invincible* were far nearer to the scene of operations than were the bases from which FAA aircraft and those of the *Aviación Naval* flew, and that the British aircraft enjoyed ample radar control and support.

Combat is joined

With the arrival of Argentine forces in the Malvinas, preparations were immediately begun to establish a military air presence on the islands and centred on what now became



(Above right) One of the two original Mirage IIIDA two-seaters supplied to the FAA (1-002) — the other having been lost in an accident — seen at the Dr Mariano Moreno air base, near Buenos Aires. Two more Mirage IIIDAs have recently been delivered to the VIII Brigada Aérea by Dassault-Breguet. (Below) A Mirage IIIEA (1-007) at the Dr Mariano Moreno air base.



BAM *(Base Aérea Militar)* Puerto Argentino. The combat elements to be based here were the Pucará-equipped *IV Escuadron de Exploracion y Ataque* from the *IX Brigada Aérea* and detachments of MB 339As and T-34Cs from the 1ª and 4ª *Escuadrillas Aéronaval de Ataque*, dispersal facilities for these aircraft being provided by several of the existing airstrips, such as that at Goose Green, which became BAM Cóndor, and on Borbon (Pebble) Island. These were joined by a mixed force of helicopters (Bell UH-1Hs, Boeing Vertol CH-47C Chinooks, Pumas and Agusta A 109s) provided by the *Comando de Aviacion del Ejército*, the Army's air component, and some fixed-wing aircraft (eg, Skyvan) and helicopters from the coast guard organisation, the *Prefectura Naval Argentina*.

A joint command to control operations in the South Atlantic was established at the Comodoro Rivadavia base, but in the Malvinas a unified defence command was formed under Brig Gen Mario B Menéndez by reason of the distance and isolation of the islands. To this command were subordinated the air components deployed to the Malvinas, and these were supported by a Direct Air Support Operational Section, an Air Defence Operational Section and advanced air control officers. A Combat Information Centre was set up near Puerto Argentino, its fundamental element being a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F long-range radar which the British were later and unsuccessfully to attempt to knock out with Vulcan-launched Shrike anti-radar missiles.*

Some idea of the importance attached to the Pucará in the defence of the Malvinas may be gained from the fact that the original 12-aircraft complement of *IV Escuadron* was rapidly reinforced with aircraft drawn from the *III Brigada Aérea* at Reconquista — at one time during the conflict there were to be as many as 40 Pucarás in the Malvinas. The heavy attrition suffered by the Pucarás was to lead to the suggestion that they proved operationally ineffectual without any basis in fact. Only five Pucarás were lost to Sea Harriers, SAMs and anti-aircraft fire, despite this aircraft's heavy battle commitments, thanks largely to its low-altitude agility minimising casualties, but losses on the ground to strafing, naval artillery and commando attack *were* heavy.

The Pucará suffered the consequences of lack of dispersal facilities and inadequate protection of those airstrips, such as BAM Cóndor and on Borbon Island, that *were* available to it; factors inhibiting the full use of its operational flexibility which might otherwise have had a major effect on the course of events. Despite the aggressiveness of the anti-aircraft defences of BAM Puerto Argentino, attacks by Harriers still took their toll, and nine Pucarás were totally destroyed here and on the airstrips, and others so damaged that they could not b repaired in the time available and flown out to the mainland Thus, a total loss of 25 of these aircraft was to be sustained But losses notwithstanding, the Pucará enjoyed its share o successes.

The initial British landings on San Carlos on 21 May were in fact, first discovered by a Pucará from BAM Cóndor, a sighting which, reported to the command post at Puerto Argentino, initiated FAA action against the invaders, othe Pucarás being scrambled to strafe the beachhead and inflicting some of the first casualties suffered by the British forces. A Pucará was to draw blood on 28 May when it shot down a British Army Scout helicopter, but a week earlier, on 21 May a Pucará on a reconnaissance mission had been mortally damaged by 30-mm cannon fire from a Sea Harrier. The pilo of the stricken aircraft, endeavouring to regain BAM Cóndor and to evade his pursuer, flew the Pucará through a narrow ravine, but failed to lose the Sea Harrier which delivered the *coup de grâce*, the pilot of the Pucará, Maj Tomba from the *II Brigada Aérea*, ejecting. He was later to be captured at BAM Cóndor.

As the Pucarás were more heavily committed to the battle, some losses to SAMs were sustained, but most attrition was suffered on the ground and the survivors were formed into two sections which, insofar as was practicable, were constantly moved around between available airstrips and supported with supplies flown in by helicopter or dropped by C-130. As British forces approached Goose Green, the remaining airworthy Pucarás were flown out of BAM Cóndor to Puerto Argentino, but one that had lost its tail was lifted onto a flat-bed truck and fired its rockets and cannon at the advancing British troops until knocked out. Pucarás continued to participate in the battle until 14 June, among their last concerted actions being participation with other FAA aircraft in the attacks on British forces landing in the south-east of Isla Soledad, in Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, the Pucarás rocketing the landing craft.

Fast jet attacks

The main weight of attack on the invading forces was mounted from continental airfields, which, as previously indicated, were the only bases capable of sustaining high-speed jet aircraft operations. The satellite information provided the British Task Force by the US placed Argentina at a distinct disadvantage in that, to avoid the enemy drawing conclusions as to intentions from knowledge of unit basing, it was necessary to move the squadrons frequently between the different continental bases — this satellite observation enabled Adm Woodward to continuously monitor the movement of his most important adversaries, the fighter-bomber units.

Initial planning envisaged that the decisive military action would take place around the Darwin-Puerto Argentino axis. That is to say, the primary targets foreseen for FAA attack would be broadly within a circle with a radius of some 95 miles (150 km) with the insular capital at its centre and covering both land and surrounding sea. It soon became obvious, however, that this vastly over-simplified the problem; the movement of the various components of the British Task Force covered a far larger area, greatly expanding the anticipated theatre of operations. Other unforeseen factors complicated the situation. The very effective British weapons systems, for both attack and defence, dictated dramatic revision of FAA tactical procedures; because of the closer proximity of the British carriers than the continental bases to the Malvinas, the British aircraft could stay much longer over the combat zone than their Argentine adversaries; the large number of frigates and destroyers included in the task force provided an ample radar umbrella for the main units, necessitating the use by Argentine aircraft of uneconomical approach profiles and thus further reducing their endurance over the operational area.

Eighty-two A-4B and -4C Skyhawks, Mirage IIIEAs,

* *Warned of the approach of the Vulcan, the radar was deactivated and the missiles exploded harmlessly some distance away.*

One of the 10 ex-Fuerza Aérea Peruana Mirage 5Ps acquired in June last year and assigned the serials previously borne by Daggers lost on operations (this aircraft having been assigned the serial C-403) in a maintenance hangar at Dr Mariano Moreno air base. These aircraft have since been assigned to an Escuadrón of the recently-established X Brigada Aérea.





(Above) A Mirage IIIEA (1-005) of the I Escuadrón, VIII Brigada Aérea, being readied for an escort sortie from Río Gallegos. Note Matra R 530 AAM and 374 Imp gal (1700l) drop tanks. (Right) Another Mirage IIIEA with Matra Magic AAMs being prepared to fly as escort to attack aircraft on a mission against the Malvinas. The VIII Brigada Aérea Mirage IIIEAs, one of which (1-014) is seen (below) taking-off from Río Gallegos, had sufficient endurance for only some five minutes over the Malvinas and thus had no chance to establish air superiority. Note the yellow band on the tail intended to provide a means of quick identification.









(Above) Canberra B Mk 62s of the I Escuadrón de Bombardeo, II Brigada Aérea, at the Comodoro Rivadavia air base prior to a nocturnal mission, and (left) a Pucará at Puerto Argentino. Note the yellow "quick identification" panel on the tail fin.

Daggers, Canberras and Pucarás of the FAA were deployed to the nearest continental bases which imposed considerable strain on logistic and technical services. A high level of serviceability was maintained in general, the exception being the Skyhawks, of which between 30 and 40 per cent were grounded by lack of spares — engines, drop tanks, ejection seat actuators, and so on — resulting from the embargo imposed on Argentina by the USA. The FAA aircraft operated primarily from three bases: the Canberras from Comodoro Rivadavia, the Mirage IIIEAs and A-4B Skyhawks from Rio Gallegos, and the *Aviación Naval* A-4Q Skyhawks and Super Etendards from Rio Grande; the Daggers flew first from Rio Gallegos, but operated from Rio Grande for a time during the period of conflict, and the A-4Cs flew mostly from San Julian, with detachments at Rio Grande.

The average distance between these bases and the target zone neutralised what advantage might otherwise have accrued from the use of land-based air power. In fact, it placed most FAA aircraft at a distinct *disadvantage* — the 90 or so minutes occupied in flying to and from the operational area represented some 90 per cent of the endurance of the aircraft, leaving scant time to seek out and attack targets. All Mirage sorties were flown with a pair of 374 Imp gal (1 700l) drop tanks, while the Dagger, which benefited from 110 Imp gal (500l) more internal fuel, flew either with similar tankage or with three 286 Imp gal (1 300l) tanks, although the latter fuel load restricted ordnance to a pair of 500-lb (227-kg) bombs.

It must be borne in mind that the FAA was desperately endeavouring to conserve its aircraft and the CdoFAS had to plan its operations with caution in its attempts to ensure that each sortie flown had a good prospect of obtaining positive results. It could not afford to assign its limited fleet of Mirage IIIEAs from the *VIII Brigada Aérea* to the strike rôle. The possibility that RAF Vulcans might attempt to attack the continental bases, although remote, could not be ignored, and the Mirages at Rio Gallegos were therefore at a constant state of alert. They were on occasions, however, employed to provide air cover for other aircraft flying strike missions. For such sorties the external load consisted of a Matra R530 and two Magic AAMs plus two 374 Imp gal (1 700l) drop tanks.

Fuel conservation was of paramount importance on such missions, and the Mirages lacked the endurance for any serious attempt to establish even temporary air superiority, having only sufficient fuel for some 10 minutes over the combat zone. This frustrated their pilots, as the Mirages were largely ignored by the Sea Harriers whose pilots, seeing the Argentine fighters at altitude and knowing that they were most likely too low on fuel to attempt to mix it, considered that they presented little menace and concentrated their attentions on the strike aircraft. The Mirages could not launch their missiles from a distance for fear of hitting friendly aircraft.

However, the Mirage and Sea Harrier *did* meet in combat; on 1 May, for example, a Mirage flown by 1st Lt Carlos Perona providing air cover for a strike mission, in company with another Mirage, dived on a Combat Air Patrol of Sea Harriers. As Lt Perona subsequently related: "My radar showed two 'bandits' coming in head-on — Sea Harriers. Our Mirages and the British aircraft crossed each other and I began a scissors manoeuvre in an attempt to get to six o'clock of one of our adversaries. The Sea Harrier has the ability to decelerate rapidly and when I glanced to one side I saw one of the 'bandits' within 150 m of my aircraft!

"I followed it visually until it disappeared from sight and it was at that moment that I felt a tremendous impact. My Mirage began to shudder violently and control was lost. After futilely attempting to regain control I had no recourse but to eject from my crippled plane. As I hung from my chute I saw my Mirage hit the water, and then, shortly afterwards, to my surprise saw a second column of water as another aircraft impacted. I could only conclude that, unknowingly, I had collided with the second Sea Harrier!" There is no doubt, however, that Lt Perona came to the wrong conclusion; he was struck by a Sidewinder launched by the Sea Harrier, which quickly gained an advantage in position over the Mirage. The second "splash" observed by Lt Perona was probably caused by his own ejection seat hitting the sea.

Another Mirage, flown by Capt Garcia Cuerva, was to be lost during one of these air cover missions. Apparently having suffered an AIM-9L strike, the Mirage attempted an emergency landing at BAM Puerto Argentino. However, on its final approach both Magic missiles were launched, presumably as a result of a short circuit, and the Argentine gunners, assuming

the aircraft to be hostile, promptly shot it down, Capt Cuerva losing his life.

The two Mirages were lost during the FAA's first real baptism of fire. On 1 May, Adm Woodward had decided to test the efficacy of the Argentine defences by approaching the Malvinas with a large number of ships. As this fleet came within-range of continental operational bases, the FAA mounted 56 sorties — 12 A-4Bs, 16 A-4Cs, 12 Daggers, 10 Mirages and six Canberras. For several reasons, only 35 of these aircraft reached the target zone, inflicting damage on one and possibly two frigates and losing one Dagger and one Canberra in the process, apart from the two Mirages as previously related. The effect of this initial foray by the continental-based FAA was that the British Task Force withdrew a substantial proportion of its vessels beyond the range of the Argentine aircraft to the north-east of Isla Soledad until the main landings were effected at San Carlos Bay.

The CdoFAS had planned to mount 19 sorties on the following day, but inclement weather dictated their cancellation, and the severe weather was to continue, a fact which, combined with the limited number of potential targets within striking range, restricted FAA activities during the first three weeks of May. During this time, 85 sorties were planned, but because of the weather, technical and other reasons, only 16 of these were, in fact, flown. The situation changed dramatically on 21 May, when, at 0815 hours, the CdoFAS learned that ships from the British Task Force had appeared in the northern mouth of San Carlos Strait dividing Gran Malvina from Soledad and that two of the vessels were engaged in bombarding the coastline. It was obvious that this action was a preliminary to establishing a beachhead or a diversionary attack to conceal a landing that was to be made at another point. The CdoFAS immediately planned air strikes, and at 1000 hours, when a reconnaissance Pucará confirmed that a dozen ships of various types were heading towards San Carlos Bay with the apparent intention of landing troops, the FAA strike force was already approaching the Malvinas, starting its attack at 1010 hours. Thus began a series of attacks that were to establish new legends of audacity and courage in aerial warfare.

The tempo increases

Between 21 and 25 May, the CdoFAS despatched a total of 167 sorties against the beachhead and the ships of the British Task Force, 106 of these aircraft attacking their assigned targets and 16 aircraft being lost in combat by the Dagger and Skyhawk units employed. Both the attacks and the defence were noteworthy for their ferocity. The Skyhawks of the *IV* and *V Brigadas Aérea*, and the Daggers of the *VI Brigada Aérea* flying from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande attacked relentlessly, prompting the comment on 25 May from John Nott, then British Minister of Defence, "I think that the Argentine pilots are showing great bravery. It would be foolish if I said otherwise. They cannot maintain this level of losses for a long time, but obviously they are brave pilots and we must admit it!"

To approach their targets, the Skyhawks and Daggers literally wave-hopped to avoid detection until they were within 6-9 miles (10-15 km), then attacking at *deck* level, releasing their bombs and pulling up over the superstructures of the ships — more than one aircraft lost a drop-tank after striking the masts of its target. The attacking aircraft had to run the gauntlet of 20-mm, 40-mm and 4·5-in (11,4-cm) anti-aircraft fire, the ship-launched Sea Cat, Sea Dart and Sea Wolf missiles, and the Sea Harriers' AIM-9L Sidewinders with their greatly expanded acquisition range and which could be launched from any angle. These were soon to be augmented by land-based Rapier batteries. As one Argentine pilot described his attack: "It was like being the centrepiece of a fantastic firework display, shells exploding everywhere and missiles coming from every direction. It was vital to ignore the 'fireworks'; to concentrate on detecting the target, attacking it, and getting to hell out of there!"

Although responsible for the primary effort, the FAA was supported in its attacks on the British Task Force by aircraft of *Aviación Naval*, the A-4Q Skyhawks of the 3ª *Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque*, together with the handful of newly-acquired Super Etendards of the 2ª *Escuadrilla* operating from Rio Grande, and MB 339As of the 1ª *Escuadrilla de Ataque* detachment operating from Puerto Argentino. During the San Carlos landings, one of the light Aermacchi attack aircraft from the last-mentioned unit damaged a British frigate — later sunk by other FAA aircraft — with a full rocket salvo. The Skyhawks were normally based aboard the carrier *25 de Mayo* which had provided support during the landing by Argentine marines on the Malvinas, but a few days after this event, the vessel had developed engine trouble and had limped back to port where it was forced to sit out the entire conflict.

The *Aviación Naval* had drawn blood on 4 May when the destroyer HMS *Sheffield*, acting as a radar picket ship, was sunk by two Exocet-armed Super Etendards of the 2ª *Escuadrilla*. The general location of the destroyer had been provided by another Super Etendard, and the two attacking

A C-130H Hercules (TC-64) of the I Brigada Aérea seen at a Southern Argentine air base. The C-130Es, -130Hs and KC-130Hs of this Brigada played vital rôles in the Malvinas conflict. The inventory of Hercules is currently being supplemented by four L-100s, deliveries of which commenced earlier this year.





(Above) A-4C Skyhawks of the IV Brigada Aérea seen taking-off from the El Plumerillo air base, Mendoza. In addition to the admitted loss of eight A-4Cs it is known that a further two A-4Cs of this Brigada were written off as a result of heavy battle damage.



(Above) A pre-Malvinas conflict photograph of an A-4Q Skyhawk formation of the 3ª Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque of the Aviación Naval. This unit lost six Skyhawks during two sorties (three each on 21 and 23 May), only one pilot surviving. (Below left) A-4C Skyhawks of the IV Brigada Aérea being refuelled by a KC-130H Hercules tanker.



aircraft approached their target from the south at very low altitude and at about 480 knots (890 km/h). There was a 500-ft (150-m) overcast with visibility limited to a quarter-mile (400 m). At some 25 nm (46 km) from the *Sheffield*, the Argentine pilots climbed to 500 ft (150 m), their radar acquiring two targets separated by 40 deg in azimuth. At 23 nm (43 km) an Exocet was launched at each target, one hitting the *Sheffield* and the other, diverted by ECM, impacting in the water about 985 ft (300 m) ahead of the *Yarmouth*.

The A-4Q Skyhawks of the 3ª *Escuadrilla* attacked both the British shipping and the beachhead itself in concert with the FAA Skyhawks and Daggers, and one mission proved particularly disastrous for the *Aviación Naval*. The Skyhawks

took-off from Rio Grande at 1830 hours on 23 May and the sole survivor subsequently related: "We found a frigate and attacked her with three aircraft. I saw the lead Skyhawk overfly the ship, launching a 500-lb (227-kg) bomb as the British launched a couple of missiles. These we evaded by violent jinking. I was now in a position to attack and dropped my bomb load which I saw strike the enemy ship. But Sea Harriers were now in hot pursuit behind us and my aircraft was soon struck by cannon fire. There were a lot of holes and many of my systems were inoperative, but I succeeded in evading the British fighters and headed for Puerto Argentino to attempt an emergency landing. I began my approach but found that I could not lower the undercarriage, so I ejected at 600 m altitude. As I descended I saw that the pilotless Skyhawk

(Below) Super Etendard (0753) of 2ª Escuadrilla Aéronaval de Caza y Ataque, 3ª Escuadra, which operated primarily from Rio Grande during Falklands conflict.



(Above) Mirage IIIEA (I-017) of I Escuadrón, VIII Brigada Aérea, which flew top cover missions from Rio Gallegos. (Below) IAI Dagger (C-413) of II Escuadrón de Caza, VI Brigada Aérea, which operated from both Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande during the conflict.



(Above right) A-4Q Skyhawk (0657) of the 3ª Escuadrilla Aéronaval de Ataque, 3ª Escuadra, which was deployed to Rio Grande during the Falklands operations. This unit lost six Skyhawks during one sortie, only one of the pilots surviving.

(Left) Aermacchi MB 339AA of the 1ª Escuadrilla Aéronaval de Ataque (4ª Escuadra) detachment deployed to BAM Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley). This aircraft (4-A-113) was damaged by air attack. Note yellow "quick identification" band.



(Right) A-4B Skyhawk (C-239) of V Escuadrón of V Brigada Aérea which was deployed to Rio Gallegos for the South Atlantic operations. Note yellow "quick identification" markings. (Below) Canberra B Mk 61 (B-101) of the I Escuadrón de Bombardeo, II Brigada Aérea, which flew nocturnal missions from Comodoro Rivadavia, losing two aircraft during the conflict.



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

An IAI Dagger (C-421) of the VI Brigada Aérea photographed at its home base of Tandil, Buenos Aires, prior to the application of the unit insignia on the tail.

was continuing to fly in circles, and it was later shot down by our own batteries." Only one of the Skyhawks succeeded in regaining Rio Grande, and this, badly damaged, crashed on landing, its pilot losing his life.

The Super Etendards made their re-appearance in the combat zone on 25 May, one of the most damaging days for the British Task Force, and again employed Exocet with effect. This time, the Super Etendards were to be refuelled in flight by FAA KC-130H Hercules tankers on both outbound and homeward legs, because of the greater distance involved. Each aircraft carried an Exocet under one wing and a 242 Imp gal (1 100l) drop tank under the other. Similar tactics were employed to those utilised for the 4 May attack, and after the pop-up to 500 ft (150 m), the radar revealed a large target with a number of smaller targets surrounding it in circular formation.

Both missiles were launched at the large target, striking the *Atlantic Conveyor* and damaging it so severely that it sank several days later. In Argentina, it was believed at the time that the dozen or so Harriers and Sea Harriers that had been transported aboard this vessel had been destroyed, but these had, in fact, been flown off to *Hermes* and *Invincible* a week earlier. Nevertheless, six Wessex and three Chinook helicopters *did* go down with the *Atlantic Conveyor*, together with much other invaluable material, representing a very serious loss for the British Task Force.

At least one other Super Etendard strike sortie was flown, this time against *Invincible*, but the one Exocet launched was destroyed by 4·5-in gunfire from the frigate *Avenger*. But if the vital British carriers succeeded in evading the attentions of the FAA and *Aviación Naval* aircraft, other vessels were not to be so fortunate. The frigates *Ardent* and *Antelope* had been sunk on 21 and 23 May respectively, and these casualties were now joined by the destroyer *Coventry*, other vessels suffering varying degrees of damage as a result of the air strikes.

Responsible for the majority of the attack missions, the Skyhawks and Daggers naturally sustained the greatest operational attrition, providing the bulk of the 19·5 per cent losses suffered in the sorties flown by the FAA against San Carlos between 21-25 May. During one attack, an entire four-aircraft formation of Daggers was shot down — presumably by Sea Harriers — and on at least one occasion Daggers attempted to engage in low-level combat with the British fighters, but this proved a fruitless endeavour as the Sea Harrier is in its element in just such conditions. The problems posed for the attacking aircraft were not solely associated with the combat zone — Daggers operating from Rio Grande had, at times, to take-off and land in winds gusting at up to 90 knots (167 km/h)!

The closing phases

Between 26 May and 7 June, the character of the conflict changed as the British forces were now firmly established on the islands and the Task Force ships could largely operate at night in their support and supply operations in which the deteriorating weather proved an ally. During this period, 110 sorties were planned by the CdoFAS for the continental-based units, but, in the event, various factors, not least meteorological, reduced the number of aircraft that actually reached the operational area to 57, and of these four were lost.

Then, on 8 June, the CdoFAS learned that a complementary landing operation was being carried out by British forces at Pleasant Bay, on the south-east coast of Isla Soledad. Thirty-seven sorties were mounted during the course of that day, all but six aircraft reaching the combat zone. The frigate *Plymouth* was heavily damaged by Daggers, a cannon shell detonating a depth charge on the helicopter pad and the ship being hit by no fewer than four 1,000-lb (454-kg) bombs, but none of these exploded! These were not the first examples of bombs failing to explode — between 60 and 70 per cent of the hits registered were believed to have failed to detonate. It was not that these were old "iron bombs" from WWII stocks, as some alleged at the time. They were modern bombs, such as low-drag US Mk 83s and other similar weapons of European manufacture. Basically, the fuses of the bombs were not designed for low-level shipping attack and there was insufficient time for them to arm themselves between release and impact. Modifications were introduced, but these were not to be accomplished in time. Had *all* the bombs exploded, British casualties would undoubtedly have been very much heavier!

During the attacks of 8 June, the landing ships *Sir Tristram* and *Sir Galahad* suffered heavy damage, the latter foundering later, and apart from the vessels in Pleasant Bay, the FAA attacked the landing barges and the troops already ashore at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove, the British forces suffering heavy casualties, but several of the attacking aircraft being lost. Between 9 and 14 June, a further 65 sorties were planned by the FAA, but the weather was by now deteriorating even further, and it was only possible for 27 of the aircraft to reach the combat zone — the last FAA aircraft actually being lost to enemy action being a Canberra brought down by a Sea Dart missile from *Exeter* just a few hours before the ceasefire.

The sorties flown by the FAA and *Aviación Naval* combat units were not, of course, the only tasks performed by these services during the conflict. The reconnaissance, transport and flight refuelling missions, if not so spectacular, were equally vital, and some of these were flown by non-service aircraft and personnel inducted as a result of the emergency. A unit known as the *Escuadrón Fenix* (Phoenix Squadron) was formed with requisitioned civilian aircraft and their crews, and added to the CdoFAS for liaison, light transport, search and rescue, and even reconnaissance missions. The last-mentioned task fully deserved to be referred to as combat missions despite having been fulfilled by unarmed civil aircraft.

Several versions of the Learjet and HS.125 were flown "operationally" by their civilian crews, nine sorties being flown to guide attack aircraft to the proximity of their targets, 27 sorties in which the civil aircraft acted as communications relays between Command and the attack aircraft, and 123 sorties in which the aircraft acted as decoys to confuse British radar and interceptors. There can be no doubt of the success enjoyed by the operations of the *Escuadrón Fenix* in reducing the attrition that would otherwise have been suffered by the attack aircraft. A Learjet 35A of the *II Brigada Aérea* was, incidentally, shot down by a Sea Dart launched from *Exeter* on 7 June.

The C-130 Hercules of the *I Brigada Aérea* were, at times, utilised as reconnaissance aircraft, as were also this unit's ex-Aerolineas Argentinas Boeing 707s. The Hercules usually flew at about 50 ft (15 m) with their radar turned off to avoid detection, popping up to 500 ft (150 m) and turning on their radar, and then dropping again to wave-top height. One C-130E so engaged was picked up by the radar of the frigate

continued on page 242

Minerva, the ship directing a Sea Harrier CAP towards the transport which was shot down by a Sidewinder and cannon fire. The Boeing 707s, which served as rudimentary AWACS aircraft, were intercepted outside the TEZ on several occasions by Sea Harriers in late April while shadowing the British Task Force, and on one later occasion, one of the Boeing 707s succeeded in eluding six missiles — thought to be Sea Darts — by manoeuvres that would have raised the hair on the backs of many necks in Seattle and by eventually diving virtually to wave-top height.

The aircraft flying these surveillance and reconnaissance missions were attached to a provisional unit that had been formed at Comodoro Rivadavia as the *Grupo Aéreo de Exploración y Reconocimiento* 1. Between 1 May and 19 June, the date on which its missions ceased, this *Grupo* flew 466 sorties with a total flying time of 2,239 hours.

Another use made of the Hercules during the conflict was that of makeshift bomber. For this rôle, the underwing tank pylons were fitted with Pucará racks to carry 500-lb (227-kg) bombs, other bombs being stowed in the hold and rolled out of the cargo door by the crew. The only observed result of this extemporisation was some hits on a British oiler, the bombs failing to detonate.

The FAA's two KC-130H Hercules tankers performed a vital rôle in refuelling the Service's Skyhawks, together with those of the *Aviación Naval* and the latter's Super Etendards. Indeed, but for their tanker support the attacks on the British Task Force would have been far less effective, and at least a half-dozen Skyhawks that had suffered fuel tank damage would have ended up in the ocean. There were cases in which holed Skyhawks flew much of the homeward leg of their mission with their probe constantly plugged into the attendant KC-130H, fuel being lost at much the same rate that it was being taken on board.

Military air transport activities between 2 April and 13 June totalled 2,356 flying hours, of which 2,047 hours were flown by FAA aircraft and the remainder by aircraft of Aerolineas Argentinas and Austral operating on behalf of the armed forces. The bulk of these hours were spent in operating the air bridge between Puerto Argentino and El Palomar, Comodoro Rivadavia, Comandante Espora, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande. This involved the transportation of 9,729 personnel and 5,442 *tonnes* of freight, of which 435 *tonnes* were carried into Puerto Argentino during the conflict in 420 flying hours, 17·5 *tonnes* of this being air dropped. A total of 514 personnel and 264 wounded were evacuated from Puerto Argentino by air during the fighting — the C-130s continuing to operate from the cratered runway and one actually taking-off with several flat tyres! — and the last flight out of Puerto Argentino took-off at 2230 hours on 13 June, the Hercules having to delay its departure for one hour owing to the presence of Harriers in the vicinity and the bombardment by British field artillery.

To summarise the FAA activity during the 44 days of the conflict, the CdoFAS planned a total of 505 sorties from its continental bases, these comprising 149 by A-4B Skyhawks, 106 by A-4C Skyhawks, 145 by Daggers, 45 by Mirages, 54 by Canberras and six by Pucarás. This represented an immense effort in view of the Service's available means, 41·5 per cent operating from the southern continental airfields being lost. While, at first sight, this figure seems high — representing 34 aircraft — when equated with the number of sorties flown it gives an attrition rate of the order of seven per cent. Fortunately, many of the personnel flying the aircraft that were lost succeeded in ejecting and were subsequently rescued. Apart from the aircraft lost in the Malvinas, those aircraft of the FAA lost while operating from continental bases comprised 11 Daggers (of which six pilots were recovered), 10 A-4B and eight A-4C Skyhawks (five pilots recovered), two Mirages (one pilot recovered), two Canberras (two crewmen recovered), one C-130 Hercules and one Learjet. In addition, six Daggers and two A-4Cs are known to have been so heavily damaged that they will not be repaired.

Various aspects of this distressing and unnecessary war, so costly to both Argentina and Britain in lives and materials, will remain contentious, but the valour and skill of the Argentine pilots, and, indeed, their counterparts in the British Task Force, will never be in dispute. Flying from their continental bases, the Argentine pilots operated continuously under the distressing mental pressure imposed by the marginal endurance of their aircraft; they were troubled by fatigue resulting from long-distance flights flown much of the time only a few metres above the waves in inclement weather, their vision partly obscured by drizzling rain or the build-up of salt on their windscreens. Few would suggest the scenario in which Argentine military aviation received its baptism of fire favoured its efforts. □





(Above) One of the Lineas Aereas del Estado (LADE) Fokker F28 Fellowships which carry FAA insignia and were used on occasions to fly personnel into Puerto Argentino, and (below) one of the three ex-Aerolineas Argentinas Boeing 707s that performed reconnaissance missions and served as rudimentary AWACS aircraft. A fourth Aerolineas Argentinas Boeing 707 has since been taken into the FAA inventory.



A mixed Aviación Naval formation comprising a Beech T-34C, an A-4Q Skyhawk and an MB.326GB. Four T-34Cs were deployed to Puerto Argentino by the Aviación Naval's 4ª Escuadrilla and all of these were destroyed on the ground by air attack on 15 May.



(Left) Agusta A 109 of the Batallón de Combate Aviación 601, Comando de Aviación del Ejercito, the Argentine Army air component. This particular A 109 (AE334) was captured in the Falklands and subsequently transported to UK.

(Below) Two I.A.58 Pucarás of the IV Escuadrón de Exploración y Ataque, IX Brigada Aérea (A-549 and A-515), which was reinforced with Pucarás from the III Brigada Aérea.



(Below) Chinook (AE520) of the Argentine Army's Batallón de Combate Aviación 601 which was captured by British forces at BAM Puerto Argentino.



(Above) C-130H Hercules (TC-70) of the I Brigada Aérea.

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The United States and Latin America
In the Aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis

Prepared Statement of

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and

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American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

before the

Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

July 20, 1982

The United States and Latin America
In the Aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis

Howard J. Wiarda

Personal Statement

I am Howard J. Wiarda, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst, and Resident Scholar and Director of the Center for Hemispheric Studies of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. Prior to joining AEI I was Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, 1979-81; Visiting Professor at MIT; Editor of the journal Polity; and Director of the Program in Latin American Studies of the University of Massachusetts. My books include Politics and Social Change in Latin America, The Dominican Republic, The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement, Latin American Politics and Development, Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy, The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America, and Corporatism and National Development in Latin America. I have traveled extensively throughout the area, have lived for extended periods in a number of Latin American countries, and have been studying the area professionally for more than twenty years.

The statement that follows is purely an individual one based upon my research and experience in Latin America, and is not necessarily the view of the organizations with which I am affiliated.

Introduction

In the media and public discussion of United States-Latin American relations in the aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas controversy, two interpretations have been dominant. One suggests that U.S.-Latin American relations have been newly, severely, and perhaps irrevocably damaged by the U.S. posture of siding with the British. The other suggests that relatively little damage has been done and that after a decent interval U.S.-Latin American relations will stabilize and return to normal.

I wish to suggest a third and, I think, more accurate position, which also borrows from the other two. I believe U.S.-Latin American relations have been severely damaged by the U.S. posture and actions in this recent crisis. On the other hand, the Falklands/Malvinas controversy was only one, particularly dramatic event in a considerably longer history of declining and probably worsening U.S.-Latin American relations, viewed as an overall picture. Our bilateral relations with quite a number of individual countries are fairly good, but our relations with the area as a whole have been deteriorating.

The Falklands/Malvinas controversy will thus help accelerate tendencies long under way. A new plateau will doubtlessly be reached in U.S.-Latin American relations in the aftermath of the most recent controversy but it will be at a lower, less amicable, less accommodative, possibly more conflict-prone level than in the past. In this sense it is perhaps

accurate to say that our relations will eventually "stabilize" and return to "normal." But "normalcy" will have been restored in an overall context of tension, difficulty, and new conditions that augur even greater problems in the future.

The Essential Problems

The Congress is at least as cognizant of the basic attitudinal and policy problems plaguing U.S.-Latin American relations as are those who study the area. Let me summarize these briefly as a series of propositions, reserving further discussion and qualification if necessary for the question period.[1]

1. The United States is not very much interested in Latin America. That attitude is highlighted nicely in New York Times columnist James Reston's comment that "the United States will do anything for Latin America except read about it."

2. The United States does not believe Latin America is important. My own view is that immigration, economic relations, political priorities, proximity and other factors are forcing us to change that assessment; but change will require some time and will be a long-term process.

3. U.S. policy is still primarily European-oriented. Moreover as a country we tend to be Euro-centric. In this context, Latin America does not count for much. The Latin American countries are seen as second-class allies.

4. U.S. policy is crisis-oriented, as in the recent Falklands/Malvinas controversy or as regards our attention to El Salvador in the last two years. The rest of the time we ignore the area.

5. Not only do we not read about Latin America or well understand its political culture, but we do not wish to understand it. Our images and comprehension of the area are shrouded in myths and misleading popular stereotypes. These attitudes in turn are conditioned by long-time political, religious, racial, and cultural prejudices. In the recent Falklands/Malvinas controversy the racial, ethnic, and cultural slurs sometimes used -- "tin-horn dictators," "pock-marked generals," etc. -- were often little short of outrageous. We combine ignorance of the area with prejudice and not a little hostility.

6. When we are forced to turn our attention to Latin America, we tend to view it exclusively through U.S. lenses. For example, we see it as a continent locked in a perpetual struggle between dictatorship and democracy, a dichotomous formulation that is false, misleading, and ignores the genius of Latin America for mixed solutions that may help reconcile these diverse traditions in the area's history.[2]

7. We often use Latin America as a kind of living laboratory for experiments in U.S.-conceived social and political engineering -- e.g., agrarian reform, family planning, community development -- or alternatively as a theater for the acting out of U.S. domestic political considerations. Examples of the latter include both the Administration's efforts early on to portray the crisis in Central America as an East-West struggle in accord with its campaign rhetoric and the activities of its foes in using Central America to demonstrate their social-reformist credentials, even though such a posture may have little to do with the realities of the area. As my AEI colleague, syndicated columnist Nick Thimmesch has written, "Democrats usually rush to Latin America with civics books, sermons, hot broth, and contraceptive devices." Republicans, in contrast, tend usually to ignore that huge land mass with its 350 million people, and to turn their attention to it chiefly when Cold War concerns force it onto the front pages.

Implications for U.S.-Latin American Relations of the Falklands/Malvinas Controversy

Given the basic problems of ignorance, prejudice, and lack of empathy or understanding with regard to Latin America, which I would argue are at the heart of our difficult political

and diplomatic relations with the area, let me turn now to the implications of the Falklands/Malvinas controversy for those relations. Again, because of space and time constraints, these will be listed briefly and in proposition form, with the understanding that further elaboration and qualification are necessary.

The implications of the Falklands/Malvinas controversy for U.S.-Latin American relations seem to me severe, damaging, and long-term. I do not see any good coming out of this crisis, nor do I see the damage being repaired easily or soon. At the same time it should be reiterated that the present crisis is but one of many in a considerable history dating back some seventeen years and helping produce a major, long-term diminuition in the presence, power, and influence of the United States throughout the hemisphere.

1. Our long-time "special relationship" with Latin America has been damaged severely and may be moribund. In this crisis, where the United States opted to choose its preferred ally, it chose Great Britain. That choice was widely seen throughout the hemisphere as a choice between Latin American and Anglo-Saxon civilizations. I understand the reasons behind the choice and also the lack of love many Latin Americans and others have for the Argentines. Still, the choice was a stark one; and while informed Latin Americans understand the realpolitik of the issue, they will not soon forget the choice made.

2. Anti-Americanism is now rampant. This is now true not only in those nations that have allied themselves with the Soviet Union but with friends such as Venezuela and Brazil as well. It is widespread not only among youth, organized labor and the left, but in conservative and centrist circles as well. We are used to and expect anti-Americanism to come from the left; what bears emphasis in the present circumstances is the growth of rightist and centrist nationalism and anti-Americanism as well.

3. The North-South dispute has been intensified. Already heating up because of past grievances and perceived U.S. inaction, the Falklands/Malvinas controversy is being widely portrayed in Latin America and elsewhere as a deplorable case of aggression by the industrialized nations of the North against the Third World countries of the South. I cannot comment on the accuracy of these perceptions but they are widely believed in Latin America, and there as here perceptions are often at least as important in politics as reality.

4. These sentiments all seem to me symptomatic of the long-term decline of U.S. influence in Latin America, of Latin American efforts to modify its position of dependency vis-a-vis the U.S., of the diminishing presence of the U.S. in the area and our presump-

tion of hemispheric hegemony, and of our declining control over Latin American affairs. Such attitudes did not originate in the Falklands/Malvinas crisis but they have become more widespread as a result of it. As ex-Peace Corps director Joseph Blatchford has said, this crisis has accelerated the drift of the Latin American nations toward Western Europe, Japan, Third Worldism, perhaps even non-alignment and the Soviet Union because "that's the way the world is going these days."

5. The crisis also damaged U.S. credibility. Not only did we side with the British but even when we were ostensibly still neutral and involved in the negotiations as a peace-maker, we were actually aiding the British. That fact has been more widely publicized in Latin America than in the United States.

6. The Inter-American system has been severely damaged. The Rio Treaty, which we long nurtured as a bulwark against Communist expansion, is all but defunct; the OAS has become an anti-American forum; the whole range of inter-American agencies built up over decades is threatened; the dream of an inter-American peace force is unlikely now to be resuscitated; the old American hope of someday linking NATO with the hemispheric alliance is now also gone.

7. My estimation is that there is almost certain to be an escalation of the arms race in Latin America.

Not only will Argentina wish to rearm but that will set off a chain reaction in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia. The arms race may not be confined to conventional weapons; Argentina and then Brazil may move to develop a nuclear capacity, and Latin America will no longer be a nuclear-free zone.

8. In Argentina the internal results of this controversy will be enormous. An already deeply divided nation is certain to fragment still farther and to produce greater economic and political instability. Argentina cannot be seen any longer as serving as a U.S. accomplice in Central America. The better relations that had been developing between the United States and Argentina over the past year and a half are gone. Argentina may reestablish "normal" relations with the U.S. but "normalcy" in that relationship implies lingering deep distrust and considerable anti-Americanism.

9. The hand of the Soviet Union has been strengthened. The Soviets may well be the only nation to have gained from this crisis. This is not to imply a sudden movement of Latin America toward realignment with the Soviet Union; the Soviets will be kept at arm's length. But it does imply stronger trade, diplomatic, and commercial ties with the Soviets; new thrusts toward non-

alignment and neutrality; and a lessening of the ties of dependence on the U.S. In the longer term the crisis may also result in a stronger Soviet presence in such strategic areas as the South Atlantic or Antarctica.

10. The Falklands/Malvinas crisis has provided an additional anti-American club for the left in Latin America, while also enabling Cuba and Nicaragua, who sided publicly and loudly with Argentina, to break out of the hemispheric isolation to which they had increasingly been subjected.

11. U.S. relations with Latin America, public and private, have been made more difficult on a wide range of issues. Normal contacts are now somewhat more testy, diplomatic relations are strained, a host of cultural and exchange programs have been cancelled. Latin America is not in a position to break with the United States or to impose overt sanctions against it, but there will be quiet sanctions. Consider this scenario told to me recently by a former Argentine cabinet minister: that when there are contracts for dams, highways, etc. and when there are European, Japanese, and American bidders, we may be certain the U.S. firm will not get the contracts.

What should the United States Do?

We argued earlier that the problems in U.S.-Latin American relations growing out of the Falklands/Malvinas crisis were mainly long-term and, for that reason, difficult of resolution. That is, the crisis helped accelerate a process of estrangement that had been under way for some time, but the crisis itself was only the most recent in a long series of events that have had the cumulative impact of drawing the U.S. and Latin America farther and farther apart. Because these differences are so basic and have been in the making for a long time, it is difficult to believe they can easily or quickly be resolved. Nevertheless some modest suggestions might be offered for improving relations somewhat -- but without our becoming excessively optimistic (1) that these suggestions can easily be followed through, or (2) that at this stage they will lead to much improvement.

1. The United States should take steps to restore its special relationship with Latin America -- or what's left of it. There <u>are</u> ties of history, culture, politics, peoples, religion, and a common New World heritage that deserve emphasis. For example, we may wish to reemphasize our common quest for democratic government, but in the present context we cannot seek to impose our institutional preferences on Latin America. Rather, we must empathize with Latin America's own institutional development and its efforts to fashion viable institutions in accord with its own history and culture.

2. We must begin to restore the Inter-American system. That may mean a revamped OAS, a revamped security treaty arrangement, etc. Whether and to what degree that is still feasible remains to be seen.

3. We need to move forward quickly with the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Whether that is possible in an election year and with the array of forces lined up against it the members of the Subcommittee can judge better than I. If we do not accept the CBI, however, presently democratic countries like the Dominican Republic or Costa Rica, faced with immense economic difficulties, may very soon become new El Salvadors.

4. In all these areas we must remember that action is required, not rhetoric. There has been much talk about why we did what we did in the Falklands/Malvinas controversy; now what Latin America is looking for are concrete steps preferably in the economic sphere. Actions on trade, tariff, and market issues will speak far louder than words.

5. We must stop meddling in the internal affairs of countries whose traditions and politics are often different from our own and which we only weakly comprehend. I am opposed to either U.S. ambassadors or congressmen exercising essentially proconsular roles in countries to which they are assigned or visit, and in seeking to impose their preferred solutions on countries

where these may be inappropriate.[3] We all understand that the granting of U.S. assistance carries with it an obligation on the part of the U.S. to see that the funds are appropriately spent, but there are ways to do this with sensitivity and without the heavy-handedness that we have frequently seen recently. Such interventions in Latin American internal affairs only breed greater resentments and anti-Americanism.

6. We must on a longer-term basis strengthen our cultural exchanges and our languages and area studies programs. The fact is we do not understand Latin America very well and Latin America does not understand the United States. These misconceptions and misreadings on both sides were particularly evident in the Falklands/Malvinas controversy.

7. We should begin discussions and hearings on the relative importance to be assigned the diverse world regions with which we must deal. Is our Eurocentrism still justified or must other areas be elevated in importance? I have seen figures recently that the U.S. now has more trade with the Third World than with Western Europe and Japan combined. I think a fundamental reassessment, based on such hard economic and political-strategic data, is now due on the relative importance of the world's areas with which we have important relations.

8. We must show greater restraint in using Latin America as either a laboratory for social and political experimentation or as a backdrop for political pronouncements and posturing designed chiefly for domestic political purposes. The pressure to command a headline is large, and Latin America is not usually in a position to retaliate; but the fact is we do and say things with regard to Latin America we would not dream of doing with regard to Europe, the Soviet Union, China or the Middle East. The stakes by now are too high for us to continue taking our Latin American alliances for granted.

9. The Falklands/Malvinas controversy illustrated again the need for good intelligence, clear signals, firmness, and unambiguous directions in foreign policy. To one degree or another, all of these were faulty or lacking in the South Atlantic crisis. Some foreign policy "looseness" is perhaps inevitable in the kind of pluralist and democratic society we are, but there is also much room for greater coherence and coordination of policy.

10. We need to be more cognizant of and discriminating with regard to the dynamics of Latin American politics. Our discussion in this and other crises is often couched in terms of a presumed struggle between dictatorship and democracy. I submit this is a wrong and

dangerous dichotomy when applied to Latin America that rules out various mixed solutions. It forces Latin America into a rigid political straitjacket and into a situation of choice divorced from its own political realities; it rules out the possibilities for various half-way houses between these polar points; and it in fact denies what has long been the genius of Latin American politics and politicians in devising fused, sometimes crazy-quilt, and ad hoc solutions. Yet it is precisely these mixed and ad hoc arrangements that enable Latin America to adjust to crises, accommodate to change, and go forward with development efforts.

11. Above all, I would call for a new era of tolerance, empathy, and understanding with regard to Latin America. For too long our attitudes toward the area have been characterized by ignorance, disdain, condescension, and a certain vague hostility. These were all strongly reflected in the Falklands/Malvinas controversy. It is time that we put these prejudices aside and began to understand Latin America not on strictly U.S. terms but in its own context, language, and setting. Latin America will and must fashion its own developmental model, independent of U.S. preferences. It is time that we let Latin America be Latin America.

Mr. Chairman, I have been urging such restraint, empathy, and understanding toward Latin America for some twenty years. That experience, you may well understand, does not lead one to be overly optimistic as to the possibilities for very many basic attitudes and foreign policy premises with regard to that area to be easily or quickly altered. My students and much of the younger generation understand the necessity of reordering our priorities as suggested here, and for some unaccustomed modesty and deference in our attitudes, pronouncements, and policy toward Latin America. But among more senior officials and in policy-making quarters, among both Republicans and Democrats, the interventionist urge, the presumption that we know best for Latin America, remains powerful. That presumption, and the often naive, ill-informed, and ethnocentric policy initiatives that flow from it, lie at the root of our problems with Latin America.

Hearings such as these can provide a useful forum for bringing that message to policy-makers and opinion-leaders such as yourselves, and for continuing discussion of the appropriate and proper role of the United States in Latin America. That role, it seems to me, in the changed circumstances of the present, requires that we avoid the sense of superiority tinged with dislike with which we have always looked at Latin America, and that we begin to exercise understanding, empathy, and comprehension of Latin America's efforts to develop autonomously, on its own, and in terms of its own institutional arrangements. At the least the Falklands/Malvinas crisis should alert us

to the intense nationalistic feelings throughout the area and the desire to "go it alone" if necessary, and to the fact that Latin America can no longer be counted upon automatically to ally itself with the United States.

1. These arguments have been presented at greater length in my books Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982); The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); and Corporatism and National Development in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981). See also the arguments set forth in a special issue of the AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review devoted to "The Crisis in Central America."

2. These arguments are elaborated in a provocative fashion in my essay "Is Latin America Democratic -- And Does It Want to Be?" in The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America.

3. As applied to the human rights issue and the differing understandings as between the United States and Latin America, see my essay entitled "Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: Toward a New Conceptualization" Orbis (Spring, 1978); reprinted in Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy (Washington: AEI, 1982).

PREFACE

One of the most striking--but least noticed--aspects of the British success in the Falklands dispute was the United Kingdom's ability to cope with the unexpected. Fighting Argentina had not figured prominently in British defense planning before April 1982, and the unforeseen conflict required logistical and tactical planning "on the run," modifications to military and civilian equipment, and rapid retraining. This Working Draft is a quick attempt to pull together the public details of such efforts.

This study was researched and written in somewhat less than two weeks. Accordingly, time constraints have precluded careful structured analysis; rather, the authors took a "shot-gun" approach in order to identify certain important aspects of the British mobilization and support effort that are of potential interest to American security planning.

A note on sources would be pertinent. Newspaper accounts, reports, and analyses from the Times, the Guardian, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and various journals, such as The Economist, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Strategy Week, International Defense Review, and Flight International were examined in the preparation of this report. Heavy reliance on the press creates some problems, due to the British Government's control over the press. The British Government has always been extremely secretive on military affairs, as American journalists, used to the voluminous briefings during the Vietnam War, have persistently complained during the Falklands crisis. Under what is

known as the "D-Notice" system, all British newspapers have agreed "voluntarily" to submit their reports on national security issues to the Ministry of Defence for clearance, thus enabling the executive branch of the British Government to avoid the publication of "sensitive" or classified data. At the same time, all British journalists who were with the task force had to transmit their reports to Britain through military channels and these messages were subject to direct censorship. Further, the British Government also employed a certain amount of deception during the crisis; for example, the nuclear hunter-killer submarine H.M.S. SUPERB was reliably reported to be enforcing the blockade of the Falklands in the early days of the crisis, only to cause a certain amount of embarassment in press circles when she suddenly surfaced at Holy Loch a few days later.

No doubt the authors of this report are also victims of British "misinformation." The uncertainties will become fewer when the furor dies away and reasoned scholarship supplants journalistic speculation. In the meantime, however, this overview should prove helpful to those concerned with the implications of this important episode.

This report was undertaken in the Concept Development and Project Formulation project of the Project AIR FORCE Resource Management Program, which is broadly concerned with the relationship between resource availability and distribution and related allocation policies and combat capability. The draft is part of a larger Project AIR FORCE effort to draw together "lessons learned" from the recent Falkland Islands and Middle East conflicts.

SUMMARY

Analysis of the United Kingdom's performance in the Falklands crisis will no doubt exert a powerful influence over American defense policy. The existing British military machine in some respects resembles that sought by the American defense establishment: elite, highly-trained, air, sea, and land forces that stress professionalism and military competence. Further, British defense policy since the end of the Second World War has been dominated by the necessity of countering a wide range of potential threats from a limited--and in real terms, shrinking--economic base. As such, Britain's defense establishment has therefore been forced to formulate flexible policies and programs that exploit the potential of its limited resources. The recent conflict in the Falklands put this approach to its severest test and clearly demonstrated Britain's ability to mobilize for a war that it neither expected nor was prepared for. Accordingly, the British victory in the Falklands should be of special interest to American defense planning, particularly in regard to allocating resources and developing the capability to deploy rapidly an effective striking force.

This paper attempts to identify specific elements of the British mobilization and support process during the Falklands conflict that might be of particular interest to American defense planners. Special attention might be given to: 1) the improvisational expertise displayed by Britain in adapting and modifying ships and aircraft to suit the unforeseen dimensions of the crisis; 2) the rapid retraining provided to pilots, support crews, and soldiers in preparation for

battle; 3) the unique character of what we have termed "staged mobilization" that permitted the more expeditious dispatch of the British force to the South Atlantic; 4) the maintenance of logistical support for the task force; and 5) the efficient manner in which the British were able to allocate resources for the conflict.

Britain demonstrated some innovative and useful methods of employing her scarce forces and limited logistical infrastructure to maximum effect. Accordingly, the British mobilization process, and particularly its adaptive and coordinated nature, may well deserve the careful attention of U.S. military planners in the months ahead.


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FALKLAND SOUND
EAST FALKLAND
0 20mi.
BRITAIN
Londo
Gibraltar
AFRICA
7,840 miles
EQUATOR
SOUTH AMERICA
BRITISH FLEET
Ascension Islands
ATLANTIC OCEAN
ENTINA
CHILE
FALKLAND ISLANDS
SOUTH GEORGIA
SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS
200-mile exclusion zone
TIME Map by Paul J. Pugliese

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I. INTRODUCTION

The recent conflict in the Falklands will no doubt influence American defense policy, although the measure of that influence necessarily remains uncertain. The information gained from the example of the United Kingdom, our closest European ally, deploying a force of 100 ships and 25,000 men a distance of 8000 miles into an extremely inhospitable climate against one of the stronger Third World nations will certainly serve as the source of innumerable "lessons" for a wide range of American defense issues.

In a sharp break with past history, Britain on this occasion was the rather surprised target of "gunboat diplomacy," but she managed to dominate the outcome. In the largest amphibious operation since the Suez fiasco of 1956--and one of the few post-1939 landings carried out without local air superiority--Britain landed 8000 soldiers to fight an entrenched enemy some 12,000 strong. Employing a classic maritime strategy of surprise, deception, and the "indirect" approach, the British task force achieved its political objective--regaining control of the Falklands--without suffering or inflicting heavy casualties. Eight hundred Argentines and two hundred and fifty British died in the campaign, rather light casualties considering the numbers of forces involved and the sophisticated weaponry employed. From the British perspective, the only blot on the military record of the campaign was the surprising vulnerability of modern surface ships to air power; the Argentine air force sank and damaged several relatively new warships.[1] From the political point of view, however, material losses are probably

[1] Britain lost two destroyers, two frigates, a converted container ship, and two landing craft; two destroyers and six frigates were damaged.

less damaging than attendant losses of life.

The recent British campaign has particular relevance for the United States because the British government maintains an existing military machine (albeit on a much smaller scale) of the sort that is an objective of American policy; namely, the possession of elite, highly-trained air, sea, and land forces that stress quality rather than quantity. In view of this, the military success of Her Majesty's Government in the Falklands dispute should be particularly heartening for the United States. Further, the recent operation is an example of projecting force into a remote region without the benefit of nearby prepared bases and in that respect should be of great interest to the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which faces similar problems. Finally, the conflict tested a large number of previously untried weapons systems--many of which are similar or identical to American systems--in a combat environment.

Because of Britain's decline from the great power ranks at the end of World War II to her present position as a medium-sized power, it is often forgotten that Britain deploys an array of military power rivaled in most respects by only three nations in the world: the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. On a budget of some twenty billion dollars, the United Kingdom supports a strategic nuclear deterrent (Polaris), long range theater nuclear forces (Vulcan bombers),[2] medium range theater nuclear forces (Jaguars and Tornadoes), short range theatre nuclear forces (Lance missiles and atomic artillery),[3] a

[2] When the Argentines invaded, the last Vulcans were being taken out of service. Due to their age (the Vulcans were designed and deployed in the 1950s and three are already in museums) it would seem likely that the Vulcans will still be retired.

[3] Britain maintains a unique position in NATO in that she is the

professional, highly-trained and motivated elite army (176,248 men),[4] a well-trained and drilled air force comparable in size and competence to the Israeli air force (92,701 men),[5] and the third largest "blue water" navy in the world (74,687 men).[6] Finally, as the war over the Falklands so dramatically illustrated, the British Government maintains a small rapid deployment force of 7,899 Royal Marines, 400 Special Air Service troops, and 400 Special Boat Service members.

Britain received intelligence reports and confirmation from American satellites on Monday, March 29, that the Argentines were considering an invasion of the Falkland Islands. Though some contingency planning and intelligence gathering were begun, preparations for mobilization were few. Argentina had threatened on numerous earlier occasions to invade the Falklands in order to force the British to recognize Argentine claims of sovereignty over the islands. The distance of the British Isles from the South Atlantic compromised the credibility of any British military reaction, while no government could contemplate a high cost mobilization until it was plainly essential.

On Friday, April 2, Argentina seized the Falkland and South Georgia islands. At this point, the British Cabinet made the decision to mobilize and three days later began the dispatch of two aircraft

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only European member of the alliance that unilaterally controls nuclear weapons, which the British claim enhances deterrence through the strategy of the "second center of decision-making". The Lance missiles and atomic artillery, however, are under a dual-key system in cooperation with the United States.

[4] Deployed in 19 armored regiments, 24 artillery regiments, 11 engineers regiments, and 56 infantry batallions.

[5] Deployed in 15 strike attack squadrons, five ground support squadrons, 11 reconnaisance squadrons, 17 air defense squadrons, and five airlift squadrons.

[6] Deployed in 32 submarines, three carriers, two helicopter assault ships, 15 destroyers, 46 frigates, and 35 support ships.

carriers, fifteen cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, as well as an assortment of support ships. The British naval movements were aimed at putting pressure on the Argentines to withdraw their forces and settle the territorial dispute through negotiations--a classic case of threatening the use of force to speed and support diplomatic efforts.

As officials in America, Britain, and Argentina embarked on an ultimately unsuccessful effort to reach a diplomatic solution,[7] the British mobilization continued.[8] Vessels ranging from ocean liners to fishing trawlers were requisitioned and refitted, troops were airlifted on hastily chartered airliners and RAF transports to Ascension Island, and rapid modifications were made to strategic bombers, Nimrods, sea surveillance fighters, Harrier attack fighters, warships, and civilian vessels. The task force eventually included about 100 ships and 25,000 sailors, soldiers, and airmen.[9]

Four weeks after mobilization, a numerically inferior British force re-took the South Georgia Islands in an almost bloodless operation. Attention then focused on the Falklands. Though suffering unexpectedly heavy naval losses to the Argentine air force, Britain still managed to land some 5000 troops equipped with indigenous artillery, air defense systems, armor, and helicopters on East Falkland seven weeks after mobilization. One week later, a detachment of British land forces routed outlying Argentine forces at Goose Green and Darwin (small

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[7] According to numerous accounts, at one point Secretary of State Haig secured agreement between Prime Minister Thatcher and General Galtieri on a compromise solution to the dispute, but the accord was disrupted by other military members of the Agentine junta.

[8] See Appendix I for a chronological accounting of the air, sea, and land mobilization process.

[9] See Appendix II for a listing of the units deployed in the British task force.

stations on East Falkland Island). During these brief and bitter engagements, 600 Royal Marines defeated 1400 Argentine troops; 17 British and 250 Argentine soldiers were killed. Britain's land forces then advanced toward Argentine-occupied Port Stanley, the capital of the Falkland islands, in a series of rapid forced marches that reportedly convered twenty miles per day, while "leap-frogging" helicopter envelopments and British naval guns and airpower kept the defenders off balance. Seventy four days after the Argentines invaded, the British expedition was able to force the surrender of some 10,000 Argentine troops at Port Stanley, allowing Major General Jeremy Moore to send the following laconic signal back to London: "The Falkland Islands are once more under the government desired by their inhabitants. God Save the Queen."[10]

The eleven weeks of the Falklands campaign are sure to become the topic of several analyses. One broad theme of future analysis will be "political". Argentine and British diplomacy, America's handling of the crisis, the effect of the crisis on NATO, and the effectiveness of economic sanctions and arms embargoes are some of the more obvious research topics, although only the pre-conflict diplomacy seems likely to be of much lasting interest. ?

Another broad theme of analysis will be that of "operations." Tactical evaluations of the effectiveness of new weapons, radar, damage control, electronic counter-measures and so on, will surely follow. No doubt British civil servants, Ministers, and service officials will be months in sifting through the mass of data from the south Atlantic and, given the past history of the Anglo-American "special relationship", the

[10] See Appendix III for a chronology of important political and military events in the Falklands episode.

British Government will probably share much of this with the United States.

Analysis of other vital areas of operations, the issues of mobilization and logistical support, require different sorts of data and conform to different research patterns. It would be useful for the United States to pay special heed to the improvisational expertise displayed by the British Government in mobilizing for a war which was neither expected nor anticipated. The following section examines this process in greater detail, focusing on such issues as major equipment modifications, crisis training, and staged mobilization, all of which enabled Britain to employ its rather limited resources to maximum effect. Much information that bore on technical details, training, and logistical support remained inaccesible as this paper was prepared; careful supplemental research would be most desirable.

II. SOME SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE BRITISH SUPPLY AND MOBILIZATION PROCESS

A. MAJOR EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS

The British demonstrated ingenuity during the mobilization process that probably has been unmatched since the improvisations of 1940-43. Listed below are the reported alterations made to civilian and military equipment during the crisis.

- RAF Hercules transport aircraft and Nimrod sea patrol aircraft were modified within three weeks to refuel inflight from air tankers. Further, inflight refueling apparatus was added to a group of Harriers, which were flown non-stop to the South Atlantic.

- An unspecified number of Hercules and possibly Nimrod aircraft were modified to function as tankers. In the case of the Hercules transports, a "hose-reel unit" was deployed out the open rear loading ramp to refuel other aircraft, while it is likely that an inflatable rubberized bladder was used to hold the fuel. Britain uses the "drogue and probe" refueling system that the RAF originated in the 1940s, in contrast to the boom system currently used by the USAF. The simpler British system is easier to install on short notice in unmodified aircraft.[1]

- Ten of Britain's 34 operational Vulcan strategic bombers were converted from their nuclear role to drop conventional bombs. Further, air refueling probes were literally rescued from the scrapyard so that the bombers could strike against the Falklands. Crews began training to drop conventional munitions and to refuel in flight within two weeks of mobilization. The first raid was carried out within four weeks of mobilization.

- AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles were fitted to RAF Harriers within three weeks of mobilization, though these aircraft apparently did not receive any additional air intercept avionics. RAF GR3 Harriers differ from RN Sea Harriers in that they are designed as ground support aircraft, with associated cannon and bomb targeting apparatus. They do not possess the Sea Harrier's sophisticated Blue Fox air intercept radar.

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[1] It appears the RAF was so pleased with the flexibility afforded by inflight refueling that it is pressing the Government to increase the tanker force to three times its present size.

10-12

- RAF Harriers were "navalized" prior to their dispatch to the South Atlantic. This hurried process attempted to reduce the dangers of salt-water corrosion to the RAF aircraft[2] and involved drilling holes in specific areas to let water drain out and protecting certain critical parts with plating. Further, in order to aid the RAF Harrier pilots in making carrier landings, Ferranti fitted a rapid-alignment "pram" to the jumpjets' inertial guidance system.[3]

- Rocket pods were fitted to both RAF and RN Harriers by April 10. Peacetime plans had called for gradual fitting of the pods to Harriers over the next two years, but the crisis speeded up matters considerably. Two pods (each of which can fire 36 two-inch rockets) were fitted to each aircraft. The MoD noted that fitting the same types of rockets on each type of plane eased munition compatability problems.

- Rocket pods were apparently also fitted to helicopters; it is unclear whether the helicopters were regularly equipped with these unguided weapons. It appears that these helicopter-borne unguided rockets were used to cripple an Argentine submarine during the attack on South Georgia. The RN's Lynx helicopters regularly carry the Sea Skua guided air-to- surface missile; the newly fitted unguided rockets helped increase the striking power of the helicopters with the task force.

- Until the arrival of RAF Harriers in mid-May on the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, Sea Harriers were used as bombers for attacks on Port Stanley. The Sea Harriers were ordinarily fitted to carry two 1,000 pound bombs for anti-shipping purposes, and the crews were appropriately trained. Due to the demands of the conflict, however, delayed fuse and BL-755 cluster bombs were employed against the airfield, while 1,000 pound air burst bombs were used against Argentine troop emplacements.

- One report stated that Special Air Service units planted listening devices next to Argentine airfields in order to give the fleet better warning of the time and size of air attacks. Through analysis of the jet noise transmitted by the listening devices, the British could judge the amount of Argentine air activity. Judging by the number of British naval losses, however, this improvised replacement for an AWAC platform did not function very well.

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[2] The RN's Sea Harriers have been specially adapted to cope with the effects of an ocean environment.

[3] The RN's Sea Harriers have special guidance equipment that eases the hazards of making carrier landings.

- Helicopter operating capabilities (and presumably associated support facilities) were fitted on to many of the civilian ships that sailed south. One estimate put the number of British helicopters with the fleet at 46. The time period required to add helipads was roughly 2-3 days.

- Two container ships, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR and CONTENDER BEZANT, were refitted to deploy Harriers and helicopters (the decks were strengthened). Both ships were refitted within one week. It is unclear whether the Harriers could be supported and armed on ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, the first container ship to be modified. One report indicated that the Harriers would take off from the converted vessel, fly to the carriers for the addition of ordnance, fly the mission, and then land back on the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. Where the extra Harriers were deployed after the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was sunk on 25 May is unclear, since the other refitted container ship, CONTENDER BEZANT, did not leave Britain until 21 May and probably would not have arrived off the Falklands until 7 June or so. It is possible that these Harriers were deployed on air strips at Pebble Island or Goose Green, or were deployed on the carriers after the latters' normal complement of helicopters was stationed on land to ferry troops and supplies.

- The base at Ascension Island was modified to cope with the sudden burst of activity generated by the mobilization. A three-mile oil pipeline was constructed in three days to aid fleet and air fueling, while a de-salination plant was also built on the island to provide fresh water.

- Liners were refitted as troop ships within three days and civilian car ferries were used with minor modifications as roll-on, roll-off ships. British have had plans for many years now to requisition some 300 civilian ships in case of a crisis in Europe; presumably these plans were put into effect for the Falklands mobilization.

- Some twelve civilian oil tankers were requisitioned and refitted with underway replenishment apparatus. Length of time required for refitting is unclear.

- Five fishing trawlers were requisitioned and refitted as minesweepers--apparently, existing RN mine-sweepers(such as the highly sophisticated HUNT class ships) were "unsuitable" for conditions in the Falklands. The RN has had plans for several years now to use the trawlers in this capacity and RN officers train annually to sweep mines with these vessels.

- An oil rig repair ship was refitted as a fleet repair ship. Structural alterations were carried out in Britain, the vessel was sent to Charleston, South Carolina, for "supplies", and then it sailed for the South Atlantic. Overall, the refit took one and one half months.

- The Stingray anti-submarine torpedo was taken out of trials and deployed with the fleet. Previously, the MoD had planned to bring this torpedo into service next year.

- British Aerospace offered to build and containerize a bolt-on Seawolf point defense system to improve fleet air defense. BA stated that system could be ready for shipment to the Falklands within three weeks. No MoD decision was announced.

- The Royal Navy used Army heavy machine guns to help defend the fleet against the Argentine air force. One ship apparently had 18 machine guns capable of firing 24,000 rounds per minute. According to one journalist's account, these machine guns shot down three out of five attacking Skyhawks as these planes made a single pass. The RN is now planning to carry heavy machine guns regularly on board its ships; the guns take up little room and are very flexible weapons.

B. CRISIS TRAINING

One significant aspect of the mobilization and deployment of British forces in the South Atlantic was the rapid training and preparatory exercises that all three Services carried out before engaging in combat. Until March 1982, the British Government had not planned on fighting in the South Atlantic and the minimal warning time did not provide much training time for the artic conditions in the area.[4]

[4] Britain was fortunate in regard to the severe conditions in the South Atlantic in that her navy's regular area of operations is the North Sea, which has similar weather. Further, the Royal Marines train regularly in icy Norway during NATO exercises. Later reports emerging from journalists assigned to the British forces, however, have criticized British Army cold weather gear and stated that Argentine cold weather gear was superior.

- It was reported on 24 April that half of the RN's Sea Harrier pilots previously had no experience in carrier operations. As the task force headed south on 7 April, RN pilots engaged in practice scrambles and landings. On 10 April, the Sea Harrier pilots began training in the use of the unguided rockets, which previously had not been fitted to the Sea Harriers.

- None of the RAF pilots, of course, had any experience in carrier operations. Some RAF "communications personnel" did sail with the fleet and probably transmitted data on naval operations back to the RAF in Britain. Before departing for the South Atlantic, the RAF Harrier pilots practiced ski-ramp takeoffs and landings on land in southern England. The pilots also received instruction on how to use the Sidewinders, which previously had not been fitted on the RAF Harriers, and how to use the rapidly fitted Ferranti rapid alignment inertial guidance system. In early May it seems that RAF Harriers participated in mock dogfights with French Air Force Mirages over the Channel in order to gain experience with the combat characteristics of the Mirages, which were deployed by the Argentines.

- RAF pilots of the Vulcan long-range bomber, which normally only carries nuclear weapons, had to be trained to drop conventional munitions and practice inflight refueling. One report alleged that all of the RAF pilots who had these skills were in retirement; indeed, three Vulcan bombers themselves are in museums!

- Between 24-29 April, RAF Harrier and Jaguar squadrons participated in ground exercises with the Army's 5th Brigade, which was readying itself for combat in the Falklands.

- The above-mentioned exercise, code-named "Operation Welsh Falcon", took place in a region of Wales which was chosen because of its similarity to the terrain in the Falklands. The exercise lasted five days, during which the troops were able to sharpen their combat skills. Further, the exercise enabled the troops, some of whom belonged to different units, to mobilize fully, rectify deficiencies in their equipment and supplies, and then embark together on the QUEEN ELIZABETH II.

- The elements of the 5th Brigade that had been sent ahead of the main force to Ascension Island on chartered 747s and RAF transports were put through similar maneuvers on the island before embarking on CANBERRA for the Falklands. These troops were also used to help load equipment for the task force.

10-12

- RN officers were trained to use trawlers as minesweepers, which were concurrently being refitted. This activity was aided by the fact that RN commanders had trained for several years previously to use trawlers as minesweepers. It is doubtful, however, that the RN had anticipated employing the trawlers in the South Atlantic.

C. STAGED MOBILIZATION: INCREASING THE SPEED OF DEPLOYMENT

Britain has traditionally been a sea power and has enjoyed a rather successful history of exerting maritime power; accordingly, the British Government's example of coordinating its mobilization should be examined closely. Through a relatively subtle series of maneuvers, which we have termed "staged mobilization", Britain was able to increase the speed at which the task force was dispatched while concurrently gaining valuable time to make decisions on resource allocation.

The major air and naval units of the British task force began sailing on April 5, three days after the British Cabinet took the decision to mobilize. The rapid despatch of the task force was aided by the fact that the ships were not completely loaded with all the required supplies. As the main force was steaming at cruising speed to Ascension, the planners and logistical experts in the MoD continued gathering intelligence data[5] and deciding on which weapons and supplies should be given priority. These logistical decision were then implemented and civilian and military air transports began lifting vital supplies to Ascension. Units from the Army Reserve aided in loading the supplies in Britain, while airlifted regular troops helped in offloading the material in Ascension.

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[5] American satellite information was allegedly relayed to the MoD. In addition, recent maps of the Falklands were purchased, while inhabitants and refugees from the islands living in Britain were interviewed.

Meanwhile, the main task force rendezvoused on 9 April with additional warships which had been conducting exercises near Gibraltar before the crisis. The combined battle group then steamed to Ascension, arriving there on 16 April, two weeks after the Argentine invasion. Supplies were lifted to the vessels by boat and helicopter; as the commander of the Ascension support team, Captain R. McQueen, noted:

> It takes a bit of believing now, but with the outstanding cooperation and hard work of all concerned, we were successful. On one day, April 16, there were over 500 helicopter movements and over 100 fixed-wing movements, making it the busiest airport in the world.
>
> It was virtually a day and night operation. I even flew a couple of runs myself.

The overall effect of this staged mobilization was to speed the initial dispatch of the task force, thus placing greater pressure on the Argentines to negotiate to British advantage, while simultaneously providing more time to make difficult planning decisions regarding strategy, tactics, and resource allocation.

Converting the liner UGANDA to a hospital ship and troop transport also provides an interesting example of the advantages of staged mobilization, which served to speed the refitting of the ship. UGANDA was in the Mediterranean on a children's cruise when the Argentines invaded. In previous contingency planning, this vessel had been designated to serve as a troop transport and hospital ship; UGANDA was particularly suited to both roles, since her large dormitory rooms, equipped with many beds, were ideal for both medical work and troop transport.

A team of technicians was flown to UGANDA while the children were unloaded in Italy and as the vessel steamed toward Gibraltar, these experts began refitting the ship to carry troops. When the vessel docked in Gibraltar to be equipped with helipads, much of the refitting work had already been accomplished. Thus the vessel was able to sail at an earlier date than otherwise would have been possible.

D. SORTIE GENERATION RATES

Obviously, the British Government released very little data on the number of sorties its planes flew during the conflict. The following data, however, may be useful.

- During the training exercise, "Operation Welsh Falcon", which was set up to give troops an idea of the terrain in the Falklands, a squadron of Harriers (12 planes) and a squadron of Jaguars (12 planes) were reported to have flown 90 sorties in one day.

- At Ascension Island, 500 helicopter sorties and 100 fixed-wing sorties were generated on one day (April 16).

- One report stated that the first raid on Port Stanley (May 1) was carried out by 16 Sea Harriers, each of which carried either at least two 1000 pound bombs or two BL-755 cluster bombs. At the time, 20 Sea Harriers were on station.

- Sea Harriers reportedly carried out two raids on Port Stanley within 48 hours at the beginning of May.

- Harriers carried out ten raids in total on Port Stanley during the month of May.

- One report stated that two Sea Harriers were stationed on combat air patrol at all times; the planes were recycled every 40 minutes. One television report showed that one Harrier was on the deck of INVINCIBLE at all times with engines running ready to take off immediately. INVINCIBLE had successfully demonstrated this capability during NATO maneuvers in late 1981.

- The Vulcan bombers carried out a total of four raids during the campaign. One bomber was used on each raid, largely because each Vulcan required at least three scarce tankers to support it on the 4500 mile mission. In the first two strikes at the beginning of May, 21 1,000 pound bombs were dropped on the airstrip. In the last two attacks, U.S.-supplied Shrike radiation homing missiles were also used against Argentine ground radar stations near Port Stanley. The first attack was frustrated when the Argentines turned off their radar, but it seems the second attack with the Shrikes was much more successful.

E. SUPPORTING AIR OPERATIONS

Information on the difficulties the British may have encountered in supporting their aircraft and helicopters is almost non-existent, but they appear to have been quite successful in regard to air support. This conclusion is derived from a comparison of losses in the one and a half months of combat, when sortie rates were high, to the losses encountered in twelve months of 1980, when aircraft were normally maintained.

During the Falklands operation, the British lost eight Harriers (three to mechanical failures and five to ground fire) and eleven helicopters.[6] It seems that most of the helicopters were lost due to weather and mechanical troubles rather than ground fire. As a useful comparison, during 1980, the British lost four Harriers and ten helicopters during regular training flights due to mechanical troubles. This relatively low loss rate during the conflict, when sortie rates were high, maintenance difficult, and the weather most inhospitable, would seem to indicate that the British were able to support their aircraft relatively well. Indeed, John Nott, the Secretary of State for

[6] Three Gazelles, two Essex, four Sea Kings, and two Westlands. In addition, a large number of Chinooks were also destroyed when the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was sunk on May 25.

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The Inter-American Peace and Security System

after the Malvinas/Falklands Crisis

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The Inter-American Peace and Security System after the Malvinas/Falklands Crisis

I. INTRODUCTION.

One of the many repercussions of the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands crisis has been the impact the conflict has had on the inter-American relationship and the Inter-American System which is the institutional embodiment of that relationship. Within the Inter-American System there is a subsystem specifically dealing with issues of peace and security which seems particularly vulnerable to criticism and analysis in the wake of the crisis, especially in the eyes of the Latin Americans. To some, the crisis proved that this system merely served the interests of the United States and was impotent when the Latinssought to use it to protect their own interests; it must, they argue, be either done away with or drastically and fundamentally restructured. Others argue that the system simply reflected the confusion and lack of consensus that the Malvinas/Falklands conflict provoked, and that the system is fundamentally sound and will survive this transient crisis as it has others in the past.

This paper will examine the impact of the Anglo-Argentine Malvinas/Falklands crisis on this inter-American peace and security system in terms of:

- the demands made on the system by the crisis, and the responses (individual and collective), as well as the currents at work in the system.
- various interpretations of the crisis.
- the apparent directions in which the system is headed.
- implications for other conflicts and tensions in the Hemisphere.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE AND SECURITY SYSTEM.[1]

At the heart of the inter-American peace and security system lies the Organization of American States and its two principal foundation documents, the OAS Charter of 1948 and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) of 1947. Taken together, they provide a comprehensive set of instruments for conflict resolution and mutual security. The Rio Treaty in particular can be used as a flexible instrument in a variety of situations ranging from an external attack (article 3.1), a dispute between American nations (article 7), or a number of other situations threatening the peace (article 6); available responses run from exhortatory resolutions through diplomatic sanctions (recall of ambassadors, breaking of relations and communications), and finally the use of armed force. On the peace-making side the OAS Charter offers an equally broad spectrum of possibilities for ameliorating conflict through mediation, arbitration and conciliation.

Within the more narrow military-security sphere, the Inter-American System has a number of other multilateral institutions which have been kept somewhat isolated from the Organization of American States:

- an Inter-American Defense Board, located in Washington, which is charged with making recommendations and planning for collective self defense. The Board supervises the operation of a senior war college (the Inter-American Defense College), which is also located in Washington.
- periodical conferences between senior army, navy and air force officers of the Hemisphere.
- multilateral military maneuvers.

Beyond the multilateral instruments of the system lie a series of bilateral arrangements between the United States and most of the remaining Hemisphere nations. These include the military assistance program (equipment, training and advisors), bilateral military maneuvers, personnel exchanges, etc.

A commonly-held perception of this complex of institutions and arrangements for peace and security is that they were set up by the United States and have remained under strong U.S. influence. In particular, the security elements of the system are seen as having a Cold War and anti-Communist tone determined fundamentally by the United States. This view has led to attempts to reform the system in the past, most notably the effort initiated by the Peruvians in the 1970's which sought to address the question of how security was linked to development.

III. THE DEMANDS MADE ON THE SYSTEM AND ITS RESPONSES.

1. Some currents at work (see figure 1).

One of the profoundly disruptive demands made on the system by this crisis was the requirement that it attempt to bridge the gaps between a series of divergent currents within the Organization of American States. The Malvinas/Falklands crisis sharpened some of the existing tensions between these currents in ways harmful to the system's future functioning. Although these currents have always existed within the system, the nature of the Malvinas/Falklands crisis (and the directions in which the Argentines took it) have served to emphasize the differences between these currents. The currents involved include:

- Pan-Hispanism, or "hispanidad": the bonds whichlink those 17 nations (plus Cuba) with a common Spanish heritage. Pan-Hispanism is frequently associated with "Bolivarismo" (the ideas of the Liberator Simón Bolívar), especially when articulated by venezuelans.
- Pan-Latinism, or "latinamericanism", which adds Brazil and Haiti to the above.

• Pan-Americanism, which links together all the nations of the Hemisphere and serves as the foundation for the Inter-American System. It should be noted that Pan-Americanism was strongly pushed by the Unted States when it wished to strengthen the Inter-American System at several points in its history, most notably the System's creation in the late nineteenth Century, the Good Neighbor period, and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy years.

• North Atlantism, which ties the United States and the English-speaking nations of the Hemisphere to Western Europe.

• Third Worldism, by means of which certain nations in the Inter-American System perceive that their interests are best served by association with other Third World nations rather than with the United States in the Pan American thrust. Third Worldism has historically been associated with anticolonialism and "dependencia" analysis, which explains Latin America's underdevelopment in terms of neocolonialist exploitation by the capitalistic developed nations of the world.

The interplay of these currents, and the tensions between them, can be illustrated in a preliminary way at this point. After the taking of the Malvinas/Falklands Islands on 2 April 1982, the Argentines felt that they could count on Pan-American solidarity to support their cause; when the United States chose to back Britain (as did the Anglo-Caribbean nations, by and large), Argentina fell back to a hard core of Pan-Hispanic supporters and then turned increasingly to Third Worldism by employing the anti-colonial theme. One of the somewhat startling outcomes of the crisis has been the strong echo that this anti-colonial thrust



FIGURE 1

has had in Latin America, especially in Venezuela.[2] Although our subsequent analysis will show unevenness and self-serving motivation in this support for Argentina, the depth of this anti-colonial and Third World current (especially when linked to dependency analysis) is a dangerous threat to Pan-Americanism and to the effective continuance of the inter-American peace and security system.

2. Responses to the crisis.

In assessing the Hemisphere nations' responses to the crisis, it should be noted that expressions of support for Argentina were not constant over time, and peaked at key points in the confrontation. Nevertheless, some general observations on the currents for support can be made. The Spanish-speaking nations generally supported Argentina, with shadings of intensity that showed up initially in terms of disapproval of the use of force in taking the islands. Once hostilities began and the United States came down on the side of Great Britain, this support solidified at the rhetorical and diplomatic level behind Argentina. Notable exceptions to this current were Chile, which remained neutral, and Colombia, whose backing for Argentina was always less than enthusiastic. In general, however, "hispanidad" showed up in the form of strong vocal support for Argentina. The Pan-Latin current involved adding Brazil (liitle was heard from Haiti, the only other Latin country). Brazil's support was cautious and pragmatic, to the point of stating (at the moment when she provided three aircraft to Argentina) that she was willing to provide aircraft to both sides. A poll taken in Sao Paolo in late April indicated an almost even split between support for Great Britain and Argentina, with an overwhelming majority calling for Brazil to stay out of the conflict. Two other elements of Brazil's participation need to be noted: Argentina's feeling that Brazil's support was disappointing, and the belief that Brazilian-U.S. bilateral relations were not basically affected by the crisis.

Moving up to the Pan-American level, the United States position of strongly condemning Argentina and supporting Great Britain in late April was a major factor in shaping the impact of the crisis on the Inter-American System. At the Pan-American level a major element was the strong support given to Great Britain by eight of the nine English-speaking Caribbean states in the OAS (Grenada was the exception). Ironically, these states, which would seem to know most about the supposed evils of British colonialism, supported London. Their cohesion in the crisis contributed to a sense of Anglo versus Latin polarization in the OAS; their effectiveness in supporting the United Kingdom and the United States was diminished by the fact that only one of them (Trinidad and Tobago) is a signatory of the Rio Treaty and thus only one of these states could vote in Treaty matters.

As many observers pointed out, the positions taken by individual nations can be linked to specific interests and other possible conflicts:

- the strong support of Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama and Peru to conflicts or strains with Guyana, Belize, the United States and Chile, respectively.
- the neutrality of Chile to historic strains with Argentina.
- the mild support of Colombia and Brazil to strains with Venezuela and Nicaragua in the Colombian case and an historical rivalry with Argentina in the Brazilian case.
- the support of Cuba and Nicaragua to an opportunistic move to diminish United States influence in the Hemisphere and the Inter-American System.

While all of these factors undoubtedly played a part in conditioning national positions in the crisis, they should not obscure other realities:

- the deep-seated resentment at the United States' sudden switch from the role of mediator to strong supporter of Great Britain.
- the feeling that the U.S. was all too willing to jeopardize the inter-American relationship in favor of the North Atlantic one.
- the way resentment at United States actions seemed to act as a lightning rod for other and less focused currents of anti-U.S. feelings.
- the existance of other special considerations, such as Venezuela's desire to put some distance between herself and the United States after a period of close coordination of Central American and Caribbean policies.

3. Actions taken by individual member states.

One measure of the significance of each nation's support for the Argentine cause can be obtained by simply looking at how the rhetorical support was translated (or more accurately, not translated) into measures of real physical or military support for Argentina.

On the military side the myriad of different types of equipment held by the Latin American militaries would argue against effective meshing of other nation's equipment into the Argentine inventory. Nevertheless, some important aircraft types in the Argentine air forces(especially Mirage fighters, Canberra bombers, C-130 Hercules transports, UH-1H helicopters and the Exocet missile) are held also by a number of Latin American nations. It would also have been possible (although difficult) for whole units of other Latin American air forces to have moved to Argentina for direct involvement in combat. Although the logistical and operational differences would have reduced these units' effectiveness, their mere presence would have delivered a strong political and diplomatic message.

South American naval forces have had limited operational contact in UNITAS maneuvers (organized by the United States), as well as in their own bilateral operations and the Inter-American Naval War Games held at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island. Thus, it would have been possible for limited (but highly symbolic) numbers of other South American navy's ships to have assisted the Argentine Navy.

On the ground similar possibilities also existed for units or individual volunteers from various Latin American armies to have gone to the Islands to fight alongside the Argentines. This aspect would have been unusually dramatic in light of the historical precedent of Argentine forces under San Martin who fought for the nineteenth Century independence of Chile and Peru.

Beyond the strictly military support, one can postulate other measures of support for Argentina ranging from economic aid, the providing of oil and fuel, the breaking of diplomatic and economic relations with the United Kingdom and the United States, etc. A highly visible attempt to assist Argentina could also have taken the form of Latin American merchant ships sailing to Port Stanley/ Puerto Argentino to break the British blockade in May and June.

In point of fact, of course, almost none of these things happened -- Latin America's physical support for Argentina, with very few exceptions, never materialized. Venezuela did supply[3] some limited quantities of parts for aircraft and weapons, and did agree to provide Argentina with 10,000 barrels of oil per day. At a 3 May press conference President Herrera Campins was pressed by a newsman for his response if Argentina requested troops, tanks, ships and aircraft; the President avoided a direct answer, noting that Venezuela was not a world power with large quantities of arms at its disposal. Later on in the conference he confirmed that the Malvinas conflict "in no way affected the purchase of U.S. F-16 fighter aircraft."[4]

Rumors of possible Peruvian support focused attention on theimpressive quantities of SU-22 Soviet fighter-bombers in the Peruvian inventory, as well as their Mirages and Canberras. These could have been a significant addition to Argentina's air arm, and might have made a fundamental difference in the outcome of the war. In late April there were reports that some of these Peruvian SU-22 aircraft had in fact been flown to bases in Western Argentina (near the Chilean border). It appeared that this flight was a gesture of military-to-military solidarity taken by Peru's generals without the authorization of President Belaunde Terry. In any case, Argentine lack of familiarity with the Soviet equipment made their value very marginal in Argentine hands, and the planes soon returned to Paru. Other Peruvian actions included a brief boycott of British goods, a refusal to allow British ships or aircraft to use Peruvian ports, and

the supplying of military equipment spares to Argentina.[5]

As noted previously, the Latin American nation which supplied aircraft to Argentina was Brazil, and these were three EMB-111 Bandeirantes suitable for reconnaissance or search and rescue.[6] Other statements of support, which were apparently not taken very seriously by Argentina, included Bolivia's offer to make its fighter planes and airports available, and Guatemala's offer of 350 troops "trained to fight in adverse terrain"[7].

Other indications of the positions the Latin American nations are taking in the inter-American peace and security system as a result of the crisis can be seen in terms of their participation in two of the oldest institutions of inter-American military cooperation:[8]

- only two South American navies (Chile and Colombia) will join the United States in the 1982 UNITAS naval maneuver. This naval exercise has the peculiar characteristic of being strongly controlled by the United States in that a U.S. flotilla sails South along one coast of South America and then North along the other, maneuvering with each South American navy as it goes; thus, it is really a series of U.S.-Latin American nation bilateral maneuvers rather than a multilateral one.

- there appears to be no change in Latin American involvement in either the Inter-American Defense Board or the Inter-American Defense College. Although nominally under strong U.S. guidance, in actuality both of these institutions involve a considerable role for Latin American participants, and there are early indications that some of the Latin American delegations intend to re-orient the thrust of these two institutions in directions more in their interests.

4. Collective actions.

The involvement of the inter-American peace and security system in collective actions in the crisis centers on three Washington meetings of the Organization of American States. Each of these three meetings followed a key event in the conflict, each involved a more intense and emotional debate than the previous one, and each had essentially the same line-up of positions and votes. The three sessions andthe formal resolutions they produced were:

5-13 April - the resolution of concern (13 April) following the 2 April taking of the islands by Argentina and the British decision to send a force to retake the islands.

26-28 April - the resolution of support for Argentine sovereignty, the

call for a truce and withdrawal of the British fleet and fulfillment of United Nations Resolution 502. This meeting was held as the Royal Navy's ships closed in on the area and retook South Georgia (25 April).

28-29 May - the resolution of support for Argentina and the urgent request that the United States halt its aid to the Thatcher Government. This session was held after the British landing at Port San Carlos and during the beginning of the final phase of the retaking of the Malvinas/Falklands.

The first meeting (5-13 April) must also be set against the background of initial euphoria and shock over the Argentine taking of the islands, and initial efforts to resolve the issue peacefully. This was also the period of intense personal involvement of Secretary of State Haig in his London-Buenos Aires-Washington shuttle diplomacy (8-19 April). The OAS met on 5 April to hear Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez but put off any substantive vote during the initial stages of Haig's mission. The 13 April resolution expressed concern over the crisis and offered OAS "friendly cooperation" to the peace efforts in progress. Because this resolution was an OAS Permanent Council action, and not an invocation of the Rio Treaty, all 29 member countries of the OAS could participate, not merely the 21 signatories of the Rio Treaty. Thus, the English-speaking Caribbean nations were able to influence the wording of the resolution and tone down some of the wording which was more favorable to Argentina. This led to behind the scenes accusations that these nations were acting as surrogates for Great Britain, a charge that brought angry denials from the delegate from Trinidad and Tobago.[9]

On the 19th of April, with Haig leaving Argentina on his last attempt at shuttle diplomacy, the Galtieri Government announced that it would invoke the Rio Treaty, despite the strong opposition of Secretary Haig, who argued that the Treaty was not the appropriate vehicle to solve the situation. Despite U.S. objections, the OAS responded to Argentina's request by voting on the 20th of April to hold a special meeting of consultation (the 20th such meeting) under Rio Treaty provisions. The key vote among the 21 Rio Treaty signatories was 18 in favor, none against, and three abstentions (U.S., Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago). The Argentine move to use the Rio Treaty can be seen as an attempt to gain a more favorable forum (by eliminating all the English-speaking Caribbean nations except Trinidad and Tobago) as well as an attempt to pressure the U.S. It was also a counter to United Nations Resolution 502, which was seen in Argentina as unfavorable because it called for withdrawal of Argentine forces. Even within the Rio Treaty framework, there was much caution on the part of Argentina,

since to obtain any of the article 8 sanctions against Great Britain would require a 2/3 majority vote -- a 14 vote majority that would be doubtful at best. Argentina's position was strengthened on the 25th of April when British forces entered the Rio Treaty's geographic security zone and retook South Georgia Island. This event prompted Argentina to invoke article 3 of the Treaty, which states that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States...".

Speaking at the 26 April session, Secretary Haig argued strongly that the best solution to the crisis lay in U.N. Resolution 502. In contrast, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister "deplored" the interference of the United Nations Security Council and proposed the Rio Treaty as the obvious instrument to meet the British attack, since it was an "attack on us all". Other delegations made statements consistent with the national positions indicated previously. The strongest supporters of Argentina, besides Venezuela, were Panama and Nicaragua; several key countries (Brazil, Mexico, Chile) took ambivalent positions, while Colombia strongly criticized Argentina. The speeches of the U.S. delegation (as well as those from the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago) were received with extreme coolness.

Reports from behind the scenes at the session[10] indicate that a number of delegations were not prepared to support article 8 sanctions against Britain, and that the best the Argentines could hope for (to their sharp disappointment) would be general statements of support, with no sanctions. The resolution which emerged on the 28th (by a vote of 17 in favor and four abstentions - U.S., Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Chile) reflected these realities. It was a simple resolution of the 20th Meeting of Consultation, and not an imposition of sanctions. It did support Argentina's claim for sovereignty and deplored the European Economic Community's sanctions; but it also called for fulfillment of U.N. Resolution 502.

One month later, with the British (firmly supported by the U.S.) on East Falkland Island and moving towards Port Stanley, the OAS met again under Rio Treaty procedures. The 27 May session produced perhaps the strongest anti-U.S. rhetoric ever heard at the OAS, with accusations that the United States had abandoned the inter-American system in favor of Great Britain, and that the explanation for this "betrayal" was to be found in joint U.S.-British Anglo-Saxon hostility to Latin America. Despite the bitterness and emotion, the resolution that was approved on 29 May by a vote of 17 to 0 with 4 abstentions (U.S., Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Chile) once again did not involve sanctions. Instead, it called for support to Argentina and an end to U.S. aid to Great Britain, and condemnation of Great Britain for its "unjustified and disproportionate armed attack."

In assessing the significance of these three OAS sessions, two tentative conclusions emerge:

- Argentina was not able to garnerenough support to get Rio Treaty sanctions. Thus, the strong rhetorical support did not carry over into concrete measures against Great Britain.

- The depth of passion and bitterness aimed at the United States suggested that the underlying sentiment was not so much pro-Argentine or anti-British as it was anti-U.S., with troubling implications for the future effectiveness of the OAS.

IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS.

The Malvinas/Falklands crisis produced a wide range of interpretations regarding the impact that it would have on the Inter-American System as well as on U.S.-Latin American relations in general. This section will examine that range of view

1. The pessimistic assessment.

The pessimistic assessment tended to be informed by the more extreme rhetoric and opinion expressed at the heart of the crisis (early May through mid June). Further, those who took this view tended to be strongly influenced by the opinion prevalent in those countries which more bitterly attacked the United States (ie, Argentina, Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba).

Prevalent in the pessimistic assessment was the theme of U.S. "betrayal" of the Hemisphere.[11] The point was frequently made that quiet U.S. sympathy and support for Great Britain was perhaps understandable -- but not when it was preceded by statements of U.S. neutrality and even-handedness and accompanied by gratuitous and vindictive sanctions against Argentina. To some cynical observers, the U.S. mediating effort in April was a deliberate attempt to gain time for Great Britain so as to strengthen her position and allow her then to defeat Argentina decisively; the U.S. would benefit by obtaining a NATO base in the Falklands from which it could dominate the South Atlantic and Antactica.[12]

The feeling of betrayal was excacerbated by the perception that even after years of forging and strengthening the multilateral structures of the Inter-American System (and telling the Latins how important their participation in them was) the United States did not hesitate to sacrifice all of this in favor of its ties to Great Britain. North Atlantism was thus shown to be immensly more important to the United States than Pan Americanism.

These themes were seized upon by many ultra-nationalists and leftists in Latin America as a golden opportunity to stimulate the ever-present wellsprings of anti-U.S. feelings. The concept of a Latin America uniting against a colonialist

Great Britain was broadened to include dependency theory tenets under which the United States was painted as a fellow imperialist exploiter. These currents were reinforced by ideas (forcefully put forward by the Argentine Government in May and early June) that the Malvinas/Falklands struggle was a North-South and Anglo versus Latin fight.

The inter-American peace and security system (and the Rio Treaty as its core) were obvious targets for this bitterness and emotion. Despite the fact that no Treaty sanctions were ever voted, many of Argentina's supporters took the position that the U.S. had violated the Treaty (and thus contributed to the destruction of the system) by resisting the use of the Treaty, abstaining from the key votes, and then not abiding by the terms of the 29 May resolution.

2. The optimistic assessment.

This view tended to discount the more extreme expressions of Latin American opinion, seeing them as rhetorical excesses uttered in the heat of argument and passsion. Much more meaningful, argued the optimists, were the messages being sent through the more dispassionate bilateral channels. The optimists emphasized the lukewarm support offered to Argentina in anything but words, and the growing realization that despite all the emphasis on Latin American solidarity the final arbitrer of each nation's actions was each nation's self-interest.[13]

Even as soon as a month after the fall of Port Stanley, observers concluded that the bitterness of May and June of 1982 was fast fading as bilateral issues, especially ones concerning trade, finance and aid returned to their normal pre-eminent position. Editorial commentary in Latin America in July showed a distinct cooling of the emotions of May and June, coupled with some second thoughts about the wisdom of supporting Argentina; even Argentina was indicating a desire for a return to more normal relations with the United States.[14]

There are even suggestions of a possible "backlash" against Argentina: even at the height of the crisis and at the peak of Latin America's supposed solidarity with Argentina, there was an undercurrent of resentment at Argentina. This was the product of a mix of historic annoyance at Argentines brought about by their poorly-disguised feelings of superiority, and a resentment that Argentina seemed to have created an unnecessary crisis for the Hemisphere without consulting or bothering to consider the long-range consequences. Argentina's new found interest in the Hemisphere and Third World solidarity struck many as being rather thin, and her constant harping on these themes had the potential of becoming rather tiresome and repetitive.

3. A closer look: individual national interests and Latin American solidarity.

Below the surface rhetoric of Latin American solidarity and support for Argentina, it became clear that each nation had individual interests in the outcome of the crisis, and individual reasons for its greater or lesser support. To some nations the crisis provided an opportunity to pursue certain goals or establish a useful precedent; to others it was a threat to national interests. A number of these goals, precedents and interests have been identified in previous sections of this paper, and we have seen how the lack of Latin American consensus prevented Argentina from obtaining greater material support or even a vote for sanctions under the Rio Treaty.

In essence, Latin America as a whole was delivering four messages to Argentina:

- we agree that the Malvinas should be yours.
- we are nervous about the use of force to solve this type of problem.
- we support you morally in your fight against Great Britain.
- we are not willing to get involved in the fight in any way that would hurt us economically or physically.

Understandably, Argentina stressed the first and third messages, rationalized the second, and was forced to accept the fourth.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that the countries which most strongly supported Argentina had their own reasons for doing so which were not related to Latin American solidarity or the justice of Argentina's cause, but rather to the second of the "messages" indicated above. Thus, Venezuela, Panama and Guatemala, each in their own circumstances, must have been influenced by the the relevance of a successful Argentine recovery of territory to their own territorial pretensions. In the other direction Colombia and Chile had good reason to be concerned over the implications of such a precedent. On yet another tack Nicaragua and Grenada (and Cuba from the outside) perceived the crisis as affording an opportunity to diminish the U.S. influence in the inter-American peace and security system, and at the same time diminish the likelihood that the system could be used by the U.S. against them as it had been against Cuba in the 1960's.

All of these considerations suggest the conclusion that the solid Latin American support for Argentina was not particularly deep, except where individual national interests were served by carrying it beyond the rhetoric. A more troubling residual concern is the fact that the issue of U.S. "betrayal" and the resultant weakening of the system remains available to be resurrected in multilateral fora (mainly the OAS) when it serves national interests to do so.

V. THE APPARENT DIRECTION.

Although the details and the specifics are still obscure, it seems obvious that the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands conflict is a significant landmark in the history of the system of Inter-American peace and security. Rather than a simply major event which caused change, the crisis was more of a catalyst for existing trends which became clarified and accelerated as they were joined by new currents emerging from the conflict. As one observer put it[15], the crisis was like a flash of lightning that clearly illuminated a landscape that had previously been only dimly perceived. To draw the analogy further, the lightning flash permitted only a single static view of the system, but told us little about dynamics or directions. The "flash of lightning" did strongly suggest that the old multilateral inter-American peace and security system was seriously weakened by U.S.-Latin American differences as well as by splits between the English and Spanish speaking nations of the system. The crisis seemed to indicate that the multilateral relationships would be changed, that selected bilateral relationships would be strengthened, and that there would be changed roles for the United States, Nicaragua and perhaps Cuba in the Inter-American System.

1. The multilateral relationship.

One apparent target of those unhappy with the existing arrangement has been the body of existing multilateral organs on the inter-American peace and security system. Fairly or unfairly, many of the Latin American nations have strongly criticized the system, and the Rio Treaty as its foundation, as being a creature of the United States and basically a servant of U.S. interests. A related casualty of the crisis has been the romantic-idealistic vision of Panamericanism. This vision, which is the stuff of much of the rhetoric at the OAS, is made up of elements as diverse as the Bolivarian amphictyonic dream, the concept of a "new world" somehow better and purer than the old, the Good Neighbor idea, and the basic underpinnings of the Alliance for Progress. Panamericanism has always been somewhat artificial and stretched to cover the tremendous diversity present in the Hemisphere, but it was an element that helped to hold the system together. To many of the Latin Americans, the main lesson of the Malvinas/Falklands crisis was that the United States did not hesitate to sacrifice Pan Americanism to the stronger bond of North Atlantism, thus revealing that theprior U.S. rhetorical support of Panamericanism was mostly lip service, and leading to feelings of "betrayal" by an unreliable ally.

Two consequences of this feeling are a new sense of realism and a turning to "Latin-only" multilateral channels. In a sense these two elements are contradictory, in that the "Latin only" multilateral channels so far have been characterized by rhetoric as full-blown and unrealistic as that which went along with the old Panamericanism. But if this rhetorical excess subsides and the Latin Americans really do strengthen their own multilateral instruments for peace and security (as well as those in economic, political and cultural areas) the inter-American relationship may be strengthened by a more realistic foundation on Latin American commonalities and a healthy appreciation for the differences with the non-Latin nations of the system.

One valid concern at present involves the weakening of the system's ability to deal with inter-state tensions. For all its faults, the inter-American peace and security system did a respectable job of providing a forum for defusing tensions and for providing peace-making (arbitration, conciliation, negotiation) and peace-keeping (observers, missions, etc). Should this Hemisphere multilateral service decline or disappear, there is grave doubt that a Latin-only multilateral system could effectively replace it.

One other aspect of the multilateral relationship should also be noted: the high probability that Argentina (and her strongest supporters, headed by Venezuela) will use every opportunity to continue to bring up the Malvinas/Falklands issue.[16] Early indications are that she will do this in the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as in the Organization of American States. As noted previously, this may be counterproductive for Argentina if she carries ittoo far (as she probably will) and it creates a backlash of resentment. Constant harping on the issue will also lead to a further disenchantment with multilateral fora on the part of the United States; it will also serve to deepen the polarization between the Spanish-speaking nations and the English-speaking ones in the system.

2. <u>The bilateral relationships.</u>

A probable by-product of the crisis is the strengthening of Latin American bilateral or subregional peace and security arrangements if the Hemisphere system declines in strength and effectiveness. These bilateral and subregional arrangements have always existed, but in the past they have been very much submerged by the U.S.-Latin American bilateral and by the inter-American multilateral peace and security relationships. The rise in the strength of these Latin American bilaterals or subregional arrangements would be the logical consequence of Latin distrust of the United States and of the perceived excessive U.S. influence in the Hemisphere system.

Some of the possible subregional arrangements might include:

- a Southern Cone security apparatus based on an Argentine-Brazilian condominium and influence over the buffer states of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.

- a Caribbean security arrangement under strong Venezuelan influence.

- an English-speaking Caribbean security arrangement which would be something of a counter to the latter.[17]

At another level, the decline of the inter-American peace and security system may stimulate the ambitions of individual Latin American nations which would attempt to create their own spheres of influence around a series of bilateral security arrangements with their neighbors. The three most obvious candidates for this role are:

- Brazil, which sees the unfortunate decline of the U.S. strategic presence as a vacuum which should be filled. Brazil's own sense of continental destiny, linked to her impressive arms industry, make her a strong candidate for this type of a role.

- Venezuela, which is emerging as an increasingly vocal critic of the U.S., as she steadily increases her own influence in the region.

- Argentina, which has always seen herself as a Hemisphere leader, and which may feel that its "sacrifices" during the South Atlantic war give it a special claim to this type of post-Malvinas leadership.[18]

Either of these two types of developments (bilateral or subregional) would further weaken and fragment the inter-American peace and security system and introduce a sphere of influence and power politics texture into Hemisphere relationships, and raise the specter of an increased probability of conflict between the different power centers.

3. A redefined role for the United States.

Implicit in all these considerations is the notion that the post-Malvinas role of the United States in the inter-American peace and security system will be redefined. This will obviously be a by-product of the on-going reassessment of U.S.-Latin American relations in general, but some specific aspects will be considered below.

The U.S. role in the inter-American peace and security system has actually been in a slow and steady decline since it peaked at the height of the counter-insurgency thrust in the mid-1960's. This decline is both a result of the overall drop in the historic U.S. influence in the Hemisphere as well as the increase in the independence and maturity of the Latin American nations.

One increasingly evident conclusion is that the inter-American peace and security system is no longer available to the United States for its own narrow purposes. The employment of the system as an anti-Castro weapon or a fig leaf for U.S. intervention (as in the Dominican Republic in 1965) is highly unlikely in today's climate. The Latin bitterness over U.S. reluctance to employ the Rio Treaty in the Malvinas/Falklands crisis implies that any future use of the Treaty will be possible only if the Latins clearly see that it is in their own interest.

Faced with the reality of a decreasingly effective multilateral fora, coupled with the probability of harassment in the OAS, it seems likely that part of the redefined U.S. approach will be to increase the emphasis and priority given to bilateral security arrangements. With the obvious exception of Argentina, most of these bilateral arrangements have been only marginally affected by the Malvinas/Falklands crisis, and some (Colombia, Chile, English-speaking Caribbean) have been strengthened.

Still undefined is the role of the United States in the multilateral military organizations of the Hemisphere. As we have noted, the Latin American participation in the annual naval maneuver (UNITAS) is sharply down. Participation in the Inter-American Defense Board and College is not down (it has in fact increased in the College), but preliminary indications are that the Argentines and the Venezuelans intend to give these organizations new directions. Yet to be seen is the impact of the crisis on the bi-annual conferences of Chiefs of American Armies, Navies and Air Forces, and on U.S. training activities in Panama.

4. Openings for Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

During the peak of the crisis in May and June there was much speculation that the strains within the Inter-American System were providing opportunities for Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union. One immediate result was the end of any U.S.-Argentine cooperation in Central America. Although there were reports that Argentine advisors remained in Central America over the summer, they were there in Argentina's interests and not as part of any support to U.S. goals.

Nicaragua participated in the OAS debates as a full member of the Rio Treaty. This provided multiple opportunities for Nicaraguan diplomats (most notably Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto) to stress Nicaraguan support of Latin American solidarity and strongly criticize the United States. A consistent theme in this connection was that the U.S. had historically exploited the OAS for its own ends, and that the present crisis would lead the Latin American nations to create a new organization which excluded the United States.

For Cuba the crisis represented a chance to reduce her isolation, attack the U.S., and wellcome several important Latin American nations as more active participants in the Non-Aligned Movement. Both Fidel Castro and Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez took public note of the way the crisis had helped Cuba by including her in the Latin American solidarity movement against Great Britain and the United States.[19]

The Soviet Union maintained a cautious attitude during the conflict, supporting Argentina and attacking Great Britain and the United States. Apart from the propaganda benefits, the Soviets were obviously interested in protecting their trade agreements with Argentina and guaranteeing the flow of Argentine grain and meat on advantageous terms. Soviet offers of military equipment (especially aircraft) in exchange for these agricultural products have been resisted by the Argentines.[20]

5. The Latin American push to reform the Inter-American System.

During the conflict there was much talk of creating an "OAS without the U.S.", of abrogating or revising the Rio Treaty, or of moving the Permanent Secretariat of the OAS from Washington to reduce U.S. influence (Panama, San José and Caracas were mentioned as possibilities).[21] The end of the fighting in mid June brought a distinct toning down of the more radical proposals, and their proponents found themselves somewhat isolated. A symptom of this isolation was the fate of Panamanian President Aristides Royo, who was deposed supposedly because of his excessive zeal in calling for a Latin American conference which would exclude the U.S.[22]

Somewhat less dramatic were proposals to move subordinate OAS organs out of Washington in order to diminish the perceived excessive U.S. influence. Of particular interest to the inter-American peace and security system was the Venezuelan offer to move the Inter-American Defense Board and College to Caracas, which would have the effect of replacing the U.S. officers presently holding key positions with Venezuelan ones. As with the case of the "Latin only" OAS, there now seems little likelihood that this type of proposal would receive enough support to become a real possibility.[23]

It is much more likely that the Latin American frustration over the Falklands/Malvinas conflict will be channelled into a strong movement to review and revise the Inter-American System and the peace and security elements in particular, with a principal focus on the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter. The advocates of fundamental revision of the Treaty or Charter would be well advised to consider the last attempt at such a revision, which was initiated by the reformist military

regime in Peru in the late 1960's and bogged down in bureaucratic red tape and differences of opinion; the Charter revision never was signed, and the Rio Treaty revision of 1975 has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of states to make it come into force.[24]

Whether or not formal revisions are ever completed, it seems clear that Latin American positions in the Inter-American System are more likely to be coordinated on a "Latin only" or "Latin bilateral" basis than in the past. One vehicle for this coordinating process is already in place: the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA). Located in Caracas (and including Cuba), it is a strong candidate to be this coordinating instrument, either by informally broadening its mandate to include political, military and security issues, or by spawning a separate organization to deal with these issues. Any such increase in the activities of SELA will most likely have strong links to the Non-Aligned Movement and to coordination with other Third World organizations; it will also come under considerable Venezuelan influence.[25]

The term most frequently heard in connection with this thrust is the need to counter "colonialism", with special emphasis on "British colonialism", but also including "U.S. colonialism and imperialism". This terminology suggests that this movement may be a surrogate for some of the previous dependency theory currents which focused on the ways in which the United States has exploited Latin America for its own economic and strategic purposes.

One of the problems faced by advocates of radical or even modest reforms in the Inter-American System is that a number of key countries have not expressed very much enthusiasm for this type of change; countries in this category include Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and most of the English-speaking Caribbean nations. As might be expected, the United States has taken a similar position, arguing that the crisis shows a need for better communication and understanding so as to avoid miscalculations, but that no fundamental system changes are needed.

6. Some emerging models for the System.

These considerations suggest that the Inter-American System is going through a transition away from the historic hegemonic-association model in which the United States exercised considerable influence and maintained the System's cohesion around the association of the Panamerican ideal.

Three system models can be suggested as ones which might emerge:

- a bipolar one in which the system coalesces around two poles -- the U.S. and Latin America, or the English-speaking nations and the Latin American ones.

• a multipolar model, with a number of subregional power centers.

• a fragmented model , representing a more complete breakeup of the historic Inter-American System.

The challenge to the statesmen of the System in the immediate future is to achieve the transition to a rational multipolar model which sustains the System without fragmenting or polarizing in ways that would damage the System.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a more detailed description, see the author's Unequal Alliance: the Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Westview, 1980), and "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System" in Military Review, vol LX, no 10, October 1980. A recent assessment of the system's ability to deal with current problems of peace and security is found in Governance in the Western Hemisphere (The Aspen Institute, 1982).

[2]Washington Post, 24 May and 28 April 1982. Times of the Americas, 7 July 1982.

[3]Washington Post, 1 Aug 1982. Christian Science Monitor, 27 May 1982.

[4]Caracas Domestic Service, 3 May 82 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 4 May 82.

[5]Washington Post, 29 Apr 82 and 10 Jun 82. Christian Science Monitor, 27 May 82. O Estado de Sao Paolo, 27 Apr 82 in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), 4 May 82.

[6]Jornal do Brasil, 24 Apr 82 in FBIS, 26 Apr 82.

[7]AFP, 13 Apr 82 in FBIS, 14 Apr 82. AFP, 16 Jun 82 in FBIS 16 Jun 82.

[8]Washington Post, 4 Jun 82. Chicago Tribune, 30 Jun 82. Personal observation.

[9]New York Times, 14 Apr 82.

[10]See, for example, New York Times and Washington Post, 27, 28, 29 Apr 82. Also see Asst Secretary of State Thomas Enders' speech of 21 Jun 82 (State Department Current Policy #407).

[11]"Betrayed by the U.S." by Robert D. Bond in Washington Post (Outlook), 30 May 8 Also "U.S. Support for Britain leave Latin allies feeling betrayed", Washington Post, 9 May 82.

[12]See Foreign Minister Costa Mendes' statements in Havana as reported on Havana Domestic TV Service, 4 Jun 82 in FBIS, 4 Jun 82.

[13]See New York Times editorial, 3 Jun 82, "Weep not for the Americas". Also Christian Science Monitor, 14 May 82.

[14]Christian Science Monitor, 13 Jul 82. Washington Post, 7 Jul 82.

[15]Governance in the Western Hemisphere, The Aspen Institute, 1982.

[16]See, for example, the remarks made by Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas on Buenos Aires TV, 2 Jul 82 in FBIS, 6 Jul 82.

[17]Port of Spain Sunday Guardian, 11 Apr 82, in JPRS, 11 May 82.

[18]Convicción (Buenos Aires), 25 Apr 82, in JPRS, 28 May 82.

[19]Washington Post, 21 Jun 82. New York Times, 5, 7 Jun 82. EFE (Madrid), 3 Jul 82 in FBIS 7 Jul 82. Castro interview in L'Unita (Rome), 6 Jun 82 in FBIS, 11 Jun 82.

[20]New York Times, 13 May 82, 3 Jun 82, 15 Jun 82. Washington Times, 14 Jul 8

[21]Baltimore Sun, 26 May 82. EFE (Caracas), 4 May 82 in FBIS 5 May 82. Prensa Libre, 8 May 82 in FBIS, 25 May 82.

[22]Washington Post, 1 Jul 82. Washington Times, 2 Aug 82. Baltimore Sun, 4 Aug 82.

[23]La Nación (San José), 8 May 82 in JPRS, 25 May 82. Panama RPC TV (Illueca interview), 20 Apr 82 in FBIS, 22 Apr 82. TELAM (Buenos Aires), 4 May 82 in FBIS 5 May 82.

[24]LATIN, 1 May 82 in FBIS 3 May 82. TELAM (Lima), 7 Jul 82 in FBIS 9 Jul 82. ACAN (Panama), 17 Jun 82 in JPRS, 2 Jul 82. Ecuador Radio (Quito), 16 Jul 82 in FBIS 19 Jul 82.

[25]Caracas Radio Continente, 2 Jul 82 in FBIS 6 Jul 82. LATIN (Buenos Aires), 19 Jul 82 in FBIS, 21 Jul 82.

Appendix: Countries with territorial disputes; their position on the Malvinas/Falklands crisis and the significance of the precedent.

Country	Support for Argentina	Dispute with	Would the nation's position in the dispute be strengthened by the precedent of Argentine success in the Malvinas/Falklands?
Chile	Minimal	Argentina (Beagle Channel)	No
		Peru (War of Pacific)	No
Peru	Strong	Chile (War of Pacific)	Yes
		Ecuador (Amazon)	No
Ecuador	Strong	Peru (Amazon)	Yes
Venezuela	Very strong	Guyana (Essequibo)	Yes
		Colombia (Gulf of Ven.)	Possibly
Guyana	None	Venezuela (Essequibo)	No
Colombia	Weak	Venezuela (Gulf of Ven.)	No
		Nicaragua (Islands)	No
Guatemala	Strong	Belize	Yes
Belize	None	Guatemala	No
Nicaragua	Very strong	Colombia (Islands)	Yes
Panama	Strong	U.S. (Treaty implementation)	Yes
U.S.	None	Panama (Treaty implementation)	No

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Appendix: Economic Considerations

1. General.

The Argentine economy, which was in trouble before the 2nd of April (but received some artificial stimulus during the conflict) is now beginning to feel the full brunt of the cost of the war. Beyond the direct economic impact is the more profound problem of a national lack of confidence in the government and of a general feeling of malaise and self-doubt among Argentines. Still to be felt is the impact of probable major arms purchases to replace the significant war losses (up to 40% of the best fighter aircraft). This appendix will evaluate some economic considerations of the conflict, with a principal focus on Argentina and some attention to the implications for regional trade and investment.

2. The economic picture at the outset (late March 1982).

Dominating other economic considerations was Argentina's overwhelming external debt of some $32 billion, of which $20 billion was public sector debt; Argentina owed $5.8 billion to British banks alone. The specter of default was definitely a concern in April when it appeared that Argentina might refuse to service its British debts as a retaliatory measure (it eventually put service payments into an escrow account). However, any move to push Argentina into default would hurt all concerned because of the elaborate system of cross-default clauses, and this eventuality was carefully avoided in the hopes that the conflict would be a short one and that financial normalcy would be quickly restored (see Fig A-1).

The trade panorama (see Fig A-2) showed that Argentina had rather diversified trading partners: Latin America (mainly Brazil), the U.S., the European Economic Community and the Soviet Union. The grain and meat exports to the USSR



Figure A-1
Source: The Economist, 10 April 1982

Argentina's trading partners*

	Percentage of total exports	Percentage of total imports
United States	8.4	22.5
Japan	4.8	9.5
Europe	31.4	36.1
EEC	27.6	28.1
UK	2.8	3.4
France	2.7	4.0
West Germany	6.8	10.9
Italy	5.5	6.1
Soviet Union	15.0	0.1
Comecon (exc. USSR)	3.0	0.5
Latin America	26.0	18.6
Brazil	12.5	8.2

* 1980 figures; geographical breakdowns are not yet available for 1981. It is clear, however, that the proportion of Argentine exports going to the Soviet Union rose to approximately 34 per cent.
Source: Directory of Trade Statistics, IMF

Figure A-2
Source: Latin American Weekly Report, 23 April 1982

gave Argentina some flexibility and immunity to sanctions since these sales generated about $2.4 billion over the last year.[1]

United States corporations (about 200 in all) had considerable investments in Argentina -- some $2.4 billion, which represented a doubling since the mid-1970's. U.S. banks held a total of some $9.2 billion in public and private sector loans to Argentina, a sum which represented a dramatic increase from the $1.7 billion level in 1975.[2] (See Figure A-3).



Figure A-3
Source: New York Times, 28 April 1982

Prior to the war, and since coming to power in December 1981, the Galtieri junta had been supporting a monetarist policy pushed by Economy Minister Roberto Aleman which aimed at reducing state interference in the economy and at encouraging foreign investment, controlling inflation and reducing protective tariff barriers. His efforts were having modest success in reducing the inflation rate of 131%.

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3. The initial impact of the war (from 2 April to the U.S. sanctions, 30 April).

The initial direct cost of the invasion up to the imposition of U.S. sanctions (30 April) and the first real fighting (1 May) was not unmanageably high for the Argentine economy: the official figure was $200 million, with private estimates of 2½ times that figure; it was believed that the day-to-day cost of supplying and fortifying the Argentine forces on the Islands was running about $500,000 per day. But there were signs that the Argentine economy was dangerously incapable of sustaining the costs of a protracted shooting war: the industrial sector was operating at a very low capacity (estimates ranged from 40% to 55%), unemployment was a high 13% (with underemployment at perhaps 40%), and large numbers of depositors were withdrawing savings and desperately attempting to convert them to dollars. The pressure on the peso pushed the black market rate up to 20,000 to the dollar in comparison with the official rate of 11,700 (up from 2,000 in early 1981).[3]

4. The sanctions[4]

Most observers agree that the impact of the sanctions (EEC in early April, U.S. in late April) was more political and symbolic than economic. This was clearly true for the U.S. sanctions, which involved relatively small dollar amounts of military sales, Ex-Import Bank loans, and Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees. The potentially more serious impact of the EEC economic sanctions was diluted by an ingenious series of maneuvers involving triangulation of sales through third countries, new customers (Iran, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru), the reduction of imports of consumer goods, and other means. Despite these ameliorating circumstances, an Argentine Foreign Trade official estimated in early April that the net cost to Argentina of the sanctions was in the range of $1 billion.

5. The 5 May "economic package".

Argentina's economic situation deteriorated rapidly in late April and early May. The Junta increasingly abandoned Minister Aleman's monetarist policies as demands for military spending ballooned. The end results were a devastating mix of recession, high interest rates, hyperinflation and loss of public confidence. To counter this situation Mr Aleman instituted an emergency economic package in early May. These measures were aimed at increasing exports and foreign currency reserves, and included a devaluation of the peso (to 14,000/dollar), a raise in taxes on gasoline, cigarrettes and alcohol, and tax incentives for exporters.[5]

6. The search for arms: I- during the war.

As the fighting intensified in May and early June, so did the Argentine military's almost desperate search for weapons, ammunition and spare parts. With traditional U.S. and West European government sources closed off, Argentina had to turn to increasingly expensive sources, including black marketeers. Governmental sources reportedly included several Latin American nations (most notably Venezuela and Peru), Libya and Israel. In the special case of the Exocet (the anti-ship missile which sank the HMS Sheffield) the asking price was said to have risen from $200,000 to $1 million per copy. Argentine efforts also focused on speeding up the output from their own arms industry, especially the supply of ammunition, bombs, and the Pucará light fighter. The problems with sources provoked speculation that the Soviet Union might make an extremely attractive offer of weapons (especially aircraft) in exchange for wheat and meat.[6]

7. The economic situation as the war ended (15 June).

The 5 May emergency economic package did not succeed in controlling inflation or in generating sufficient revenues to cover the costs of the war. By early June Argentine losses in planes, heavy weapons and ships (excluding the ancient cruiser ARA Belgrano, lost in early May) were estimated at $700 million, with another $150 million spent on fuel, ammunition and other areas.

The foreign debt had risen to $35.6 billion, and was generally being serviced with only slight delays (exculding payment to British banks, which went into the escrow account). Argentina's economic situation was helped by record grain exports, along with substantial crops of sunflower seed, sorghum and soybeans. The longer range economic prospects for these agricultural exports was clouded by the fact that the USSR (by far the biggest purchaser of Argentine grain with %77 of the total) was holding off on new contracts, apparently hoping for either a barter arrangement with Argentina or favorable credit terms from the U.S. for its own whe Argentina was able to diversify wheat sales by exporting to Iran, Taiwan, Japan and Venezuela, but the overall grim external debt picture raised the need to seek rescheduling or emergency loans from the IMF in early June.[7]

8. The search for arms: II- post-war.

The rapid collapse and surrender of Argentine forces in mid June brought with it the loss of large quantities of military vehicles, weapons and ammunition on the Malvinas/Falklands islands. These included 3 Exocet missiles, surface to air missile systems, two complete radar systems, numerous aircraft, 14 helicopter

more than 100 vehicles, 12 armored cars, and uncounted quantities of small arms and ammunition.[8]

The major loss, however, was in ships and aircraft. While the Argentine Navy could presumably delay replacing the cruiser Belgrano and the submarine Santa Fé, Argentina's military leaders keenly felt the need to maintain their credibility by quickly replacing the 34 fighters and bombers (about 40% of the most modern portion of their inventory). This felt need for credibility was linked to their position that they had "lost a battle but not the war, which still continued". The geography of the situation (over 400 miles of empty water from mainland Argentine bases to the Falklands/Malvinas) required new and high-performance aircraft with substantially greater ranges and capabilities than those of the older A-4 Skyhawks and the Mirage IIIs and Daggers (the Israeli version of the Mirage). Appropriate aircraft are Mig 23 or 25 (Soviet), U.S. F-15 and F-16, and advanced Mirage 2000's. These are exceedingly expensive aircraft, with costs running from $15-25 million per copy. U.S. aircraft sales to Argentina are clearly out of the question for the time being; the best prospects appear to be the French or the French in combination with the Israelis (the French lifted their ban on arms to Argentina in early August).

Supplies of other arms and equipment may come from Western European nations and possibly Brazil. Arms from Brazil would symbolize a radical departure from past Argentine-Brazilian coolness, but the possibility has been made more likely by Brazil's support for Argentina, which included three Bandeirante aircraft.[9]

9. The post-war economic panorama.

In the period of a few short months Argentina has gone from national euphoria, patriotism and unity to malaise, depression and uncertainty. The economic situation contributed significantly to this national loss of confidence, and was described by the new (1 July) Economic Minister José María Dagnino Pastore as being in "an unprecedented state of destruction". More than the direct cost of the war, the chaos stemmed from distrust, confusion, and the sharp move away from Aleman's free market monetarist approach to greater government controls, statism, and currency and import restrictions.

The inflation rate was up to 125% (and actually reached annual rates of over 500% for brief periods), and the black market dollar sold for 65,000 pesos, prompting additional official devaluations. Argentina began to fall behind on external debt servicing; an estimated $15 billion must be covered in the remainder

of the year, with hard currency reserves of less than $3.5 billion. The officially acknowledged external debt was $37 billion, but other sources indicated that it was as much as $40 billion.[10]

It seems clear that Argentina must continue to export large quantities of grain and meat to bring her foreign debt down to manageable levels. If the Soviet Union significantly shifts purchases back to the United States on a long-term basis, Argentina will be hard-pressed to continue to develop the alternate markets she began to find during the crisis; the gap will be hard to fill. This effort will involve some new and highly diverse trading partners: Iran, Israel (attractive because of her important arms industry) and the Arab nations (important because of the banking and financial implications and because of their need for foodstuffs).[11]

Latin America will be another major area of attention in this search for new Argentine markets. Venezuela and Brazil both purchased quantities of sorghum and soybeans during the conflict, and Argentina will presumably continue to try to develop this type of market. There were some indications towards the end of the conflict that other Latin American nations, either individually or collectively (through SELA or the Andean Pact) were organizing their efforts to assist Argentina, but few concrete results are evident.

Some observers, in noting the exposure of U.S. banks and corporations in Argentina, and their uneasy reaction to that exposure, have predicted that the Malvinas/Falklands experience will cause these banks and corporations to be more cautious in other Latin American nations in the immediate future. The exposure is also considerable in Brazil and Mexico, and while there is no parallel between the Argentine situation and that in these or other Latin American nations, there is a sentiment that the Malvinas/Falklands experience was an unsettling and perhaps repeatable one. Thus, the loss of banking and investment confidence in the area as a whole may be yet one more price of this unhappy episode.

The abrupt resignation of Economic Minister Dignone Pastore in late August (after only 54 days on the job) indicates that the Argentine military regime has still not come up with any satisfactory or coherent answers to the economic crisis, and that the prsent period of uncertainty, low productivity and hyperinflation will continue. In late August the government was under increasing pressure from both the need to service or reschedule the external debt (with politically dangerous IMF austerity requirements) and the need to pacify labor's demands for a major wage increase to offset the effects of inflation.

Footnotes - Economic Considerations (Appendix)

[1]Economist, 10 April 82, p 26.

[2]New York Times, 28 April 82, p B-1.

[3]America, 8 May 82. Business Week, 26 Apr 82. Washington Post, 24 Apr 82. Economist, 24 Apr 82.

[4]Washington Post, 6 Jun 82, p A-1. Buenos Aires Herald, 2 Aug 82 in FBIS, 4 Aug 82.

[5]Washington Post, 6 May 82. New York Times, 12 May 82.

[6]New York Times, 10 May 82, 6 June 82. Newsweek, 14 Jun 82.

[7]Business Week, 7 Jun 82.

[8]Washington Post, 24 Jun 82.

[9]New York Times, 10 Jul 82, 10 Aug 82. Washington Times, 30 Jun 82. Washington Post, 27 Jul 82.

[10]New York Times, 12 Jul 82. Washington Post, 7 Jul 82, 5 Aug 82. Financiero (Mexico), 23 Aug 82.

[11]Latin American Weekly Report, 28 May 82, 2 Jul 82, 23 Jul 82, 6 Aug 82.

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Lawrence Freedman

THE WAR OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 1982

IV

The War of the Falkland Islands began with a successful invasion by Argentine forces on April 2, 1982, and ended with their surrender to British forces ten weeks later. It was a textbook example of a limited war—limited in time, in location, in objectives and in means. Care was taken when it came to the treatment of civilians and prisoners and only in the later stages did noncombatants get caught in the fighting. The military casualties were severe—800 to 1,000 Argentine and 250 British dead—but still only a small proportion of the forces committed.

In the character of the military operations, the clarity of the issues at stake and the unambiguous outcome, it was a curiously old-fashioned war. We have become used to wars of political complexity and strategic confusion. Such modern dramas were underway in the Middle East and Central America in 1982, compared with which the Falklands War came and went like something from the Victorian stage: a simple plot, a small but well-defined cast of characters, a story in three acts with a clear beginning, middle and end, and a straightforward conclusion that everybody could understand.

The limited and old-fashioned nature of the war should caution against trying to draw too much of wider significance out of the experience. Nevertheless, in an age of rapid technological development without regular opportunities to assess the current state of the military art, the details of any war will be picked over by those anxious for guidance on how to prepare for future conflicts. Professional observers expected much from this conflict: two belligerents capable of using advanced military technology properly and, there was reason to believe, the first major sea battles since 1945.

The search is therefore already underway for the lessons of the war. This article is concerned with that search, largely with the objective of encouraging a move away from a narrow preoccupation with the performance of individual items of hardware. My argument is that if there are lessons to be learned, they lie in recognizing that factors neglected in formal presentations of a military balance are often decisive. Britain's victory was only partly based on superior equipment. It depended much more on the professionalism and tactical skill of its forces, and on political conditions, at home and abroad, which allowed the government to prosecute the war in a determined and consistent manner.

The following account of the war is in some ways premature. Evidence is still being collated on key operations. Official secrecy obscures details of decision-making in London and some perplexing mysteries of the campaign. No Argentine sources have been used, so readers should be warned that this is very much a British version of events, though I have tried to be detached.

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Lastly, there is no attempt to judge the rights and wrongs of the dispute or to analyze fully the diplomatic side of the conflict, except insofar as it was relevant to the military side.

II

If initially it was difficult to take the conflict seriously, this was because of the unprepossessing nature of the territory at its heart. Nations are expected to go to war over something more than a collection of islands in an inaccessible and inclement part of the South Atlantic.

The islands consist largely of hilly grasslands and shrubs, few trees and barely 60 miles of roads. In addition to over 100 islands in the main group there are also a number of dependencies including South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The population of 1,800 would be barely sufficient to warrant one representative at the lowest level of local government in Britain. The economy was once based on whales and is now based on sheep. There have been rumors of exploitable resources, including oil, in the surrounding waters but, along with the rest of the islands' economic potential, exploitation has been rendered difficult by the persistent dispute over their future between the islands' closest neighbor, Argentina, and their owner, Great Britain.

The dispute's history goes back to the late eighteenth century, when control of the islands passed between Britain and Spain. In 1771 Britain reoccupied West Falkland (having been thrown off by Spain the year before) and it is claimed that Spain then recognized British sovereignty. However, a few years later Spain was back, following a British withdrawal. When Spanish rule in Latin America came to an end, Spain abandoned the Falklands (in 1811). They were occupied by the Government of Buenos Aires for the United Provinces, the forerunner of Argentina, in 1820 and sovereignty was officially claimed in 1829. Britain, which had never renounced its own claim, protested and at the start of 1833 expelled Argentine forces. Since then Britain has maintained a presence. The dependencies have a separate history, with British sovereignty on more certain ground.

Argentina never forgave Britain for this reoccupation, which marred otherwise friendly relations between the two countries. It revived its claim in 1945. In 1965, after much Argentine lobbying, the United Nations urged the two countries to sort out the dispute, "bearing in mind . . . the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)."

The question of the interests of the local population dogged the negotiations from the start. As with practically all of the residue of its Empire, Britain has found itself holding on to colonies against its better judgment because of the strong preference of the colonized for British rule as against the most likely alternatives. The islanders have always shown a marked antipathy to Argentina. The principle of self-determination could therefore be interpreted to rule out any transfer of sovereignty. Argentina, on the other hand, argued that the islanders were not necessarily the best judge of their own interests.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office view came to be that the logic of the situation favored Argentina. However, the stubbornness of the islanders, fortified by supporters in the House of Commons, made it impossible to concede the point of principle to Argentina. Yet Britain was not willing to devote resources to the islands because it could not share the population's hope of a long-term future under the British flag. The compromise was an

attempt to show good faith in negotiations and push the islanders as gently as possible into cooperation with Argentina, for example by making them dependent on Argentina for communication with the outside world. No special provision was made for the islanders in the British Nationality Act of 1981, which limited citizenship rights in British dependencies; thus many suffered a loss of "Britishness."

By 1980 this compromise had gone about as far as it could go. In that year a junior Foreign Office Minister, Nicholas Ridley, became convinced that the Islands would decline into non-viability unless some settlement were reached with Argentina. The option he favored was to transfer sovereignty of the islands to Argentina but then lease them back. Unfortunately he was not supported in the relevant Cabinet committee. This has been one of those issues where backbench sentiment exceeds ministerial interest. Mr. Ridley was given no mandate to solve the issue by the lease-back method or to give anything away to Argentina. When he visited the islands all he could do was consult over alternative options and acknowledge the local preference for freezing the status quo. When he returned to Parliament the general feeling was that he had no business even suggesting that there were options other than the status quo. Thus when he went back to talk with Argentine representatives he had nothing to offer.

British policy had got dangerously out of kilter. There was a lack of political will in London either to solve the dispute once and for all in some deal with Buenos Aires or else to accept full responsibility for the long-term security and prosperity of the islands. This became evident in June 1981 when it was decided to scrap the ice-patrol ship HMS *Endurance*. This ship, although sparsely armed, constituted the sole regular British naval presence in the South Atlantic and had taken on a symbolic importance far beyond its military capabilities. The Royal Navy had never attached a high priority to its preservation, offering it as a sacrifice when cuts were sought. If the government found the Navy's suggestions for cuts politically unacceptable, then it was unreasonable to cut elsewhere. In 1981 the Ministry of Defence was determined to reduce naval capabilities even if this meant letting HMS *Endurance* go. The Foreign Office warned that this could well be misread in Buenos Aires. This left a garrison of some 70 Royal Marines to deter Argentina from attempting to retake the Falkland Islands by force.

III

Britain now could offer neither compromise to Argentina nor a credible long-term commitment to the Falkland Islands. The only negotiating position left was prevarication. Talks with Argentina in February 1982 produced some agreement on negotiating procedures. British participants appear to have been misled by the accommodating behavior of their Argentine counterparts into believing that matters had not quite reached a head. Unfortunately the feeling in Buenos Aires was quite different.

Prior to April 1982 most people in Britain could not have found the Falkland Islands on a map. Argentines learn from childhood about Las Malvinas. By 1982, patience had run out with Britain. The 150th anniversary in January 1983 of the British seizure of the islands appeared as a sort of deadline. The government of General Leopoldo Galtieri, which had come to power in December 1980, had the issue high on its agenda.

It has been suggested that General Galtieri saw the invasion essentially as

a distraction to take his people's minds off political repression and economic calamity. The invasion certainly improved, albeit temporarily, the regime's popularity. But the timing was also determined by international conditions that looked as conducive to invasion as they were ever likely to be. Argentina's links with both superpowers were in good repair. In Washington, the Galtieri regime was judged to represent the acceptable face of military dictatorship. Cooperation was developing on the support of other right-wing regimes in Central America. The Soviet Union had reason to be grateful for supplies of grain at a time of American embargo. The hope was that Washington would not be too cross if Las Malvinas were retrieved, while the Soviet Union would veto any strong action in the U.N. Security Council. As for Britain, it had managed to convey the impression of intransigence in negotiations on the principle of sovereignty but no real interest in holding on to the islands.

All these assumptions turned out to be overoptimistic. The crucial mistake concerned Britain. It may be that the underestimation was not so much of British anger and readiness to take up the challenge as of its actual capacity to retake the islands by military means. The timing of the Argentine invasion indicates a lack of concern for minimizing Britain's ability to respond. Much of the British fleet was home for Easter, which facilitated the rapid assembly of a task force. Two months later and the British position would have been overstretched, with a group of warships including the carrier HMS *Invincible* in the Indian Ocean. Any force which reached the South Atlantic would only have done so at the height of winter and after a long delay. Furthermore, Argentina was only just starting to take delivery of new arms, including the Exocet-carrying Super-Etendards from France. Within a few months, its own forces would have been much better equipped.

This leads on to the question of whether the invasion was triggered by the pretext provided by the comic-opera saga of the Argentine scrap metal merchants who raised the Argentine flag on the dependency of South Georgia on March 19, or whether this itself was part of a plan. It may be that this incident did take place with the connivance of Admiral Jorge Anaya, the chief of the Argentine Navy, who seems to have masterminded the eventual invasion. Certainly the invasion option grew in attraction with first, the muted British response to the South Georgia incident, and then the splitting of the limited garrison of marines as some went off on HMS *Endurance* to South Georgia.

With its Navy at sea and only two days away from the islands, the temptation for the Argentine government to take the historic step at the end of March 1982 seemed irresistible. When the invading forces arrived on April 2 the British marines were in no position to resist and they soon surrendered. Resistance on South Georgia was no more successful, if a little more spirited, and Argentine forces took some casualties. Nowhere were there casualties among the British forces or the civilians, a fact which the Argentine government appeared to believe would make the invasion tolerable.

Without adequate forces in place, British defensive plans had depended on the dispatch of reinforcements by sea at the first sign of trouble. As it takes up to three weeks to cover the 8,000 miles from Britain, this required a generous warning time. Whenever the issue flared up Britain had to decide between risking strong military action while the crisis was still in its early stages, or alternatively, for the sake of quiet diplomacy, delaying preventive military measures until possibly too late. In 1977 the Labour Government responded

to an invasion scare by sending some frigates and a nuclear submarine to the area, but the decision was rendered easier by the fact that the vessels were relatively close for quite unconnected reasons. It is still not clear whether Argentina was then either considering invasion or aware that the British were taking action to forestall one.

There would always have to be good reason to send forces specially to the South Atlantic. It would involve taking ships away for a long period from other duties and high expenditure on fuel. Even maintaining two ships in the squadron watching over the Gulf of Oman over the past two years has made a large dent in the Navy's fuel allocation. In March 1982 these considerations created a disposition not to react strongly to the incident on South Georgia. It was reinforced by a desire not to upset by provocation the good work that had gone into improving relations with Latin America, including Argentina, over the previous few years as well as a belief that the problem could be solved through diplomatic channels. Indicators of an intent to invade, such as speculation in the Argentine press, were not judged to be significant in themselves: such indicators had appeared too often before.

The misjudgment was in not recognizing the change in political conditions in Buenos Aires and that the crisis this time was serious. Ministers in Britain had their minds on other things: the Foreign Secretary's visit to Israel and another row over the European Communities' budget. Too late was it realized that sovereign British territory was about to be seized by a foreign power. There was time only for frantic but futile diplomatic activity.

IV

If Argentina had expected a muted and embarrassed British response it was mistaken. Nothing could turn the Falkland Islands themselves into some great strategic and economic asset, but the circumstances of their loss turned their recapture into a popular cause. Here was a clear act of aggression and a disregard of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes. The victims were clearly British and the perpetrators fascistic and, fortunately, white and not too wretched. Moreover, there was a need to avenge what Lord Carrington described, in his resignation as Foreign Secretary, as a "national humiliation."

The option of a solely non-military response was not seriously considered though it was recognized from the start that any military operation was likely to be hazardous and without guarantee of success. A large naval task force was dispatched immediately, but it would take a number of weeks to reach the South Atlantic. There was more time than is normally available on these occasions to explore diplomatic solutions to the crisis. To encourage a peaceful withdrawal, Britain sought to maximize pressure on Argentina.

The pressure began at the United Nations where, helped by a Soviet abstention, Resolution 502 was passed calling for withdrawal of all forces prior to negotiation. The European Community's Council of Ministers agreed to economic sanctions, surprising themselves by their alacrity and unanimity. (Needless to say, this did not set a pattern for future decision-making on the matter.) Other friendly nations followed with their own sanctions. The United States, embarrassed at a quarrel between two allies, did not take sides but acted as mediator in the form of Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

In a slow-motion shuttle, Secretary Haig could not reconcile the two countries' positions. Britain hinted at flexibility in future negotiations and

began to equivocate over the extent to which the islanders' wishes would be "paramount"; Argentina promised to respect and improve the islanders' current way of life. Neither side could concede anything on the fundamental principle of sovereignty. Britain demanded a return to the status quo ante; Argentina insisted on recognition of the new status quo.

The political and economic pressures faced by Buenos Aires were severe but resistible, given the domestic popularity of the government's positions. Nor was there reason initially to believe that the military pressures were irresistible. Time was on Argentina's side. If Britain failed to get quick results, then its military operation would become difficult to sustain and it would be forced to retreat. By then the immediate fuss would have passed over. The international community would soon come to terms with the new situation and economic sanctions would fall into disrepair.

The British assessment was not that different. There was little confidence in economic sanctions as a means of solving the dispute, though an arms embargo would be helpful if fighting began in earnest. The international support for Britain's stance was gratifying and probably important in terms of maintaining domestic support, but could not be decisive in solving the dispute. It was irritating to watch a display of American evenhandedness between aggressor and aggrieved. There was some feeling that this hid from Buenos Aires the extent of its isolation, without producing commensurate benefits in the process of mediation. If anything could impress the Argentine leaders, it was likely to be the military power to be faced if they failed to back down peacefully and gracefully.

On both military and diplomatic grounds, it was therefore pointless for Britain to send a token force. From the start the task force had to look capable in principle of retaking the islands. But even then it was not obviously and overwhelmingly superior to the force it would meet. As no outcome could be predicted from an analysis of the balance of the forces, battle would have to be joined before either side need feel obliged to make significant concessions. Furthermore, while it was in Argentina's interests to prevaricate, Britain could not really allow too long for a diplomacy unaccompanied by military action.

On April 30 the task force reached its destination, and a total exclusion zone was imposed around the Falkland Islands. On the same day Secretary Haig announced that after a month of effort his mediation had failed and that the United States was now coming down firmly on the side of Britain. U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar tried to pick up the diplomatic pieces in May, but without success. By then it was evident that the impasse could now only be broken by a clash of arms.

V

The quality of the British military response was a function of the numbers of men and matériel that could be transported 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic and then sustained in operational condition over an extended period. The extent to which this was achieved is one of the most remarkable logistical feats of modern times. The bulk of the task force was prepared for departure virtually over a weekend. Not only were warships fitted out and equipped but also civilian ships were transformed to take helicopters and to refuel at sea. The success of this operation was due to sheer hard work at the dockyards and other naval establishments, laws which facilitated the requisitioning and

chartering of civilian ships, and detailed contingency plans drawn up for a European emergency which guided all this activity.

The task force did not quite exhaust Britain's naval resources. It did require the services of both of the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers, HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible*, both of its assault ships (recently reprieved from being scrapped) and practically all of the fleet auxiliaries. However, during the campaign the total number of destroyers and frigates sent to the South Atlantic was 23, under half those readily available at the time. Contrary to popular suspicions, only two of these ships were scheduled for disposal. The four nuclear-powered and one diesel-powered submarines on patrol in the South Atlantic were only a portion of Britain's submarine fleet. Fifty-one warships were involved in all, and the maximum number active at any one time was 26 (in the second half of May). The crucial factor was the number of civilian ships which were mobilized—some 54 in total. The most celebrated were the luxury liners, *Canberra* and *Queen Elizabeth 2*, which served as troop-ships, but others played critical roles from tankers to hospitals.

The second important factor in the logistical effort was Ascension Island, owned by Britain but normally used only by the United States. Some 3,500 miles from the Falkland Islands, it was too far back to be used as an operating base but it was invaluable as a staging post, with personnel and freight being taken there by air to continue their journey by sea.

The troops sent with the first wave of the task force were by and large made up of the highly trained specialist units—Royal Marine commandos, the Parachute batallions and the Special Air Services. They were joined later on by soldiers from Guards Divisions and the Nepalese Gurkha troops, who were less well suited to the particular demands of this campaign. In all the land forces totaled some 9,000 men (6,000 Army and 3,000 Marines).

The task force was most limited by the lack of air power it could carry. Deployed in the South Atlantic were 22 Sea Harriers, joined later by six more and by ten Royal Air Force Harrier GR3 combat support aircraft, and 140 sundry helicopters of which the majority were either Sea Kings or Wessex. There were none of the wide-ranging fighter aircraft which would have been found on earlier generations of aircraft carriers.

As part of the effort to compensate for this deficiency, great strides were made in the art of in-flight refueling. This was used to get Harrier GR3s to Ascension Island (and for four to fly directly on to a carrier), as well as four Vulcan bombers, Nimrod maritime surveillance aircraft, and Hercules transport aircraft. The 16 Victor tankers based at Wideawake Airport on Ascension Island were kept busy but their military impact was limited. As it took ten Victors to keep one Vulcan in the air for the raids on the islands, only one bomber could be used at a time. Nimrod air warning and control aircraft did not really get close to the combat zone. It was only through individual pilots being willing to fly excessive numbers of sorties and the maintenance crews attaining impressive levels of availability (of up to 90 per cent) that effective patrols could be maintained. With aircraft and helicopters of limited range and staying power, the capability that was missed the most was for early warning of enemy attack.

The Argentine forces awaiting Britain benefited from geography—home ports and air bases. Nevertheless, the Islands were some 400 miles from the mainland, which meant that Argentine aircraft had to operate at the limits of

their range while an awkward supply line had to be set up to service the garrison defending the newly won territory.

Argentine forces when compared with those of Britain looked impressive enough, with many weapons of comparable quality and similar type—often, embarrassingly enough, bought from Britain. The Navy was smaller than that of the British task force and many elements of it were of World War II vintage. But other elements such as British destroyers, French frigates and German submarines, and much of the armament, were quite modern. In the air there was a clear advantage in numbers if not in quality with some 120 Mirages, Skyhawks, Super-Etendards and Canberras. The other advantage derived from being the defending force. By the end of April 12,000 troops—a mixture of regulars and conscripts—had been transferred to the islands and positions had been fortified.

VI

The commander of the task force was charged with bringing about the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and reestablishing British administration there with the minimum loss of life. A prerequisite for most of the strategic alternatives was to blockade the defending forces. A maritime exclusion zone of 200 miles was declared on April 12, as soon as Buenos Aires could reasonably expect a nuclear submarine to have reached the area. This was turned into a total exclusion zone once the main task force arrived.

The only diversion was to retake the dependency of South Georgia. This was not part of the original plan, but the opportunity to demonstrate military prowess, probably without interference from the Argentine Navy or Air Force because of the distance from the mainland, was too tempting. In the event the operation was almost a disaster. An advance party was helicoptered onto a glacier on which it got stuck. Two helicopters crashed trying to rescue it but a third succeeded. Eventually, sufficient men were landed to provide keen observation of Argentine activity. On April 25, they observed a submarine reinforcing the garrison. The operation was immediately brought forward. The submarine *Santa Fe* was severely damaged by missiles and depth charges from helicopters and was forced to ditch on land. Marines landed and surprised the garrison, which surrendered without much resistance, providing the desired impression of effortless British victory.

Enforcing the exclusion zone proved more taxing. There was reasonable success on the naval side as a result of the first major engagement of the war and the one that involved the most casualties. On May 2, the cruiser *General Belgrano*, while accompanied by two destroyer escorts, was torpedoed by the submarine HMS *Conqueror*. The cruiser sank with the loss of 360 lives. The destroyers did not wait around to pick up survivors. They were looking either for the submarine or simply for cover. The large cruiser may have been picked on instead of the more capable destroyers as an easier target for the submarines' relatively unsophisticated Mark-8 torpedoes.

Politically the incident was damaging to Britain, as the victim was just outside the 200-mile exclusion zone. Although Britain had been very careful not to suggest that this was a combat-inclusive zone it had been widely understood as such. Such a dramatic transformation of the crisis led to accusations of unwarranted escalation. The counter was that the Argentine ships were well armed and heading toward elements of the task force on

something other than a goodwill mission.

That being said, it is doubtful that the British commanders were dismayed that such a target presented itself, allowing for an awesome display of the power of modern submarines. The lesson was underlined when it was announced a few days later that any Argentine warships or aircraft found further than 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be treated as hostile. No Argentine surface warships took up the challenge, though a number of patrol boats and supply ships were caught attempting to break the blockade.

The anticipated large-scale naval battle never materialized. Of the Argentine submarines, one of the old ones was cannibalized for its twin which was caught at South Georgia. Of the two modern German submarines little was seen. There were rumors of problems in their operation. Once Harriers attacked what might have been a submarine with no evident results. At any rate, as the U.K. fleet is now largely designed for anti-submarine warfare, it would have been scandalous if its ASW net had been penetrated. All Argentina could do was to avenge the loss of the *General Belgrano*. The destroyer HMS *Sheffield* was surprised on May 4 by an air-launched Exocet missile. The missile failed to detonate but its spare fuel ignited and a fire soon engulfed the ship. Twenty sailors were killed, and the ship abandoned to sink.

The attempt to impose the exclusion zone in the air was less successful. The key to this operation was the closure of the airfield at Port Stanley. There were five long-range air strikes mounted against this and related targets by Vulcans from Ascension Island using gravity bombs, with follow-up raids by Harriers. The first, on May 1, was the most successful, with one bomb leaving a crater in the center of the runway. This prevented it from being used by high-performance combat aircraft but not by lighter aircraft and transports. Argentine transports managed to get through until the end, largely by taking risks flying onto an inadequate airfield at night. Reconnaissance was unsatisfactory, as a result of cloud cover and a shortage of aircraft. The British were kidded by sand placed on strategic points in the runway pretending to be craters.

Given the difficulties of putting a crude airfield out of action, it was surprising that there was any interest in attempting to bomb air bases on the Argentine mainland. The possibility of an attack on a carefully delineated target, for example the base of the Super-Etendards, was not ruled out but the general view was that the political costs of this sort of escalation, combined with the practical problems of making it a success, rendered it unattractive.

The other part of the air strategy was to destroy Argentine air resources wherever possible. On May 1, a Sea Harrier shot down a Mirage while others successfully took on two Canberras. Thereafter the Argentine Air Force avoided dogfights with the Sea Harriers to conserve resources for a British landing on the islands. On being spotted by Harriers, Argentine aircraft returned home. More success was achieved by a commando raid on a small airstrip at Pebble Island on May 15. Eleven aircraft, mainly light ground-attack Pucaras, were destroyed. However, despite these and a few other losses, the bulk of the Argentine Air Force was still intact.

It became clear to the British command that a blockade would not work. There were no signs that the military pressure exerted thus far was encouraging Argentine compromise on the sovereignty issue. There was no reason to believe that the state of the garrison on the islands was dire, or that it had less staying power than the task force. Only one Harrier had been lost in combat (attacking

Port Stanley) but two others and three helicopters had been lost in accidents. This plus the destruction of HMS *Sheffield* created the prospect of gradual attrition that would lower morale. The greatest problem was of sustaining the task force in increasingly stormy and inclement weather over an extended period. Stuck on board ships the soldiers would lose combat readiness. Options to harass the enemy by small-scale raids or even troop landings on remote parts of the islands would not inconvenience the enemy sufficiently. There was little choice but to attempt a landing.

Those with a knowledge of the history of British amphibious landings could feel nothing but trepidation. The calculation was made that, in military terms, substantial losses were tolerable if the land forces could establish a beachhead. On May 21, there was a dawn landing at Port San Carlos off the Falkland Sound which divides the two main islands, just to the west of East Falkland, 50 miles from Port Stanley. It succeeded beyond the expectations of the British command.

It was important that no enemy forces were sufficiently close to provide opposition. At the start of May, at the earliest possible opportunity, special forces had been landed on the islands to keep a close watch on Argentine positions. The islands offered lots of alternative landing sites, most of which would be undefended. However, because of the lack of an internal road network and the limited number of heavy-lift helicopters, it had to be feasible to move forces to Port Stanley. One advantage of Port San Carlos was that the Argentine command probably assumed that it was just too far away for British forces. The other advantage was that the layout of the bay made it very difficult to mount air attacks on the landing forces. With the attacking aircraft coming from the west, they would have to first pass a Harrier cordon, then a picket line of ships with a variety of anti-air defenses and eventually the antiaircraft weapons of the ground forces. The disadvantage was that many warships would have to sit for a number of days in highly vulnerable positions. The only compensation was that the Sound allowed for reasonable protection against Exocets and submarines (because of the narrow entrance at each end).

With the help of a series of diversionary raids, surprise was achieved. By the time Argentine forces had realized what was going on, three separate beachheads had been established and 4,000 men were ashore.

Then the air raids came. In the intensive duels four ships—two frigates, a destroyer and one merchantman (the *Atlantic Conveyor*)—were lost. Contrary to repeated claims from Buenos Aires, neither aircraft carrier was hit, nor was the most valuable target to venture into Falkland Sound, the troopship *Canberra*.

Much has been made of the good fortune of another six ships hit by bombs or missiles which failed to explode. The failure was a direct result of the low altitude at which the Argentine aircraft was forced to attack in order to get under British air defenses, which allowed insufficient time for the delayed action fuses on the bombs. An Exocet missile was diverted on to the *Atlantic Conveyor* from the carrier HMS *Invincible* by the use of chaff, one of a number of countermeasures that were developed against this missile during the campaign. Later on, a ground-launched Exocet from Port Stanley struck the HMS *Glamorgan* a glancing blow.

The Argentine Air Force suffered dreadful attrition. The pilots flew bravely and skillfully with, at times, barely a one in two chance of survival. In the

three days of May 21 to May 24, almost 40 aircraft were lost, including 15 Mirages and 19 A-4 Skyhawks. This can be compared with Argentina's total air losses during the campaign of over 90 (including 26 Mirages and 31 Skyhawks). This number excludes those caught on the ground. The effort left the Argentine Air Force severely depleted and exhausted. The only aircraft able to bother the British ground forces were the Pucaras still on the islands. Toward the end of the campaign, aircraft were mustered for a last raid on June 8. This succeeded in inflicting the heaviest British casualties of the war on two landing ships in Port Fitzroy. In this raid eight Mirages and three Skyhawks were shot down.

Harriers achieved most "kills" of Argentine aircraft (though not always en route to a raid). Naval air defense missiles performed reasonably well, shooting down 20 aircraft during the whole campaign, with close range weapons accounting for another five, but, as mentioned earlier, the consequences of the diversionary action they forced onto attacking aircraft must also be taken into account. Land-based missiles, including the Rapier and hand-held weapons such as the Blowpipe, shot down about 20 aircraft. Argentina also used the Blowpipe to shoot down two helicopters but was unable to make its sophisticated Franco-German Roland work at all.

The land campaign which followed was neither as spectacular nor as interesting to those addicted to modern technology. With air power playing a limited role on either side, conditions unconducive to armored warfare, and an absence of urban sprawl and modern roadways, it was almost a throwback to 1914–16. For the British such thoughts were disturbing, for their task was to dislodge a well-armed enemy from entrenched positions. The methods were not dissimilar to those of the Great War—artillery bombardment combined with determined infantry assaults on vulnerable points with a hope that surprise, training and morale could compensate for the natural advantages accruing to the defense. Formulas offering guidance on the necessary numerical superiority for a successful offense were irrelevant.

As stores were unloaded at Port San Carlos, advance patrols determined enemy dispositions. The breakout from the beaches began on May 27. The next day came the first battle at the settlements of Goose Green and Darwin, where 600 men of the 2nd Parachute Brigade took on 1,000 Argentine troops. Pucara aircraft with the Argentine garrison were shot down before they did much damage. Argentine troops fought fiercely at first but became demoralized by their inability to hold on to forward positions. Before surrender, some 50 had been killed (not 250 as originally reported) as against 17 on the British side.

The Argentine Command had not expected an attack from the West. It had anticipated a landing reasonably close to Port Stanley on either the north or the south and had prepared accordingly, for example by laying minefields astride the likely attack route. Now hasty adjustments were required, including some frantic mine-laying that will plague the islanders for years to come. Another adjustment was to move troops from Mount Kent, some five miles inland from Port Stanley, to reinforce the garrison at Goose Green.

When it was realized that Mount Kent had been vacated, Royal Marines moved forward in appalling conditions to occupy it. This may have been a mistake, for Mount Kent was more suited to defense than for launching attack and the troops there were bitterly exposed to the elements. It required the use of scarce helicopter resources to attend to their needs. This, plus the fact that

three valuable Chinook heavy-lift helicopters had been lost on the *Atlantic Conveyor*, created a helicopter shortage.

This had important consequences for the 3,000 men of the British 5th Infantry Brigade who had by now arrived at Port San Carlos. They lacked the wherewithal for movement in sub-Arctic conditions and were in danger of getting stuck. The troops had therefore to be moved by sea. An advance party established, by telephoning one of the local residents, that Bluff Cove (just to the south of Port Stanley) was not occupied by Argentine forces. The Second Parachute Regiment was quickly helicoptered to Bluff Cove and the neighboring Port Fitzroy to take advantage. Then over the next few nights landing ships brought first the Ghurkhas, Blues and Royals, then Scots Guards and finally Welsh Guards around from Port San Carlos. The operation went wrong only at the final stage. Two landing ships, *Sir Tristram* and *Sir Galahad*, arrived at Port Fitzroy in clear daylight on June 8 to the surprise of those already there. They were spotted, an air attack was launched, and the two ships were hit leaving 50 men dead.

Despite this calamity, land forces were now in position around Port Stanley for the campaign's finale. Argentine defenses were based on the high ground on the outskirts of Port Stanley overlooking one of the few roads boasted by the islands which led into the capital, on the erroneous assumption that the British would wish to launch their main attack along this road. Instead, the defending forces were unhinged by a series of nighttime attacks on their exposed flanks. The battles were sharp, with stubborn Argentine resistance in some cases and disarray elsewhere. The loss of the defensive perimeter and the wearing down caused by intense bombardment from the sea as well as land (6,000 shells over the last 12 hours) took its toll. On June 14 white flags went up and the next day General Mario Menendez, commander of the Argentine garrison, surrendered on behalf of all his forces on the Falkland Islands.

VII

The key difference between the two sides was in the organization of their military forces and their professionalism. Argentine forces were riven by conflicts between officers and men, regulars and conscripts, which impaired their performance. At the end General Menendez did not even have an accurate picture of all the forces under his command. The British forces had the advantage in training, stamina and leadership and so demonstrated the virtues of military professionalism. In a war in which physical elements such as terrain and climate loomed as large as the technical factors, the traditional military virtues could be decisive. In this sense, the important lessons of the war were old ones that had been neglected in the fixation on technological prowess and weapon inventories.

The technical side of the conflict was once again shown to depend on competence and skill in using equipment, and a capacity for improvisation, as well as the basic reliability of the equipment. It also depends on a tactical appreciation. For example, Argentine troops were surprised at night despite excellent nightfighting equipment. As the capability of a modern weapon is very much a function of what it is up against, variations in conditions of challenges can have lasting consequences for a weapon's reputation. Circumstances can flatter: for example Harriers were often taking on Argentine aircraft which had no reserves of fuel to allow maneuver. A weapon such as the long-range air defense weapon Sea Dart can be effective if the enemy

avoids it out of respect—but this will reduce the "kills" to its credit.

Notorious successes create reputations. Exocet, for example, was in fact only moderately successful. Its major success was achieved despite a failure in the warhead and its second success was a result of a diversion. Cumbersome but effective counter-measures were developed to cope with it.

The focus today is on the most advanced weapons, but most forces are a mixture of the old and the new and it is important to know how well the more elderly items cope. A good eye can sometimes compensate for a lack of precision guidance but nothing can compensate for a lack of range.

Obsolescence turns out also to be a function of circumstance—a 4.5-inch gun shot down a Skyhawk. Air attack is no occasion for sophisticated disdain of primitive weapons.

High rates of ammunition usage were recorded and at the end some of the British units had virtually exhausted their supplies. The readiness to use up resources—be they shells or aircraft—could well have been linked to expectations of how long the battle would last. Lastly, Britain gained enormously by plans to mobilize civilian assets, particularly shipping, in the event of war.

By and large what was suspected was confirmed. Submarines may be of little use for showing the flag or carrying supplies but they are lethal instruments. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable to dedicated air attacks. The British fleet lacked sufficient air cover and early warning, spent much of the time in a confined space, and still shot down many attacking aircraft, so its losses may not have been excessive. But the Argentine Air Force was neither particularly modern nor designed for anti-shipping purposes.

The technical lessons are thus ambiguous and the revived old lessons may only be relevant if future wars are to be fought in such unmodern conditions. At the very least the experience serves as a correction to notions of electronic battlefields where human qualities are redundant and it can all be explained by cybernetics. The political lessons may be more interesting. They stem from relating the experience of a modern industrial power fighting alone in a limited war to the war it plans with its allies in the center of Europe.

The first concerns military management. The Royal Navy was assigned overall command responsibility which it exercised from its headquarters on the outskirts of London, transmitting orders to the commander of the task force. Operations on land were the responsibility of the senior Army officer. The decision-making was by and large successful but there were still misunderstandings between the two services: the Army did not always understand why naval gunfire support had to be withdrawn at crucial moments or key ships kept back when they might have been useful. The central staffs at the Ministry of Defence busied themselves with attending to requests from the commanders and considering the broad policy options and the rules of engagement. The Prime Minister's small "war cabinet" took the fundamental decisions on diplomacy and military action but offered no advice on how to implement the decisions. The civilians' constancy of political purpose was their most valuable contribution to the military effort. This experience with a relatively simple conflict threw into relief the likely problems with lines of command in a NATO-Warsaw Pact crisis, attempting to coordinate a variety of governments each with their own views on its conduct and some with a proclivity to interfere with field decisions.

This leads us to the second lesson, which concerns crisis management. Military power is not a simple instrument of diplomacy. Once invoked it

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transforms diplomacy as compulsion takes over from compromise. Military means come to demand commensurate political ends. After Britain was forced to fight for the Islands, the sort of diplomatic solution that would have been embraced a few weeks earlier now turns out to be an insult to the men who have died. At the end of the war, Britain found itself with a political commitment to the Falkland Islands that had been absent before.

Nor is diplomacy a clear-cut alternative to military action, for it often depends on the assessment of the likely winner of an eventual battle. If one side is continually requested to hold back, its diplomatic position may deteriorate along with its military options. For the party that does not have time on its side, it is necessary to keep the military initiative. Moreover, this initiative rarely allows for gradual escalation. In general, graduated response is an ideal that can rarely be achieved in practice. An overwhelmingly superior country can show flexibility and patience, meting out the military medicine in small doses to begin with, but this course is unlikely to commend itself to a country risking defeat. There is a military logic which it dare not ignore. This logic warns that military options cannot be maintained indefinitely and that some are highly perishable; that there are risks attached to tentative actions taken merely for demonstrative effect and that, confronting a capable enemy, there may be risks attached to doing nothing at all; that military campaigns rarely involve a simple buildup to some grand finale, but that the bloodiest and most difficult operations may be amongst the earliest; and that military action is unpredictable, so that what looks good in the plans can look awful in reality.

In the Falklands War the engagement with the greatest casualties—the sinking of the *General Belgrano*—came right at the start of the actual fighting. It was an important military victory for Britain, yet it turned into a political defeat because of the premium that the international community put on the appearance of avoiding escalation. Any military action which is not self-evidently for defensive purposes, even if it is preemptive, becomes an outrage. Measures such as economic sanctions or blockades are deemed more acceptable than any military action which tends to lead to direct casualties. Yet if sanctions or blockades are to succeed it can only be by causing immense distress to civilians—while if they fail, those involved will still have suffered lasting disruption and the international community is left with a smoldering problem. All this provides political discouragement for going on to the military offensive unless it is going to be reasonably bloodless.

The relevance of this for crisis management seems to be as follows. First, the concept of "escalation," which is now an established part of thinking on crisis and war, is in practice misleading, and creates unreal expectations as to the likely development of a conflict. Second, there can rarely be a neat proportionality between ends and means. Third, it is a diplomatic as well as often a military advantage to force the enemy to initiate battle.

All this makes it harder rather than easier for democracies to manage conflicts. Yet in other respects the war of the Falkland Islands showed that simple assumptions about the difficulty of maintaining political support were not well founded. Since the American experience with Vietnam there has been an assumption that democratic societies have a low level of tolerance of war, with national will being sapped with each casualty and lurid media coverage.

This assumption may explain some of the awkwardness of the Ministry of

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Defence in its handling of the media. Certainly a role for the media needs to be incorporated into strategic planning. There were no contingency plans available in this case. Government policy on the release of information showed great inconsistencies. Correspondents were only allowed to accompany the task force after an enormous fuss, and their accreditation papers were left over from the Suez Crisis of 1956. No means were found to transmit television pictures back or even, for some time, black-and-white stills. It is perhaps significant that the Parliamentary Defence Committee is conducting its first postwar investigation on this matter. Here again, this was a very unusual and old-fashioned war. From the British, but not the Argentine, side there were no television images. The correspondents with the task force were utterly dependent on the military for their stories and their external communications. This made possible tight censorship. The consequent public demand for information in Britain was met too much by speculation and reports from Argentina.

However, there seems to have been no reason to assume that the public would not support the war. Opinion polls have long recorded an immediate surge of support for governments in such circumstances and this case was no exception. This was helped by the fact that the opposition parties who initially saw the issue in terms of embarrassing the government for its "loss" of the islands found themselves associated with the cause of their recapture. The British public is unfortunately used to its soldiers being killed in Northern Ireland. This is easier to take with a volunteer than with a conscript Army. Polls showed initial reluctance to contemplate any loss of life in retaking the Falkland Islands, but once the casualties came, Argentina was blamed and support for the war grew.

The question again becomes what would have happened in different circumstances: if Britain had not appeared to be keeping the initiative and the war turned into a stalemate or even defeat; if allies had been more critical or indeed if Britain had been trying to fight in concert with them; if the fighting was not so contained in time and space and so far away; if the issue had not been the simple one of aggression against British subjects by a military dictatorship but one much more complex and ambiguous, involving shadowy notions of national interest.

The war was a strange and atavistic interlude for Britain, a curious and enthralling distraction from its economic troubles. It was generally believed to have been popular and the victory raised national morale. What it did not do was solve the problem of the Falkland Islands. It made a diplomatic solution virtually impossible for many years, as the islanders' feelings about Argentina have become even more hostile. Britain will now have to provide properly for the islands' defense and try to improve their economic viability in the face of persistent hostility from Argentina and non-cooperation from the rest of Latin America. Having retrieved the Falkland Islands, Britain is well and truly stuck with them!

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THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS CONFLICT

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August 17, 1982

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U.S. military strategy:
- Is the Navy prepared to meet its increasing conventional responsibilities as it assumes ever greater strategic significance under the Administration's long-range defense plans?
- Is the U.S. prepared with sophisticated tactics to meet the threat posed by ever more lethal weapons?

other issues:
- what are the prospects for NATO unity?
- ought the U.S. seek to create a more restrictive international regime for the control of weapons sales?
- what are the implications for global U.S. force projection?

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to review the range of experiences of the conflict between Britain and Argentina in the South Atlantic (hereinafter termed the Falklands conflict) that may have implications for U.S. defense programs and to reflect competing perspectives on what -- if any -- "lessons" we should draw from those experiences. This study includes preliminary evaluations of weapons systems and of longstanding assumptions of military doctrine. But there is much disagreement about what lessons can be drawn beyond these. The conflict itself was unusual, and in many ways unique. Nor are there many direct similarities between U.S. forces and those engaged in the Falklands conflict - the former possess capabilities of an entirely different order of magnitude. Nevertheless, the conflict does raise some issues for United States' consideration and it has shed new light on some long-standing issues. It has affected the way issues of force structure and defense spending have been viewed in Congress.

This paper's findings are necessarily preliminary. Many of the raw data about the performance of weapons systems have come to the public arena only through considerable filtering by governments and the press. Many data are simply lacking at this writing. Each of the U.S. armed services has undertaken some sort of inquiry into the Falklands' lessons, though these studies will not be concluded for some months. They will scrutinize weapons systems in greater detail and with more certain information than is possible here.

While acknowledging this, it is possible to examine the conflict, to raise questions, and to suggest some preliminary conclusions based on currently available information. The broad parameters of the conflict (e.g., the capabilities of each combatant, many of the operational details, and the outcome)

already known. This type of information provides an adequate basis for analysis of some of the matters in which Congress has shown interest.

This paper examines the conflict by mission areas (naval, air, land), though the Falklands conflict serves as an excellent example of the interrelationship of the mission areas. Each of these sections begins with a consideration of non-controversial principles or lessons reaffirmed by the conflict and with brief analyses of weapon systems. Each then proceeds to examine competing perspectives on the significance of successes and failures and especially on the impact of technological change within each area. These sections conclude with matters for possible Congressional oversight. This study then considers some lessons of a general military nature. The last section of this paper is an assessment of some of the politico-military aspects of the conflict that raise longer-term policy issues for Congress.

MISSION AREA: NAVAL WARFARE

Naval warfare in the Falklands conflict, in which each side reportedly lost 5 or 6 ships, has raised a large number of issues of some pertinence. There are a few relatively non-contentious "lessons" of the naval warfare. Among these are the following:

- the combined force battle group proved to still be an effective military instrument;
- sea power is flexible (the British fleet is postured for a North Atlantic anti-submarine campaign but proved itself able to conduct a power projection operation);
- the technological element of naval power is but one component determining the successful application of that power (skilled crews, superior tactical doctrines, ingenuity, and luck all contribute significantly to success at naval warfare).

Several new weapon systems had their first major test under combat conditions in the South Atlantic. Final conclusions on their performance must depend on the analysis of currently unavailable detailed information. One apparent surprise was the utility of the helicopter as a weapons platform against certain types of surface vessels. But naval missiles have been the subject of keenest public interest. Four missiles were used in combat for the first time (Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, Sea Skua, and Exocet) with varying results.

The most significant offensive missile is the Exocet, exported to Argentina by Aerospatiale of France. It proved its utility insofar as it can be fired at a distance beyond visual range and approaches its target just a few feet above the sea. But its sophistication has been exaggerated. With 350 lbs. of explosives, its warhead is not especially destructive, though its ability to penetrate a ship's hull is increased by the kinetic energy of its flight. It is a "smart" weapon but can be blinded; the radar wavelength of its homing radar can be "read" (measured) and, assuming a fast response chaff decoy system is available, the

...le's guidance system can be confused. It is a delicate system, requiring fine-tuning by highly skilled technicians familiar with the system. The missile was newly introduced to Argentina's military forces, perhaps accounting for the inability of Argentine forces to score "kills" with each Exocet it fired. Its success also depends in part upon surprise, as there are weapon systems, such as chaff clouds and the British Sea Wolf, able to confuse or destroy it.

British naval failures have become a focal point of U.S. interests. There are three areas of concern. First, it appears that the naval blockade of the island was not fully effective. When the British took Port Stanley it became publicly known that Argentina had been steadily resupplying its forces by air and sea. Second, Britain was unable to find and destroy either of Argentina's two modern diesel-electric submarines (though sporadic reports that they were at sea may have been wrong and they may have remained in port). This could be cited by those who argue that Western fleets are far more vulnerable to submarine attack than is publicly acknowledged. The one submarine Britain did capture was a very antiquated (and hence noisy) U.S.-built submarine that eluded British detection until it had the misfortune of surfacing at the precise moment of a British air attack. But no successful Argentine submarine action occured, and this can be cited as able Royal Navy fleet protection.

The third area of concern is the most significant - major British naval losses. The U.S. Navy argues it would not have incurred such losses; it argues that it has already thought through many of the ship vulnerabilities illustrated by the Royal Navy sinkings and designed solutions into the generation of ships and weaponry it is now procuring such that functionally equivalent ships would not have sunk under similar circumstances. Critics sense over-confidence in the U.S. Navy's position and assert that the Navy's response

PREDOMINAC EN AREA NAVAL

1) EL BLOQUEO FUE BURLADO
2) INCAPACIDAD DE GB EN LOCALIZAR Y DESTRUIR LOS 2 SUBS ARGENTINOS. LUEGO LAS FLOTAS OCCIDENTALES SON MUCHO MAS VULNERABLES AL ATAQUE SUB. QUE LO QUE SE CREIA
3) LAS EXCESIVAS PERDIDAS NAVALES BRITANICAS

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GUERRA NAVAL

to the Royal Navy's failures may be ignoring some salient evidence.

The U.S. Navy argues its case on the following basis. First, it argues that enemy aircraft would not get within range of a U.S. task force to fire an Exocet-type missile, because U.S. forces are able to provide comprehensive air cover for naval task forces out to 200 miles (well beyond the 30 mile range of an Exocet), and to detect and destroy incoming aircraft before they have a chance to fire their missiles. If such missiles are successfully fired, the U.S. Navy notes that it can divert many with electronic countermeasures and decoys and can destroy the remainder in flight with a wide variety of zone defensive systems coordinated by the highly sophisticated Aegis crusier and the Phalanx point defense system (a radar-guided, computer-driven, Gatling-type gun able to fire 3000 rounds per minute). Should these defenses fail, the Navy argues that even small U.S. ships struck by an Exocet-type missile would be unlikely to sink. The Navy claims that, in contrast to British counterparts, U.S. ships are better designed (more watertight compartments, superior means for damage control) and Navy crews better trained to deal with any such strike.

Critics of the U.S. Navy's position point out that the Aegis class cruiser and point defense systems such as the Phalanx are not currently available in significant numbers. According to the Wall Street Journal (Power of Small Missiles in Falklands Leads U.S. to Mull New Defenses, June 4, 1982) the Phalanx is deployed on only 11% of U.S. ships. It is not scheduled to be deployed on the new Spruance or Garcia class ships. Some of these critics also contend that British ships are very carefully designed and their damage control crews and amongst the best trained in the world. They go on to point out that serious ship design errors became apparent to the British, and wonder if the same might not happen to the U.S. Some believe that the extensive use of toxic and flammable

PVC piping, and poorly integrated weapon and damage control systems, contributed to the Sheffield's vulnerability. They argue that similar design characteristics might contribute to the vulnerability of U.S. ships. There was an even more disturbing British systems planning failure: reportedly, the Sheffield had to turn off all of its radar systems when operating its satellite link with London, rendering it blind to incoming Argentine aircraft and missiles (Army Times, July 5, 1982). [The use of aluminum in ship construction is a source of concern, but was not relevant to the sinking of the Sheffield, whose hull and superstructure were both made of steel, not aluminum.]

Critics extend this argument to suggest that the Royal Navy sinkings are illustrative of a major change in the viability of naval surface task forces as instruments of power projection against more sophisticated, modern, and complex threats than those faced by Britain in the South Atlantic. The Exocet and iron bomb attacks by the Argentines were relatively primitive compared to the type of swarmed attack with sophisticated missiles that the Soviets are already capable of launching against NATO navies. The new Soviet Charlie-class submarines fire supersonic SS-N-7 cruise missiles less than thirty miles from their target, well within the outer defense zone of a task force and giving defenders only a few seconds to respond. The SS-N-19 can be fired at sea-going targets from up to 300 miles away, well outside the outer defense zone of U.S. task forces. The AS-4 Kitchen air-to-surface missile has a range of 250 miles, flies at Mach 4, and has a warhead of 2300 lbs. Even more capable missiles will probably be deployed soon. These constitute a far more sophisticated threat than the one encountered by the British in the South Atlantic, and critics argue that the U.S. has not solved the problem they pose. Nor, they argue, is it clear that the U.S. Navy has assessed with sufficient care the broad

variety of threats it may have to meet during the lifetime of the new aircraft carriers it is requesting. These carriers have a useful lifetime extending through the first quarter of the 21st century, when the technology of new weapons will make those used in the South Atlantic appear quite archaic. Critics argue that the survivability issue is especially urgent for the U.S. because most of the offensive capability of a naval battlegroup is concentrated in twelve aircraft carriers. They argue these can be sunk or rendered ineffective, especially if their defensive escorts should be stripped away.

The link between the lessons of the Falklands and the debate over large aircraft carriers is fairly tenuous, but it is one many have made. There are no lessons from that experience that prove conclusively one position or another. But since so many analysts have made such liberal use of the Falklands experience to justify their positions, they are outlined below.

The U.S. Navy argues that the Falklands shows the necessity of ships that can project large amounts of high quality air power at distance, provide airborne electronic warning, and sustain hits (Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has indicated that even 5 or 6 hits with torpedoes would not disable big carriers and that their decks can withstand severe direct hits). The Navy acknowledges that smaller carriers might be adequate for certain kinds of missions if they were protected by adequate electronic early warning systems but argues that they are not adequate for the kind of high threat situations the Navy must be postured to meet. In sum, the Navy argues that the Falklands conflict vindicates its proposal to build more big carriers.

Others see the Falklands conflict as evidence that no matter how well constructed and defended ships are, they will always be subject to being hit and damaged and conclude that ship losses must always be anticipated. Proponents

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of this position assert that navies should avoid placing irreplaceable value in a few ships by dispersing offensive capability over larger numbers of ships. They argue that the U.S. Navy should start now to build smaller, more numerous carriers. An ancilliary argument often made in support of this position is that concentrating capability in a few ships plays into Soviet hands; the elimination of a few ships would not tax the Soviets in the way that the necessity of attacking large numbers of lethal platforms would.

Observers have also noted that the Argentine Navy possesses a 20,000 ton conventional aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo. However, this played no role in the conflict, remaining in port as did the rest of the Argentine fleet, thereby depriving analysts of any basis on which to assess the utility of this type of carrier. Reasons for the inactivity of the Veinticinco de Mayo are unclear, although many analysts have suggested it arose from Argentine concern over British submarines, especially after the sinking of the Belgrano.

Others look at the sinkings of British frigates and the Argentine cruiser and argue that ships limited to strictly offensive or defensive operations are of diminishing utility and that a survivable Navy ought be characterized by large numbers of self-sufficient, multi-mission ships that can also perform as a team to survive high technology weaponry. Such a "high-mix" Navy could be achieved by deploying more antimissile systems and electronic countermeasures through the fleet. Increased funding would allow the rapid development and deployment of cruise missiles, Phalanx guns, and Aegis class cruisers. Advocates of this perspective argue that the U.S. Navy should change its policy of not putting maximum capability on all ships and that it should be willing to give up items now of higher perceived priority to attain this capability. But changing technology does not necessarily prejudge the choice between the two

positions outlined above, for it is possible that a future naval force posture might still include large aircraft carriers -- their escort ships could be more serious offensive threats and as well as more capable to defend themselves.

Advocates of each of the last two positions argue that trends in technology, as evidenced in the Falklands, make possible their ideas. Offensive capability can be increased through improved weapon accuracy and warheed lethality, and improved satellite reconnaissance can enhance defensive capabilities (meaning that the number of high performance aircraft traveling with a carrier could be reduced). Programs which match high performance missiles with low performance platforms (such as the current program mating the Tomahawk missile to the slow speed Orion P-C3s) might be explored as relatively inexpensive quick fixes maximizing the benefits of emerging technologies. In the Falklands conflict, British Nimrod reconnaissance craft reportedly were equiped with Sidewinder missiles in the hopes of shooting down Argentine Boeing 707 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Improvements in the U.S. satellite surveillance capability might proceed at a more rapid rate. Currently, the Navy is undergoing a phased improvement in the Integrated Tactical Surveillance System, having been unable to fund a major shift to a satellite surveillance capability able to track all ships always. In sum, the argument concludes, overall naval force structure and individual ships could be made much more lethal.

Still others look to the Falklands conflict and conclude that it raises more important questions about strategy than about weaponry. They contend that the strategic consequences for U.S. naval warfare capability extend beyond those focusing on the large vs. small carrier debate to questions of roles and missions. Carrier groups currently have two primary missions: to keep the sea

seas open and to press the battle to the opponent's homeland. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones argues that the Falklands raises questions related to these missions. Should the Navy be charged with both roles? Can the strategic missile and bomber force better handle the latter one? Do both roles require the same technology? Carriers can be engaged by land-based Backfire bombers before their own strike arm is in range of hostile bases - does this effect their strategic vulnerability? Arguments following this concept suggest that initiatives be considered to reduce dependence on a surface Navy. The Soviets make greater use of land-based conventional bombers against maritime targets and have a more lethal and varied attack submarine force, with tactical cruise missiles for both land attack and anti-shipping missions. Some argue that if the U.S. were to adopt similar strategies, it would increase its ability to continue sea denial operations and to project power after key ships are lost.

Although the Navy has not publicly responded to these concepts in light of the Falklands conflict, it could conceivably argue that now, as in the past, popular perceptions not withstanding, the U.S. surface Navy constitutes a viable and significant threat to the homelands of potential adversaries and that the quality of this threat is being enhanced with time rather than diminished, as the Navy acquires advanced weaponry, aircraft, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. It could also argue that this capability is a significant addition to that of strategic bombers and missiles that strengthens overall U.S. strategic capabilities and hence ought not be relinquished.

In conclusion, the naval warfare component of the Falklands conflict has dramatized numerous issues already under debate in Congress. Is the U.S. Navy equipped with the proper weapons systems for the kinds of threats it is likely

to face? Are budget increases being spent optimally to improve capability in view of changing technologies? Are service missions appropriately apportioned given new technologies and the character of the Soviet threat?

MISSION AREA: AIR WARFARE

Most of the "lessons" in the air warfare mission area are related to the performance of specific technologies, though there are some others that merit consideration. According to preliminary figures released by the British, they lost eight jet aircraft while Argentina lost 68 airplanes of various types (not including helicopters).

The conflict reconfirmed the absolute necessity for airpower in a successful maritime strategy. Had the Argentines gained complete command of the air over the British fleet, Britain would assuredly have lost more ships than it did, seriously hampering or destroying its ability to press on with the conflict. It added an interesting twist to the truism that he who controls the skies in conventional warfare wins. Neither side consistently controlled the skies, and it was the sporadic ability of each to inflict significant losses on their enemies that carried individual battles.

The war brought home another point sometimes forgotten in the debate on military technologies: there is a human dimension to technological performance -- the Argentine pilots might have downed more British Harriers had they had more time to train with their equipment (there was a reported tendency to fire missiles too soon) and known the characteristics of the equipment they were up against (they seemed to know little of the lethality and range of the Harriers or British missiles). However, the Argentine Air Force apparently improvised and did rather well with gravity bombs and ill-suited aircraft operating at the extreme edge of their range.

Britain met with less than full success in significant aspects of the air warfare. Fleet protection was dangerously thin. And despite repeated attempts,

Britain was unable to sufficiantly damage the runway at the Port Stanley airport in order to deny use of it to the Argentines.

Equipment-related issues are the core of current interest in the air battles. Specifically, interest focuses on: aerial surveillance, helicopters, missiles, bombs, and British-built Harrier VSTOLs.

Both sides suffered from their inability to bring aerial surveillance planes to bear. The British Nimrods deployed in the South Atlantic were equipped primarily with an anti-submarine capability and were unable to track incoming airborne threats and program responses to them. Argentine Boeing 707 maritime reconnaissance aircraft were similarly ill-equipped. British losses would probably have been reduced dramatically had they been able to deploy an aircraft capable of plotting incoming airborne threats and coordinating responses to those threats. As it was, the range at which incoming threats were detected was dictated by the radar horizons of surface ships. The U.S. capability currently resides in large AWACs, the carrier-capable E-2C Hawkeye aircraft, and picket aircraft patrols with highly capable radar (e.g., F-14). The British have sped up a project aimed at creating a heliborne capability in this area.

Britain lost larger numbers (25) of helicopters than anticipated. Some argue that the harsh climate and pilot fatigue from excessive flying time contributed to the losses and thus mitigate criticisms; others argue that these are the kinds of conditions typical to war and helicopters ought to have performed better. The helicopters did excel, however, in their attack roles. When equipped with missiles, they proved capable of screening the force against fast patrol craft (a Lynx helicopter with Sea Skua missiles is credited with the sinking of at least one such craft), thus adding an important dimension to

...n's ability to harass Argentine naval power.

Air-to-air missiles also again proved themselves to be formidable. Both sides employed the Sidewinder missile, a veteran of the Vietnam war. The British have an advanced version of the Sidewinder, the AIM 9L, which proved especially effective, as it has in the Lebanon conflict. This missile homes in on any heat generating surface of an aircraft, including the leading edge of a wing, freeing the attacking pilot of the necessity of maneuvering to fire into his opponent's exhaust, as was the case in the older version employed by the Argentines.

Another aspect of the technology of air warfare of interest to the United States is the performance of the bombs used by Argentina. By one report, fewer than half of the Agrentine bombs that hit British ships actually exploded. Had these bombs been effective, the outcome of the war might have been different. Most of the Argentine bombs were 500-1,000 lb. gravity bombs bought from the U.S. about 13 years ago. The causes of the high rate of duds are not clear. It is likely that the Argentine use of these weapons (designed for land targets) against sea targets contributed to the rate of failure. British Sea Dart missiles forced Argentine planes to fly in very low, perhaps so low that bombs did not have time to become "live" during the short flight from plane to ship (some were activated by wind-driven propellers that had to rotate a certain number of times to activate the bomb). The fusing mechanisms of these bombs, in conjunction with their heavy weight, was probably inappropriate for use against the thin sides of some British ships (with some bombs passing right through these ships having encountered insufficient resistance to trigger the fusing mechanism.) But to the extent that the failure rate has to do with deterioration in their firing circuits, there is potential cause for concern for the U.S.

the Falklands conflict might stimulate those who would like to see more effort expended by U.S. forces on testing and maintaining the reliability of its weapons systems.

The most striking aspect of the air war was the performance of the Harrier VSTOL craft. Designed as a quick-response, tactical air support craft that is able to take off and land either vertically or in a very short distance, the Harrier performed well in the many different types of missions it was required to undertake, including ground attack, reconnissance, fighter, and strike missions. It proved remarkably survivable. It handled battle damage well and was easily repaired and returned to battle when damage did occur. Its ability to "viff" (vector in forward flight, i.e., to rapidly and radically alter its flight path) gave it a significant advantage in aerial combat. At issue is whether -- or to what extent -- the Harrier's technical performance was made to look deceptively promising by the inadequacies of its opposition. The training of British pilots is reportedly superior to that of Argentine pilots. Argentine attackers were hampered by the necessity of operating at the extreme limits of their range with heavy bomb loads. Many Argentine craft were probably not operating at full capability, as the Argentines lacked spare parts and possibly had not had sufficient time to acquire the expertise to fine-tune some of their best equipment (e.g., their only all-weather attack craft, the French-built Super Etendard with Exocet missiles, had only been in Argentina a few weeks and Argentine technicians had only limited familiarity with their operation and maintenance). Also, the British displayed once again their ability to exploit opportunities for mobility, flexibility, and surprise which increased the advantages inherent in the Harrier for the type of conflict it was called upon to fight. Nevertheless, the Sea Harrier is not designed as

a high performance fighter: it is subsonic and is limited in range, payload and avionics, nor is it equipped with medium to long range air intercept missiles (though the VSTOL technology does not preclude the addition of higher performance capabilities.)

Specific issues of interest to Congress based on the air warfare component of the Falklands conflict focus on the following: does the difficulty Britain had in destroying the airfield at Stanley raise significant issues about NATO ability to put Warsaw Pact fields out of commission (as some suggest)? To what extent does the U.S. Navy have a mix of air power such that it can project sufficient force in a variety of expectable maritime operations? Should the Navy and Air Force accelerate and broaden their cooperation (the extreme option being a unitary Tactical Air component), as some have suggested, to ensure that sea and land based aviation are mixed to maximum advantage? To what extent should the American-version of the Harrier (the AV-8B) receive higher funding priority? This craft is currently under development for the Marines; might there be other areas in which it could be used?

MISSION AREA: GROUND WARFARE

In the public attention to air battles, ship sinkings, and missiles, the crucial aspect of ground combat in the Falklands received much less emphasis. The air and sea battles were essentially preliminary to the landing of ground forces and the waging of land warfare. Here as in the other areas, lessons are suggested from the preliminary reports.

Many types of ground combat equipment were tested in the conflict, much of it up-to-date versions of standard equipment already combat-tested elsewhere. Of particular relevance are performances of Blowpipe SAMs and armored vehicles. The Blowpipe is a shoulder-fired Surface-to-Air missile that can be fired head-on at aircraft instead of into the heat of their exhaust. Its utility in the Falklands might obscure the fact of its general obsolesance. It must be fired from a standing--and hence exposed--position and while this apparently presented few problems in the Falklands, the situation on a European battlefield might be quite different. Light armored vehicles (SCIMITAR) and light tanks (SCORPION) both reportedly did very well against Argentine forces, and the performance of each is of interest to U.S. forces. The SCIMITAR is a tracked vehicle with a high power to weight ratio, which moved rapidly over the bogs of East Falkland. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are both considering moving away from tracked vehicles towards wheeled ones in the search for a new generation of light armored vehicles. The SCORPION is a very light, fast, tracked, amphibious tank with a small caliber gun that can be delivered to battle by parachute if need be. Its utility in the Falklands, and especially its ease of deployment, are likely to be cited by those planning weapons systems for the Marines and for an RDF as vindication of their arguments for easily air transportable armored vehicles.

The most striking impression of the Falklands ground combat is how little this type of warfare has changed, at least relative to the other mission areas. The land battle for the Falklands was similar to land campaigns of the Second World War. Long-standing principles of war were reconfirmed: maneuver, surprise, momentum, and luck were all factors that the victor exploited. Well-trained, well-motivated, and fit soldiers provide an inestimable advantage regardless of the quality of the weapons each side possesses. The stamina of the British soldiers was clearly a factor: after weeks confined on ships in rough seas, infantry was able to march across difficult terrain carrying 110 lb. packs for long distances at a very steady pace. Troops must also be well-led: the Argentine conscripts who were apparently left without senior officers were unable to recover from serious setbacks whereas the British were apparently able to maintain tactical unity in fierce combat. Infantry, armor, and artillery lust be carefully coordinated. The Argentine failure to hold high ground positions proved costly, as Britain used them effectively as artillery bases from which to harrass its enemy. What was apparently a new experience for the British also served to reconfirm a long--standing U.S. perception of the importance of helicopters to ground combat, which in the Falklands provided mobility of men and material of great advantage to the British.

The Falklands conflict reconfirms the value of an amphibious landing capability and the value to that of aircover and standard naval gunfire. It has been many years since an opposed amphibious landing capability has been required of the U.S. or its allies. The effect its failure would have had on the entire operation suggests the great value of its maintenance.

Though aspects of the ground warfare were familiar, others provided evidence of the impact of changing technologies on this type of warfare. This

...ict provided a demonstration of the value of night-fighting and of night vision technology. Most of the British attacks and breakthroughs came at night, which denied the Argentines much of their defensive advantage, confident surveillance and intelligence of British actions. American advocates of manuever warfare highlight the significant role played by helicopter transported British commando brigades, attributing much of the momentum and many of the breakthrough successes of the campaign to these units. They suggest this highlights an aspect of British infantry practice at odds with that of Argentina (and by extension, U.S. Army forces): British tactical doctrine highly favors individual initiative at the low levels of the command structure, which allowed the advancing British forces to exploit unforeseen opportunities and adapt quickly to new situations in ways that more rigid command structures would not permit.

Some analysts have seen in the British ground combat successes a "vindication of NATO doctrine that agressive, well-officered infantry can defeat a numerically superior enemy." It is clear that superiority of numbers was not decisive to the Falklands conflict (the Argentines enjoyed an advantage in that regard) and that a mobile, disciplined, well-equipped infantry can be devastating to a larger, stationary force. But the implications of this are probably more meaningful for RDF-type operations than for NATO. A Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, would not produce a static enemy force dug firmly into entrenched positions. Warsaw Pact forces also differ from those of Argentina in other regards: they may be more highly trained, they possess superior weaponry, and they are highly mechanized.

The ground combat experience points to a number of recurring issues of congressional interest. First, training, leadership and esprit de corps

parisons are inevitably attempted between the elite British units deployed and their U.S. counterparts; to what extent do comparable U.S. forces possess positive qualities demonstrated by their British counterparts? Are U.S. forces encouraged to use individual initiative in battle situations? In seeking to improve the overall war-fighting capability of the U.S. ground forces, has Congress overemphasized efforts to improve equipment readiness to the detriment of attaining general purpose forces as "professional" as their elite counterparts? Second, do U.S. forces possess the night-fighting and light-mechanized capabilities so usefully exploited by the British? Has emphasis on the type of warfare likely to be encountered in any potential conflict in Europe led to deemphasis on other important areas of expertise valuable in other types of conflicts (e.g., amphibious landings, non-mechanized warfare)?

GENERAL MILITARY LESSONS

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Some "lessons" suggested by the conflict are not strictly related to mission areas but are of general applicability to war and war-fighting capability. Many of these are not new but recent experience tends to reinforce them.

- wars do not necessarily occur when or where expected or unfold according to the anticipated scenarios - defense policy must be flexible enough to meet the unexpected;

- wars are always initially fought with the forces and capabilities at hand and not as they are planned to be in the future;

- success in wars usually requires high levels of basic military characteristics such as training, tactics, motivation, and the skillful use of standard weapons as well as better military technologies;

- "failures of intelligence" can have calamitous results but will still occur despite all efforts to prevent them (both Argentina and Britain seem to have seriously miscalculated the capabilities and ambitions of their opponents as well as the dynamics of domestic politics);

- deterrence of attack may require a demonstrated war-fighting capability (e.g., the mere presence of a British frigate in the Falklands might have sent different signals to Argentina);

- ingenuity in conflict is invaluable (e.g., the British adapted quickly and creatively the material at hand: Nimrods were equipped with a refuelling capacity, Sidewinders were fitted to RAF Harriers, a "ski-jump" runway was bolted to a merchant ship in two days, other merchant ships were refitted for troop transport, hospical, and other use.

The Falklands conflict suggests three further general military "lessons" of special interest to Congress.

The first lesson is that military technology is but one aspect of an over-all war-fighting capability. Questions of military performance often tend to focus on the technological, and the Falklands experience suggests this is insufficient. Men matter at least as much as machines in conflicts and there can be no replacement for the professionalism of thoroughly trained and motivated troops. Are the U.S. forces doing all that is economically and politically

feasible to form fully professional forces?

The Falklands conflict also shows that the advantages inherent in superior weaponry can be overcome by sophisticated tactics. New technologies, e.g. sea skimming missiles, create problems that have both technological, and tactical solutions. For example, though lacking the superior Phalanx system the British were reportedly able to neutralize the threat posed by the 5 or 6 Exocet missiles left after the Sheffield sank by implementing sophisticated electronic countermeasures and ingenious deceptive techniques. Have the U.S. armed services devised (and trained in) alternative tactical approaches or is there an over-reliance on attaining superior firepower?

A second set of observations concerns the value of rapidly available strategic mobility well-tailored to mission requirements. The Falklands battle was fought at the end of an extended supply line from Great Britain and consequently is relevant to U.S. planning for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The crucial role played by the British and American base on Ascension Island is also an important factor in analyzing the British experience. Both aspects of strategic mobility -- sealift and airlift -- were required of the British in the Falklands. Their sealift capacity excelled. They were able to draw upon substantial numbers of serviceable merchant marine ships to transport men and goods to the Falklands. Forty-nine merchant ships (and many of their crews) were mobilized to support the British effort. These ships lent themselves to rapid adaptation to military use. The Falklands experience triggered again the persistent questions as to the adequacy of the U.S. merchant marine and the kind of merchant marine the U.S. ought to have if needed to support the RDF in an emergency. A currently salient issue in Congress is whether it ought to authorize money to subsidize the construction of multi-purpose merchant ships, that is, ships that could be

The British mission to the Falklands has some notable similarities to possible RDF-type operations. On the one hand, had Britain been able to reinforce the Falklands with adequate airlift on short notice, the Argentine action might have been forestalled. The British have no such capability, and were forced to depend primarily upon sealift which, though much more effective in terms of lift capability, was indeed much slower. Unable to deter the Argentine invasion, the slower British reaction did work to advantage in one way: the two weeks it took for the task force to reach the Falklands was a diplomatically useful time, with each day increasing the stakes. (It also provided ample time for Argentine fortification and preparation.) Some have also speculated that the Falklands conflict might lead to increased U.S. efforts to find more base facilities within reach of likely RDF deployment areas--without its facilities at Ascension Island, the British airlift and sealift capabilities would have been much more severely constrained.

The third lesson of general military applicability raised by the Falklands is that military technology is becoming more electronic, lethal and costly. A salient aspect of this phenomenon is the so-called missile revolution. The Falklands conflict suggests the value of preparing for missile warfare: success requires adequate supplies of missiles, proper expertise at using them, and flexible offensive and defensive systems. Some analysts doubt whether either side fully comprehended the impact of missile technology.

But missile warfare is just one component of an overall phenomenon, and it can be argued that to focus simply on missiles is to miss more salient aspects of the larger revolution. Overall weapon system lethality is being sharply enhanced through improved target acquisition, greater accuracy of delivery system, and precise delivery of weapon at points of highest vulnerability. Some

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rapidly converted to military applications should the need arise. A related question is whether efforts to improve strategic mobility have favored airlift to the serious detriment of U.S. sealift capability.

Britain's ability to effectively exploit its sealift potential was crucial because of its very limited ability to project force by air. The British airlift capability was ill-suited to the demands made upon it, both in its depleted ability to field transport/cargo aircraft and in the severe strains posed upon its aerial refuelling capability to support what airlift and long-range air attack did occur. Cargo aircraft that had recently been phased out and sold to a private carrier had to be chartered for cargo support to Asencion Island. Even with these craft, Britain was unable to transport any significant portion of its forces by air, nor was it able to fly significant numbers of aircraft all the way to the Falklands. (Some have argued that the Falklands conflict provides an illustration of the need for versatile transport aircraft capable of operating at long range and into small airfields.) Britain's in-flight refueling capability (by Victor tankers) was severely strained. By one report, the RAF conducted more than 600 in-flight refuelings during the conflict. (This cut deeply into NATO force levels, though the U.S. temporarily assigned tankers to NATO positions normally manned by the British to make up the difference). Only six refuelings failed, though these failures could easily have been more costly than they were -- when one Vulcan bomber's refueling probe broke in flight (thus curtailing an entire mission), it was forced to land at the nearest possible airfield (in this case in Brazil which might not have been quite so neutral as it was). Some have used the British aerial refueling experiance to argue that the much more extensive U.S. capability be sustained and, where possible, improved.

argue that the technology for destroying weapons platforms has outdistanced the technologies for protecting them. A less tenuous conclusion is that the lethality and availability of both offensive and defensive weaponry is far greater than in years past. This is a lesson not lost on the U.S. Navy (or other U.S. armed forces), and the general public surprise at the sophisticated warfare in the South Atlantic is not shared by the armed forces of the U.S.

The other key aspect of the increasingly electronic nature of warfare is cost. The costs of individual weapons have risen dramatically. The higher lethality of those weapons, however, means that fewer must be acquired. One danger is that military leaders, in efforts to contain costs, will reject expensive components of systems that are critical to their effectiveness. For example, the Argentines were able to procure on the world market a surface-to-air missile defense system for Port Stanley and its airfield. But high costs reportedly deterred them from buying a radar component for that system, which meant the SAMs were virtually unusable against high-flying Vulcan bombers making night runs on their targets. Cost/quantity/quality trade-offs are constantly -- and necessarily -- being made by U.S. forces. Has this created any real deficiencies in U.S. capabilities?

POLITICO-MILITARY LESSONS

The Falkland Islands conflict also points to a set of politico-military factors that suggest longer term policy questions for Congress.

The first is the classic "verity" that a nation's commitments ought be in line with its capabilities. Argentina took a prize by force without having the strength to keep what it took. Britain seeks to maintain some distant outposts while cutting back on its ability to defend them. Is the U.S. capable of standing by the global responsibilities it has assumed? Or will increasing economic difficulties and a changing international environment render the U.S. progressively less capable of exercising its great power reach?

The second politico-military "lesson" of the Falklands conflict is that military power is considered and applied within a broader political, diplomatic, and economic context. Britain's position in the Falklands was enhanced by its ability to increase the economic costs to Argentina of the conflict by freezing Argentine assets and getting Britain's allies to enforce a trade embargo, as well as its ability to bring broader diplomatic pressure to bear. Some in Britain have speculated as to whether Britain has adequately maintained, and will continue to maintain, its economic leverage as its own economy has weakened and its world standing has diminished. The Argentine experience raises similar problems. Though possessing potential military "might" (i.e., equipment and manpower), its inability to utilize comparably effective international support, to buy replacement weapon systems, and to elicit "professionalism" from the troops employing that equipment, contributed to its inability to affect the course of events to its advantage. Are the non-military aspects of U.S. national security being reviewed and enhanced as its military capabilities are upgraded?

The third politico-military "lesson" is that a nation's defensive forces may take advantage of civilian resources in times of crisis. As previously mentioned, Britain benefited from its Merchant Marine, which was central to its force projection capability. Equally important was the ability of its defense industrial base to respond rapidly to the crisis by producing required goods and services on very short notice. Production of spare parts for the Harrier was speeded up. Some weapons used in the conflict had not been produced when it began (such as some missiles). Some weapon systems either used in the conflict or now deployed there were not due to be put into service nearly so soon (e.g., the Sea Skua missile and the carrier Illustrious). Industry technicians were able to adapt their weapons based on combat experience (e.g., the guidance system of the Sea Wolf missile system was reprogrammed). Could the U.S. command a proportionate response from its civilian resources? Is the U.S. defense industrial base reliable in a crisis or would it experience severe bottlenecks? Could the U.S. Merchant Marine be drawn upon in time of a national security emergency?

The fourth politico-military "lesson" is that even in so-called "low threat areas" a significant military capability can still exist. This is not to argue that the leading military powers of the day can routinely be defeated by second rate powers; it is to argue that such lesser powers can make military operations increasingly costly to great powers. The global proliferation of military capability occurs at a time when great powers have come to depend for much of their security upon ICBMs and SLBMs, that have little utility in a Third World type conflict. Despite the experience of having fought an unconventional war in Vietnam, questions are still being asked as to whether the U.S. is attuned to this kind of world in its defense policies; these factors certainly increase

the cost of international leadership.

A fifth politico-military "lesson" is that "out-of-area" problems continue to divide and preoccupy the individual members of the Atlantic Alliance. This raises questions of NATO vulnerability if a member state pulls out key elements of its contribution. The Falklands conflict highlights once again the distinctive security interests of individual members of NATO. It also demonstrated to the U.S. the difficulty and costs of choosing between support of a European ally and a Western hemisphere friend. Should NATO prepare for an RDF-type extra-territorial contingency? Will NATO continue to be able to exist with these divergent interests? Will the U.S. act effectively to balance these varied interests or will it act in such a way as to compound them?

A sixth "lesson" is that western powers who fight in the Third World can expect to face sophisticated weaponry which they themselves or their allies produced and sold. British forces were pitted against some of the best equipment available on the international market, including equipment made by the U.S., France, West Germany, Israel, Brazil, and even Britain. This experience clearly illustrates one of the potentially counterproductive consequences of arms sales to Third World countries. Some in Congress may well argue that the U.S. has supplied too many of its best and most sophisticated weapons systems to potential adversaries, or to friends who might use that weaponry against U.S. allies. One key issue is whether the economic benefit of reducing unit costs for our weapons systems by selling them on the international market worth the risks entailed. Supporters of arms sales will argue that the only real alternative is to see our allies (or adversaries) reap the benefits of making such sales.

A seventh "lesson" relates to potential conflicts between traditional U.S. policy interests and new initiatives in new areas. When the U.S. acts to improve relations with a Third World country, it can create false expectations of U.S. support for that country's regional ambitions. The extent to which improved U.S.-Argentine relations -- and expectations of U.S. support or at least benign neutrality -- figured in the calculations of Argentine leaders who planned the invasion of the Falklands is not known. Clearly, however, the Argentines expected more support from the U.S. than they got.

The last politico-military observation is that despite efforts to achieve a relatively peaceful and stable international order, violence is still, and will predictably continue to be, used to resolve disputes. The Falklands conflict has raised questions about principles of international security and order. Some have asserted that by forcefully denying gain from a military attack, Britain has served the broader causes of stability and world peace. But great power perceptions of the legitimacy of the international order continue to differ from those many nations that consider themselves disadvantaged by that order. Sovereignty disputes exist in most areas of the world. In sum, the only principle Britain may have reinforced in the minds of many Third World countries is that military action against the British is currently unwise, though its ability to respond to such aggression is diminishing with time. Those who perceive the current international order as illegitimate, or those who abet such nations, are likely to find new targets for their challenges to that order.

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